A Christmas Message - That Which Remains in Harmony CANNOT Perish

[Oreoracle]

I don’t think I’m assuming anything. You’re the one who always talks about prescription versus description. If no prescriptive statement is epistemologically valid, then there cannot be any teleological truths.

How does the statement “x is designed to lead to y” entail any prescription whatsoever? Where is the “should” or “ought?” You’re putting an awful lot of weight on your own narrow view of what “teleology” means (and, apparently, of what a prescription is). I’m pretty sure almost every philosopher uses that word differently.

“Anger leads to fist-fights” is an inductive inference. “Doubt leads to truth” is, if true, analytically true. Perhaps “doubt *sometimes *leads to truth” would be the safest bet, for both of us.

As it stands, I didn’t specify that either of those is always true, and it’s strange that you assumed I meant that. I mean, do you think I believe anger always leads to fist-fights? Of course the “sometimes” was implied. Anyway, I don’t see how the former is an induction but the latter is analytical. Both are particulars (“some” statements), so I don’t know if I’d call either of them inductions. Since “some” means “one or more or possibly all” in logic, we need only one observation of each, so induction is unnecessary. I’m not sure what you mean by "analytical’; to be honest, the usage of the word has always been vaguely defined to me.

In other words, a “preference” is a want. But your ethics in regard to preference must be either prescriptive or descriptive.

You still don’t get it Prodigal: ALL ethics are prescriptive! There isn’t an ought-statement that isn’t prescriptive by definition.

If prescriptive, then you are saying that “people should pursue what they want”.

No, I’m saying that people should maximize the general happiness. If I supported what you just said, I would be an ethical hedonist (in some usages, an “egoist”) and not a utilitarian. Psychological hedonists hold that people seek their own happiness naturally, yes, but the goal of utilitarianism is to make them prefer the happiness of others and act on this preference for their own happiness. Everybody wins, not just the individual.

Do you have a way around this? How would you describe your principle?

The problem has been solved, hopefully. You were confusing the greatest happiness principle with the egoist principle.

Is happiness simply the state of having our preferences satisfied?

At this point, I’m not sure. Epicureanism, which was the precedent of psychological hedonism and utilitarianism, held that happiness was merely the absence of suffering. In other words, once we stop desiring things, we are happy. I’m not sure that I agree though. I can’t prove it, but relief feels different than pleasure to me. In fact, relief seems to cause pleasure. For example, if you get an A on a tough exam, the feelings that “I’m done with that!” and “I’m proud that I did so well” would feel distinct. The former just feels like the absence of anxiety, while the latter feels like the presence of pleasure replacing the absent anxiety. It could be that pleasure is caused by becoming more satisfied than you expected, but again, I’m not sure. I mean, wouldn’t you say that, between student A, who expects an A on a test, and student B, who doesn’t expect to pass the test, student B will be happier with getting an A, even though both had the same preference for the best grade possible? Maybe surprise is an element of happiness to some extent.

The person who has satisfied a great many of his preferences, in point of fact, often finds that they are worthless to him. Read Hamlet, or Ecclesiastes. Getting what I want, in the moment, leads me down the wrong path entirely. But perhaps you are talking about some higher level of want, that will be better served by delayed gratification? But how do I know that this higher level is actually satisfying, and not just as worthless? Wise men throughout the ages have said that seeking happiness is one of the worst ways to find it.

If you don’t mind, I’ll finish this post later. I want to talk in particular about men like Ecclesiastes. His chapters were some of the few parts of the Bible I’ve read, actually.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Keep in mind (both James and Prodigal) that not everyone shares your rather obscure definitions of “judgment.” Just imagine if we used your definition in courtrooms, James! Does the judge intend to sin when he determines the defendant is “guilty?” And why should we only call it judging when it comes to negative things, i.e., condemnation? Isn’t the conclusion that someone is innocent just as much a judgment as the opposite?

Certainly, and it is a judgment we are most likely not qualified to make. I have a duty to *assume *a person has not trespassed, unless they demonstrate to me otherwise. But even if I see that they have trespassed, I have a duty to *assume *that they have some good reason to trespass, until they show me otherwise. I must always assume the best of others, but these are not judgments – certainly not in the sense you are using the word.

The courts never judge someone to be innocent; they *rule *someone innocent. The judgment is not made by a person, but rather by a rule: “beyond a reasonable doubt”, or some such criterion. This is necessarily somewhat subjective, in the end, and good judges and jurors must constantly struggle with the burden of justice placed on them.

Oh, and our definitions of judgment aren’t obscure. Read the history of Western civilization, and you will find this distinction made constantly. The fact that we seem to be forgetting it is a bad sign.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

How does the statement “x is designed to lead to y” entail any prescription whatsoever? Where is the “should” or “ought?” You’re putting an awful lot of weight on your own narrow view of what “teleology” means (and, apparently, of what a prescription is).

Perhaps I am. I guess I would simply point out that if ethics is focused on “x is designed to lead to y” statements, then Christian ethics need not be prescriptive, any more than utilitarianism is prescriptive. Utilitarians say that “the design that leads to most happiness is the greatest happiness principle,” apparently a statement of teleology. Christians say that “the design according to which human beings best function is the virtues,” another statement of teleology.

Both statements are normative, in exactly the same way: in that they appeal to design and some definition of “good”.

Since “some” means “one or more or possibly all” in logic, we need only one observation of each, so induction is unnecessary. I’m not sure what you mean by "analytical’; to be honest, the usage of the word has always been vaguely defined to me.

One might make the claim that the idea of approaching truth is what is meant by “doubt”. Consider: when a scientist wants to learn something through experiment, he begins by being skeptical. The idea is that doubting is always an attempt to find the truth, because that’s what is meant by the term “doubt”. This would be an analytic truth, by which I mean an analysis of an existing concept.

You still don’t get it Prodigal: ALL ethics are prescriptive! There isn’t an ought-statement that isn’t prescriptive by definition.

To describe how human beings actually relate to ethics is not a prescriptive endeavor. To describe prescriptions is not to prescribe anything.

No, I’m saying that people should maximize the general happiness. If I supported what you just said, I would be an ethical hedonist (in some usages, an “egoist”) and not a utilitarian. Psychological hedonists hold that people seek their own happiness naturally, yes, but the goal of utilitarianism is to make them prefer the happiness of others and act on this preference for their own happiness. Everybody wins, not just the individual.

Are you saying that acting in the interest of everyone will make me happier than just acting in my own interest? Why should such a thing be true, unless the world were designed that way?

**Why **should they prefer general happiness to their own (specific) happiness? How is this different from any other human system of behavior that seeks to impose its own will on others? Isn’t it hypocritical to say that you cannot derive an “ought” from an “is”, and then act as if you “ought” to benefit other people with your actions? Wouldn’t it be better to say that you *choose *to do so, which makes your action “cleansed” of normative ethics?

The problem has been solved, hopefully. You were confusing the greatest happiness principle with the egoist principle.

That was because the egoist principle makes some sense, while the generalized happiness principle doesn’t (unless you bring in metaphysics). At least, I don’t see how it makes any sense.

At this point, I’m not sure. Epicureanism, which was the precedent of psychological hedonism and utilitarianism, held that happiness was merely the absence of suffering. In other words, once we stop desiring things, we are happy. I’m not sure that I agree though. I can’t prove it, but relief feels different than pleasure to me. In fact, relief seems to cause pleasure. For example, if you get an A on a tough exam, the feelings that “I’m done with that!” and “I’m proud that I did so well” would feel distinct. The former just feels like the absence of anxiety, while the latter feels like the presence of pleasure replacing the absent anxiety.

Good – I agree entirely. Interestingly, pleasure often occurs when you do not get something else you wanted. If my daughter gives me a big hug when I am trying to bring in the groceries, she has done something I didn’t want her to do, because I was focused on the task at hand. And yet, I may be delighted. The pleasure is a good in itself, not because it gives me something that I was wanting (at least not consciously wanting).

It could be that pleasure is caused by becoming more satisfied than you expected, but again, I’m not sure. I mean, wouldn’t you say that, between student A, who expects an A on a test, and student B, who doesn’t expect to pass the test, student B will be happier with getting an A, even though both had the same preference for the best grade possible? Maybe surprise is an element of happiness to some extent.

More important than this distinction is the distinction between pleasure/happiness and amusement. Amusement keeps you entertained, but happiness is an experience over and above that. Many people who we say “live their lives for pleasure” actually experience very little pleasure, although they are constantly amusing themselves. If you want to see real delight and happiness, talk to a child with a mental disability. It’s amazing how much intelligence can get in the way of pure delight.

If you don’t mind, I’ll finish this post later. I want to talk in particular about men like Ecclesiastes. His chapters were some of the few parts of the Bible I’ve read, actually.

Sure.

 

[Oreoracle]

Perhaps I am. I guess I would simply point out that if ethics is focused on “x is designed to lead to y” statements, then Christian ethics need not be prescriptive, any more than utilitarianism is prescriptive.

This is simply an appeal to nature, then. “X is designed to lead to Y” is not to say “X ought to lead to Y” (or “X ought to be designed to lead to Y,” if you prefer). In other words, just because a process is happening doesn’t mean it should be happening, intended or not (it doesn’t even tell us if it ought to have been intended).

This is why is-statements only produce is-statements until you introduce an arbitrary, subjective “should” into the mix. “This should be” adds no explanative value to anything, it’s just something we tack on to indentify which objects we feel should exist.

Utilitarians say that “the design that leads to most happiness is the greatest happiness principle,” apparently a statement of teleology.

But notice: That isn’t to say that happiness should exist. The assertion that happiness is good is still as subjective as ever, and that assertion is an inherent part of the principle.

Christians say that “the design according to which human beings best function is the virtues,” another statement of teleology.

What standards are you using to determine what type of functioning is best?

Both statements are normative, in exactly the same way: in that they appeal to design and some definition of “good”.

But the point is that what is good, what ought to exist, is still a matter of opinion either way, and thus subjective. Additionally, the principles referenced in those teleological statements contained “shoulds.” The “shoulds” are just disguised by “best” and “the greatest happiness principle” (which holds that happiness ought to be and suffering ought not be).

One might make the claim that the idea of approaching truth is what is meant by “doubt”. Consider: when a scientist wants to learn something through experiment, he begins by being skeptical. The idea is that doubting is always an attempt to find the truth, because that’s what is meant by the term “doubt”. This would be an analytic truth, by which I mean an analysis of an existing concept.

But aren’t there instances when doubt doesn’t lead to truth? I just don’t think that doubt was “designed” in the sense that it was created for a purpose. It sometimes produces a certain result, and that’s that. Or perhaps you have a different definition of “design.”

To describe how human beings actually relate to ethics is not a prescriptive endeavor. To describe prescriptions is not to prescribe anything.

I’m not sure what you mean by “describing prescriptions.” Would “Oreo feels that happiness should exist” be a description of a prescription? If so, that’s not ethical, it’s just a factual statement about ethics (there’s a difference!). An ethic itself is prescriptive, though.

Are you saying that acting in the interest of everyone will make me happier than just acting in my own interest? Why should such a thing be true, unless the world were designed that way?

No, I’m saying that is the aim of utilitarianism. We want that to be the case, but it isn’t.

**Why **should they prefer general happiness to their own (specific) happiness? How is this different from any other human system of behavior that seeks to impose its own will on others?

You’ve p(name removed by moderator)ointed the subjectivity of it all. It isn’t different than other systems in that way. Neither is Christianity. Just because an ethical system defines itself as objective doesn’t mean it is objective.

Isn’t it hypocritical to say that you cannot derive an “ought” from an “is”, and then act as if you “ought” to benefit other people with your actions? Wouldn’t it be better to say that you *choose *to do so, which makes your action “cleansed” of normative ethics?

It isn’t hypocritical, it’s just an inconvenient fact. I realize that my choice of ethical system is based on my own preferences and perspective, but I’m not going to parade it about as though it isn’t subjective. I will, however, try to improve the world, even if others don’t agree with my idea of improvement. I’ll try to hear others out on the way, and if they can persuade me to do otherwise, I’ll change. That’s about the best one can do, isn’t it?

That was because the egoist principle makes some sense, while the generalized happiness principle doesn’t (unless you bring in metaphysics). At least, I don’t see how it makes any sense.

Again, you’re confusing what utilitarians want with design. I’m not saying everyone will be happier by promoting the happiness of others, I’m just saying it’s the ideal situation from the perspective of utilitarianism.

More important than this distinction is the distinction between pleasure/happiness and amusement. Amusement keeps you entertained, but happiness is an experience over and above that. Many people who we say “live their lives for pleasure” actually experience very little pleasure, although they are constantly amusing themselves. If you want to see real delight and happiness, talk to a child with a mental disability. It’s amazing how much intelligence can get in the way of pure delight.

I would agree. Keep in mind, however, that some can derive happiness from amusement because they’ve grown to prefer it to less exciting lifestyles.

 

[Oreoracle]

The person who has satisfied a great many of his preferences, in point of fact, often finds that they are worthless to him. Read Hamlet, or Ecclesiastes.

When we start talking about personal experiences of searching for happiness, we’re getting into some pretty subjective stuff, so I’ll just give my opinion about Ecclesiastes. Also, I’m summarizing from memory here; I’m too lazy to find my link to the chapters online.

From the start, Ecclesiastes’ writings gave me the vibe that he had high expectations. I think you’ll agree that “wise men” throughout history typically had high expectations, though a few notably did not. Or, at least, these expectations were difficult to satisfy if not high. Anyway, he would often compare earthly things with what he expected the conditions in Heaven to be like. Now here is where I might be wrong, but I got the impression that Ecclesiastes was religious throughout his life. If so, that is important to remember: Ecclesiastes always had high expectations because of his conception of Heaven even during his earthly ventures for happiness.

One line from his early chapters caught my eye. He mentioned that, while living, our senses are neverly permanently pleased; the eyes always want to see more, the ears always want to hear more, the mouth always wants to eat more, and so on. He spoke of this constant struggle for bodily appeasement as though it were a bad thing. Personally, I don’t think of this struggle as a futile effort to satisfy my body, as Ecclesiastes did. Just think, if we were to please ourselves once, and never desire again, how boring would existence be? This constant struggle Ecclesiastes spoke of was life itself, and he was tired of having to get refills; that is, satisfying himself over and over again, whatever the preference be.

These factors put Ecclesiastes in an interesting position, by my estimation: He preferred to live in a world where he didn’t truly have to live. He wanted to act without feeling the need to act. He wanted satisfaction without having preferences to appease. In short, his preferences were impossible to satisfy while he was alive, and that’s why he constantly looked to Heaven and poured his expectations into it. It’s not that he couldn’t gain satisfaction from the natural world, it’s just that he had preferences for the supernatural world that were stagnating. And to an extent, I can sympathize with him.

What a funny statement! Do me a favor and read the Gospels, and tell me how often Jesus speaks condemning words to discourage people from sin. He doesn’t. He knows that they know their own sin deeply, and He loves them despite their sin. He wants them to be free, but He waits until they ask for Him to free them. How is that kind of Christianity watered down?

Don’t you think it’s rather naive to believe that Christianity is based entirely on Jesus? Christianity as a whole is a cultural phenomenon that spun out of control. This is why the Church, and other churches, can impose rules that Jesus himself never spoke of. Jesus isn’t so much the foundation of a sect as he is the beginning of a dynasty, if you’ll pardon me for saying so. And in this case, the doctrine of the dynasty expanded much more than Jesus anticipated (the mortal, not the god).

When Christians nowadays speak condemning words and do not show tangible love to sinners, they are bearing false witness to Jesus. In some ways, it would be better if they were not Christians. Kierkegaard hated the popularity of Christianity, and I can see why! Listen to Jesus’s teaching about Pharisees if you want to know His thoughts on the matter.

If most Christians were like Jesus, I would have far fewer qualms with Christianity as a whole.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

This is simply an appeal to nature, then. “X is designed to lead to Y” is not to say “X ought to lead to Y” (or “X ought to be designed to lead to Y,” if you prefer). In other words, just because a process is happening doesn’t mean it should be happening, intended or not (it doesn’t even tell us if it ought to have been intended).

This is why is-statements only produce is-statements until you introduce an arbitrary, subjective “should” into the mix. “This should be” adds no explanative value to anything, it’s just something we tack on to indentify which objects we feel should exist.

So utilitarianism and Christian ethics are in the same boat, right? They both involve oughts.

But notice: That isn’t to say that happiness should exist. The assertion that happiness is good is still as subjective as ever, and that assertion is an inherent part of the principle.

The problem: the choice of “happiness” as a good is either arbitrary or not arbitrary. If it is not arbitrary, then it is based on some objective fact about the world. This fact could either be a) the fact that there is a particular underlying nature to goodness/beauty, or b) that the choice conforms to certain general statements about the world (“Most people want pleasure”). You would discard option a, and choose b.

But, although I agree that most people want happiness, you have failed to give a rationale for why one would pick happiness instead of some other characteristic. “Happiness” is an arbitrary goal, unless you allow that it is inherently good. Perhaps we should pick for our ethic the statement that “we ought to give people hats”. How is this less arbitrary a choice of happiness?

And, if you admit that the choice is arbitrary, then – to the degree that people become utilitarians – they are oppressing that portion of society that does not share their values. But how can something right (a principle of morality, followed faithfully) lead to something wrong (oppression)?

What standards are you using to determine what type of functioning is best?

God’s. Aristotle’s. A wise and virtuous friend of mine’s. For those who believe that the human soul naturally latches onto goodness, it is no problem finding people to emulate.

But aren’t there instances when doubt doesn’t lead to truth?

Yes, I agree entirely. But someone might “rig” their definition of “doubt”, such that doubt-that-led-to-truth was “doubt” and doubt-that-didn’t-lead-to-truth was, say, “schmout”. Ah, the wonders of idiosyncratic personal lexiconizing!

I’m not sure what you mean by “describing prescriptions.” Would “Oreo feels that happiness should exist” be a description of a prescription? If so, that’s not ethical, it’s just a factual statement about ethics (there’s a difference!). An ethic itself is prescriptive, though.

Agreed. But I believe that, as soon as an ethicist decides that there is no fundamental truth about ethics, it is his duty to stop making prescriptive ethical statements, and instead only describe the ethical landscape. (But then again, my statement is paradoxical! “It is his duty”, eh? ).

No, I’m saying that is the aim of utilitarianism. We want that to be the case, but it isn’t.

So you play pretend?

It isn’t hypocritical, it’s just an inconvenient fact. I realize that my choice of ethical system is based on my own preferences and perspective, but I’m not going to parade it about as though it isn’t subjective. I will, however, try to improve the world, even if others don’t agree with my idea of improvement. I’ll try to hear others out on the way, and if they can persuade me to do otherwise, I’ll change. That’s about the best one can do, isn’t it?

What is “best”? It seems just as logical to destroy everyone who opposes you until you have killed half the human race. You can’t throw out the idea of goodness and replace it with “value”.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

From the start, Ecclesiastes’ writings gave me the vibe that he had high expectations. I think you’ll agree that “wise men” throughout history typically had high expectations, though a few notably did not. Or, at least, these expectations were difficult to satisfy if not high. Anyway, he would often compare earthly things with what he expected the conditions in Heaven to be like. Now here is where I might be wrong, but I got the impression that Ecclesiastes was religious throughout his life. If so, that is important to remember: Ecclesiastes always had high expectations because of his conception of Heaven even during his earthly ventures for happiness.

Actually, the teacher in Ecclesiastes doesn’t (to my memory, at least) have any idea of heaven. He’s working with mortality, writ large, with no sense of hope beyond the grave except the “immortality” of his possessions and family. He did have high expectations for life, however; he thought that good and diligent people ought to fare well.

One line from his early chapters caught my eye. He mentioned that, while living, our senses are neverly permanently pleased; the eyes always want to see more, the ears always want to hear more, the mouth always wants to eat more, and so on. He spoke of this constant struggle for bodily appeasement as though it were a bad thing.

Perhaps if you read it again, you would amend your ideas about this. He mentions over and over that the best thing a person can do is work diligently and enjoy food, drink and mirth. He does not say that these are bad things – far from it – but rather that they are incomplete.

I have seen the burden God has laid on men. 11 He has made everything beautiful in its time. He has also set eternity in the hearts of men; yet they cannot fathom what God has done from beginning to end. 12 I know that there is nothing better for men than to be happy and do good while they live. 13 That everyone may eat and drink, and find satisfaction in all his toil—this is the gift of God.

The teacher struggles with the question: if eating and working and conversing is all God gave us, why do we want so much more? Why is eternity in our hearts? Where is the utilitarian who will provide happiness not just for my body, but also for my soul?

It’s not that he couldn’t gain satisfaction from the natural world, it’s just that he had preferences for the supernatural world that were stagnating. And to an extent, I can sympathize with him.

Yes, this is my interpretation exactly – though he had no idea of any supernatural world.

Don’t you think it’s rather naive to believe that Christianity is based entirely on Jesus? Christianity as a whole is a cultural phenomenon that spun out of control.

Kierkegaard agrees with you. Certainly, Christianity carries along with it a lot of baggage that “following Jesus, in simpliciter” does not. But you’ll find that being too choosy about which organization you join will keep you out of every human organization.

If most Christians were like Jesus, I would have far fewer qualms with Christianity as a whole.

A very powerful, touching, and disturbing comment. Personally, I wish that people who ignored Jesus’s teaching would leave the Church this very moment. It would make us much smaller, but a profoundly better witness.

 

[Oreoracle]

So utilitarianism and Christian ethics are in the same boat, right? They both involve oughts.

They’re both subjective in that they are ethical systems, yes. The main difference is that Christian ethics define themselves as “objective” but that doesn’t make them so. I could define the Magical Pinball Machine as a pinball machine that rests inside a crater on Mars, but that hardly makes it so.

The problem: the choice of “happiness” as a good is either arbitrary or not arbitrary.

I say “arbitrary.” However, I feel that, as far as subjective rationalizations go, utilitarianism’s is as good as any. Following the greatest happiness principle has the advantage of giving everyone what they want by default instead of training them to desire something else and regard it as “good in its own right,” as you see with religious systems and Stoicism, for example. Psychological hedonism says that people would dismiss that “inherent good” without a second thought if it didn’t make them happy in some way.

If it is not arbitrary, then it is based on some objective fact about the world. This fact could either be a) the fact that there is a particular underlying nature to goodness/beauty, or b) that the choice conforms to certain general statements about the world (“Most people want pleasure”). You would discard option a, and choose b.

(B) is certainly a factor, and most ethics are based on some facts. No ethics are based entirely on facts though, and that is why they will always be arbitrary to some extent. You always have to jump in and say “Hey guys, knowing A, we ought to do B.” That valuation is subjective/arbitrary. The “ought” is something we tack on because of facts, but it isn’t a fact in itself; rather, it’s caused by how we feel about the facts.

But, although I agree that most people want happiness, you have failed to give a rationale for why one would pick happiness instead of some other characteristic.

That would be where the arbitrary assertion comes in. Don’t you have anything you take for granted in your own system–you know, something you assume nobody would question valuing but you don’t have a true defense for either?

“Happiness” is an arbitrary goal, unless you allow that it is inherently good.

In utilitarianism, happiness is regarded as an inherent good, but not an intrinsic good. This means that happiness is treated as being the arbiter of all values (the values of other things are dependent on happiness and suffering) but it isn’t considered “objectively valuable” as that would be a contradiction in terms.

And, if you admit that the choice is arbitrary, then – to the degree that people become utilitarians – they are oppressing that portion of society that does not share their values. But how can something right (a principle of morality, followed faithfully) lead to something wrong (oppression)?

I wouldn’t always consider oppression wrong. For example, in medieval times, when the villagers wanted to have a witch burned, don’t you think it would have been nice for a not-so-superstitious leader to step in and “oppress” the crowd, preventing them from killing an innocent civilian?

God’s. Aristotle’s. A wise and virtuous friend of mine’s. For those who believe that the human soul naturally latches onto goodness, it is no problem finding people to emulate.

How do you determine who ought to be emulated? Why emulate the kind friend down the street and not Hitler?

Agreed. But I believe that, as soon as an ethicist decides that there is no fundamental truth about ethics…

But even though you feel this way, you seem to realize that it is the truth regardless of how the ethicist feels. We can only treat things as though they are intrinsically valuable (again, a contradiction in terms), but that doesn’t make them so. In the end, it is our opinion, however the opinion is rationalized.

So you play pretend?

I think a comparison is in order. Christians try their best to please God, right? God, being perfectly honest, has dictated rules that will lead you to please him if they are followed. Straying from these rules is called sinning, and Christians don’t want that, as it displeases God. So the goal, in a nutshell, is to eliminate sin and make all actions pleasing to God. Most Christians realize that sinning is inevitable, but they shoot for optimal behavior anyway; that is, sin-free living. Utilitarians do the same: They want everyone to prefer the happiness of others, and they shoot for it, but they realize that not nobody will do so all of the time.

 

[Oreoracle]

Hmm…My interpretation of Ecclesiastes sounds pretty far off (even for me!). I’ll have to read it again, and perhaps I’ll quote the sections as I speak of them next time.

 

[James_S_Saint]

They’re both subjective in that they are ethical systems, yes. The main difference is that Christian ethics define themselves as “objective” but that doesn’t make them so.

But it doesn’t make them not so either.

 

[fhansen]

Clearly neither of you have experienced a midlife crisis, as that would demonstrate my point nicely. There comes a point in one’s life where they are inclined to ask, “How many years have I wasted pursuing unimportant or uncertain things instead of pursuing what I know to be important?” Whether or not they show it, most theists are racked with doubt from time to time, and the increasing awareness that they may be wasting their lives pursuing an uncertainty even causes some to become atheists; these people have finally broken there emotional attachment or “positive existential view” as MoM would call it. Do you guys know about the “positive existential view” otherwise known as a belief in Santa Claus? If you do, imagine how much kids who learn that Santa Claus doesn’t exist are disappointed by learning this. Now multiply that a few thousand times, and you might realize how difficult it is for adults racked with doubt to break through their once cherished beliefs. It was difficult for me as a fifteen-year old. Luckily, my doubt broke through before I could become more attached.

I’ve known atheists who converted and then felt like they wasted so many years in the emptiness of disbelief-this is quite commonly heard, in fact. Doubts are normal, mid-life crises are normal-we’re all human and we all must go through the stages of human life and hopefully grow and become stronger through the whole experience.

But it’s all kind of a hopeless waste if there’s nothing to grow* towards.* And while that thought proves nothing in itself, many people already have an innate albeit dim perception of the aim of this future hope- where virtues such as integrity and nobility and courage and wisdom and love don’t die but have an ultimate purpose. And those who’re willing to swim against the tide and take seriously the message of hope when they hear it proclaimed by a source external to themselves- to risk believing in it- are rewarded by the knowledge that it is a justified hope after all. Not everyone in religion does this, however-many “fellow” believers may be just as mocking towards one who actually takes the faith seriously as an avowed atheist might be.