Belorg:
Why?
I don’t think he says that. But, OK, let’s go on.
This is true.
Why would an eternal, infinite being that has a mind, that can conceive and will, “not produce without changing?”
Yes. Sorry, I should have been more clear. For the purpose of refuting your argument it is enough to say that the mode of ontological analysis precludes time. And that a hierarchy present in a series of relations analyzed from “the fullness of time” doesn’t mean that reality is somehow changeless. In fact, it says nothing of the sort either way.
The correct ontological analysis in the above quote merely says that such a contingency, whether eternal or not, depends on some other entity… to say anything about an entity’s non-existence and then existence is to sneak time back into the analysis.
No one, I think, is denying this. The problem lies in undergoing an ontological analysis while still trying to talk about a succession from not-being to being. It does not so apply. You might say that you agree with this statement thus far and think that it is grounds for your conclusion of a changeless reality. However, if that is indeed the case, there is a categorical negation rather than mere negation… which makes all the difference.
I do understand transfinite numbers. And Aleph-null is the cardinailty of the natural numbers. So, yes, an infinite number of points can be removed from infinity, and also yes, this is a change, because some of the points are not present anymore.
The Thomist God is ultimately simple and uncomposed. He has no infinite number of points.He is, ony one ‘point’.
The ‘point’ is just an analogy. The Thomist God is one and uncomposed, so, no ‘points’ or whatever can be removed from Him.
Sorry Michael, but I am not going to proceed with this discussion.I am not using any notion of time, so your critique of my argument is irrelevant. If you have other points to make, I am willing to respond to them, but not to this one.
First off I’d like to say, if we want to get very precise (perhaps overly), it’s important to note that this argument, if it did indeed work, would not refute Aquinas’ First Way per se. That’s because a reductio only means that at least one of the premises is wrong, not that all of them or any such premise that is in strict contradiction with the conclusion is necessarily wrong. Specifically, premise 1,2 and 4 are not part of Aquinas’ First Way. However, I will not argue that they are not part of further conclusions reached from separate arguments nor that Aquinas did not believe them. They are and he did. Instead, I think it’s fair to say that your argument would refute a central doctrine in Thomistic thought rather than the First Way specifically.
Given my formulation, a couple things jump out:
The ontological analysis of the whole of reality includes changing and unchanging entities. Ontological analysis results in a series of hierarchichal relations and is a mode of analysis that is atemporal. Do not confuse the method with the reality nor the scope of ontological analysis. I think your argument does both which leads you to unknowingly introduce a concept of time into the mix.
That’s one thing, but more important is the fact that God ‘producing’ something necessarikly entails some sort of ‘power’ , and this power has an effect ‘outside’ God’ (I realise that this is an imperect analogy, of course). that means a power that is originally (ontologically) part of the uncomposed and ultimately simple First Mover, makes its way to the ‘outside’ (or to a completely new reality.)
As I said I’m not debating this point, its a side issue anyway, so let’s just accept that as true and keep on topic.
Ok, so you are not saying that an effect can only have properties which were possessed by its cause. Sorry I misunderstood. Could you run past me again exactly what you are trying to say with this one?
Just to be clear I’m not arguing that something can come from nothing. I’m just arguing that an effect can have properties which it’s cause did not possess. Since it appears you weren’t arguing that it’s probably moot.
Nope, I just thought it was implied by your argument. Again apologies for misunderstanding.*
Ok, so if you agree that effects can have properties which were not possessed by their cause then I’m not sure what your argument is here?*
I’ve already accepted that for the sake of argument.
Actually science can say absolutely nothing about “nothing” since it is unobserved. But again I am not debating that point so let’s just leave that as accepted and focus on the main thrust of your argument.*
AndyThanks Michael.
Belorg, thanks for the discussion and raising some interesting questions. At this stage, I can’t explain the problems with your argument any better than in my last post and I don’t feel like you have seriously engaged with it. I would encourage you in all honesty to re-examine your argument and see if it really stands up to the many pages of detailed criticism it has received. But your call
Belorg,
Let me see how your definition of a “point” turns out. Your definition seems to imply that the infinite God is a single point. I believe what you are introducing is the concept of an “infinite point”. Wow! That has got to be the granddaddy of all contradictions.
I do understand the nature of infinity, and an infinitty may not chnage in cardinality, but that’s not what we are taliing about here/
I do not define a point. The Thomist God is one single uncomposed entity and it has no points to be added or removed.
Uncomposed space cannot be characterized by a number, except maybe 1.
JDaniel: I’ll try and break this down for you.
Actually there are lots of things I appreciate in Aquinas. I think he was a great philosopher, but he wasn’t infallible.
Yes, you are correct. In restating my premise 6 at Andy’s request, I forgot something very important. “(Onto)logically prior to changeable reality there is an eternally unchangeable reality” should be “(Onto)logically prior to changeable reality the whole of reality is eternally unchangeable.”
Maybe that’s a good idea, seems redundanrt upon closer lopk/
Ok, thank you very much.
Belorg:
Not so. If God were composed of points, He would be an infinity of them. You cannot use a real number system to describe infinity. Again, a very hard concept to understand. But, all finite numbers - including any number considered to be transfinite - is a determinant number, such as 2, or 22, or 2,222,222, etc. Each aggregation is called (named) by its ending number, and that is what defines it. In other words, there can be, for example, 2,222,222 sets of 2,222,222. Anything outside of this is as much an abstraction as anything inside of it.
Belorg:
Ummm. I see your contention. This is a good part of your problem with Aquinas’ argument. And, the problem is an anthropomorphization. You are regarding God in the same way that one might regard a finite creature.
This is sufficiently answered above, I think, although you are free to reject, or counter, it.
That’s why I said that infinity does not chnage in cardinality, but it can chnage in nature. Consider a three dimensional infinity and then substract all points so that it becomes two-dimensional. Even though the cardinality of both infinities remains the same, one is three-dimensional and the other is two dimensional.
But JD, God is NOT composed.
Perplexed:
Perhaps not. How alterable are fundamental particles? Not at all? And are they not infinitesimally more than all ‘material things’ which consist of them?
So, here you elevate the confidence level of that which you want to elevate. This is nothing more than sheer “denial.” And, “preferentiality.”
No, I am not.
.
A configuration is a change. God cannot be ‘configurable’.
I am willing to concede FTSOTA that God’s thinking somehow does not entail a succession. But that is not the problem.
To consider the act creation as ontologically ‘before’ the effect of creation is simply to acknowledge that there is indeed a cause and an effect and realizing that the effect, according to dogma was ‘brough into being’. To bring into being from nothing means that there is a state of nothingness ontologically prior to the universe.
Belorg:
Again, this is the result of an inadequate conception of “infinity.” The only way God can be understood in relation to the “point” is to understand Him as the totality of all points. A line segment has points; but, no aggregation of points can make a line. This is mathematical. The only way you can make a line is to aggregate “line segments.” God can easily, without contradiction, be the totality of all points and, therefore, an infinity of them, precisely because they are not parts of Him (A point on a line divides two parts of a line from each other and also joins them but is not part of the line itself), and, because they cannot be aggregated to extrapolate, i.e., fill, an infinity.
Think of it as the “configuring” of “points.” Space-points, to be more precise. Reifications, NOT PARTS - as they would necessarily be being “thought.”
OK. (But, I think you might want to come back to this later.)
But, don’t you see, this is an anthropomorphism. The whole idea of efficient causality is precisely that the efficient cause moves the effect simultaneously - except when a first cause is operating through secondary causes. There is not a successionary event here.
If you would say the sentence as it should be said, when speaking of Creation, you would have said, “Something comes to be where there was nothing.” This is the Catholic dogma on creation. There must be no words that indicate a past tense, or a future tense. All of the words should indicate - as well as possible - a Now. A Now divides time into its two parts, the past and the future, without itself being a part of time, much the same as the point. “The Now is like a point on a line, and time is like a line.” This too, is Thomistic understanding. See: Physics, Bk. IV, ch. 13, 222a, 14 - 16; and Commentary on the Physics, Bk. IV, les. 18, n. 1120
