A closer look at the first way

[belorg]

If you really do have a notion of ontological priority that is devoid of time, then sure, God sustains everything else in existence. That does not mean what you think it does. In my ontological analysis, yes, I see that God is the only sustainer of creation, eternally. But if I then say because only God is eternally the sustainer than nothing else exists, I have committed a fallacy, in less I want to bring in some notion of time into ontological priority. I look forward to my next post where I hope it will be even more clear that you are mixing up your method with reality.

I am not talking about a gid who merely sustains everything in existence. I am talikng about the Catholic God, who is said to be the creator of everything IOW not just a sustaining cause but also an originating cause.

That is a tautology that isn’t supported by ontological analysis.

Of course it’s a tautology, and ontological analysis of reality does not show an uncha,ging entity. It shows that all known entities are changing and then extrapolates to some Prime Mover or an unchangeable changer, which, according to my argument; leads to contradictions.

Include changing reality alongside unchanging reality and you will see that ontological priority, which merely means dependence, says nothing about which one exists or not.

I do include changing reality, but I maintain that the conclusion that an unchangeable reality lies at its basis is false. Changing reality cannot have an unchangeable reality at its basis, so the conclsuion is either that reality is unchanging or that reality is eternally changing.

Your argument starts with unchanging reality and attempts to deny changing reality, not the other way around. If what you say is true, however, it seems like it denotes some kind of unchanging reality.

My argument is a reductio, Michael. It starts from the assumption that both changing realty and unchangeable reality exist and that unchangeable reality is the basis of changing reality and shows a contradiction.

 

[belorg]

And in this ontological prior state, the prime mover still had the will to move. The will produces the particular agent, form, which precedes matter, as matter exists for form. And with this passive power of matter existing from an active will of the mover, it is not necessary to conclude that the ontology of the prime mover was changed when the ontology of the whole was made fitting to its intended end.

Precedes entails a sequence, TS.
If the will ‘porduces’ something, then prior to the existence of ‘form’, there was no form, and ‘form’ if caused by God, is a change of God, because there is nothing outside God that can be ‘formed’ And I do not just mean ‘no matter’, I mean 'nothing at all.
Toy seem to hold to the notion that there is God, and there is, outside God, a void that God can fill with whatever He wills. But that’s not the case. Prior to creation, God IS the whole of reality, there are no ‘voids’ because that would entail that God is not the creator of everything apart from Him.

Now, to TSAquinas and Shike and Andy and Boojie and Yppop (and others I may be forgetting here), thank you for the interesting discussion, I am leaving it now, because I feel I have said everything I wanted to say on this matter and I fear we are just going to run in circles if we proceed. So, unless somebody has something new to say, so long.

 

[TS_Aquinas]

Precedes entails a sequence, TS.
If the will ‘porduces’ something, then prior to the existence of ‘form’, there was no form, and ‘form’ if caused by God, is a change of God, because there is nothing outside God that can be ‘formed’ And I do not just mean ‘no matter’, I mean 'nothing at all.

I thought you’d say something like that, luckily Aquinas already thought about it and answered it, ST 1, 46, 1:

Reply 6: The first agent is a voluntary agent. And although He had the eternal will to produce some effect, yet He did not produce an eternal effect. Nor is it necessary for some change to be presupposed, not even on account of imaginary time. For we must take into consideration the difference between a particular agent, that presupposes something and produces something else, and the universal agent, who produces the whole. The particular agent produces the form, and presupposes the matter; and hence it is necessary that it introduce the form in due proportion into a suitable matter. Hence it is correct to say that it introduces the form into such matter, and not into another, on account of the different kinds of matter. But it is not correct to say so of God Who produces form and matter together: whereas it is correct to say of Him that He produces matter fitting to the form and to the end. Now, a particular agent presupposes time just as it presupposes matter. Hence it is correctly described as acting in time “after” and not in time “before,” according to an imaginary succession of time after time. But the universal agent who produces the thing and time also, is not correctly described as acting now, and not before, according to an imaginary succession of time succeeding time, as if time were presupposed to His action; but He must be considered as giving time to His effect as much as and when He willed, and according to what was fitting to demonstrate His power. For the world leads more evidently to the knowledge of the divine creating power, if it was not always, than if it had always been; since everything which was not always manifestly has a cause; whereas this is not so manifest of what always was.

 

[tonyrey]

It starts from the assumption that both changing realty and unchangeable reality exist and that unchangeable reality is the basis of changing reality and shows a contradiction.

You are putting the Creator in the same category as creatures…

 

[belorg]

I thought you’d say something like that, luckily Aquinas already thought about it and answered it, ST 1, 46, 1:

Reply 6: The first agent is a voluntary agent. And although He had the eternal will to produce some effect, yet He did not produce an eternal effect. Nor is it necessary for some change to be presupposed, not even on account of imaginary time. For we must take into consideration the difference between a particular agent, that presupposes something and produces something else, and the universal agent, who produces the whole. The particular agent produces the form, and presupposes the matter; and hence it is necessary that it introduce the form in due proportion into a suitable matter. Hence it is correct to say that it introduces the form into such matter, and not into another, on account of the different kinds of matter. But it is not correct to say so of God Who produces form and matter together: whereas it is correct to say of Him that He produces matter fitting to the form and to the end. Now, a particular agent presupposes time just as it presupposes matter. Hence it is correctly described as acting in time “after” and not in time “before,” according to an imaginary succession of time after time. But the universal agent who produces the thing and time also, is not correctly described as acting now, and not before, according to an imaginary succession of time succeeding time, as if time were presupposed to His action; but He must be considered as giving time to His effect as much as and when He willed, and according to what was fitting to demonstrate His power. For the world leads more evidently to the knowledge of the divine creating power, if it was not always, than if it had always been; since everything which was not always manifestly has a cause; whereas this is not so manifest of what always was.

Aquinas is saying here that God does not operate under an imaginary teporal sequence. That’s fine, because I do not claim He does.
What I claim is that the effect, the ‘form’ is a change intrenal to God because there is no such thing as outside God. And even if there was, it would still mean that a ‘form’ goes from God to ‘somewheer else.’, which still is a change.
The bottom line is: although Aquinas asserts that God does not change, his position is untenable.

 

[belorg]

You are putting the Creator in the same category as creatures…

No I am not.
Now, do yoi also have something substantial to add to this discussion, Tony?

 

[Boojie]

Seems pretty logical to me, so what exactly is wrong with this presmise?

Here is what’s wrong with the premise: You are assuming the effect changes therefore the cause also changes. It does not follow, because a pure act being can have single act of eternally causing can result into multiple effects that can change. The changes occur in the effects not in the pure act cause. The cause remains in a pure act state while causing a changeable effects.

“Eternally creating does entail a succession, nut, as I have repeated countless times, not temporal succession but (onto)logical succession.
Does that make sense? I do not know, because frankly, I do not think that timeless causation is a coherent notion, but if it is, and FTSOTA, I am willing to assume it does, there definitley is ontological succession.”

Belorg, show us the succession in a single act of eternally creating by a pure-act being. Where is the succession occuring?

Quote "It is not contradictory if eternally is only meant in a temporal sense.

How can’t it be not contradictory? How can we mean “eternally” in a temporal sense? It does not make sense!! If this is not a contradiction, nothing will be.

 

[belorg]

Here is what’s wrong with the premise: You are assuming the effect changes therefore the cause also changes. It does not follow, because a pure act being can have single act of eternally causing can result into multiple effects that can change. The changes occur in the effects not in the pure act cause. The cause remains in a pure act state while causing a changeable effects.

The question I asked was :
“If God is the whole of reality and the whole of reality changes, then God does change.
Seems pretty logical to me, so what exactly is wrong with this premise?”
Now you deny that God is the whole pf reality. That’s fine, but I hope it doesn’t get you into trouble, because for a Catholic, this is heresy.
You are , in fact, introducing a whole new reality. But you do not have an ontological basis for a new reality.

How can’t it be not contradictory? How can we mean “eternally” in a temporal sense? It does not make sense!! If this is not a contradiction, nothing will be.

Again, the context of what you are in fact claiming.

Stick on the issue: “Eternally creating” phrase does not necessarily entails succession. God, as a pure act being, is eternally creating or causing the universe to exist. What’s wrong with that statement? Is that statement contradictory?** If you cannot find any contradiction, then the issue is closed.**

And your answer is: How can’t it be not contradictory?
My answer is: it is contradictory because eternally creating does entail a succession.
So, you are right: it cannot be not contradictory, so it necessarily is contradictory.

 

[tonyrey]

You are putting the Creator in the same category as creatures…

You must be because “unchanging reality” overlooks the teaching that “In Him we live, move and have our being”.

God is “He Who Is”, i…e. the Ground of our being, not just another being.

 

[tonyrey]

The question I asked was :
“If God is the whole of reality and the whole of reality changes, then God does change”.

God is the whole of reality but God is not** a part** of reality. God is reality!

 

[belorg]

God is the whole of reality but God is not** a part** of reality. God is reality!

Congratulations. That’s what I have been saying all along.

 

[tonyrey]

Congratulations. That’s what I have been saying all along.

 

[Shike]

1. God is the creator of everything (Catholic dogma- Nicene Creed)
2. God is ontologically prior to his creation
3. The universe is changing (common experience)
4. God is eternally unchanging and unchangeable (Thomas of Aquino)
5. (Onto)logically prior to changeable reality the whole of reality is eternally unchangeable (1, 2, 3, 4)

1. ∀x(Cxg & x≠g)
2. ∀y(Pgy & y≠g)
3. ∀x(Xx & x≠g)
4. Ig
5. ∀x∀y(Ix & Xy & Pxy & y≠g) from 1,2,3 and 4

Where:
Cxy = x is created by y
Pxy = x is ontologically prior to y
Xx = x is changing
Ix = x is eternally unchanging and unchangeable
g = God

I like this discussion. I think we have made a lot of progress by cleaning up the initial argument.
And here are my initial points:

• I really wonder if premise 1 is needed for your overall argument. I’m not sure it is doing any work. At the very least, looking at the PL version you can see that it isn’t doing any work and isn’t present in the conclusion.
• How is the conclusion derived from the premises? Showing that, I think, will be quite difficult in PL, I fear impossible. That is because I also think, besides not being valid, additional premises are needed. Premise 4 needs to undergo universal generalization in order to be used in the conclusion… that needs support.

The next stage in cleaning up the PL will be the hardest. I invite the cooperation of others, if interested, to help derive the conclusion from 1, 2, 3, and 4 (or 2, 3, and 4 if you think my criticism is correct) and/or proffer the needed premises to bridge the gaps.

Anyways, here is where I am at with what has been said up until this point. 1) That “God is identical with reality” is an assertion not yet grounded by the premises of the argument. Stating that God is ontologically prior to anything is not an argument in favor of the assertion; the assertion needs an argument (or it needs its argument restated in precise terms). The assertion is also vitally important to the success of the main argument. 2) Ontological analysis is a method and is not an argument in itself in support of the identity of God and reality. I think that such an argument will have to be produced/restated in precise terms in order to reach the conclusion that God is identical with reality. And the only way I can see such an argument working is if there is a conflation between method and reality (which subsequently brings time into the mix, which is another issue). And 3) the statement that “God is identical with reality” is not Catholic doctrine. Earlier tonyrey said that “God is reality”. However, he should have said that, “God is Reality” signifying that he was predicating in an analogical mode.

Take care everyone!

• Michael

 

[belorg]

I like this discussion. I think we have made a lot of progress by cleaning up the initial argument.
And here are my initial points:

• I really wonder if premise 1 is needed for your overall argument. I’m not sure it is doing any work. At the very least, looking at the PL version you can see that it isn’t doing any work and isn’t present in the conclusion.

Michael. I wasn’t planning on continuing this discussion, so only a couple of things to clean up some misunderstandings.
Premise 1 is actually a key-premise, because without it, premise 5 does not follow.
If God is not the creator of everything, then it is possible that there are some things that cannot change out of themselves but nevertheless can be changed by God.
Without premsie 1, we would be talking about the Aristotelean version of this 1st way, which has its own problems, but is immune to my criticism in this thread.

• How is the conclusion derived from the premises? Showing that, I think, will be quite difficult in PL, I fear impossible. That is because I also think, besides not being valid, additional premises are needed. Premise 4 needs to undergo universal generalization in order to be used in the conclusion… that needs support.

Premise 4 is an almost literal quote from Aquinas.

The next stage in cleaning up the PL will be the hardest. I invite the cooperation of others, if interested, to help derive the conclusion from 1, 2, 3, and 4 (or 2, 3, and 4 if you think my criticism is correct) and/or proffer the needed premises to bridge the gaps

.

I have already done that, Michael.

Anyways, here is where I am at with what has been said up until this point. 1) That “God is identical with reality” is an assertion not yet grounded by the premises of the argument.Stating that God is ontologically prior to anything is not an argument in favor of the assertion; the assertion needs an argument (or it needs its argument restated in precise terms).

That God is ontologically prior to everything is the necessary conclusion from “God is the creator of everything”.

 

[Candide_West]

As I said I’m not debating this point, its a side issue anyway, so let’s just accept that as true and keep on topic.

Ok, so you are not saying that an effect can only have properties which were possessed by its cause. Sorry I misunderstood. Could you run past me again exactly what you are trying to say with this one?

Just to be clear I’m not arguing that something can come from nothing. I’m just arguing that an effect can have properties which it’s cause did not possess. Since it appears you weren’t arguing that it’s probably moot.

Nope, I just thought it was implied by your argument. Again apologies for misunderstanding.*

Ok, so if you agree that effects can have properties which were not possessed by their cause then I’m not sure what your argument is here?*

I’ve already accepted that for the sake of argument.

Actually science can say absolutely nothing about “nothing” since it is unobserved. But again I am not debating that point so let’s just leave that as accepted and focus on the main thrust of your argument.*

Hey ReapReason,

Any further thoughts on this or should I assume that the discussion is now closed? If I don’t hear back in a couple days I’ll assume you aren’t interested in further discussion.

Thanks

 

[Shike]

Premise 1 is actually a key-premise, because without it, premise 5 does not follow.
If God is not the creator of everything, then it is possible that there are some things that cannot change out of themselves but nevertheless can be changed by God.
Without premsie 1, we would be talking about the Aristotelean version of this 1st way, which has its own problems, but is immune to my criticism in this thread.

I can’t say that I understand what you are saying. You’d have to clarify, that is, if you have the time.

Premise 4 is an almost literal quote from Aquinas.

I’m talking about the moves in PL needed to reach the conclusion. I do not have a problem with premise 4. I only have problem with how 4 will be used to justify the conclusion… that is the sticky wicket.

I have already done that, Michael.

Well, okay. I for one like things spelled out in one post, clearly and precisely. It will only help.

That God is ontologically prior to everything is the necessary conclusion from “God is the creator of everything”.

Sure, I agree. The problem is when you try to say that ontological priority entails that everything else doesn’t exist and that God is identical with the whole of reality. That needs to be included into the main argument and not assumed. Until more premises are inserted, at this point, it is assumed. I’m not saying you don’t have grounds for what you say. I’m only saying show it in the context of the format we have going.

I appreciate the reply. However, we still have the PL version of the argument to deal with. The conclusion is not justified in PL and I am having the hardest time seeing how it could be. Would you like to help re-formalize the argument to make it work?

 

[Shike]

I am not talking about a gid who merely sustains everything in existence. I am talikng about the Catholic God, who is said to be the creator of everything IOW not just a sustaining cause but also an originating cause.

I don’t want to ignore any of your points. My reply is that in a timeless context, there is no difference between an originating and sustaining cause. The differences only arise in the context of time.

Of course it’s a tautology, and ontological analysis of reality does not show an uncha,ging entity. It shows that all known entities are changing and then extrapolates to some Prime Mover or an unchangeable changer, which, according to my argument; leads to contradictions.

To me that means that ontological analysis shows that there is an unchanging entity. We have to be more careful, however. Aquinas’ First Way needs at least 1 object that undergoes change to prove his point, not all known entities. And If by “extrapolate” you mean demonstrate (in the strict sense of the Scholastic word), then yes, we agree.

I do include changing reality, but I maintain that the conclusion that an unchangeable reality lies at its basis is false. Changing reality cannot have an unchangeable reality at its basis, so the conclsuion is either that reality is unchanging or that reality is eternally changing.

And is this statement of yours absolutely true? If it is not, why do you state it so forcefully?

My argument is a reductio, Michael. It starts from the assumption that both changing realty and unchangeable reality exist and that unchangeable reality is the basis of changing reality and shows a contradiction.

We aren’t quite there in the PL version. Again, are you willing to help?

 

[belorg]

I don’t want to ignore any of your points. My reply is that in a timeless context, there is no difference between an originating and sustaining cause. The differences only arise in the context of time.

No offense, Michael, but if you think that, there is nothing left to discuss, because what you are saying here is simply wrong.If God is the creator of everything from nothing, which is Catholic dogma, this simply entails that there was an ontological state of nothingess prior to the universe.

And is this statement of yours absolutely true? If it is not, why do you state it so forcefully?

I belivee my statement is absolutely true.

We aren’t quite there in the PL version. Again, are you willing to help?

I’ll clarify a few points, if you like. But in fact everything I wanted to say has been said, so I really do not have anything to add.

Premise 1 is actually a key-premise, because without it, premise 5 does not follow.
If God is not the creator of everything, then it is possible that there are some things that cannot change out of themselves but nevertheless can be changed by God.
Without premsie 1, we would be talking about the Aristotelean version of this 1st way, which has its own problems, but is immune to my criticism in this thread.

I can’t say that I understand what you are saying. You’d have to clarify, that is, if you have the time.

If God is not the creator of everything, then there may exist things that are not created by God and it is possible that thiose things that cannot change out of themselves but nevertheless can be changed by God. So,n in that case, it is not so that ontologically prior to creation, the whole of reality is unchangeable.

 

[Shike]

No offense, Michael, but if you think that, there is nothing left to discuss, because what you are saying here is simply wrong.If God is the creator of everything from nothing, which is Catholic dogma, this simply entails that there was an ontological state of nothingess prior to the universe.

Then we are at an impasse on this point. In ontological analysis, there is no actual state of nothingness since God exists. If you want to call it an ontological state of nothingness, then this has very little meaning other than, God is the creator of the universe. In other words, the only thing an ontological nothingness could translate to is that all of created reality has a dependence relationship to God. I think to get any other meaning out of ontological analysis in this case would be to twist the definition of the word ontological, which doesn’t presuppose time.

I belivee my statement is absolutely true.

What is truth? Don’t you think it involves something that is real, and if so, wouldn’t an absolute truth entail that there is some reality that exists that is unchanging? You can take a Heraclitean position but that means you have to accept the conclusions that follow from it. If I am not mistaken Nietzsche’s work is a good example of the consequences.

I’ll clarify a few points, if you like. But in fact everything I wanted to say has been said, so I really do not have anything to add.

Okay, I suppose I can work on the PL version myself.

If God is not the creator of everything, then there may exist things that are not created by God and it is possible that thiose things that cannot change out of themselves but nevertheless can be changed by God. So,n in that case, it is not so that ontologically prior to creation, the whole of reality is unchangeable.

Thank you for the clarification. I was getting tripped up by the phrase, “out of themselves”.

I’ll try to reformulate the PL (and original argument) to show the underlying structure that includes premise 1 as vital to the conclusion.

ciao,
Michael

 

[belorg]

Then we are at an impasse on this point. In ontological analysis, there is no actual state of nothingness since God exists. If you want to call it an ontological state of nothingness, then this has very little meaning other than, God is the creator of the universe. In other words, the only thing an ontological nothingness could translate to is that all of created reality has a dependence relationship to God. I think to get any other meaning out of ontological analysis in this case would be to twist the definition of the word ontological, which doesn’t presuppose time.

Of course there is no actual state of nothingness, that’s the whole point. There is only God and nothing else, which means God is the whole of reality.

What is truth? Don’t you think it involves something that is real, and if so, wouldn’t an absolute truth entail that there is some reality that exists that is unchanging?

Maybe something about reality is unchanging, but it is impossible that the whole of reality is unchanging. And unchanging reality must be logically posterior to changeable reality.

Okay, I suppose I can work on the PL version myself.

You may do so, but what’s the point if you do not even belive my argument is valid?