This is what I keep hearing: ontological priority is not priority in time. Ontologically prior to creation was a point where God was all of existence. If you can’t cash out the previous sentence in terms of “is”, then you can’t cash out the meaning of ontological priority. Anything less is bringing time back into the equation, regardless of intent.
Ok, linguistically it’s hard to express an ontological prior without implying a temporal prior (in common usage they are effectively identical). But I see no reason at present that you cannot have an ontological prior without being a temporal prior*(assuming you accept the possibility of timeless existence,
which clearly you must if you agree with catholic dogma and Thomism).
In any case though, if we accept for the moment that you are correct and ontologically prior means temporally prior as well. That would mean that God cannot have created time.*
You can probably see that immediately but I’ll explain anyway. In order to have created time, God MUST have been ontologically prior to it. However clearly it is meaningless to say that God was temporally prior to time itself, there cannot have been a temporal period “before” time existed.*
So that leaves us with two options: either;
a). Ontologically prior can be independent of temporally prior (in which case your above objection fails).
b). God did not create time, which means time must have always existed (even ontologically and temporally prior to everything other than God himself). In other words there was an ontological and temporal point at which only God and time existed, since time is a measure of rate of change, and God was the only thing which could be changing at that point, God must have been changing. Which according to Thomism and Catholic dogma is incorrect.*
I can’t see any other options at least.*
Did you check my PL? If so, then could you please help me fill in the moves that shows that his argument is valid? At the moment, it is not.*
I’ve never been too good with those so I’ll just leave you and Belorg to it I think. I’m sure you’ll get there in the end if you’ve a mind to.*
My own objection to the first way is rather different anyway, essentially that even if we accept the argument (with the exception of the last line “hey let’s call it God”) then it tells us nothing meaningful about any deity. The challenge I have presented is getting from “there was one or more prime movers” (the conclusion of the first way) to “the prime mover should be considered to be a personal being”.
To date I’ve not met anyone who can fill that gap using logical arguments.
I only stepped in on this discussion because DavidV seemed to have misunderstood Belorgs argument entirely.*