A closer look at the first way

[Candide_West]

Thanks for the reply.

I won’t say too much about the meat of your post because I agree with most of it.

Ok.

But there is a third option, which was the point of my last post. Namely, that someone is insisting that they are using ontologically prior in a timeless sense… when in reality they are not. I say this because in ontological analysis, there is both God and created reality. To say that there is a state of “ontological nothingness” and have it matter in the way belorg wishes it to matter, I think it would have to be a case of confusing the method with reality.

As I said, to date at least I’ve seen nothing to suggest that Belorg is suggesting temporally prior.*

Within my last few posts I ask for an example of ontological analysis of any old object, in that case a tree. I don’t think many in this thread can deliver which is why I raise my eyebrow at its central use in the argument.

The argument Belorg has presented seems quite straightforward. Do you disagree that God being creator of the universe entails that he be ontologically prior to it?*

Yes, those are common objections. All I can say is that the answers are out there. There’s so much to say, I almost don’t know where to begin… that’s how deep the thinking and arguments and treatises go. Basically, you’d have to read at least the first 100 pages of the Summa Theologica to see some of what I am talking about.

I know it sounds lame, but it’s true nonetheless. Keep reading. If you haven’t read Edward Feser’s Aquinas, I highly recommend it. It will not answer all of your objections to the satisfaction that you probably want, but it will probably answer most of them, especially the ones that easily refute Aquinas’s Five Ways and which have been around as long as Aquinas (which is probably false; most of the objections are more recent in history).

Fair enough, then for the moment at least my query stands. Thus far nobody has been able to provide me with a link from the “prime mover or movers” from the first way to a personal being.*

 

[Shike]

No but ‘creatio ex nihilo’ entails the former

Creation ex nihilo may entail that God is ontologically prior to creation, but it does not entail that there is some kind of state of ontological nothingness, something that doesn’t really make any sense, and if it does, is some kind of metaphorical notion.

Basically, if it’s not a real state of nothingness but an “ontological” one, it is in a crucial way a mental construct. That being so, the only way you can capitalize on that in the way that attacks the principles of actuality and potentiality (principles found in real things), is to confuse the method with the reality.

It’s not ontological analysis, it’s an ontological claim.The cahtolic church claims that there is a state of nothingeness ontologically prior to the existence of, everything except God.

Trust, me. I understand your point that you are putting an ontological claim as one of the assumptions of your argument. I just disagree that ontological priority entails any state of ontological nothingness, or that your choice of words make sense. Also, as TS_Aquinas says, you won’t be able to find Catholic support for any “state of ontological nothingness”.

1. If x is ontologically prior to y, it means that if x does not exist, then y does not exist.but it does not mean that if y doezs not exist, x does not ecist.
   IOW there is an ontolological state of affairs at which x exiosts and y does not.

You are either talking about something really not existing or you are talking in metaphorical terms. Ontological nothingness seems to be a metaphorical term. Nothingness, where I come from, means the absence of any entity. Ontological nothingness in your argument, then, could only mean a set of hierarchical relations… something that is very far from nothing. And as I pointed out before, a set of hierarchical relations does not support the notion that God is the whole of reality, in fact, it actually disproves it.

Go back to the Pantheism argument. I think it makes it clear that you have to show that ontological priority entails God is the whole of reality–which you can’t do with a metaphorical mental construct, especially if when cashed out it merely indicates relations and not existence proper.

So, how do you propose that we fix the Pantheism** Argument Sub-2**? Your argument depends upon it.

 

[TS_Aquinas]

Creation ex nihilo may entail that God is ontologically prior to creation, but it does not entail that there is some kind of state of ontological nothingness, something that doesn’t really make any sense, and if it does, is some kind of metaphorical notion.

Basically, if it’s not a real state of nothingness but an “ontological” one, it is in a crucial way a mental construct. That being so, the only way you can capitalize on that in the way that attacks the principles of actuality and potentiality (principles found in real things), is to confuse the method with the reality.

Trust, me. I understand your point that you are putting an ontological claim as one of the assumptions of your argument. I just disagree that ontological priority entails any state of ontological nothingness, or that your choice of words make sense. Also, as TS_Aquinas says, you won’t be able to find Catholic support for any “state of ontological nothingness”.

You are either talking about something really not existing or you are talking in metaphorical terms. Ontological nothingness seems to be a metaphorical term. Nothingness, where I come from, means the absence of any entity. Ontological nothingness in your argument, then, could only mean a set of hierarchical relations… something that is very far from nothing. And as I pointed out before, a set of hierarchical relations does not support the notion that God is the whole of reality, in fact, it actually disproves it.

Go back to the Pantheism argument. I think it makes it clear that you have to show that ontological priority entails God is the whole of reality–which you can’t do with a metaphorical mental construct, especially if when cashed out it merely indicates relations and not existence proper.

So, how do you propose that we fix the Pantheism** Argument Sub-2**? Your argument depends upon it.

It’s like I said way back in post 180 taking what Aquinas said in ST 1, Q46, a1, reply 6, He wills the particular agent, form. No relation exists outside of Him, as all forms exist within Him in their maximum. But no relation really exists within Him, as far as His essence, in matter, since matter does not represent true form.

I would call it panentheism as a knee jerk reaction, but that word carries negative light in its history. Has Thomistic causality ever been reduced in a term?

 

[belorg]

Creation ex nihilo may entail that God is ontologically prior to creation, but it does not entail that there is some kind of state of ontological nothingness, something that doesn’t really make any sense, and if it does, is some kind of metaphorical notion.

Of course it does not make any sense. that’s why the catholic dogma of creatio ex nihilo is either completely incoherent or is to be taken as some kind of metaphorical notion.
But if you really want to reject my argument, you’ll have to prove (or at least give a substantial argument ) that ontological nothingness is impossible. So far, all you’ve done is state that you cannot imagine what it would be like. But that’s not an argument.
If it were, until you could imagine what a timeless person would be like, you should reject tGod as metaphorical too.

Basically, if it’s not a real state of nothingness but an “ontological” one, it is in a crucial way a mental construct. That being so, the only way you can capitalize on that in the way that attacks the principles of actuality and potentiality (principles found in real things), is to confuse the method with the reality.

Then the Prime Mover is also just a mental consruct.

Trust, me. I understand your point that you are putting an ontological claim as one of the assumptions of your argument. I just disagree that ontological priority entails any state of ontological nothingness, or that your choice of words make sense. Also, as TS_Aquinas says, you won’t be able to find Catholic support for any “state of ontological nothingness”.

There is a great deal of Catholic support for a state of ontological nothingness. Ask any Catholic on the street and he will tell you that God created the universe from nothing and that this is not just a metaphorical way of speaking.

You are either talking about something really not existing or you are talking in metaphorical terms.

I am not talking about anything, Michael. Catholic dogma is doing all the talking. So your criticism should address Catholic dogma , not me.

Nothingness, where I come from, means the absence of any entity. Ontological nothingness in your argument, then, could only mean a set of hierarchical relations… something that is very far from nothing. And as I pointed out before, a set of hierarchical relations does not support the notion that God is the whole of reality, in fact, it actually disproves it.

You simply cannot account for anything apart from God, because God, in your view, is only the creator of everything else in a metaphorical way. But I realise that is probably because Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ notion of cause does not carry any real meaning.

Go back to the Pantheism argument. I think it makes it clear that you have to show that ontological priority entails God is the whole of reality–which you can’t do with a metaphorical mental construct, especially if when cashed out it merely indicates relations and not existence proper.

If ceration has any real meaning, then ontological p^riority means that God is the whole of reality, if creation is only meant in a metaphorical sense, then we have nothing to discuss. I have no problems with metaphorical Gods, but I don’t confuse them with real entities.

So, how do you propose that we fix the Pantheism** Argument Sub-2**? Your argument depends upon it.

You are the one proposing this pantheism argument, Michael, My argument has nothing to do with pantheism. And I have proposed a way to fix it, but you reject it solely on tjhe basis of your inability to grasp the meaning of it.
.

 

[belorg]

It’s like I said way back in post 180 taking what Aquinas said in ST 1, Q46, a1, reply 6, He wills the particular agent, form. No relation exists outside of Him, as all forms exist within Him in their maximum. But no relation really exists within Him, as far as His essence, in matter, since matter does not represent true form.

All forms exist within Him, then I suppose He wills one form to be actualized and another one not to be actualized. Otherwise all forms would be actualized. But then, there is an ontological state of affairs at which “form A” is not- actualized , and another state of affairs at which “from A” is actuaized. And since form A is part of God, it is clear that God , in this caqse, undergoes a change (or rather) changes (part of) Himself.
That is indeed panentheism.

I would call it panentheism as a knee jerk reaction, but that word carries negative light in its history. Has Thomistic causality ever been reduced in a term?

AFAIK, it hasn’t. And that’s because Thomistic causaility isn’t causality in any meaningful way.
The only thing I can say for sure is that it cannot be reduced to panentheism, because that’s as far from Thomism as you can get.

 

[Shike]

Do you disagree that God being creator of the universe entails that he be ontologically prior to it?*

No, I do not disagree. In fact I do agree with that entailment. But what I do disagree is belorg’s confused notion of a state of ontological nothingness. If the notion makes sense, it does not prove his argument. If the notion proves his argument, it does not make sense.

Since it’s his argument I would assume the burden of proof is on him to describe in detail what a state of ontological nothingness means, instead of me imagining how it does make sense.

Fair enough, then for the moment at least my query stands. Thus far nobody has been able to provide me with a link from the “prime mover or movers” from the first way to a personal being.*

Well, start looking because I have been able to find a bunch that proves those things. It’s in the Summa Theologea.

 

[belorg]

No, I do not disagree. In fact I do agree with that entailment. But what I do disagree is belorg’s confused notion of a state of ontological nothingness. If the notion makes sense, it does not prove his argument. If the notion proves his argument, it does not make sense.

Since it’s his argument I would assume the burden of proof is on him to describe in detail what a state of ontological nothingness means, instead of me imagining how it does make sense.

It’s my argument, but the notion is a direct consequence of Catholic dogma. I do not have the burden to prove it makes sense, the burden is on the people making the claim. if it does not make sense, then maybe Thomism makes sense, but Catholic dogma most certainly does not.

 

[Shike]

It’s my argument, but the notion is a direct consequence of Catholic dogma. I do not have the burden to prove it makes sense, the burden is on the people making the claim. if it does not make sense, then maybe Thomism makes sense, but Catholic dogma most certainly does not.

A simple challenge, then:

Quote a source that mentions a “state of ontological nothingness”.

Not a quote that merely mentions that God is ontologically prior to creation. Nor a quote that merely mentions that creation was made from nothing. It shouldn’t be too hard if it’s Church doctrine.

 

[Shike]

If ceration has any real meaning, then ontological p^riority means that God is the whole of reality, if creation is only meant in a metaphorical sense, then we have nothing to discuss.

Such a statement would have to come at the end of an argument. The Pantheism argument I gave you is a good start. It is waiting for a reformulation of premise 2 in the Pantheism Argument Sub-2. Or if you wish you could spell out an argument of your own.

The original argument needs more premises for it to work, as far as PL goes. But it is open to additions.

 

[TS_Aquinas]

All forms exist within Him, then I suppose He wills one form to be actualized and another one not to be actualized. Otherwise all forms would be actualized. But then, there is an ontological state of affairs at which “form A” is not- actualized , and another state of affairs at which “from A” is actuaized. And since form A is part of God, it is clear that God , in this caqse, undergoes a change (or rather) changes (part of) Himself.

Let me rephrase, all necessary forms are united to matter (or are in actuality in your vocabulary) or second actuality. Forms that are not, are first actuality in a second potentiality. All necessary forms He wills are in second actuality, but there are contingent forms we craft (clear distinction here from create, we craft) matter into such as a car which did not exist prior to our conceptualization of car. Where we had no knowledge of form of car was a first potentiality while now knowing it is in second potentiality/first actuality, making the car is second actuality. To God, the form of car was and is a contingent form to what He wills which are necessary forms, such as the production of matter which is necessary for a car to exist and even be conceptualized by us. Being a contingent is a second potentiality to Him but a first potentiality to us who did not know that matter can be arranged in such a way to craft a car, now we do it is a second potentiality/first actuality to us. But just because we never knew prior, did not mean the form of car was not always a second potentiality/first actuality. Hence, there is no change when form A is not a first actuality to us, it has always been a first actuality.

 

[belorg]

A simple challenge, then:

Quote a source that mentions a “state of ontological nothingness”.

“the world began when God’s word drew it out of nothingness”

Now, are you going to declare the CCC ‘completely metaphorical’?

Not a quote that merely mentions that God is ontologically prior to creation. Nor a quote that merely mentions that creation was made from nothing. It shouldn’t be too hard if it’s Church doctrine.

It was a piece of cake, Michael.

 

[belorg]

Such a statement would have to come at the end of an argument. The Pantheism argument I gave you is a good start. It is waiting for a reformulation of premise 2 in the Pantheism Argument Sub-2. Or if you wish you could spell out an argument of your own.

The original argument needs more premises for it to work, as far as PL goes. But it is open to additions.

I do not care too much about PL, Michael. PL cannot describe all subtleties of an argument. It’s much too rough an instrument for this task.
And I have already provided a reformulation.

 

[Shike]

And I have already provided a reformulation.

Please restate your formulation in premise conclusion form. If you have already done that please just copy and paste the content from the relevant post. Thank you.

Originally Posted by CCC 336
“the world began when God’s word drew it out of nothingness”

Where does it say a “state of ontological nothingness”? I missed it.

Could you also please define “ontological nothingness” using genus and specific difference?

The only way we can move forward is by being precise.

ciao,
Michael

 

[belorg]

Please restate your formulation in premise conclusion form. If you have already done that please just copy and paste the content from the relevant post. Thank you.

x is ontologically prior to y, iff ~x then y is impossible .and ~y then x is possible.

that’s if x and y are both contingent.

If x is necessary, we get
x is ontologically prior to y, iff ~x then y .is impossible and ~y then x is necessary.

Where does it say a “state of ontological nothingness”? I missed it.

It says ‘nothingness’ , that’s enough. to make my point.

Could you also please define “ontological nothingness” using genus and specific difference?

What do you mean by ‘specific difference’. Specific difference to what exactly?
I mean a real state of nothingness. If something can be drawn out of nothingness, it entails that there is a real state of nothingness.
Unless, of course, you are willing to concede that the CCC is to be taken as metaphorical, in that you can interpret it any way you want.

The only way we can move forward is by being precise.

ciao,
Michael

What is so difficult to undrestand about ‘nothing?’

 

[ReapReason]

What is so difficult to undrestand about ‘nothing?’

If the intent of the author is to say that the universe came out of absolutely nothing at all, then you are correct to say that such is illogical.

If the authors intent is to say that the universe as a whole is not a product of anything “physical”, then you can only question how the universe came to be out of “something” that is not physical: since it is not self evident that such is impossible. The exnihilo statement is stated in contrast to physical things, not nothing. This is to say that it came out of nothing physical.

Also, if it can be shown that physicality itself must be contingent, then one does not have to explain how physicality came about in order to know that it has to come from something that is not physical; something that cannot be understood as possessing the nature of physicality intrinsically.

 

[Shike]

x is ontologically prior to y, iff ~x then y is impossible .and ~y then x is possible.

that’s if x and y are both contingent.

If x is necessary, we get
x is ontologically prior to y, iff ~x then y .is impossible and ~y then x is necessary.

Thanks for reformulating premise 2 of the Pantheism Argument Sub-2. However, inserting such a premise into your reformulated and revised argument (I mean your argument, the Pantheism one is technically mine) would not make it valid as it does not support the thesis that God is identical to everything. Moreover, your definitions of necessity and possibility are somewhat besides the point. In the Five Ways, Aquinas employs concepts of possibility and necessity that rely on natural philosophy, concepts which are not modal.

belorg:

Unless, of course, you are willing to concede that the CCC is to be taken as metaphorical, in that you can interpret it any way you want.

• By the very fact that nothingness is named means that it is treated in a metaphorical way. That’s what happens when one gives a positive name to a completely negative concept.
• The existence of a metaphor does not justify subjectivism. In other words, some interpretations of metaphors are not correct.
• Taking one sentence in its proper context does not justify taking an entire work out of context.

belorg:

I mean a real state of nothingness. If something can be drawn out of nothingness, it entails that there is a real state of nothingness.

A timeless state of real nothingness where God exists is a manifest contradiction (nothing about ontological priority needs to be mentioned). More importantly, creation ex nihilo, as far as I know, was never meant to suggest such a position anyways. It was only ever intended to say that creation did not arise from previous matter and that creation is entirely dependent on God for its existence. It’s something that is sometimes misunderstood, so I do not blame you for not being aware of its intended meaning.

Here’s a reformulation, then, of your argument that would get to the heart of the matter:

1. God exists
2. Nothing exists
3. Aquinas is wrong

I am now satisfied with this discussion. I’ll be around though if you have any questions or think I am not being fair.

peace,
Michael

 

[belorg]

Thanks for reformulating premise 2 of the Pantheism Argument Sub-2. However, inserting such a premise into your reformulated and revised argument (I mean your argument, the Pantheism one is technically mine) would not make it valid as it does not support the thesis that God is identical to everything. Moreover, your definitions of necessity and possibility are somewhat besides the point. In the Five Ways, Aquinas employs concepts of possibility and necessity that rely on natural philosophy, concepts which are not modal.

I don’t need to insert this premise into my argument.

• By the very fact that nothingness is named means that it is treated in a metaphorical way. That’s what happens when one gives a positive name to a completely negative concept.

If you want to fo down the road of redifining everything in Catholic dogma that does not fit into your world-view, we are done.
I had really hoped to have to opportunity to have an intellectually honest discussion about this, but that does not seem to be possible with you.

A timeless state of real nothingness where God exists is a manifest contradiction

There is nothing manifestly contradictory in this, once you accept timless existence is possible. The reeal problem is that you cannot grasp this. But that’s does not mean it’s contradictory.

More importantly, creation ex nihilo, as far as I know, was never meant to suggest such a position anyways. It was only ever intended to say that creation did not arise from previous matter and that creation is entirely dependent on God for its existence. It’s something that is sometimes misunderstood, so I do not blame you for not being aware of its intended meaning.

Like most catholic concept, this is also formulated in such a woolly way that everybody can interpret it the way they want.

Here’s a reformulation, then, of your argument that would get to the heart of the matter:

1. God exists
2. Nothing exists
3. Aquinas is wrong

This is a huge strawman, Michael. If you really think you can reformulate my argument this way, it’s clear that you haven’t understood a single word of my argument.

I am now satisfied with this discussion. I’ll be around though if you have any questions or think I am not being fair.

peace,
Michael

I am not satified at all, Michael. You haven’t even touched my argument, but if formulating a strawman satifies you, that’s your choice.

All the best

 

[Candide_West]

This is a huge strawman, Michael. If you really think you can reformulate my argument this way, it’s clear that you haven’t understood a single word of my argument.

Agreed, and pretty shocking one at that.

I am not satified at all, Michael. You haven’t even touched my argument, but if formulating a strawman satifies you, that’s your choice.

All the best

Personally I have a suspicion that he knows full well that he has not touched your argument, but is unable to fault the logic and unable to accept the consequence, so he has constructed a straw man which he can convince himself is your argument. Rather poor show, but not unusual.

 

[tonyrey]

By the very fact that nothingness is named means that it is treated in a metaphorical way. That’s what happens when one gives a positive name to a completely negative concept.

• The existence of a metaphor does not justify subjectivism. In other words, some interpretations of metaphors are not correct.
• Taking one sentence in its proper context does not justify taking an entire work out of context.

A timeless state of real nothingness where God exists is a manifest contradiction (nothing about ontological priority needs to be mentioned). More importantly, creation ex nihilo, as far as I know, was never meant to suggest such a position anyways. It was only ever intended to say that creation did not arise from previous matter and that creation is entirely dependent on God for its existence. It’s something that is sometimes misunderstood, so I do not blame you for not being aware of its intended meaning.

Irrefutable!

 

[belorg]

Irrefutable!

Maybe you shouldn’t get mixed up in things you obviously do not understand, Tony.