A closer look at the first way

[TS_Aquinas]

My whole argument is built in order to demonstrate that Aquinas notion of creation does involve change. I am aware that Aquinas denies this, but I am convinced he is wrong in this respect, for the reaosns I state in my argument.

Aquinas’ notion of creation and the entire doctrine of creation cannot by definition involve change. Now if you proposing that creation from preexisting material is more tenable, that’s a different subject. But we both know that the position cannot be absolutely demonstrated anymore then creation from nothing. Aquinas knew that which is why he stated it is an article of faith but at the same time did not give grounds to creation from preexisting materials as a provable theory. What convinces me, belorg, of creation from nothing is the entire argument of form, which is why I have been focused on that in the thread. If form is an eternally unchanging thought of God, in Him and by Him as the Scriptures state, then since it is tenable grounds to stand on that He created matter, for since matter exists for form.

I am at work and writing from my phone, later tonight I will supply quotations from the Summa and Contra.

 

[TS_Aquinas]

Aquinas’ notion of creation and the entire doctrine of creation cannot by definition involve change. Now if you are proposing that creation from preexisting material is more tenable, that’s a different subject. But we both know that the position cannot be absolutely demonstrated anymore then creation from nothing. Aquinas knew that which is why he stated it is an article of faith but at the same time did not give grounds to creation from preexisting materials as a provable theory. What convinces me, belorg, of creation from nothing is the entire argument of form, which is why I have been focused on that in the thread. If form is an eternally unchanging thought of God, in Him and by Him as the Scriptures state, then -]since/-] it is tenable grounds to stand on that He created matter, for since matter exists for form.

I am at work and writing from my phone, later tonight I will supply quotations from the Summa and Contra.

Typos corrected.

Also another correction, he said it was an article of faith for the universe to have a beginning and not creatio ex nihilo. Creation from nothing doesn’t challenge the notion of an eternally existing universe, only makes it eternally depend on the act of the unmoved mover, a subsisting act.

As far as that quote,

“…whatever is the cause of things considered as beings, must be the cause of things, not only according as they are “such” by accidental forms, nor according as they are “these” by substantial forms, but also according to all that belongs to their being at all in any way. And thus it is necessary to say that also primary matter is created by the universal cause of things.”

In other words, if God is the cause of being or form of things, then what exists on account of these forms, matter, must also be created by that very same universal cause. How can it be tenable that if something existed without cause has the potentiality to the very forms God has in mind?

But belorg, all this doesn’t challenge your view of unchangeable ontology, which is essentially our position as well when you consider that form has always existed as a first actuality, creating matter to account for the particular agent, form, is simply a second actuality (no essential change has happened to either substantial forms or the causer.) This isn’t about an ontological analysis of creation from nothingness, the only concern you have is the article of faith the Thomist professes as a Catholic, that the universe has a beginning. I don’t see why you can’t be a non-religious Thomist that professes an eternally existing universe, which is a faith based position as well since that cannot be proven by demonstration either.

 

[belorg]

Typos corrected.

Also another correction, he said it was an article of faith for the universe to have a beginning and not creatio ex nihilo. Creation from nothing doesn’t challenge the notion of an eternally existing universe, only makes it eternally depend on the act of the unmoved mover, a subsisting act.

As far as that quote,

“…whatever is the cause of things considered as beings, must be the cause of things, not only according as they are “such” by accidental forms, nor according as they are “these” by substantial forms, but also according to all that belongs to their being at all in any way. And thus it is necessary to say that also primary matter is created by the universal cause of things.”

I know that’s what Aquinas, says.

In other words, if God is the cause of being or form of things, then what exists on account of these forms, matter, must also be created by that very same universal cause. How can it be tenable that if something existed without cause has the potentiality to the very forms God has in mind?

This presupposes a teleology. But that has to be proved.

But belorg, all this doesn’t challenge your view of unchangeable ontology, which is essentially our position as well when you consider that form has always existed as a first actuality,

Sop far, I can follow your reasoning.

creating matter to account for the particular agent, form, is simply a second actuality (no essential change has happened to either substantial forms or the causer.)

The problem here is accounting for ‘second actuality’. Going from first to second actuality is by definition a change.
No matter how hard you try, the moment you connect this second actuality (which is changeable) to God, you end up with a changeable God. To make this clear, in my argument I use the notion of ‘the whole of reality’
You can only deny that the unchangeable ‘whole of reality’ does not change by positing ‘creation’ as a whole new reality, but once you cannect this whole new reality to the ‘original’ reality (God), it is nonsensical to call this second reality completely new.

This isn’t about an ontological analysis of creation from nothingness, the only concern you have is the article of faith the Thomist professes as a Catholic, that the universe has a beginning. I don’t see why you can’t be a non-religious Thomist that professes an eternally existing universe, which is a faith based position as well since that cannot be proven by demonstration either.

I am not sure how one can be a non-religious Thomist.I, as a athiest have no problem with an eternal universe, but the only possible way for this to lead to our current universe is for this eternal universe to be eternally changeable, which is not a Thomist stance.

Anyway, I do not think we can get out of this impasse, so we’ll have to agree to disagree here, TS. thank you for the interesting duscussion.

 

[Shike]

The problem here is accounting for ‘second actuality’. Going from first to second actuality is by definition a change.
No matter how hard you try, the moment you connect this second actuality (which is changeable) to God, you end up with a changeable God. To make this clear, in my argument I use the notion of ‘the whole of reality’
You can only deny that the unchangeable ‘whole of reality’ does not change by positing ‘creation’ as a whole new reality, but once you cannect this whole new reality to the ‘original’ reality (God), it is nonsensical to call this second reality completely new.

This does not seem to follow if you hold change as the reduction of potency to act.

Also, to say that God is the whole of reality and then talk about changeable reality is to sneak time into what should be an ontological analysis. Instead, one has to take both God and changeable reality into account in an atemporal way. If then the whole of reality is God and changeable reality then we have a different animal to deal with.

I am not sure how one can be a non-religious Thomist.I, as a athiest have no problem with an eternal universe, but the only possible way for this to lead to our current universe is for this eternal universe to be eternally changeable, which is not a Thomist stance.

You could be a non-religious Thomist in the sense that you don’t practice any of the monotheist religions. But I would argue you’d still have to recognize the existence of God.

As for an eternally changeable universe, I think that very well could be a part of a Thomist perspective (see Edward Feser’s book Aquinas). There are two definitions of eternally, however - a) one that takes into account all the successions of time, and b) one that is nontemporal. One could work for a Thomist and one could not.

 

[Shike]

The problem here is accounting for ‘second actuality’. Going from first to second actuality is by definition a change.

The principles used to define change really only care about composite entities (whether in principle or otherwise). And I still have yet to see how such a notion of change has to be involved for a non-composite entity.

As is the case with much of modern philosophy, you seem to be missing out on the philosophy of nature and jumping to logical concepts rather than ontological concepts. Remember when you restated premise 2 of my Pantheism Argument Sub-2 and talked about necessity and possibility? They were modal logical notions through and through.

Aquinas cannot be read like that.

 

[TS_Aquinas]

The problem here is accounting for ‘second actuality’. Going from first to second actuality is by definition a change.

Nothing potentially existed for change to happen (hence the doctrine creatio ex nihilo.)

Anyway, I do not think we can get out of this impasse, so we’ll have to agree to disagree here, TS. thank you for the interesting duscussion.

You’re welcome, hopefully we can continue in the future.

 

[belorg]

You could be a non-religious Thomist in the sense that you don’t practice any of the monotheist religions. But I would argue you’d still have to recognize the existence of God.

I agree that a Thomist does not by definition have to practice any sort of organized religion, but I do think Thomism entails a belief in some sort of deity, albeit a very opaque deity.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Ok, I’ve been through this argument recently but lets see where this goes.

The problem I have always had with this argument is that it skips over the real meat of the question and jumps directly to “this being is what we call God”. The same sudden massive leap that Aquinas made. Now I’m happy to accept for the sake of argument that there was a prime mover (which I’ll refer to as PM for short). This PM is a “something” which happened first.

My question to you is whether you can fill in that gap and give the PM some of the qualities usually associated with the Christian God, instead of just saying “lets just call it God”. Lets start off with “personal being” how do you show that PM is really a personal being?

catholicprimer.org/aquinas/aquinas_summa_contra_gentiles.pdf
newadvent.org/summa/
vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_INDEX.HTM ( Catechism of the Catholic Church)

God said to Abraham, " I am who am. "

Thomas Aquinas and the Church agree that not many have the ability, the time, the perseverence or the interest in pursuing formal " reasons " for believing in God. Yet formal proofs are not necessary, His existence, power, etc are clearly known in the effects of his creation which are open to all with eyes to see. So they have no excuse.( St. Paul ) But not wanting to leave a stone unturned, God revealed Himself to men and made all things known through His Son. He gives all men the grace to believe, of course we can turn our backs on that and loose the grace.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Ok, I’ve been through this argument recently but lets see where this goes.

The problem I have always had with this argument is that it skips over the real meat of the question and jumps directly to “this being is what we call God”. The same sudden massive leap that Aquinas made. Now I’m happy to accept for the sake of argument that there was a prime mover (which I’ll refer to as PM for short). This PM is a “something” which happened first.

My question to you is whether you can fill in that gap and give the PM some of the qualities usually associated with the Christian God, instead of just saying “lets just call it God”. Lets start off with “personal being” how do you show that PM is really a personal being?

No Scholastic Philosopher in the last hundred years that I know of has made that claim - as much as they would have liked to be able to. Thomas did say he was offering five proofs for God’s existence. Judging from the reaction up to the present time the result is mixed and I say that as one who thinks he did succeed. However, the qualities of a First Unmoved Mover, A First Effecient Cause, Himself Uncaused, A Necessarialy Existent Being Who Cannot Not Be, Who causes all possible beings to exist, A Selfsubsistent Existent Being, the Cause of the existence of all other beings, A Final Cause directing the end of every other being are some of the qualities Christianity would ascribe to its God, who is definitely a loving, personal God.

Don’t judge Thomas too harshly. Remember, he lived in an age of faith. When he thought he had demonstrated the existence of God, I’m sure he took it for granted that everyone would recognize that god as the God of Christianity, the God of his Faith, the God of the Bible - a personal God. In his day there were no agnostics or athiests in the civilized world. There were Catholics, Jews, and Muslims. That was it. I don’t know how important this point is to you but that is the best that philosophy can do.

However, if you look at the universe around you, just taking it all in through your senses, just enjoying the beauty, the fantastic order and complexity, the amazing diversity of beings from zero ( so to speak) to a trillion and tens of trillions, the suitability of it all for the existence of humanity one feels compelled to believe in an all loving, personal God, the cause of it all. But then I am looking at it all as one who already believes. To me it seems impossible that some don’t, yet it is apparently true that some don’t, perhaps many.

 

[belorg]

No Scholastic Philosopher in the last hundred years that I know of has made that claim - as much as they would have liked to be able to. Thomas did say he was offering five proofs for God’s existence. Judging from the reaction up to the present time the result is mixed and I say that as one who thinks he did succeed. However, the qualities of a First Unmoved Mover, A First Effecient Cause, Himself Uncaused, A Necessarialy Existent Being Who Cannot Not Be, Who causes all possible beings to exist, A Selfsubsistent Existent Being, the Cause of the existence of all other beings, **A Final Cause directing the end of every other being **are some of the qualities Christianity would ascribe to its God, who is definitely a loving, personal God.

“The Final Cause directing the end of every other being” is the only quality that would point to some sort of intentionality. Unfortunately, even granting FTSOTA that Aquinas proved the existence of a Prime Mover, he never managed to argue succesfully for any sort of intention on the part of that Prime Mover.

 

[Shike]

“The Final Cause directing the end of every other being” is the only quality that would point to some sort of intentionality. Unfortunately, even granting FTSOTA that Aquinas proved the existence of a Prime Mover, he never managed to argue succesfully for any sort of intention on the part of that Prime Mover.

Efficient and final causality go hand in hand. Prove the former and you also have the latter by implication.

 

[belorg]

Efficient and final causality go hand in hand. Prove the former and you also have the latter by implication.

Only on Aquinas notion of causation, which is onl y held by a minority of contemporary philosophers, and which , BTW, cannot be proven either.It’s question-begging to say that efficient and final causaility go hand in hand. Efficient causility in itself does not entail any sort of teleology, while final causility (sort of) does.

 

[Shike]

Only on Aquinas notion of causation, which is onl y held by a minority of contemporary philosophers, and which , BTW, cannot be proven either.It’s question-begging to say that efficient and final causaility go hand in hand. Efficient causility in itself does not entail any sort of teleology, while final causility (sort of) does.

Three points:

• On an Aristotelian notion of causation, yes.
• The truth doesn’t bow to majority opinion.
• I challenge anyone to show me one example of a cause that doesn’t, at least in principle, point to an effect or range of effects. The Aristotelian notion of causation that we are dealing with here can not be disproven. And as far as being correct, I’ll leave that to each individual’s act of apprehension.

More than anything you have many people who misunderstand just what final causality is, not to mention the confusion that mounts over any Aristotelian notion.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

“The Final Cause directing the end of every other being” is the only quality that would point to some sort of intentionality. Unfortunately, even granting FTSOTA that Aquinas proved the existence of a Prime Mover, he never managed to argue succesfully for any sort of intention on the part of that Prime Mover.

I appologise for being obtuse but what is FTSOTA?

 

[Shike]

I appologise for being obtuse but what is FTSOTA?

I assume “For The Sake Of The Argument”.

 

[belorg]

Three points:

• On an Aristotelian notion of causation, yes.
• The truth doesn’t bow to majority opinion.

No, but if a majority of well educated people who are familiar with the matter reject sopme notion, you cannot just assert that this notion is ‘the truth’.

• I challenge anyone to show me one example of a cause that doesn’t, at least in principle, point to an effect or range of effects.

éA cause that points to a range of effects" does not point to an intention. An avalanche e.g. can have a range of effects, but , AFAIK, does not have too many ‘intentions’.

The Aristotelian notion of causation that we are dealing with here can not be disproven. And as far as being correct, I’ll leave that to each individual’s act of apprehension.

.Lots of things cannot be disproven, but the amount of certainty you are shwoing does not merely need something that cannot be disproven, it needs something that is proven to be correct (or at least ios very likely to be correct), something that’s hardly the case with the Aristotelean notion of causation and causality.

 

[belorg]

I appologise for being obtuse but what is FTSOTA?

“For The Sake Of The Argument”, as Shike correctly assumes.

 

[Shike]

No, but if a majority of well educated people who are familiar with the matter reject sopme notion, you cannot just assert that this notion is ‘the truth’.

Too loosey goosey for my tastes.

éA cause that points to a range of effects" does not point to an intention. An avalanche e.g. can have a range of effects, but , AFAIK, does not have too many ‘intentions’.

Intentionality is one kind of final causality.

 

[belorg]

Too loosey goosey for my tastes.

You are the claimant, Shike.

Intentionality is one kind of final causality.

That’s exactly why the First Way (and the other four) does not in any way prove the existence of a personal deity. At most it proves the existence of one ‘kind of final causality’.

 

[Leigh01]

Hi………! Well, be in love with and searching about some think which ordinary people never can understand Meaning. The education about the elementary nature of knowledge and continuation.