A closer look at the first way

  • Thread starter Thread starter AndyT_81
  • Start date Start date
Status
Not open for further replies.
My argument doesn’t address God, it’s focused on the unmoved mover qua unmoved mover.
Perplexity:

To leave it like that is to leave it completely vague. However, in the several actions of my hand using a hammer to drive a nail into some wood, there is an absolute ending to the actions. A nail has been driven into some wood. There is no further action or motion. Shall we then leave the first mover completely vague? Or, shall we extend the chain of movers one more link? And then another, and another, and another, so that we can never get to a first mover? Or shall we give this first mover a name, thus making the entirety of the finite series of actions actually what they are: “a finite series of actions?”

Your response would have us believe that there is a first mover, but that that first mover may not be God. But that can’t be. The first mover of such a chain of movers must be something more than any one or all of the links in that chain. Action and passion are each motion but motion as relating to its active cause on the one hand and to its receiving subject on the other. There is not a necessary unity of motion here.

Your argument depends upon your premise that whatever moves something else must have been a receiver of that perfection as well. That is our point! God is the unmoved mover; He is not nor has He ever been a receiver of motion. To deny this is to continue the impossibility of an infinite series of movers.
The disclaimer agrees with the gist of your point, the difficulties with simultaneous causation, the ordinary meaning of causation etc. But, any causal actions of the unmoved mover would be a-temporal and I didn’t want to question beggingly rule those out.
Since such “difficulties” would leave with us absolute vagary, we admit to a First Cause. The non-admission of such would leave us with the notion that where there was nothing, something came to be and this magical something turned into the first cause. This is far less plausible than admitting that the First Cause always existed and that Christians call Him “God.” Besides, from nothing nothing comes.
This makes perfect sense to me. But, I never said that something with active potency must be causally prior to that thing. I said that in order for a thing to be a mover, its potential to be a mover must first be reduced to act.
And this is precisely the problem! Such a contention projects causation and motion infinitely. And if infinitely, no motion would take place now – as there would be no now.
Huh? All premise (2) says (in your words) is that in order for x to have been “capable of imparting something”, x must have “been able to receive something” (i.e., the property of being the ‘imparter of something’).
But that is circular reasoning. You’re merely re-stating what you are arguing for.
It could accrue new properties by standing in relations it previously didn’t, such as being 10 feet away from an accelerating object instead of the 12 feet away it previously was.
So, purely incidental and absolutely accidental relations are equal to non-incidental and absolutely substantial relations? God, the First Mover, is the relation of the beginning of a series of motions. The stone that I have just finished moving to this or that place is the receiver and, therefore, the relation of the end of the series of motions. 10’ and 12’ are non-essential. The originator of the motion and the recipient of the motion are the real relations.
If it is “absolutely and completely unsubstantiated”, you certainly haven’t shown it to be. All you need to do is defeat one of its premises. Out of your response, the only premise you addressed was (2), but all you said was it ‘inserted’ an ‘infinite being’ into time, and that was illogical. :confused:
And that was and still is sufficient. How can Infinity be a part of time?

God bless,
jd
 
Your response would have us believe that there is a first mover, but that that first mover may not be God. But that can’t be. The first mover of such a chain of movers must be something more than any one or all of the links in that chain. Action and passion are each motion but motion as relating to its active cause on the one hand and to its receiving subject on the other. There is not a necessary unity of motion here.
All it takes for something to be an unmoved mover is for it to actualize something’s potential without being caused to do so. This doesn’t require consciousness, omniscience, or moral perfection, etc.
Your argument depends upon your premise that whatever moves something else must have been a receiver of that perfection as well. That is our point! God is the unmoved mover; He is not nor has He ever been a receiver of motion. To deny this is to continue the impossibility of an infinite series of movers.
You’re still deducing the first mover from the impossibility of an infinite series of movers. You can only do this if an unmoved mover could exist, and since that’s precisely what I’m arguing against, your reply here assumes my argument fails. But, which premise is false? Could you state exactly which premise you’re denying?
And this is precisely the problem! Such a contention projects causation and motion infinitely. And if infinitely, no motion would take place now – as there would be no now.
If I’m understanding you correctly, you’re saying that if there was an infinity of movers, then an infinite amount of motion must have occurred before now. And since an infinite amount can’t be traversed, there would be no now, it would never be reached.

But, this paradox is only generated where there are two points between which an infinite amount exists. In that case, it would make sense to say we could never get from the first point to the second (the present). But, if there was an infinite regression of movers, there would be no first point! There would be no point infinitely distant from now, there’d be no first point at all.

As Aquinas replied to a similar objection, passage is always understood as being from term to term. Whatever mover before now we look at, from it to the present there is a finite number of movers which can be passed through, even if there are an infinity of such movers in total.
So, purely incidental and absolutely accidental relations are equal to non-incidental and absolutely substantial relations? God, the First Mover, is the relation of the beginning of a series of motions. The stone that I have just finished moving to this or that place is the receiver and, therefore, the relation of the end of the series of motions. 10’ and 12’ are non-essential. The originator of the motion and the recipient of the motion are the real relations.
JDaniel, we’re talking about passive potency, which includes both ‘purely incidental and absolutely accidental relations’ and ‘incidental and absolutely substantial relations’.
 
Please note. The Prime Mover is Pure Actuality. In our material universe there is no such entity, all beings of our universe are composed of matter and form, or essences which are composed of matter and form which exist. It exists in another " world. "

The kind of movement/change Aquinas is talking about in the First Way is simultaneous. All the movers and the moved are acting and receiving this instant. Such a series must of necessity end with a First Unmoved Mover who is Unmoved because It is Pure Actuality and because it is Pure Actuality it cannot be Moved or Changed, because it has no " passive " potency, it cannot ever have been nor shall ever be but what it is - Pure Act - a Being which just Is - a Being of Pure Existence, a Being we can scarcely imagine.

Such a Being is not simply the motion/change or our series, it is Outside the series causing the movement, It is not a part of the chain. In a sense It is causing the motion/chainge not only " at a distance " but from a different plane of reality altogether, from a " world " where there is no and can be no time. The fact that it moves other beings implies no change in itself ; for, as pure act, it cannot change. It moves others by Will. That is something we cannot understand but it is a necessary conclusion.

And by the way, a Pure Actuality is necessarily self subsistant, owing its existence to no other, necessarily limitless and boundless in Existence, the source of all the movement/change, beings, perfections existing in them, the efficient, formal, and final cause of all that exists and the Intellect and Will that accomplishes all and directs all in the universe.

Disagree with it if you want, but don’t say this is not what Thomas argues for. Given this understanding it is perfectly right that he called this Pure Actuality God. Because the God of Christianity has these attributes and move.

👍👍
 
All it takes for something to be an unmoved mover is for it to actualize something’s potential without being caused to do so. This doesn’t require consciousness, omniscience, or moral perfection, etc.
Perplexity:

And humanity and science have seen this phenomenon occur how many times? If mankind has never, ever seen it occur, and it doesn’t appear in any historical records, it is safe to conclude that it doesn’t occur. Otherwise we’re talking comic book reality, not human reality.
You’re still deducing the first mover from the impossibility of an infinite series of movers. You can only do this if an unmoved mover could exist, and since that’s precisely what I’m arguing against, your reply here assumes my argument fails. But, which premise is false? Could you state exactly which premise you’re denying?
"Your Argument:
  1. If x is a mover, x had active potency.
  2. If x had active potency, x had passive potency.
  3. If x had passive potency, x is not an unmoved mover.
  4. Therefore, if x is a mover, x is not an unmoved mover."
Premise 1. The problems begin with the first premise: this premise treats the first mover as just any other mover in the chain. But, since mankind has never, ever seen a mover that was unquestionably the first mover, that was able to do, and did what our first mover is postulated to have done, we have no justification for assuming it is nothing other than just one more moved mover. A first Unmoved mover cannot have the exact same properties as does all other movers. It was NOT a moved mover; all other movers are. It is NOT an effect; all others are effects. It was NOT moved into being; all others were. It is the pinnacle of Being in the category of being; NO other beings are; It is the Final Cause of all else; No other thing can make that claim.

In saying the above, I am saying that x could not have had “passive potency.” In order to have passive potency, it would have to be a “receiver” (of some motion or action). We have said, and I have shown, that this claim is not possible or plausible

Furthermore, “active potency” strongly suggest that a first mover is capable of “motion.” This too is impossible. The first mover could not have been finite/physical substance and be capable of doing what was and is being done. Only finite/physical substances can have active potency. Motion requires not only “space,” but also, “place.” That which is mobile must be capable of being moved through space, from one place to another place. If our first mover/cause is infinite, as I am arguing, there is no space in which to move, nor are there any places that are the before and after of movement.

Premise 2. There is no axiom for your second premise. That is nothing more than a mental construct. By the very fact that It had no antecedent and, therefore, no mover/cause/creator, it could not have had either potency.

Premise 3. This premise is also defective: here you are assuming that x had passive potency, which you have not been successful in satisfactorily proving.

Premise 4. Your fourth conclusion is unwarranted and irrelevant since it assumes evidence not in evidence.
If I’m understanding you correctly, you’re saying that if there was an infinity of movers, then an infinite amount of motion must have occurred before now. And since an infinite amount can’t be traversed, there would be no now, it would never be reached.
No. I am saying that “if” essentially subordinated movers were in motion infinitely, there would be no Now. Remember, in mathematics, any “part” of an infinity is infinite. For there to be motion in any now within an actual infinity, would mean that we would have had to traverse an infinity of Now’s.
But, this paradox is only generated where there are two points between which an infinite amount exists. In that case, it would make sense to say we could never get from the first point to the second (the present). But, if there was an infinite regression of movers, there would be no first point! There would be no point infinitely distant from now, there’d be no first point at all.
😉 Nice try! What you are saying means there is no Now. Infinity means interminable. How would a “terminable Now” exist where there is naught but the “interminable?” If there is no first point, then there is no second point, or third point, or fourth point, etc. There would be nothing.
As Aquinas replied to a similar objection, passage is always understood as being from term to term. Whatever mover before now we look at, from it to the present there is a finite number of movers which can be passed through, even if there are an infinity of such movers in total.
Not so. As I pointed out earlier, if infinity was separable into parts, any and all parts would be likewise infinite.
JDaniel, we’re talking about passive potency, which includes both ‘purely incidental and absolutely accidental relations’ and ‘incidental and absolutely substantial relations’.
Not so. Active potency is motion’s relation to the agent, i.e., mover. Passive potency is motion’s relation to the receiver of motion from an agent. You must remember, what St. Thomas is speaking to is the same motion with differing relations. This means that there is a unity of motion only in each of the separate moving things. For example, if God moves my intellect, that then moves my will, that moves my nervous system, that then moves my muscles, that then moves my arm, that then moves my hand, that then moves a stick, that then moves a stone, there appears a unity of motion. But that motion is differentiated by each of the components of the apparent unity. This is what Aquinas is speaking to in this regard.

God bless,
jd
 
Not so. Active potency is motion’s relation to the agent, i.e., mover. Passive potency is motion’s relation to the receiver of motion from an agent. You must remember, what St. Thomas is speaking to is the same motion with differing relations. This means that there is a unity of motion only in each of the separate moving things. For example, if God moves my intellect, that then moves my will, that moves my nervous system, that then moves my muscles, that then moves my arm, that then moves my hand, that then moves a stick, that then moves a stone, there appears a unity of motion. But that motion is differentiated by each of the components of the apparent unity. This is what Aquinas is speaking to in this regard.
God bless,
jd
You are doing a good job Mark. But you realize some people have a vested interest ( i.e. an ideology, philosophically, politically, morally, etc) which prevents them from acknowledging the truth of your ( Thomas’ ) argument. In other words, they will never accept anything which points to or even hints at the existence of the Almighty. Because that would have immediate and imortant consequences in their personal lives and in their world view in general. Once that bridge is crossed ones personal responsibility and the eternal consequences have to be faced. Of course they can be faced and ignored but the facts will not be changed. And that is the reason Thomas has always been so strongly attacked. They imagine that without him the Faith has no reasonable intellectual support. Of course that is incorrect. People have always had perfectly good reasons for their faith .Even if some things cannot be " proven, "’ at least they are seen as not unreasonable. 👍
 
I’ve always been baffled at how folks can think those who disagree with their conclusions aren’t doing so on intellectually honest grounds. I can assure you Linus, mine and other’s rejection of Catholicism, Christianity, and the Five Ways isn’t half as romantic as you imagine. It simply comes down us firmly believe there are excellent reasons to regard these positions as false. That’s it. I’m not trying to avoid the moral implications of the Christian God’s existence (though I’d probably struggle with sin like anyone else if I came to believe again). It’s just that (i) there are no good arguments for these positions, and (ii) there are good arguments against them. It really is that dull and boring.
 
I’ve always been baffled at how folks can think those who disagree with their conclusions aren’t doing so on intellectually honest grounds. I can assure you Linus, mine and other’s rejection of Catholicism, Christianity, and the Five Ways isn’t half as romantic as you imagine. It simply comes down us firmly believe there are excellent reasons to regard these positions as false. That’s it. I’m not trying to avoid the moral implications of the Christian God’s existence (though I’d probably struggle with sin like anyone else if I came to believe again). It’s just that (i) there are no good arguments for these positions, and (ii) there are good arguments against them. It really is that dull and boring.
Nothing you have said here is true. You simply do not understand the arguments, and your pride won’t allow you to understand them.
 
JDaniel: Thank you for your criticisms. I’ll try to respond as best I can.

Premise (1) just says that in order for something to be a ‘mover’, it must have had active potency. You respond by arguing that to attribute ‘active potency’ to the unmoved mover is to treat it as a moved mover, the implication being that only moved movers can have active potency (you gave several reasons for this, but we need only address the claim these reasons were used to support).

In reply, I’d say that I think there are good reasons to believe the unmoved mover could have active potency and that if it couldn’t, we have even stronger reason to doubt its existence.

As the Thomist Fr. W. Norris Clarke, S.J. says:

(a) Passive potency = the capacity to receive some actual perfection. (b) Active potency = the power to act, to do something, given the proper conditions. The former implies some incompleteness on its own, hence cannot be found in God; the second implies no incompleteness or imperfection, hence can be found in God: God has the power (active potency) to create the world or not.” - Clarke, W. Norris. The One and the Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 2002. p. 318

Saying that the unmoved mover had active potency is actually the only way to avoid saying its actions flowed from its nature necessarily, as if it was unable to make any choices. If it didn’t have to act, then it could have refrained from acting. That is, it would have had the potential to act or to refrain from acting (i.e., active potency).

But, suppose we’re wrong and the unmoved mover cannot have active potency. We should still accept my first premise because it’s actually contradictory to deny it.

Remember, a mover is just something that actualizes a potency, and active potency is just the ability to do something. So, to reject the first premise, you must accept that something can actualize a potency even though it was unable to actualize that potency. But, if it really was unable to actualize the potency (i.e., if it had no active potency), then it could not have actualized the potency (i.e., been a mover).

So, if the unmoved mover cannot exist if premise (1) is true, and it is a contradiction to deny premise (1), then we have the best reason we could for rejecting the existence of an unmoved mover.
Premise 2. There is no axiom for your second premise. That is nothing more than a mental construct. By the very fact that It had no antecedent and, therefore, no mover/cause/creator, it could not have had either potency.
Premise (2) is just a conditional claim JDaniel, it just says that if something had active potency, then it had passive potency. It’s not saying that anything has active or passive potency, much less that the unmoved mover does or would.

To deny premise (2) is simply to say that a thing can have active potency without having passive potency. But, what does this mean? You’d have to say that a thing can be able to cause something (have active potency) even if it’s unable to become a cause (have passive potency). But, this isn’t coherent. If it caused something, it’d become a cause of that thing. Therefore, it can’t be able to cause unless it’s able to become a cause.
Premise 3. This premise is also defective: here you are assuming that x had passive potency, which you have not been successful in satisfactorily proving.
Premise (3) is a conditional statement as well. It’s not saying that something has passive potency, it’s saying if something had passive potency, then it would be a moved mover. You agreed to this in your response to premise (1) where you said an unmoved mover couldn’t have passive potency, or undergo motion etc.
Premise 4. Your fourth conclusion is unwarranted and irrelevant since it assumes evidence not in evidence.
(4) is just the logical deduction from (1)-(3). It’s true if and only if (1)-(3) are true.
No. I am saying that “if” essentially subordinated movers were in motion infinitely, there would be no Now. Remember, in mathematics, any “part” of an infinity is infinite. For there to be motion in any now within an actual infinity, would mean that we would have had to traverse an infinity of Now’s.
In set theory, a set is countable if each of its elements can be counted one at a time (i.e., are finite). There are many countably infinite sets in set theory.

I’ll have to think about your other points more.
 
Nothing you have said here is true. You simply do not understand the arguments, and your pride won’t allow you to understand them.
This really is a ridiculous statement considering I’ve said a number of things here that are undeniably true such as that my argument is logically valid, that you cannot deduce the existence of an unmoved mover from the impossibility of an infinite regression of moved movers unless an unmoved mover is possible, etc. etc.

And why should we believe you that I’m misunderstanding “the arguments”? From my experience of you elsewhere here you’re certainly not qualified to say who is and who isn’t understanding Aquinas’ arguments, so I’m not going to agree with you on your word alone. I suspect I left a bad taste in your mouth from the other thread and you’re venting (which would explain the ‘pride’ remark). But, pride shouldn’t enter the equation. This is only about whether or not my argument succeeds.
 
This really is a ridiculous statement considering I’ve said a number of things here that are undeniably true such as that my argument is logically valid, that you cannot deduce the existence of an unmoved mover from the impossibility of an infinite regression of moved movers unless an unmoved mover is possible, etc. etc.
If you know an infinite regress is impossible, then you have no choice but to accept the existence of a unmoved mover; it does not matter whether or not you know that such is possible. It has to be possible if an infinite regress is impossible.
 
I’ve always been baffled at how folks can think those who disagree with their conclusions aren’t doing so on intellectually honest grounds. I can assure you Linus, mine and other’s rejection of Catholicism, Christianity, and the Five Ways isn’t half as romantic as you imagine. It simply comes down us firmly believe there are excellent reasons to regard these positions as false. That’s it. I’m not trying to avoid the moral implications of the Christian God’s existence (though I’d probably struggle with sin like anyone else if I came to believe again). It’s just that (i) there are no good arguments for these positions, and (ii) there are good arguments against them. It really is that dull and boring.
I’m certainly glad to learn that, it makes you one of the exceptions among all those I have heard. But you do know your logic is wrong and Thomas’ is correct. 👍👍
 
You are doing a good job Mark. But you realize some people have a vested interest ( i.e. an ideology, philosophically, politically, morally, etc) which prevents them from acknowledging the truth of your ( Thomas’ ) argument. In other words, they will never accept anything which points to or even hints at the existence of the Almighty. Because that would have immediate and important consequences in their personal lives and in their world view in general. Once that bridge is crossed ones personal responsibility and the eternal consequences have to be faced. Of course they can be faced and ignored but the facts will not be changed. And that is the reason Thomas has always been so strongly attacked. They imagine that without him the Faith has no reasonable intellectual support. Of course that is incorrect. People have always had perfectly good reasons for their faith .Even if some things cannot be " proven, "’ at least they are seen as not unreasonable. 👍
Linusthe2nd:

Yes, I do realize what you say is true. But, I offered in good faith to undertake the endeavor and, in good faith, I wish to keep my promise. Even if I can’t convince my opponents, maybe someone else will follow the conversations and will be solidified in their beliefs. It takes reason sometimes. Thank you for you support.

God bless,
jd
 
If you know an infinite regress is impossible, then you have no choice but to accept the existence of a unmoved mover; it does not matter whether or not you know that such is possible. It has to be possible if an infinite regress is impossible.
Reap: What happens if you’re just as confident that an unmoved mover can’t exist as you are that an infinite regression is impossible? You’d suspend judgment. You’d say ‘I know either an unmoved mover or an infinite regression has to exist, but the reasons against both seem equally good, so it’s unclear to me which one does.’

That’s the very least I can force the Thomist to concede. At most, I might be able to convince them that an infinite regression is possible, but I don’t need to. My arguments attempt to show that an unmoved mover cannot exist and thus intend to force the Thomist into agnosticism with respect to the unmoved mover.
 
JDaniel: Thank you for your criticisms. I’ll try to respond as best I can.

Premise (1) just says that in order for something to be a ‘mover’, it must have had active potency. You respond by arguing that to attribute ‘active potency’ to the unmoved mover is to treat it as a moved mover, the implication being that only moved movers can have active potency (you gave several reasons for this, but we need only address the claim these reasons were used to support).

In reply, I’d say that I think there are good reasons to believe the unmoved mover could have active potency and that if it couldn’t, we have even stronger reason to doubt its existence.
Perplexity:

I’m sure you would agree that there must be a difference between a “moved mover” and an “unmoved-mover,” right? What would you suggest that the differences(s) are?
As the Thomist Fr. W. Norris Clarke, S.J. says:
(a) Passive potency = the capacity to receive some actual perfection. (b) Active potency = the power to act, to do something, given the proper conditions. The former implies some incompleteness on its own, hence cannot be found in God; the second implies no incompleteness or imperfection, hence can be found in God: God has the power (active potency) to create the world or not.” - Clarke, W. Norris. The One and the Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 2002. p. 318
I disagree. The Catholic Church does not regard God as a being which, therefore, possesses attributes, such as a man would possess tallness. God is Being as being, i.e., the very origin of being qua being. This proceeds from St. Thomas’ Fourth Way. Thus, if a person claims to be a Thomist, said person cannot ignore the Fourth Way, or he is not a Thomist.
Saying that the unmoved mover had active potency is actually the only way to avoid saying its actions flowed from its nature necessarily, as if it was unable to make any choices.
Not so. His thoughts, which you are conflating as actions, must flow necessarily. But, the content of those thoughts need not in any way be be necessesitated as though Free Will was absent.
If it didn’t have to act, then it could have refrained from acting.
You continue to miss the point: God does not per se “act.” God Thinks and Wills. No action or activity. Those are human determinants.
That is, it would have had the potential to act or to refrain from acting (i.e., active potency).
Again, what you are describing are strictly human determinants. God has the ability to think thoughts and will them or not. These are not actions. When I think of a million dollars, it is a mere fiction of the mind. There is no action associated with it. Likewise, God thinks “thoughts,” but until He wills them into existence, they remain fictions. But never is a willing an action, per se.
But, suppose we’re wrong and the unmoved mover cannot have active potency. We should still accept my first premise because it’s actually contradictory to deny it.
Not so. It is not contradictory in any manner whatsoever. Contradictions involve antipathetical things within the same order: such as this apple is green and red. You are calling green and small contradictory. They are not.
Remember, a mover is just something that actualizes a potency, and active potency is just the ability to do something. So, to reject the first premise, you must accept that something can actualize a potency even though it was unable to actualize that potency. But, if it really was unable to actualize the potency (i.e., if it had no active potency), then it could not have actualized the potency (i.e., been a mover).
Defined as hereinabove, I have no problem with this part of your argument.
So, if the unmoved mover cannot exist if premise (1) is true,
Premise # 1 is: “If x is a mover, x had active potency.” I’m not OK with it the way it is formulated. If, OTOH, it said, “If x is a mover, x has active potency,” I would be OK.
and it is a contradiction to deny premise (1), then we have the best reason we could for rejecting the existence of an unmoved mover.
If what you say was true. But, what you say is not true.
Premise (2) is just a conditional claim JDaniel, it just says that if something had active potency, then it had passive potency. It’s not saying that anything has active or passive potency, much less that the unmoved mover does or would.
It is a conditional claim that is completely unwarranted. In it, you are tying the claim that anything with active potency, has to have had passive potency. While that is true of all physical beings, it cannot be true of the First Mover. Hence, it must be denied of the First Mover.

continued . . .
 
continuation . . .
To deny premise (2) is simply to say that a thing can have active potency without having passive potency. But, what does this mean? You’d have to say that a thing can be able to cause something (have active potency) even if it’s unable to become a cause (have passive potency). But, this isn’t coherent. If it caused something, it’d become a cause of that thing. Therefore, it can’t be able to cause unless it’s able to become a cause.
This is your biggest problem. Precisely because an infinite past time does not exist and is impossible, we claim that God is both: an unmoved-Mover, and an un-caused-Cause. Logically, we are left with no other choices.
Premise (3) is a conditional statement as well. It’s not saying that something has passive potency, it’s saying if something had passive potency, then it would be a moved mover. You agreed to this in your response to premise (1) where you said an unmoved mover couldn’t have passive potency, or undergo motion etc.
Actually, I didn’t agree to it. Because of some slick and muddy word-play, my initial perception of your meaning of “potency” was different from how you defined it above. Further, you are introducing “time” again after you yourself affirmed that “time” was not to play a part in your argument. I disagree with: “if something had passive potency, then it would be a moved mover.” I would never agree with such a statement – unless we were speaking of the physical realm absolutely.

“You agreed to this in your response to premise (1) where you said an unmoved mover couldn’t have passive potency, or undergo motion etc.” This is cute word-play. But does not represent my position, nor anything I said – you know it (and so does everyone else. But, nice try, but you left out a great deal!)
(4) is just the logical deduction from (1)-(3). It’s true if and only if (1)-(3) are true.
Here we have an example of a poor dialectical induction.
In set theory, a set is countable if each of its elements can be counted one at a time (i.e., are finite). There are many countably infinite sets in set theory.
Wait. You just said “theory.” Set theory is useful to mankind only because it can show a number line that, as a mental fiction, trails off to infinity. This means that it is an “abstraction.” The shorthand notation for an infinite set is not drawn that way for convenience. It is drawn that way because in actuality it would be impossible to be or be drawn. Can you draw an actual infinite set for us? Go ahead, we’ll wait.

God bless,
jd
 
Reap: What happens if you’re just as confident that an unmoved mover can’t exist as you are that an infinite regression is impossible? You’d suspend judgment. You’d say ‘I know either an unmoved mover or an infinite regression has to exist, but the reasons against both seem equally good, so it’s unclear to me which one does.’
Perplexity:

I would say that our conclusion has much more merit than yours. Why? Because things exist. Because things move - just as St. Thomas describes. Because things come into being - just as St. Thomas describes.

OTOH, your premise concludes to nothingness. The only way your conclusion is true is if . . . . none of this was, is not, or ever could take place.
That’s the very least I can force the Thomist to concede. At most, I might be able to convince them that an infinite regression is possible, but I don’t need to. My arguments attempt to show that an unmoved mover cannot exist and thus intend to force the Thomist into agnosticism with respect to the unmoved mover.
That’s the least we can force the atheist to concede. You cannot convince any good mathematician that an infinite regression is possible. Your intentions being all well and good, are, unfortunately, not provable, just like your proofs.

God bless,
jd
 
JDaniel: Much of your reply is about what God can or would do, including thoughts, actions, will etc. You seemed to have moved from talk of an unmoved mover to God because my citation of Fr. Clarke mentioned God in it. But, just used Fr. Clarke to illustrate my point that in Thomism, the unmoved mover has active potency. I haven’t conceded that the unmoved mover would be capable of thought, or will etc. It also doesn’t seem like you could show that it would from the First Way. You’d have to employ some other argument (you alluded to the fourth way) for this. So, for now, I’m just going to stick to the unmoved mover as such:

A thing is a ‘mover’ if it actualizes something’s potency, it’s ‘moved’ if it was caused to do so, and ‘unmoved’ if it wasn’t caused to do so.
Not so. It is not contradictory in any manner whatsoever. Contradictions involve antipathetical things within the same order: such as this apple is green and red. You are calling green and small contradictory. They are not.
A contradiction is just the affirmation of a proposition with its negation: p & ~p.

It’s a contradiction to deny premise (1) because you end up affirming that something is able to actualize a potency and that it’s not able to. This because if something actualizes a potency (i.e., is a mover), it’s a fortiori able to actualize a potency. But, if it doesn’t have any active potency, then it’s not able to actualize a potency. Therefore, in saying something can be a mover without active potency, you end up affirming that something is and isn’t able to actualize a potency.
Premise # 1 is: “If x is a mover, x had active potency.” I’m not OK with it the way it is formulated. If, OTOH, it said, “If x is a mover, x has active potency,” I would be OK.
Given my stated understanding of (1), it’s logically equivalent with your reformulation of it. But, I don’t understand how you could be ok with your reformulation since it logically commits you to believing the unmoved mover has active potency:

1*. If x is a mover, x has active potency. [You said you’d be ok with this]
2*. The unmoved mover is a mover. [You believe this]
3*. Therefore, the unmoved mover has active potency. [You deny this]
It is a conditional claim that is completely unwarranted. In it, you are tying the claim that anything with active potency, has to have had passive potency. While that is true of all physical beings, it cannot be true of the First Mover. Hence, it must be denied of the First Mover.
It’s precisely because this would not be true of the First Mover that we have such good reason to disbelieve in any such First Mover. If something could have active potency but not passive potency, then it could be able to cause X, but be unable to become the cause of X. This is unintelligible though. If you cause X, you thereby become the (or a) cause of X. :confused:
This is your biggest problem. Precisely because an infinite past time does not exist and is impossible, we claim that God is both: an unmoved-Mover, and an un-caused-Cause. Logically, we are left with no other choices.
As I’ve said before, you can be just as sure that infinities are actually impossible as that an unmoved mover cannot exist. I’m giving reason to think an unmoved mover cannot exist. This would mean you’d have to suspend judgment on the matter: you know either an unmoved mover exists or the past is infinite, but don’t know which one it is since they both seem absurd.
Wait. You just said “theory.” Set theory is useful to mankind only because it can show a number line that, as a mental fiction, trails off to infinity. This means that it is an “abstraction.” The shorthand notation for an infinite set is not drawn that way for convenience. It is drawn that way because in actuality it would be impossible to be or be drawn. Can you draw an actual infinite set for us? Go ahead, we’ll wait.
You said in mathematics, every element of an infinite is itself infinite. I proved this false since in set-theory (the very foundations of all mathematics), elements of infinites can be finite.

Why would I need to draw an actual infinite set? You said actual infinites are impossible. All I need to do to prove that false is show that they’re possible. I don’t need to actually draw one to do that. We don’t need to be able to see one, or any such thing in order for them to be possible.
 
JDaniel: Much of your reply is about what God can or would do, including thoughts, actions, will etc. You seemed to have moved from talk of an unmoved mover to God because my citation of Fr. Clarke mentioned God in it. But, just used Fr. Clarke to illustrate my point that in

Thomism, the unmoved mover has active potency. I haven’t conceded that the unmoved mover would be capable of thought, or will etc. It also doesn’t seem like you could show that it would from the First Way. You’d have to employ some other argument (you alluded to the fourth way) for this.
Perplexity:

That a First Mover might have attributes that are god-like only stands to reason. There cannot be an inert first mover. A first mover that originally did and continues to move ALL ELSE, is much more than a thing that has no “plan.” If that were the case, there would be no order to the motion that we see. Instead, we only occasionally see anomalies. When we see these sorts of things we call them aberrations, accidents, or chance events. In this wise, they have been understood by men as causes that are the result of dual (at least) normally ordered causes. We admit that dual causes can and do exist. However, we further admit that they are very highly unusual. Something inert and thoughtless might be ascribed to be a “mover” by some, but clearly only a few, which I conceive to do so precisely because they have, um, shall we say, “ulterior motives.”
So, for now, I’m just going to stick to the unmoved mover as such:
A thing is a ‘mover’ if it actualizes something’s potency, it’s ‘moved’ if it was caused to do so, and ‘unmoved’ if it wasn’t caused to do so.
This is fine, but don’t forget that this statement, and its corollary, are “analytical statements” with regard to “motion” proper. It is only when something else is added to the concept of motion that action and passion are seen to be different. When this something else that is added to motion is the relation of the agent to motion, we are considering action; and when this something else that is added to motion is the relation of the recipient to motion, we are considering passion.
A contradiction is just the affirmation of a proposition with its negation: p & ~p.
Not so. A contradiction may also be the ontological juxtaposition of two (or more) extant realities existing at the same time, in the same place and in the same respect, such as a cat both dead and alive.
It’s a contradiction to deny premise (1) because you end up affirming that something is able to actualize a potency and that it’s not able to. This because if something actualizes a potency (i.e., is a mover), it’s a fortiori able to actualize a potency. But, if it doesn’t have any active potency, then it’s not able to actualize a potency. Therefore, in saying something can be a mover without active potency, you end up affirming that something is and isn’t able to actualize a potency.
As I said, I have no problem with this as stated. I do have a problem with it if it is conflated with the meaning of potency, in the relation of the word “potency” in the dichotomy of act and potency. That would be an equivocation. Again, remember, the use of the word “potency” in the above is about a power that is, at least for the moment, unused, i.e., not brought to bear. As the word is used in the dichotomous relationship of “act” and “potency,” it means an absence (of something).
Given my stated understanding of (1), it’s logically equivalent with your reformulation of it. But, I don’t understand how you could be OK with your reformulation since it logically commits you to believing the unmoved mover has active potency:
As I have said, numerous times now, the notions of “active potency” and “passive potency” have to do with reifying “motion.” They are not properties possessed by something as is “act,” i.e., the act of existing, or “potency,” as is “not existing.”

As I said earlier, “motion is one. As by the agent, it is action; as in or out of the recipient, it is passion. Can you not see that these cannot relate to the same entity? Action and passion are each motion but motion as relating to its active cause on the one hand and to its receiving subject on the other. (Commentary on the Physics, Bk. III, les. 5, n. 620, St. Thomas Aquinas). Therefore, since they do not refer to the same entity, they cannot inhere in the same entity.

Physical things, have both active and passive potencies precisely because they are moved by an antecedent and may move a consequent. But, that does not require that both inhere in the same agent by virtue of the same motion. Usually, they inhere in the same agent by virtue of distinct motions.

continued . . .
 
continuation . . .
1*. If x is a mover, x has active potency. [You said you’d be OK with this]
2*. The unmoved mover is a mover. [You believe this]
3*. Therefore, the unmoved mover has active potency. [You deny this]
I affirm it as a “relation,” but deny it as an objective “property.”
It’s precisely because this would not be true of the First Mover that we have such good reason to disbelieve in any such First Mover. If something could have active potency but not passive potency, then it could be able to cause X, but be unable to become the cause of X. This is unintelligible though. If you cause X, you thereby become the (or a) cause of X. :confused:
And this is the confusion that emanates from the misunderstanding of things that are considered equivocally, as previously explained.
As I’ve said before, you can be just as sure that infinities are actually impossible as that an unmoved mover cannot exist. I’m giving reason to think an unmoved mover cannot exist. This would mean you’d have to suspend judgment on the matter: you know either an unmoved mover exists or the past is infinite, but don’t know which one it is since they both seem absurd.
But, you are doing it clandestinely. If you would truly speak of “active potency” and “passive potency” in the light of day, you would not be able to front that absurdity. On the other hand, I am truly speaking of “infinity” in the light of day and reason. All numbers on the real number line are actual and unique. Infinity is not. The real number line is clearly not delineated by any such thing as the number of “infinity.” “Infinity” clearly means indeterminate and open-ended.
You said in mathematics, every element of an infinite is itself infinite. I proved this false since in set-theory (the very foundations of all mathematics), elements of infinites can be finite.
Set-theory is not the very foundation of all mathematics. Real Numbers are. Furthermore, they did not have that name before Imaginary Numbers were thought of. They got called “Real” because they were not “imaginary.” “Infinity,” thought of as a “number” is imaginary. As I said, show us a “real infinity.” Anywhere in the real universe.
Why would I need to draw an actual infinite set? You said actual infinites are impossible.
I know you are but what am I? Please!
All I need to do to prove that false is show that they’re possible.
Not so. If that were the case, anything that I can imagine should then be real. Right now, I am imagining a square circle. So it too is real, I suppose. 🤷
I don’t need to actually draw one to do that. We don’t need to be able to see one, or any such thing in order for them to be possible.
Unfortunately for you, in this case, YES YOU DO!

God bless,
jd
 
Premise (1) just says that in order for something to be a ‘mover’, it must have had active potency. You respond by arguing that to attribute ‘active potency’ to the unmoved mover is to treat it as a moved mover, the implication being that only moved movers can have active potency (you gave several reasons for this, but we need only address the claim these reasons were used to support).
The term " active potency " is merely a convention of speech. It is meant to emphasize the fact that the Unmoved Mover, though a pure actuality, is active in trillions upon trillions of ways while remaining One and Uncomposed and the Cause of all that is or that happens. On the other hand " active potency " is properly attributed to " secondary " causes that move potentialities to actuality.
In reply, I’d say that I think there are good reasons to believe the unmoved mover could have active potency and that if it couldn’t, we have even stronger reason to doubt its existence.
Thomas makes it clear numerous times that there is no potentiality of any kind in the Pure Actuality of the Unmoved Mover ( who we all call God)

A mere convention of speech to help explain the the Pure Actuality of God is anything but inactive.
Saying that the unmoved mover had active potency is actually the only way to avoid saying its actions flowed from its nature necessarily, as if it was unable to make any choices. If it didn’t have to act, then it could have refrained from acting. That is, it would have had the potential to act or to refrain from acting (i.e., active potency).
You gratuitously manufacture false premisses of your own design claiming that they ares what Thomas meant or worse the only things he could have meant. Then you put words in his mouth, put your own intrepretation on what they mean for Thomas, then conclude in a false delimma, which supposedly makes Thomas look the fool. Pure sophistry.

Your premisses are not those of St. Thomas and therefore do not merit a response.
There is no delimma because your premisses are incorrect.
But, suppose we’re wrong and the unmoved mover cannot have active potency. We should still accept my first premise because it’s actually contradictory to deny it.
You see, your delimma doesn’t exist. It certainly doesn’t apply to St. Thomas.
Remember, a mover is just something that actualizes a potency, and active potency is just the ability to do something. So, to reject the first premise, you must accept that something can actualize a potency even though it was unable to actualize that potency. But, if it really was unable to actualize the potency (i.e., if it had no active potency), then it could not have actualized the potency (i.e., been a mover).
False delimma as I pointed out to you in an earlier post.
So, if the unmoved mover cannot exist if premise (1) is true, and it is a contradiction to deny premise (1), then we have the best reason we could for rejecting the existence of an unmoved mover.
False conclusion based on false premisses. No delimma because your premisses is false and you have placed your own preconceived interpretations on the meaning of the term " active potency " and you confuse the meaning of mover in the universe of composit beings and Unmoved Mover that exists outside this universe but can act upon the creatures of this universe moving them, causing them, causing them to act, directing them and giving them existence and mantaining them in existence.

Your whole problem is that you have not confronted St. Thomas, you have opposed him with a false construct that does not reflect the reality of his argument.
Premise (2) is just a conditional claim JDaniel, it just says that if something had active potency, then it had passive potency. It’s not saying that anything has active or passive potency, much less that the unmoved mover does or would.
The conditional is false. And the implications are false. A composit being is composed of act and potency period. " active potency " is a convention of speech to illustrate the difference between the " act " of a being and its " potency. " It has no ontological existence or reality. On the other hand, " potency " does, it is that component of a being subject to change.
To deny premise (2) is simply to say that a thing can have active potency without having passive potency. But, what does this mean? You’d have to say that a thing can be able to cause something (have active potency) even if it’s unable to become a cause (have passive potency). But, this isn’t coherent. If it caused something, it’d become a cause of that thing. Therefore, it can’t be able to cause unless it’s able to become a cause.
It isn’t coherent because you rigged the entire sophistry to get that outcome. Big deal.
There is no delimma because the whole construct is false from beginning to end.
(4) is just the logical deduction from (1)-(3). It’s true if and only if (1)-(3) are true.
There is nothing logical in the whole construct.
In set theory, a set is countable if each of its elements can be counted one at a time (i.e., are finite). There are many countably infinite sets in set theory.
And lets get out of set theory. We are realists here. We don’t live or die by some esoteric modern theory of knowledge, that’s what’s wrong with the " smart " people today. They have been doped up to the gills with esoteric theory which means nothing and was never meant to mean anything except to the author of the theory or text.

So what alternative would you offer to St. Thomas anyway. Nothing in it but matter I bet.
We are all just little atoms bumping along endlessly. How exciting. 🤷
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Back
Top