A colossal accident?

[James1215]

They are the exact same thing. A proposition is not just a sentence, but it is the content and meaning. A proposition written in different languages, or in a different way are still the same if there meaning is the same. In this case the propositions mean the same thing. You have just admitted that your proposition fails. Not that everyone didn’t know that 50 years ago.

Well it is interesting that you finally resort to looking at the meaning of what I’m saying, but only to make another spurious counter.

Is there no difference in meaning between asserting a proposition provisionally and asserting it with certainty? What do these words - ‘provisionally’ and ‘with certainty’ - mean? Are they compatible? If not, how can the two propositions in question be

the exact same thing

That doesn’t seem like the thinking of a rationalist… but a desperate irrationalist!

 

[warpspeedpetey]

Well it is interesting that you finally resort to looking at the meaning of what I’m saying, but only to make another spurious counter.

I have been looking at the meaning of the proposition you assert for hundreds of posts now.

Is there no difference in meaning between asserting a proposition provisionally and asserting it with certainty?

Nope, there isn’t. The content or meaning of the proposition does not change based on the intent of the speaker.

What do these words - ‘provisionally’ and ‘with certainty’ - mean? Are they compatible? If not, how can the two propositions in question be

Because the two propositions mean the same thing.

1. “Experience is required for knowledge”.
2. ‘we are certain that all knowledge is based on experience’

That doesn’t seem like the thinking of a rationalist… but a desperate irrationalist!

Says the guy who has spent 700 posts trying to prove the experts, demonstrations, and historical facts are all wrong.

 

[James1215]

The meaning of propositions differ according to the intent of the speaker.

What would it mean to declare that I believe in God, if I do not?

Is the meaning of the statement “The sun releases energy through nuclear fusion” not dependent upon things outside of the content? It is a hypothesis if a scientist claims it, learning if a layman says it, and knowledge if the layman says it with awareness of its truth. It might be a dogma if there was no evidence for it, it would be erroneous if evidence went against it, and it would not be knowledge unless it was held true with an awareness of its validity.

These points should illustrate that you cannot get the totality of the meaning of a statement without appreciating its context. However, your main point, which is predicated on a different meaning of ‘meaning’, is also false. There is a difference between these two propositions; they are not equivalent:

1. We are certain that experience is necessary for knowledge
2. We have reason to believe, but not with certainty, that experience is necessary for knowledge

 

[James1215]

Inductive reasoning could not sustain no 1, but it can sustain no 2. Hence, no 2 is my position. It is sustained by a consideration of evidence, which makes it firstly non-contradictory and secondly non-dogmatic. That is the essence of it all! That is the fundamental principle of a viable naive empiricism. You would like me to be asserting no 1, because that is false, but I am asserting no 2.

I would go as far as saying I believe in it! “My name is James1215 and I am a materialistic empiricist. I’ve been clean of metaphysics for 3 years now. applause”

Only the last bit is a joke, I don’t think I’m clean of metaphysics, but I believe in as little of it as possible.

One thing I have gained from this discussion is a greater enthusiasm for learning about rationalism, as well as about the distinction between analytic/synthetic propositions - whether that is a priori or not, for example. This question is a weaker point for empiricism than anything addressed so far, so you can have that one for free. I will leave it that we disagree, and you know (from the evidence of experience) that I still think I am right.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

The meaning of propositions differ according to the intent of the speaker…

Absolutely not. You cannot say that “black is white” and then say it’s true because you are asserting it as a consistent statement, such a thing is ludicrous.

1. We are certain that experience is necessary for knowledge
2. We have reason to believe, but not with certainty, that experience is necessary for knowledge

You have changed proposition 2.

1. “Experience is required for knowledge”.
2. ‘we are certain that all knowledge is based on experience’

 

[warpspeedpetey]

Inductive reasoning could not sustain no 1, but it can sustain no 2. Hence, no 2 is my position. It is sustained by a consideration of evidence, which makes it firstly non-contradictory and secondly non-dogmatic.

You have no evidence, as I have pointed out, you cannot make the leap from observations like “water oxidizes iron” to “therefore experience is required for knowledge”

That is the essence of it all! That is the fundamental principle of a viable naive empiricism. You would like me to be asserting no 1, because that is false,

You are asserting proposition 1. “We are certain that experience is necessary for knowledge” because that means the same thing as "experience is required for knowledge

but I am asserting no 2.

No you aren’t. Your asserted proposition is “experience is required for knowledge” by changing the proposition to “We have reason to believe, but not with certainty, that experience is necessary for knowledge” You are admitting the original proposition failed. Further with your stated definition of the word “knowledge” what the new proposition actually says is “2. We have reason to believe, but not with certainty, that experience is necessary for a reason to believe” Which just boils down to we have a reason to believe we have a reason to believe, maybe."

…I will leave it that we disagree, and you know (from the evidence of experience) that I still think I am right.

As you wish.