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Matthias123
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I am not posting anymore in this thread until I get the go-ahead from the moderator, as I have just learned that there is a ban on discussing atheism.
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AlbertBall
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Well were not discussing atheism, were discussing your so called proof for a god.I am not posting anymore in this thread until I get the go-ahead from the moderator, as I have just learned that there is a ban on discussing atheism.
“It is necessary that this cause be from** an intelligent entity with a will.”**
Why?
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Matthias123
Guest
I will answer all questions once I get a PM back from the moderator – not going to risk it.
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Matthias123
Guest
There are other “cosmological argument” threads open so perhaps I am not in violation.Well were not discussing atheism, were discussing your so called proof for a god.
“It is necessary that this cause be from** an intelligent entity with a will.”**
Why?
Now when we consider a particular set of metalaws, we see that it is possible for them to have particular affections other then the particular affections they currently possess. Thus we need an explanation (cause) for the existence of the particular affections in our metalaws – a metalaw-giver. We must ask, why do these particular affections exists, and not another particular affection?
The notion that an infinite set of efficient causes could be the explanation, I now think is irrelevant. After reflecting on this premise, I believe that I made a mistake including it, because all I really wish to demonstrate is that at least one of the causes is intelligent.
Now this cause is either intelligent or unintelligent – if it was unintelligent it could only explain the predicate of the particular affection. As affections are intrinsic to metalaws, but a particular affective property that would result in extremely fast generation of worlds is not intrinsic to metalaws. Thus the existence of affections is explained, but not the existence of particular affections. Just like we could say that humans are the cause of the species Liger (Lion + Tiger = Liger), humans are not directly the cause of every particular liger, for some ligers are produced by procreation of two of the Ligers of the opposite sex. To claim that humans are the direct cause of every liger is to commit the fallacy of division.
It could be erroneously claimed that the human caused the particular liger by causing the species liger, as without the species of the liger in existence, there could be no procreation to produce another particular liger, just as without the existence of affections, there could be no particular affections, but since the predicate “affection” is contingent upon the particular affection (the kind “affection” only exists if a particular affection exists) the existence of a particular affection precedes the existence of the kind “affection” thus if this affection is necessary, then it is explained – but as I said above none of the particular affections are necessary – so therefore even though the whole is necessary, the parts are not.
Now I assert that this metalaw-giver has to be intelligent because a property of intelligence is necessary to explain the existence of particular affections in a particular set of metalaws. For example, when a human lawgiver decrees laws in our government, the explanation of why a particular law exhibits, say an affective quality of cruelty, would be that such affection was designed into it by the intellect, via the will of the lawgiver. Such is the same, if it is not possible for the particular affections to be created by any property other then intelligence.
One could claim that perhaps the knowledge of such a property is just not known, and that it would be unreasonable to take a negative position for the existence of such a property. This however does not seem sound, as it is highly unlikely that such a property exists, because if it did, there is really no good reason why we should have not observed it. So therefore I involve a familiar epistemic axiom – “absence of necessary evidence is evidence of necessary absence”. The notion that we should acknowledge the existence of such a hypothetical property, is like claiming that true and false might equal true, because we could only be lacking in the knowledge of how to perform such an operation. I believe the only rational position is to hold that we know that such knowledge doesn’t exist, and that we know such a property doesn’t exist, beyond a reasonable doubt, which is really the perfection of knowledge.
As for the existence of will – I am willing to withdraw such a property from consideration as it does not seem to follow from the premises – mea culpa.
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Matthias123
Guest
You do not understand the argument, as even if there is only a single entity in set S, the argument still holds, therefore this objection is a strawman.As per the first argument, I reject your first premise: an observed effect may be essentially moved but that doesn’t mean that they all are (as physicists have asserted, some matter comes into and out of existence completely of its own volition)
Cute bit of anti-realism there – it is basically a wilful limitation of your reasoning capabilities without a sound reason. Even so, your position does not resolve your problem per my second set of arguments.The axiom of causality is the answer to why one thing follows another (as in the relation between particular entities under the effect of metalaws), not the answer to why there are metalaws.
**False analogy **– but I can see that it flows from pulling the wool over your eyes in your last objection. Why helium is helium, can be explained by the cause that transmutated it into helium, from some other element, or the cause that brought it from potentia to actus in esse. Furthermore these are substances not qualities.In necessitating an answer to the question “why?” you’ve smuggled in the very thing you’re trying to prove: that there is an answer to the question. We don’t have sentient motivations (or at least any access to them) lurking behind questions which only have descriptive and observatory evidence in their stead. We may ask why carbon is not helium but our answer as to why will only be why carbon is not like helium (descriptive; that they’re different in elemental composition). Similarly, we may ask why there is something rather than nothing, but there is nothing further to be said about why it is.
If you would notice, this argument has a metaphysical foundation that I clearly posted before I presented the argument. I am holding that essence and existence is not the same thing.You may argue that God is the sufficient reason for his own existence, but there is nary an argument to be made about how such a thing can be.
These two arguments don’t prove either that God must exist for observed effects to exist, nor why He exists, as is proper to the very question of cause I was demanding from you earlier in the discussion.
Please elaborate on these two objections as they are presently too vague for be to rebut. I must tell you that it seems you are not understanding the argument – I suggest you sit back and reflect on it some more.I also reject your last premise that there must be a first mover. The universe could have come into being per se, in a like manner. Based on the same line of reasoning, I reject your 4th premise in the second argument.
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AlbertBall
Guest
Can you please explain what you mean by “affections”? In fact, can you please link me to a paper that explains “affections”. For at this point in time i have to agree with Voice of Reason, all i see is convoluted jargon.There are other “cosmological argument” threads open so perhaps I am not in violation.
Now when we consider a particular set of metalaws, we see that it is possible for them to have particular affections other then the particular affections they currently possess. Thus we need an explanation (cause) for the existence of the particular affections in our metalaws – a metalaw-giver. We must ask, why do these particular affections exists, and not another particular affection?
The notion that an infinite set of efficient causes could be the explanation, I now think is irrelevant. After reflecting on this premise, I believe that I made a mistake including it, because all I really wish to demonstrate is that at least one of the causes is intelligent.
Now this cause is either intelligent or unintelligent – if it was unintelligent it could only explain the predicate of the particular affection. As affections are intrinsic to metalaws, but a particular affective property that would result in extremely fast generation of worlds is not intrinsic to metalaws. Thus the existence of affections is explained, but not the existence of particular affections. Just like we could say that humans are the cause of the species Liger (Lion + Tiger = Liger), humans are not directly the cause of every particular liger, for some ligers are produced by procreation of two of the Ligers of the opposite sex. To claim that humans are the direct cause of every liger is to commit the fallacy of division.
It could be erroneously claimed that the human caused the particular liger by causing the species liger, as without the species of the liger in existence, there could be no procreation to produce another particular liger, just as without the existence of affections, there could be no particular affections, but since the predicate “affection” is contingent upon the particular affection (the kind “affection” only exists if a particular affection exists) the existence of a particular affection precedes the existence of the kind “affection” thus if this affection is necessary, then it is explained – but as I said above none of the particular affections are necessary – so therefore even though the whole is necessary, the parts are not.
Now I assert that this metalaw-giver has to be intelligent because a property of intelligence is necessary to explain the existence of particular affections in a particular set of metalaws. For example, when a human lawgiver decrees laws in our government, the explanation of why a particular law exhibits, say an affective quality of cruelty, would be that such affection was designed into it by the intellect, via the will of the lawgiver. Such is the same, if it is not possible for the particular affections to be created by any property other then intelligence.
One could claim that perhaps the knowledge of such a property is just not known, and that it would be unreasonable to take a negative position for the existence of such a property. This however does not seem sound, as it is highly unlikely that such a property exists, because if it did, there is really no good reason why we should have not observed it. So therefore I involve a familiar epistemic axiom – “absence of necessary evidence is evidence of necessary absence”. The notion that we should acknowledge the existence of such a hypothetical property, is like claiming that true and false might equal true, because we could only be lacking in the knowledge of how to perform such an operation. I believe the only rational position is to hold that we know that such knowledge doesn’t exist, and that we know such a property doesn’t exist, beyond a reasonable doubt, which is really the perfection of knowledge.
As for the existence of will – I am willing to withdraw such a property from consideration as it does not seem to follow from the premises – mea culpa.
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Matthias123
Guest
classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/categories.html
plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-categories/
The only category that I am interested in is the affection sense of quality – deny the rest if you would like.
plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-categories/
The only category that I am interested in is the affection sense of quality – deny the rest if you would like.
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Oreoracle
Guest
When did I assert that?Funny – this is what you are asserting.
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Matthias123
Guest
Where does the effect come, without an efficient cause?When did I assert that?
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Oreoracle
Guest
Which effect are you talking about? When did I say that an effect didn’t have an efficient cause?Where does the effect come, without an efficient cause?
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Matthias123
Guest
I apologise, I thought that this:Which effect are you talking about? When did I say that an effect didn’t have an efficient cause?
was reflective of your personal position – I was wrong.Premise (1) is just a rephrasing of the principle of sufficient reason. If you think events can occur without causes, then this discussion is pretty much over.
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NowAgnostic
Guest
Stop right there. This assertion is problematic. Either that cause is necessary itself, or it is contingent. If it is necessary, then the effect is necessary as well. (There’s room for confusion here: I’m using “necessary” in the sense of “not contingent” NOT in the sense of distinguishing a necessary cause from a sufficient one.) If contingent, then there is another cause. So either there must be an infinite regress or no contingent particular entities. But an infinite regress is the set of all particular entities existing in the chain; there must be a cause for its existence as well. So no matter how many infinities you wish to tack on, there will be a particular uncaused entity. Therefore, the conclusion is that there are no contingent particular entities (modal collapse).Particular entities that are not necessary, but are possible, necessarily have a cause for their existence.
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Matthias123
Guest
I do not believe this follows due to my view of causality (I never exposed this view). As I do not agree that a cause necessarily implies an effect – therefore I do not agree with □CФ → □ФStop right there. This assertion is problematic. Either that cause is necessary itself, or it is contingent. If it is necessary, then the effect is necessary as well. (There’s room for confusion here: I’m using “necessary” in the sense of “not contingent” NOT in the sense of distinguishing a necessary cause from a sufficient one.) If contingent, then there is another cause. So either there must be an infinite regress or no contingent particular entities. But an infinite regress is the set of all particular entities existing in the chain; there must be a cause for its existence as well. So no matter how many infinities you wish to tack on, there will be a particular uncaused entity. Therefore, the conclusion is that there are no contingent particular entities (modal collapse).
Here is a revised version of the argument (I found several syntax errors in the notation and I removed irrelevant premises):
*]Particular entities that are not necessary, but are possible, necessarily have a cause for their existence.
*]Particular metalaws of a multiverse exist, therefore they are possible particular entities.
*]A particular set metalaws of a mutliverse are not necessary particular entities.
*]Therefore these particular metalaws need a cause for their existence.
*]It is necessary that the particular affections in these particular metalaws don’t remain unexplained. (PoSR).
*]This cause is necessarily separate from the multiverse. (1-4)
*]It is necessary that this cause be from an intelligent entity (4-5)
Let particular existing entities be ξ
Let caused to exist be C
Let a particular set of metalaws be Ф
Let a particular affective property be A
Let the property of being unexplained be Ʊ
Let the property of being intelligent be İ
Let the property of having a will be Ŵ
Let a multiverse be M
*]((~□ξ⦁◊ξ)→ □C ξ)
*] (∃ ξФ→◊ Ф)
*]~□ Ф
*]((~□Ф ⦁◊ Ф)→ □CФ)
*](□~(∃AƱ) )
*](□~(C Ф∈ М))
*]C Ф → ₦
*]□(∃₦İ)
Premise 7 is just a cast to make it easier for me to express premise 8.
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AlbertBall
Guest
Thanks for the links.There are other “cosmological argument” threads open so perhaps I am not in violation.
Now when we consider a particular set of metalaws, we see that it is possible for them to have particular affections other then the particular affections they currently possess. Thus we need an explanation (cause) for the existence of the particular affections in our metalaws – a metalaw-giver. We must ask, why do these particular affections exists, and not another particular affection?
The notion that an infinite set of efficient causes could be the explanation, I now think is irrelevant. After reflecting on this premise, I believe that I made a mistake including it, because all I really wish to demonstrate is that at least one of the causes is intelligent.
Now I assert that this metalaw-giver has to be intelligent because a property of intelligence is necessary to explain the existence of particular affections in a particular set of metalaws. For example, when a human lawgiver decrees laws in our government, the explanation of why a particular law exhibits, say an affective quality of cruelty, would be that such affection was designed into it by the intellect, via the will of the lawgiver. Such is the same, if it is not possible for the particular affections to be created by any property other then intelligence.
It seem to me that your argument basically boils down to you feel an intelligent agent is necessary to explain the physical constants of the universe.
I fail to see how affections can be assigned to physical constants in the manner you do above.
“What is meant is that these said qualities are capable of producing an ‘affection’ in the way of perception.”
Our perceptions are not necessary for the physical constants. While honey may not be “sweet” without us, gravity will still act in the exact same manner.
I also fail to see what humans laws of cooperative societies has to do with physical constants. You are comparing fundamentally incomparable things, these things have nothing in common therefore the analogy is pointless.
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NowAgnostic
Guest
Well that depends on whether A is a sufficient cause, or only a necessary cause, of B. If A is a sufficient cause then A → B. If A is only a necessary cause of B, however, then while it’s true that A does not entail B, it’s also true that the existence of A then doesn’t explain the existence of B.I do not believe this follows due to my view of causality (I never exposed this view). As I do not agree that a cause necessarily implies an effect – therefore I do not agree with □CФ → □Ф
How do you justify premise 1) if by “cause” you only mean a necessary, but not a sufficient, cause?
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Matthias123
Guest
I understand where you are coming from, but I do not believe that this follows in the context we are considering. For it is true that the existence of a metalaw-giver does not necessarily imply the existence of metalaws, the existence of metalaws necesarily implies a metalaw-giver. The problem I see with your objection is, that you overlook the fact that we already know the metalaws exist, thus we do know that a metalaw-giver exists. Your objection would only follow if I was trying to establish a metalaw-giver via deduction – I am attempting to establish a metalaw-giver via induction.t’s also true that the existence of A then doesn’t explain the existence of B.
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Matthias123
Guest
Our perceptions are not necessary for the physical constants. While honey may not be “sweet” without us, gravity will still act in the exact same manner.
Aristotle is giving examples of affective qualities of those he knows for instruction. Affective properties can be assigned to physical laws in so far as they affect the world in different degrees and ways. The dificulty is that we have not created any words to desribe these concepts, we will need to coin them. The comparing of human laws is just my attempt to explain a concept that we have no words to describe. I don’t know the names of any affections that may belong to metalaws, for the sole reason that nobody has created any.I also fail to see what humans laws of cooperative societies has to do with physical constants. You are comparing fundamentally incomparable things, these things have nothing in common therefore the analogy is pointless.
If we are to move away from metalaws and consider the physical laws in our universe, we can ask why does gravity have an affective quality of weakness? For it is certainly possible for it to be a strong force, or at least stronger then it is now. If we are to put any worth in string theory, the answer to how gravity is weak, is that gravitons move freely through multidimensional space. Yet this just describes how our current physical constant is weak, it does not describe why it is weak. (Given my current argument)
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AlbertBall
Guest
Well to be honest as far a established scientific theories go we should not put to much worth into string theory, for at this point in time it is far from an established scientific theory. As for “why” you first have to prove this is even a valid question. Some questions just do not make sense to ask “why” about gravity, may make as much sense as to ask “what” is a star for.If we are to move away from metalaws and consider the physical laws in our universe, we can ask why does gravity have an affective quality of weakness? For it is certainly possible for it to be a strong force, or at least stronger then it is now. If we are to put any worth in string theory, the answer to how gravity is weak, is that gravitons move freely through multidimensional space. Yet this just describes how our current physical constant is weak, it does not describe why it is weak. (Given my current argument)
You seem to want to apply the physics and laws from this universe to that which is outside it. This just can’t be done. The truth of the matter is we don’t know the origin of the big bang, we pretty much don’t know anything about before that point. Yes there are many hypothesis, and much work is being done in that area. However as of this point in time none of it constitutes knowledge, and as such your proof is grounded in conjecture.
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Voice_of_Reason_1
Guest
We don’t have sentient motivations (or at least any access to them) lurking behind questions which only have descriptive and observatory evidence in their stead. We may ask why carbon is not helium but our answer as to why will only be why carbon is not like helium (descriptive; that they’re different in elemental composition). Similarly, we may ask why there is something rather than nothing, but there is nothing further to be said about why it is.
I know you wish that I would reply in the same manner in which you force and finagle your conclusions into obscure language, but I’m really only interested in raising objections. You can pretend that they’re insufficient because I haven’t wrought them into the contriving language that you’re accustomed to using, but the difficulties still exist. You’re trying to draw conclusions from a world that we know (and very little of) to something exterior (which is foolish).**False analogy **– but I can see that it flows from pulling the wool over your eyes in your last objection. Why helium is helium, can be explained by the cause that transmutated it into helium, from some other element, or the cause that brought it from potentia to actus in esse. Furthermore these are substances not qualities.
You misunderstood my analogy. I might have said that asking why there is something rather than nothing is like asking why “up” is not “down.” They are just distinctions; the “why” implies the author though. I might have even put it this way:
To ask “why” about gravity may make as much sense as to ask “what” is a star for.
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