A debate about metaethics

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Hi there, this isn’t necessarily about moral theology, but moral philosophy. I had a recent debate with someone online. His contention is that it isn’t necessary to understand the ontology or use meta-ethics to hold JUSTIFIABLE normative ethical oughts…

He uses a few examples, like referring to not needing to know what H20 is, to say it exists, and using that as an analogy to support his position, which to me, doesn’t provide a justification anyways, to normative ethics…

I point out that in order to provide a justifiable position for why normative ethical propositions are true, you need to refer to meta-ethics…

Unfortunately, I can’t upload our debate transcript, which is about 6 pages long, and way more complex than this post, but, I don’t think I can copy and paste 6 pages here…
 
One can have a justified belief in P without being able to explain how P is true. People knew that apples fell when you dropped them before Newton explained WHY they fell.
 
Nevertheless, if a third party wants to call into QUESTION moral truth, then the person who has a metaethical groundwork is more likely to be able to be persuasive than the person who simply asserts that moral truths are evident in some way.
 
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Thanks very much for the response. I disagree with some things, so I would appreciate if you can weigh in on my objections…

How can someone have a justified belief in a proposition, without explaining how it’s true? Notice, that for my claim to be true, all I need is some kind of true and relevant answer besides, “I don’t know” (not in the justifiable aspect, but in the need to appeal to meta-ethics point I was making).

For example, saying that P is true because it’s reasonable, and reason is good, or because it increases utility, will be:

1.) Answers that rely on meta-ethical explanations…

and

2.) Not even justifiable (not the same as convincing) anyways, without further justification.
 
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abadjpyo said:
How can someone have a justified belief in a proposition, without explaining how it’s true?
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One must have EVIDENCE that it is true in order to justify belief in a proposition. But having evidence is not the same as knowing how something is true. If I opened a bank vault and found Jim Harbaugh inside, my visual experience would give me evidence that someone had broken into the vault, even if I had NO IDEA how someone could get inside such a secure vault. Knowing that is different from knowing how.
 
If you wanted to explain how the person got into the vault, you would have to appeal to various causal factors as to how they got there right? You can’t just say, “I don’t know”, and merely repeat that they are in the vault.

The question is not: Are they in the vault? The analogous question (I’m still unsure if it’s even possible to make an analogy) is how they got into the vault.

Similarly, for morality, if you want to explain why someone ought to do something, you MUST necessarily appeal to meta-ethics (why something is good or evil in the first place, what is the standard). You can’t just say, “I don’t know”, and pretend to have a justified rationale as to why one ought to do X or Y activity…

So the question is not whether one ought or ought not to do such a thing. The question is WHY we ought to do a thing (and it can’t be a mere practical reason, since we’re referring to an obligation here). And to answer why, you must refer to meta-ethics…
 
OK, let’s look at a simple moral claim:

“Kicking babies for fun is wrong.”

In order for one to know this, one’s belief must be justified. It may well be justified by the knowledge that kicking babies HURTS the babies, and hurting people is wrong. That seems, to me, to be a complete justification. You could take it another step, and ask, “How do you know hurting people is wrong?” At this point, a person might just respond, “Because it’s obvious to me.”

Any metaethical system will eventually give the same answer. As Wittgenstein said, “Explanations come to an end”, and something must be simply taken as foundational. If you say that hurting people is wrong because God ordained it so, or some such thing, you’ll eventually end up with the same answer I did above. “Why should we obey God?” or some such question will be answered with, “Because it’s obvious to me.” Questions can’t go on forever.

Or let me approach this another way, by asking you a question: Do you know that you are sitting on a chair right now?
 
How would you grade the Ten Commandments based on your expectations that all moral obligations must be explained or justified with meta ethical evidence?
 
“In order for one to know this, one’s belief must be justified. It may well be justified by the knowledge that kicking babies HURTS the babies, and hurting people is wrong.”

This would be appealing to meta-ethics, and thus, my contention remains true (that in order to explain a normative ethical proposition, you must appeal to meta-ethics…

Now, is that a plausible justification, not entirely, but that’s different point that could be made, depending on how one chooses to interpret what I mean by justified rationale for a normative proposition…

I don’t know, however, or I don’t need to know, are not justifications…

“Do you know that you are sitting on a chair right now?”

If we take basic presuppositions about reality, then yes I do. And those basic presuppositions would be like the meta-ethical rational I was talking about, which would justify my belief that I’m sitting on a chair right now…
 
I don’t know what you mean by grade, but in order to justify why any particular commandment is true, I would have to appeal to meta-ethics. Obviously, such a justification from the Jews at the time, was that they came from God (meta-ethics)…
 
abadjpyo said:
This would be appealing to meta-ethics, and thus, my contention remains true (that in order to explain a normative ethical proposition, you must appeal to meta-ethics…
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You are not using the same notion of metaethics that I am, apparently. In standard philosophical parlance, normative ethics studies what things are right and wrong, and what theories and principles determine right and wrong; whereas metaethics provides the ultimate grounding for those moral theories. “Hurting people is wrong” is a moral principle, and thus belongs in normative ethics, not metaethics. Metaethics would explain ON WHAT BASIS the moral principle is justified.
 
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Yeah, that’s definitely a different definition from the one I’m using, and it makes all the difference. My understanding of it is:

1.) Normative ethics = what one ought to do. It deals with goals and obligations.

2.) Meta-ethics = what good and evil are, why one ought to do X or Y (rationale for normative ethics).

Are these the wrong definitions? If so, can you provide a source?
 
For example, it seems like the following backs up my definitions:

“Normative ethics makes moral claims in its own right. Metaethics does not do (p. 6) this, yet, despite this, it is morally engaged. For among its central questions are the questions whether any moral claims are true, and whether it is rational to commit oneself to acting morally. One cannot answer such questions without taking a position on the correctness or cogency of people’s moral convictions.”

 
abadjpyo said:
“Normative ethics makes moral claims in its own right. Metaethics does not do (p. 6) this, yet, despite this, it is morally engaged. For among its central questions are the questions whether any moral claims are true, and whether it is rational to commit oneself to acting morally. One cannot answer such questions without taking a position on the correctness or cogency of people’s moral convictions.”
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The best source for any such questions is always the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaethics/

It says there that metaethics is not about why one should do X, but rather about questions like this:
Is morality more a matter of taste than truth? Are moral standards culturally relative? Are there moral facts? If there are moral facts, what is their origin? How is it that they set an appropriate standard for our behavior? How might moral facts be related to other facts (about psychology, happiness, human conventions…)? And how do we learn about the moral facts, if there are any?
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By “moral fact”, they would usually mean “moral principles”. The only ethical theory I know of that has any other kind of moral fact is called “moral particularism”.
 
I think that the definition offered fits my definition of meta-ethics, since it refers to standards in the definition. It’s not a mere proposition of oughts, which I take to be normative ethics. It’s an explanation of the standards (meta-ethics) that give foundation to the oughts (normative ethics). Thus, it seems to me that it follows that in order to justify normative propositions as true, one needs to refer to meta-ethics…

I think in both definitions, that’s what follows. Do you disagree? If so, why?
 
If anyone can jump in and reply to my last argument, please do…
 
I disagree because I’m a professor of philosophy, and I can tell you how these terms are used in the field. Normative ethics covers theories and principles. Metaethics covers the foundations of those theories and principles. This is simply how the terms are used among philosophers; I cannot speak for theologians.
 
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I can’t say that’s a convincing answer, no offense. If we take a look at both those definitions presented, we can see how it fits into the definitions I gave. Namely, meta-ethics deals with standards, which offer a rationale for normative ethics, which deals with obligations, goals, etc…

I can’t merely take you being a professor, and your word that the professors you know using it with such a definition, as better than the definitions offered in those academic articles that were linked…

I hope you will understand. If you find within the definitions themselves, that they do not refer to standards for meta-ethics, and goals and obligations for normative ethics, I’ll find that more convincing…
 
Sure, we agree on the first part, but if one is to give coherent rationale as to why a moral claim is true, then they have to appeal to meta-ethical expanations. Would’nt you agree? In the ultimate instance. Otherwise, their claims, if true, would be true in a superficial sense…

Let’s imagine someone says that objective moral values can exist without God. They say by analogy, that you don’t need to know the ontological state of numbers, to know that there exist mathematical truths…

I would contend that they need to provide a meta-ethical explanation as to how good and evil can exist, in order to infer moral values in the first place…

I would also contend that morality has obligations and values that are dissimilar to numbers, so that’s a false analogy…

So there, their problem would be that they don’t know a plausible meta-ethical foundation for their moral claims. Yet they may know moral truths in a superficial sense (borrowing from a real standard, God’s goodness)…

What are your thoughts on this?
 
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