D
DL82
Guest
Classical political liberalism recommends that the state is neutral towards different ‘private’ conceptions of the good, i.e. different beliefs that people have about how they ought to live their own life, provided these ways of life do not restrict others’ rights and freedoms. This is a principle that can claims such supporters as JS Mill and John Rawls. It is also a principle embedded in America’s constitution and history, through the right to freedom of religion.
At the same time, liberalism counts the rights of the individual person as being of supreme value. Murder cannot be accepted on the grounds of a ‘greater good’, precisely because each individual has the right to decide his or her own ‘good’.
But the issue of abortion is not a ‘private’ belief, because it (potentially) involves another person.
What we have are two groups of people who hold different beliefs about what constitutes a human person, on the one hand, those who affirm the personhood of the unborn child, on the other, those who deny it. Both have good philosophical reasons for their beliefs, which start from totally different points, and so cannot be synthesized.
Further, these are philosophical reasons, and so they are not amenable to empirical proof. Nobody can prove that the unborn fetus is or is not a person through any kind of research. The question must remain philosophically unsettled.
What we have, therefore, is a situation where (from the perspective of the liberal state) a certain group of objects may or may not be human beings.
We must then consider the options for acting mistakenly. If the affirmers are correct, and we ignore their arguments, the result is that we permit the murder of human persons, which is totally unacceptable. If the deniers are correct, and we ignore their arguments, the result is that some people are inconvenienced, even gravely inconvenienced, without cause. In the first case, we deny a person their basic rights, in the second, we merely limit unnecessarily the availability of ‘secondary’ goods (i.e. things which allow some people to pursue their conception of the good). While secondary goods, in a Rawlsian liberal account, should be maximised as far as possible in the service of all (and especially the least advantaged), they can never be used as an excuse to deprive a person of their basic rights, the primary goods (life, food, freedom) that give them their dignity as human persons.
Consider the worst discomfort and inconvenience you could possibly be in. If the way to end this pain were to kill a baby, we would all say that this was an unacceptable solution. Natural law, human intuition, and liberal principle, combine to rule out infanticide.
Now, imagine the same situation, but with the object you are killing either being or not being a baby, and there being no observable proof one way or the other (similar to the problem posed by Shrodinger’s Cat dilemma). Because there is simply no proof in either direction, it is not possible to weigh up the ‘odds’ in any way. An act of type x is required to end this pain and discomfort, and that act of type x may or may not be equal to the act of killing a baby. According to Shrodinger, such an act both does and does not kill a baby in equal measure, though such an account doesn’t seem to sit right with Catholic moral intuitions. Nonetheless, from an ideologically neutral (and thus, acceptable for liberal politics) standpoint, this act is, in part, the act of killing a baby, not the act of killing part of a baby, but the act of killing and not killing at the same time. Given this uncertainty principle, it seems wrong that such an act (which involves an attack, albeit an uncertain attack, on fundamental personal rights) could ever be permitted merely for the advancement of ‘secondary’ goods such as comfort and convenience.
There may be other consequences for such an account, for example, those who argue that animals also have an inalienable right to life, whose argument also does not rest on empirical facts about animals’ nervous or cognitive features, but on a philosophical principle, may also need to be accommodated by the principle of uncertainty as to the identities of rights-bearing persons. All the same, such accommodation seems a small price to pay to ensure that we defend the rights of all those who are, or may be rationally presumed to be, persons.
At the same time, liberalism counts the rights of the individual person as being of supreme value. Murder cannot be accepted on the grounds of a ‘greater good’, precisely because each individual has the right to decide his or her own ‘good’.
But the issue of abortion is not a ‘private’ belief, because it (potentially) involves another person.
What we have are two groups of people who hold different beliefs about what constitutes a human person, on the one hand, those who affirm the personhood of the unborn child, on the other, those who deny it. Both have good philosophical reasons for their beliefs, which start from totally different points, and so cannot be synthesized.
Further, these are philosophical reasons, and so they are not amenable to empirical proof. Nobody can prove that the unborn fetus is or is not a person through any kind of research. The question must remain philosophically unsettled.
What we have, therefore, is a situation where (from the perspective of the liberal state) a certain group of objects may or may not be human beings.
We must then consider the options for acting mistakenly. If the affirmers are correct, and we ignore their arguments, the result is that we permit the murder of human persons, which is totally unacceptable. If the deniers are correct, and we ignore their arguments, the result is that some people are inconvenienced, even gravely inconvenienced, without cause. In the first case, we deny a person their basic rights, in the second, we merely limit unnecessarily the availability of ‘secondary’ goods (i.e. things which allow some people to pursue their conception of the good). While secondary goods, in a Rawlsian liberal account, should be maximised as far as possible in the service of all (and especially the least advantaged), they can never be used as an excuse to deprive a person of their basic rights, the primary goods (life, food, freedom) that give them their dignity as human persons.
Consider the worst discomfort and inconvenience you could possibly be in. If the way to end this pain were to kill a baby, we would all say that this was an unacceptable solution. Natural law, human intuition, and liberal principle, combine to rule out infanticide.
Now, imagine the same situation, but with the object you are killing either being or not being a baby, and there being no observable proof one way or the other (similar to the problem posed by Shrodinger’s Cat dilemma). Because there is simply no proof in either direction, it is not possible to weigh up the ‘odds’ in any way. An act of type x is required to end this pain and discomfort, and that act of type x may or may not be equal to the act of killing a baby. According to Shrodinger, such an act both does and does not kill a baby in equal measure, though such an account doesn’t seem to sit right with Catholic moral intuitions. Nonetheless, from an ideologically neutral (and thus, acceptable for liberal politics) standpoint, this act is, in part, the act of killing a baby, not the act of killing part of a baby, but the act of killing and not killing at the same time. Given this uncertainty principle, it seems wrong that such an act (which involves an attack, albeit an uncertain attack, on fundamental personal rights) could ever be permitted merely for the advancement of ‘secondary’ goods such as comfort and convenience.
There may be other consequences for such an account, for example, those who argue that animals also have an inalienable right to life, whose argument also does not rest on empirical facts about animals’ nervous or cognitive features, but on a philosophical principle, may also need to be accommodated by the principle of uncertainty as to the identities of rights-bearing persons. All the same, such accommodation seems a small price to pay to ensure that we defend the rights of all those who are, or may be rationally presumed to be, persons.