A More Localized Version of the Argument From Morality

[PRmerger]

Not unreasonable at all, since the realm where this afterlife is supposed to exist also interferes with our physical universe, and as such it is subject to the interface problem. We could detect it, if it existed.

What would you accept as evidence for the afterlife?

 

[PRmerger]

Ok, let is be eternal “joy”. Equally horrifying prospect.

What the what?

picking jaw off the floor

 

[edwest2]

Here’s a blazingly simple question:

Is a statement conditional?

See what I did there? I have asked a question about the nature of an unspecified statement, and I provided no information whatsoever about the statement. The question has no regard for distinguishing between different statements. It is devoid of context. And I’d like an answer please. Which puts anyone who holds that we can categorize any given statement as either conditional or absolute in something of a quandary in attempting to answer it.

The answer can be YES (any given statement is conditional) or NO (any given statement isn’t conditional), either of which will do to prove the point.

Perhaps someone thinks: I‘ll just change ‘statement’ to ‘conditional statement’ and I can get around this, because everyone knows that a conditional statement is always conditional. Except that what you have then done is create a new conjecture that, although plausible, is conditional, and relative, and non-absolute. That is you have created the following conjecture: ‘Yes, a statement is conditional – if the statement being examined is a conditional statement.’ However, because we used the word “if” to introduce a qualification, we are forced to put the plausible conjecture into the junk heap of what is merely relative.

Any resemblance of the above to the following may or may not be a coincidence:
Rhetorical tactics on display

Nothing can be known as good or bad/moral/immoral. I hate the word rhetoric. It solves nothing, and proves nothing.

Ed

 

[PseuTonym]

Here’s a blazingly simple question:

Is killing a person wrong?

I can think of a question that ought to be easier to answer, because I will provide all of the information required.

1. The rules:
   Rule A: Talking about Stan Laurel is permitted.
   Rule B: Talking about Oliver Hardy is forbidden.

Question: Is talking about a person forbidden by the rules?

The problem is that we don’t know what role the phrase “a person” plays in determining the meaning of the question.

If you have in mind one particular person, then the answer is “yes” if the person is Oliver Hardy, but we cannot answer the question until we know who is “a person.”

If you don’t have in mind a particular person, then it seems that we are asked to choose one of the following:
False dilemma choice A: For every person, the rules forbid talking about that person
False dilemma choice B: For every person, the rules permit talking about that person

Now, perhaps you don’t like math, but I am sure that you are familiar with the concepts of even and odd. For example, five is odd, and six is even.

Here’s a blazingly simple question:
Are all positive integers even or are all positive integers odd?

(Obviously, the correct answer is: “Neither.”)

Nobody is likely to be tricked into accepting either of the two options, and it will do no good to demand compliance and use all capital letters to write …

“BY THE VERY DEFINITION OF WHAT ABSOLUTE MATHEMATICS MEANS.”

Now, let us copy the structure of the original “blazingly simple” question …

Is dividing a positive integer into two, equal, whole number pieces going to leave a remainder of one unit?

“Yes” commits a person to asserting that all positive integers are odd, and “No” commits a person to asserting that all positive integers are even.

I don’t buy it, but the problem is the product itself. I have to acknowledge that the marketing was excellent.

 

[edwest2]

There is real morality out there. I’ve decided, but others have not.

Moral absolutes? Definitely.

Ed

 

[Bradski]

To understand “intrinsically evil” acts, one may call to mind a verb which describes a morally neutral human act, e.g. eating. Now invent a word which qualifies that action to have an immoral or evil objective, e.g. gluttony. Gluttony becomes an intrinsically evil act. The same qualification can be used with any neutral human act: speaking (lying), procreating (fornicating), taking (stealing), wanting (lusting), killing (murder), etc.

Intrinsically evil acts are always subsets or qualified acts of a larger set of otherwise descriptively morally neutral human acts in which an evaluative circumstance exists that renders the act evil in its object.

Exactly. So any statement about morals, as you have pointed out, needs to be qualified. It has to have conditions specified. Which, as almost everyone seems not to understand, makes it a conditional statement.

 

[Bradski]

I completely agree. Our instincts help inform us about what is morally correct but they do not determine it. So, then, that moral sense that informs us of what is the moral course of action whenever our instincts compete with one another cannot itself also be an instinct; especially since it is often the case that our moral sense will indicate that we ought to take the course of action that will involve suppressing the stronger competing instinct. It is in that sense that morality cannot get its origin from nature exclusively unless nature has a personality or an intelligence over and above our own;.

I don’t think I’m making my point clear enough so we are talking past each other.

Our instincts don’t inform us of what the correct moral course should be. As in they help us to determine what that path is. They define our morality in the first instance.

Our instincts have been formed to guide in a way that is beneficial to us. We then describe those guides as moral acts. The fact that we feel the need to help a neighbour in distress doesn’t align with morality. It’s not that there is altruism ‘out there’ and our instincts guide us to it. Our instincts DEFINE altruism.

We define what we do for the benefit of society as being good. What is good has been decided for us by evolution. If it was a requirement for survival that we only have one child and that had been the case over evolutionary time, then we would describe it as immoral to have two.

If you check that Youtube video I linked to earlier, it explains it better than I probably am.

 

[Bradski]

And there’s nothing wrong with that. Not unless it is in fact A FACT that it is wrong to contribute to society’s demise in such a way. But, if it is only factual because we declare it to be factual, then it is not objectively true and our position is no better than the psychopath’s position; except the psychopath can actual write a reasonable argument for his position.

It isn’t factual because we declare it to be so. It was factual lng before we were in a position to declare it to be so. We had no part in deciding what was good for us. Nature did that for us.

The fact that we are here now talking about it means that it worked.

 

[Bradski]

We’re going to have a difficult proceeding, then. You’re insisting on a particular definition of ‘absolute’ that doesn’t jive with the way that discussions of morality are framed up.

If you want to say “absolute only means ‘devoid of any context whatsoever’,” then Vera is almost talking about what you’re asserting: this sounds a little bit like – especially in the context of Catholic moral theology – those things we’d call “intrinsic moral evils.” Catholics would assert that they exist, but not that they are the sum total of the categories in play. However, it all comes down to how you frame up the situation. (And, after all, isn’t that the real ‘trick’ in talking about morality? The way you frame it up tends to be an attempt to steer the conclusion, in my experience.)

So, you might ask “is killing morally wrong?” And a Catholic would reply, “that depends.” If the ‘killing’ we’re talking about is the intentional killing of a baby in the womb, then we’d reply “yes – always and in every circumstance!” We would call that an ‘intrinsic evil’ – that is, any circumstances that you add to that discussion do not change the answer, ever. (My guess is, though, that you’d object, "but, you’ve just added circumstances! That’s no longer an ‘absolute’ statement!)

My gut feel is that we could play a game in which any situation we would raise could be abstracted by you sufficiently to make it seem like it’s no longer ‘absolute’ under your definition. So, by those rules, you’ve just constructed a tautology that’s pretty unhelpful to aid us in getting to a solution.

But, since we’ve seen that you have a particular definition of ‘absolute’, lemme ask the question: if you have problems with an ‘absolute’ morality (I would, too, if I defined ‘absolute’ the way you do!), do you have problems with an ‘objective’ morality? That seemed to be the direction you were headed with the ‘reasonable person’ approach, before it veered into this ‘devoid of circumstance’ tangent…

Well it’s hardly me that’s defined absolute morality to suit my own ends. Absolute morality IS defined as I’ve described. And as such it doesn’t work.

Objective morality is subject to another problem. It would mean that a statement about morality would be true (conditional or not) independent of anyone’s opinion. And that opens up a rather large can of worms. Becuase someone would make a statement with which no-one in their right mind could disagree and declare it to be an objective fact and then make another statement which they demand be treated exactly the same.

Can a moral statement be objective if there is debate about it? Is a statement objective simply because everyone agrees?

To my mind, and this seems blazingly obvious to me, any moral,statement needs an argument. Period. Whether it is obvious or not. Them’s the rules. Any moral statement that doesn’t have an argument with which to back it up,will be ignored. The argument may be so obvious to us that it needs no explanation (although the father who wants to kill his daughter because she was raped might need to hear it).

Hence all moral statements cannot be absolute. They are all conditional.

 

[Mort_Alz]

They define our morality in the first instance.

If that is the case, then it is indicative that our instincts or their source(s) have a personality or an intelligence of some kind since non-rational matter simply cannot define anything like morality. That requires a mind of some kind. That is why people attribute moral truth to a higher intelligence.

It is important to note here that one can admit this without defining that higher intelligence to be anything like the Christian God. I think it is a failure to realize this that causes so many people to have such an aversion to admitting that the existence of moral truth informs us of the existence of a higher intelligence. It could be nature itself; that nature, or the universe, somehow has a mind or a personality in a way which we don’t yet understand. It could be a higher species (aliens) as Richard Dawkins has admitted as a remote possibility. Or, of course, it could be the God or gods of any of the religions which humanity practices today. Admitting this possibility at least makes a lot more sense of man’s inclination to be religious (or transcendent. Call it what you will.) whether theistic or not.

Our instincts have been formed to guide in a way that is beneficial to us. We then describe those guides as moral acts. The fact that we feel the need to help a neighbour in distress doesn’t align with morality. It’s not that there is altruism ‘out there’ and our instincts guide us to it. Our instincts DEFINE altruism.

You don’t think it is curious that nature produces in us inclinations to behave in ways that benefit the whole species? Sometimes even to an individual’s detriment? That is why it makes much more sense to say that the source of morality is intelligent (even if that is to say that nature is intelligent). A group entity made up of independent sentient beings that think it is good in some cases to sacrifice one’s own life for the benefit of the whole (which would result in the individual receiving no benefit) is kind of like that group is its own organism with a mind that is different than the minds of its individual. I realize this is very anthropomorphic and I’m not even saying that I think it exactly works this way. There are alternative ideas which you are already aware of. Without a higher intelligence being the definer of morality, then the psychopath’s selfish moral reasoning is by far the more rational.

What is good has been decided for us by evolution. If it was a requirement for survival that we only have one child and that had been the case over evolutionary time, then we would describe it as immoral to have two.

I agree. In that case we would describe that as immoral because we accept the moral axiom that it is good to promote the welfare and progress of our species. But the truth of that axiom is an assumption. We only accept it because our instincts compel us toward survival. Ultimately, our experience of being influenced by our instincts feels very much like we are being told to do certain things. And since we also know from experience that acting on those instincts is actually a choice and that we can even choose to act on one instinct over another or even ignore instinct altogether, then that moral sense by which we decide whether or not to heed instinct’s compulsions/warnings cannot just be the product of non-rational material doing what it will in our brains according to the laws of physics. Non-rational material cannot produce anything like that, so it cannot be the exclusive source.

I know you said earlier that our instincts don’t align with an external morality, but rather define it, but it is that assumption of yours which I am challenging. Specifically, on the basis that some of our survival instincts can be validly questioned. If we can question the morality of acting on our instincts in any instance, then I’m not sure we can say that instinct is the sole definer of moral truths. I’m not sure you fully understood my point in bringing up psychopaths. Psychopathic moral thinking is an example of a valid questioning of the morality of ordinary human survival instincts in the context of the survival of the whole species. We say that it is good and noble when an individual sacrifices him or herself for others, but a psychopath cannot be faulted for saying that’s rubbish. I.e., Why is it good for me to sacrifice myself for the whole? I will receive no benefit from it because I will be dead. Why should I neglect my survival instinct for my own survival in favor of the survival of the whole? The only way this can be answered with enough intellectual satisfaction to actually cause an individual to want to make the sacrifice is if the sacrifice objectively serves something that is objectively the greater good. Now, if our perception of the greater good is just a result of non-rational nature just running its course and producing this perception by happenstance, then it is an illusion, and the psychopath is right to live only for himself/herself because it is not actually true that it is a good thing for him to sacrifice himself.

 

[Mort_Alz]

It isn’t factual because we declare it to be so. It was factual lng before we were in a position to declare it to be so. We had no part in deciding what was good for us. Nature did that for us.

The fact that we are here now talking about it means that it worked.

I sort of addressed this in my very last reply. Nature dictates what is good for our survival but that is not always synonymous with moral good. Nature can be questioned. Maybe nature is wrong to compel our species to survive. Maybe I should seek to maximize my enjoyment in life rather than make sacrifices that will benefit future generations and produce no benefits for myself.

 

[Gorgias]

Well it’s hardly me that’s defined absolute morality to suit my own ends. Absolute morality IS defined as I’ve described. And as such it doesn’t work.

Hence all moral statements cannot be absolute. They are all conditional.

Again, yes: I agree. If you define ‘absolute’ in the way you do, then you’re right. I’ve never heard morality discussed in the purely abstract way you claim it’s discussed, though, using ‘absolute’ to mean what you claim it means.

Objective morality is subject to another problem. It would mean that a statement about morality would be true (conditional or not) independent of anyone’s opinion. And that opens up a rather large can of worms. Becuase someone would make a statement with which no-one in their right mind could disagree and declare it to be an objective fact and then make another statement which they demand be treated exactly the same.

That’s not a problem with ‘objective morality’, per se. What you’re describing is a problem with a particular statement made by a particular person. If I look at a glass of Coca-Cola and declare “Coke!” and then look at a glass of Mountain Dew and declare “Coke!”, then the problem isn’t whether there is the opportunity to describe, objectively, what’s in the glasses. The problem would be the truth value of my putatively objective statement.

Can a moral statement be objective if there is debate about it? Is a statement objective simply because everyone agrees?

Yes. No.

To the former: Your correction to me that it’s Mountain Dew sitting in front of me, not Coke, is an objective truth (even if I care to disagree).

To the latter: you’re confusing ‘consensus’ with ‘objective truth’.

To my mind, and this seems blazingly obvious to me, any moral,statement needs an argument. Period. Whether it is obvious or not. Them’s the rules. Any moral statement that doesn’t have an argument with which to back it up,will be ignored. The argument may be so obvious to us that it needs no explanation (although the father who wants to kill his daughter because she was raped might need to hear it).

And, at the end of the day, I’d assert, there’s an objective and true claim about the morality of actions that can be made for each such situation – even if there’s debate or a lack of consensus about it.

 

[Vera_Ljuba]

Again, yes: I agree. If you define ‘absolute’ in the way you do, then you’re right. I’ve never heard morality discussed in the purely abstract way you claim it’s discussed, though, using ‘absolute’ to mean what you claim it means.

So how can we have a conversation, if we cannot agree on such basic concepts? And what definition would you suggest?
Let’s look at the result presented in Google, when we type in “definition of absolute”:

1. adjective: not qualified or diminished in any way; total.
2. noun (philosophy): a value or principle that is regarded as universally valid or that may be viewed without relation to other things.
3. noun (philosophy): that which exists without being dependent on anything else.
   It seems to me very clear that the interpretation offered by Bradski is the correct one.

That’s not a problem with ‘objective morality’, per se. What you’re describing is a problem with a particular statement made by a particular person. If I look at a glass of Coca-Cola and declare “Coke!” and then look at a glass of Mountain Dew and declare “Coke!”, then the problem isn’t whether there is the opportunity to describe, objectively, what’s in the glasses. The problem would be the truth value of my putatively objective statement.

Fortunately, when such propositions are “IS” statements, we can conduct some experiments (a generalized litmus test) and find out which statement is correct. What epistemological method is there for “OUGHT” statements?

And, at the end of the day, I’d assert, there’s an objective and true claim about the morality of actions that can be made for each such situation – even if there’s debate or a lack of consensus about it.

How? That is the fundamental problem. Epistemology raises its “ugly” head again. No wonder that among the different branches of philosophy AND science, the question of “HOW DO WE KNOW IT?” is the most important one.

 

[PRmerger]

It seems to me very clear that the interpretation offered by Bradski is the correct one.

Well, yes and no.

If you view Bradski’s interpretation with the fundamentalist lens of “either/or” then he is correct.

But, fortunately, Catholicism evaluates reality without a fundamentalist lens.

Hence, we are able to see the world as it truly is. Not as fundamentalists would like to argue.

 

[inocente]

Again, yes: I agree. If you define ‘absolute’ in the way you do, then you’re right. I’ve never heard morality discussed in the purely abstract way you claim it’s discussed, though, using ‘absolute’ to mean what you claim it means.

Unfortunately everyone on the thread seems to have made up their own definitions, and as a result everyone is talking past each other. Can you confirm the following is correct?

“Moral Absolutism is the ethical belief that there are absolute standards against which moral questions can be judged, and that certain actions are right or wrong, regardless of the context of the act”.

That does not mean the Church’s morality is a list of absolute rules of conduct to be followed blindly. Jesus taught against doing that (Matthew 23) and it’s hardly likely the Church would go against his teaching.

It means there are some absolute principles which must always be applied in every circumstance. For instance, CCC 1789 says “One may never do evil so that good may result from it” and CCC 1790 says “A human being must always obey the certain judgment of his conscience”.

The moral action may depend on the circumstances, as long as it always conforms to those absolute standards.

 

[o_mlly]

I sort of addressed this in my very last reply. Nature dictates what is good for our survival but that is not always synonymous with moral good. Nature can be questioned. Maybe nature is wrong to compel our species to survive. Maybe I should seek to maximize my enjoyment in life rather than make sacrifices that will benefit future generations and produce no benefits for myself.

What nature dictates as good for survival is morally good. The moral or human virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance are and were all recognized and practiced by pagans.

No human moral system would obligate one to give a kidney to another.

Heroic virtue is just that – extraordinary virtue possible only through the theological virtues (gifts of grace) of faith hope and charity.

 

[o_mlly]

…If morality comes exclusively from nature; if nature, by itself, produced morality, then that morality could be valid since nature can be considered higher than two disagreeing people groups. But only a nature that had a personality could actually produce a valid morality. If nature is just as irrational as two bodies colliding because of the laws of physics, then morality is an illusion. But we certainly behave as if it is no illusion.

To say that morality does not come exclusively from nature does not say that many moral principles do come from nature. Therefore, it is possible for the theist and atheist to find common moral ground. The appeal is not to faith but reason; not to feelings but reason. The discussion proceeds best that discounts existential expressions and emphasizes rational argument.

Existentialism, knowledge gained by individual experience, is inherently biased. When the subject becomes its own object, bias impregnates knowledge. If the “lived experience” examined is unique to its examiner, then that “lived experience” must be considered an anomalous experience of the examiner, and, therefore, not natural by definition— present in all normal people, at all times and all places.

Until the “lived experience” of the one is confirmed by the many, the generalized truthfulness of that knowledge as applying to all humanity must be held in suspense. The only logical way around this conundrum is to specify that morality is not singular, but multiple, and, at times, perhaps even contradictory. But such a position, making morality subjective, would obviate any need for further deliberation! I must, therefore, reject any part of an existentialist’s expression of human morality that does not square with my own existential expression. If we are to dispute productively, we must go to a different realm of knowing, and, I suggest, the metaphysical as the only court of appeal.

 

[PseuTonym]

What nature dictates as good for survival is morally good. The moral or human virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance are and were all recognized and practiced by pagans.

Pagans practiced human sacrifice, infanticide, gladiatorial combat to entertain audiences, mandatory worship of human emperors as Gods, and the passing on of their traditions to the next generation, without tolerating discussion of alternatives to those traditions.

 

[Gorgias]

So how can we have a conversation, if we cannot agree on such basic concepts?

Good question…

Let’s look at the result presented in Google, when we type in “definition of absolute”:

1. adjective: not qualified or diminished in any way; total.
2. noun (philosophy): a value or principle that is regarded as universally valid or that may be viewed without relation to other things.
3. noun (philosophy): that which exists without being dependent on anything else.
   It seems to me very clear that the interpretation offered by Bradski is the correct one.

OK. Let’s work with it, then, and see if we can come to a consensus regarding whether we must accept Bradski’s interpretations of the definition as the only proper one…

We’ll try out two statements:

“From a moral standpoint, killing is wrong.”

“From a moral standpoint, abortion is wrong.”

Now, I’m not asking us to consider the truth value of these statements – I’m only asking that we consider them in terms of whether they’re ‘absolute’ or not…

I would argue that these both are absolute statements. They make universal statements, and stand on their own without relation to other things. They aren’t dependent on anything else.

Therefore, by your definition, they’re both absolute assertions.

Yet, by Bradski’s argument, they’re not both absolute. Only the first one is, since it’s the most abstract assertion. I think – given Bradski’s arguments here – that he’d say that the second one isn’t absolute, since abortion is one type of killing. In other words, by adding the circumstance of killing from within the womb, Bradski (I think) would assert we’re no longer talking about an ‘absolute’ assertion.

I disagree. Both are absolute. Neither of them rely on additional context for their definition.

So, this is where we stand. We agree, I think, on the definition of the word ‘absolute’. Where we disagree is the way in which we apply it. Bradski’s use of it is too restrictive, I’d argue. He’s setting up a false dichotomy between ‘abstract’ and ‘relative’.

 

[Vera_Ljuba]

OK. Let’s work with it, then, and see if we can come to a consensus regarding whether we must accept Bradski’s interpretations of the definition as the only proper one…

Yes, let’s do that.

We’ll try out two statements:

“From a moral standpoint, killing is wrong.”

“From a moral standpoint, abortion is wrong.”

Good starting point, but I see a serious problem. Both of these propositions can be extended with either “under any and all conditions” or “under some circumstances”. Now which one of these possible extensions is included “implicitly”? If one implies the first one, it will create two absolute statements. If one implies the second one, it will create two conditional (or relative) statements.

Now, I’m not asking us to consider the truth value of these statements – I’m only asking that we consider them in terms of whether they’re ‘absolute’ or not…

I would argue that these both are absolute statements. They make universal statements, and stand on their own without relation to other things. They aren’t dependent on anything else.

Therefore, by your definition, they’re both absolute assertions.

Let me accept this - provisionally, and see where it leads. If the proposition is fully qualified, it means that it needs no relation to other things. But that leads to absurdity: “it is morally wrong to kill in self-defense on Friday afternoon in the Central park on a rainy day”. This proposition is “fully qualified”, it needs no “other things”. But no one would consider it an “absolute proposition” - much less accept it as valid.

Just because the circumstances are embedded in the proposition, it will not change from a relative statement to an absolute one. It was PR, who came up with this nonsensical category of “relative absolute”.

Yet, by Bradski’s argument, they’re not both absolute. Only the first one is, since it’s the most abstract assertion. I think – given Bradski’s arguments here – that he’d say that the second one isn’t absolute, since abortion is one type of killing. In other words, by adding the circumstance of killing from within the womb, Bradski (I think) would assert we’re no longer talking about an ‘absolute’ assertion.

I disagree. Both are absolute. Neither of them rely on additional context for their definition.

So, this is where we stand. We agree, I think, on the definition of the word ‘absolute’. Where we disagree is the way in which we apply it. Bradski’s use of it is too restrictive, I’d argue. He’s setting up a false dichotomy between ‘abstract’ and ‘relative’.

Take any proposition and append “under any and all circumstances, regardless of who performs the acts, why is the act performed and under what additional circumstances it is performed”. THAT would be an absolute statement. Take any proposition and append “under certain, well defined circumstances” and you will get a conditional (relative) statement.

So I suggest that a proposition is absolute if it does not contain any - either explicit or implicit - qualifiers.