J
Jonesboy
Guest
From the ideas of Kant and Wittgenstein there is a question we can ask ourselves that can, if its answer is pursued, dissolve the conflict between religion and the sciences. Unfortunately, the question, and the idea behind it is misunderstood, even by philosophers.
The question is what is the basis of an object? Traditionally, religion says that it’s existence is its basis and this is given from without, by God. Science says it is given by the object itself. Both views are mistaken, and this mistake is the source of the creationist/evolutionist conflict. The minutiae of this traditional conflict is not my interest here.
The mistake is to think that an object is first given by its “existence”. It is not. It is first given by its identifiability. It is upon the question of identifiability, and not existence, that science and religion diverge.
So, to continue, science claims that an object identifies itself. For example, a TV is a TV independently of any perceiving agency. Unfortunately, traditionally, religion also makes the same claim about objects and TV’s, or appears to when it is in conflict with science. This view of objects is called Transcendental Realism. The creationist debate is held within the clutches of this transcendentally real perspective.
But religion can move away from the transcendentally real perspective that it shares with science, and by adopting a transcendentally ideal perspective dissolve its apparant conflicts with Science, and come off better for it. Trancendental idealism is the idea that objects are identified by a framework. For example, it is only by the framework of human entertainment that the physical limits of the object we call a TV can be identified.
Let’s examine more closely the transcendentally real perspective that is sciences’, and though it need not be, religions’. In fact, a materialist perspective can have no objects, unless it is animist. Why? There is no material property that can identify the physical limits of an object. It follows that if there is an object, a pattern, or a design in the physical world then it cannot exist because it cannot be identified. To claim, with science, that an object, such as a TV, identifies itself, is animism, not science. If it was science then we would be given a material property that identifies the physical limits of objects. But no such property has been given.
Science, then, is animistic or transcendentally real, while religion is transcendentally ideal: science and religion have a different way of constructing their objects. This is in opposition to the commonly perceived idea that they share the same philosophy of objects - that objects are transcendentally real, or identify themselves. On the other hand, the trancendentally ideal view of religion is quite solid and immune from the arguments of science. Objects, designs, and patterns, are, for our religious philosopher, real enough or given, but cannot be material for the same reason that there can be no material objects - that reason being given above - the absence of a framework of identification. For the scientist, objects are also real enough or given but, unfortunately for our scientist friends, can have no ground for being given because their limits, and limits in general, cannot be purely materially identified.
The question is what is the basis of an object? Traditionally, religion says that it’s existence is its basis and this is given from without, by God. Science says it is given by the object itself. Both views are mistaken, and this mistake is the source of the creationist/evolutionist conflict. The minutiae of this traditional conflict is not my interest here.
The mistake is to think that an object is first given by its “existence”. It is not. It is first given by its identifiability. It is upon the question of identifiability, and not existence, that science and religion diverge.
So, to continue, science claims that an object identifies itself. For example, a TV is a TV independently of any perceiving agency. Unfortunately, traditionally, religion also makes the same claim about objects and TV’s, or appears to when it is in conflict with science. This view of objects is called Transcendental Realism. The creationist debate is held within the clutches of this transcendentally real perspective.
But religion can move away from the transcendentally real perspective that it shares with science, and by adopting a transcendentally ideal perspective dissolve its apparant conflicts with Science, and come off better for it. Trancendental idealism is the idea that objects are identified by a framework. For example, it is only by the framework of human entertainment that the physical limits of the object we call a TV can be identified.
Let’s examine more closely the transcendentally real perspective that is sciences’, and though it need not be, religions’. In fact, a materialist perspective can have no objects, unless it is animist. Why? There is no material property that can identify the physical limits of an object. It follows that if there is an object, a pattern, or a design in the physical world then it cannot exist because it cannot be identified. To claim, with science, that an object, such as a TV, identifies itself, is animism, not science. If it was science then we would be given a material property that identifies the physical limits of objects. But no such property has been given.
Science, then, is animistic or transcendentally real, while religion is transcendentally ideal: science and religion have a different way of constructing their objects. This is in opposition to the commonly perceived idea that they share the same philosophy of objects - that objects are transcendentally real, or identify themselves. On the other hand, the trancendentally ideal view of religion is quite solid and immune from the arguments of science. Objects, designs, and patterns, are, for our religious philosopher, real enough or given, but cannot be material for the same reason that there can be no material objects - that reason being given above - the absence of a framework of identification. For the scientist, objects are also real enough or given but, unfortunately for our scientist friends, can have no ground for being given because their limits, and limits in general, cannot be purely materially identified.