A Peter Singer Argument

[Marc_Anthony]

Here’s an interesting argument from the horrible and morally repugnant Peter Singer. Fortunately, it’s not about abortion this time.:

1. If you pass a child drowning in a small pond while riding to work on a beat-up bike, would you be morally obligated to help the child? The ONLY inconvenience is that your work clothes will get a bit muddy; you’ll even get to work on time (you always leave a bit early).
   a) Let’s assume you say yes. Now let’s extend the scenario a bit.
2. The scenario is exactly the same as previous, except we see a different kid drowning in this pond every day. Would you still be obligated to help the kid daily if the inconvenience to you was exactly the same each day?
   b) Let’s assume you say yes again. Cool, you’re quite the swell guy or gal.
3. Same situation as last time, except that we have a gang of bicycle thieves who frequent the pond, and it’s possible, but not 100% certain, that your bike will be stolen if the kid drowns. The bike is cheap, old, beat up, and has no sentimental value. If you still see the kid drowning, would you still be obligated to save his life if your cheap bike is stolen?
   c) Of course, a kid’s life is worth much more than the bike and muddy clothes, right? Naturally you’d be a pretty bad person if you didn’t help this kid.
4. Okay, once again we have the same situation as last time, but with a minor difference. This time there are other people by the pond. Now, it is possible-let’s say 55%-60% possible-that somebody else each day will save the drowning kid. BUT-we’re not sure, and you have the chance to save the kid each time. Are you still obligated to help the kid?
   d) Let’s assume yes again. With little risk and minor inconvenience to you, it would be very morally objectionable if you left this kid’s fate up to the moral whims of others.
5. One more wrench to go.Let’s say that this situation occurs the same every day-same percentages, same inconvenience-except that you can see one instance of this happening every day at random spots in the world, and you can transport to that spot, rescue the kid, and come back with exactly the same inconvenience as walking to the pond and helping out the kid. Are you still obligated to help?
   e) The implication here would be yes, right? Seems like it.

So, what’s the point of all of this? Seems fairly obvious. Singer is implying that it is not only worthwhile and beneficial to donate to overseas charities; he thinks it is obligatory. What he seems to be referring to is those little charity cans set up in pizza places and stores. Is his conclusion true.

I think the conclusion is correct (for wealthy Americans) if you agree to each step in the thought experiment.

When I first did this test, on philosophersnet.com/games, I ended up coming to the same conclusion. On re-examination, I’m not so sure if he’s correct. What I think is that we DO have an obligation to donate to charity (10% tithing to the Church and whatever other worthy organizations you’d prefer to support). And of course, it is morally very good of you to put money into those store cans. BUT-I don’t think it’s obligatory. A few thoughts:

-Let’s say in this scenario that you are a fireman rushing off to an accident site to save people from a burning building. It’s still only one person, but since you’ve made a commitment to firefighting your job is to keep going to the building instead of stopping on the way there to save the kid. So here’s a situation where one charity can be chosen over another, mainly, when your funds are all being channeled into another equally worthy charity.

-Of course, this is only true in some rare situations but there are other things to consider. In one of the steps it was pointed out that the kid had a 55%-60% of being saved by somebody else. But in real life, the majority of these overseas organizations are already receiving millions of dollars. Any change you give to them-even up to, in most cases with large charities, 1,000 dollars-is still probably only going to be a drop in the bucket. So I don’t think the obligation to donate is there. I think you can pick from a number of worthy charities.

The obligation to donate to charity is there. To donate small amounts to different charities at every available opportunity? I disagree.

Thoughts?

 

[snarflemike]

He makes an unacceptable leap from saving a drowning child (guaranteed life vs guaranteed death) to some vague $5 worth of help (maybe) somewhere.

Look at the Haiti relief situation for a counterexample.

 

[MarcoPolo]

His analogy is basically useless because he’s telling you the guaranteed outcome before you have a chance to know what will happen. That makes his situation hypothetical. After #2, I call the police. In #3, you could be killed yourself - call the police again. Etc…

 

[George_Stegmeir]

I am not an anti-intellectual, but outside of Academia, who really cares about this person? From what I have read of his writing, all of it could be classified as intellectual masturbation! I will wager than none of his book publishers have recovered the cost of printing his books.
The only danger he poses is that he will corrupt impressionable college students who stand in awe of his academic titles.

 

[Marc_Anthony]

Perhaps you should check out the experiment worded exactly. It’s quite short:

philosophyexperiments.com/singer/Default.aspx

 

[Marc_Anthony]

I am not an anti-intellectual, but outside of Academia, who really cares about this person? From what I have read of his writing, all of it could be classified as intellectual masturbation! I will wager than none of his book publishers have recovered the cost of printing his books.
The only danger he poses is that he will corrupt impressionable college students who stand in awe of his academic titles.

I agree, but I found the thought experiment interesting so I’m interested too in responses.

 

[Marc_Anthony]

The argument was pretty involved so I left out a couple of questions. Checking it out online could be worthwhile.

 

[Marc_Anthony]

Here are some responses and objections. These are going to be long, so bear with me:

** The Pushback Variations 1

1. Other People Aren’t Helping

This objection holds that one’s moral obligation to perform some action - in this instance, to make a donation to an overseas aid agency - is dissolved, or at the very least diminished, if it’s the case that other people are not fulfilling their moral obligations in the same regard. Peter Singer dismisses this possibility as being absurd. We tested where you stood on this issue by asking the following question about the drowning child scenario:

Let's suppose that there are other people walking past who would equally be able to rescue the child but are not doing so. Does the fact that they are not doing what ought to be done mean that you're no longer obligated to save the child?

You responded that it made no difference that other people were not living up to their moral obligations - you were still obligated to save the child. This means it is not easy to see how you can deploy the “Ah, but other people aren’t helping” argument in an attempt to undercut the idea that there is a moral obligation to make a small donation to an overseas aid agency without being inconsident.

1. I Can’t Be Certain It’ll Do Any Good

This objection holds that one’s moral obligation to perform an action that will likely have a good outcome is dissolved, or at the very least diminished, if it’s the case that it is not absolutely certain that it will make a difference to how things turn out. At first thought, this argument does not appear to be persuasive - if something terrible is going to happen, it seems we have a duty to do our best to prevent it, even if we’re not sure our best will be good enough - but we attempted to discern what you thought about it anyway by posing the following question:

Let's imagine that there is some uncertainty attached to the [drowning child] situation. You know you're not going to come to any harm if you attempt the rescue, but you can't be sure that your efforts will make any difference to how things turn out...It is important to be clear about the precise situation here. You have good reason to suppose that your intervention will bring about a better outcome than would otherwise be the case, but you can't be sure about it. The question is - does this element of uncertainty mean you're no longer obliged to go ahead with the rescue attempt?

You responded that this element of uncertainty made no difference - you were still obligated to save the child. It seems then that you cannot argue along the lines that you are not obliged to make a small donation to an overseas aid agency because you can’t be sure that your money is actually going to help anybody without falling into inconsistency (not that the argument has much force anyway).

1. Waste and Corruption

This objection, which is related to the previous objection, holds that the problem with overseas aid is that much of it swallowed up in waste, and sometimes even corruption, meaning that only a small proportion of any particular donation will ever end up helping those in need (with the large part likely benefitting people who do not deserve to be benefitted). This argument is empirically dubious - reputable aid organizations are not particularly inefficient - but the issue we’re interested in here is whether the argument even works in principle. We attempted to discern where you were likely to stand on this issue by asking the following question:

It so happens that you cycle to work, and the pond is located in a park where you know a gang of bicycle thieves operates. You don't have time to lock up your bike, and you know that if you leave it, even briefly, to rescue the child, there's a good chance that it'll be stolen. It's a battered old bike, it doesn't hold any particular sentimental value to you, and you can easily replace it. Does the possibility your bike will be stolen while you're saving the child mean you're no longer obliged to go ahead with the rescue?

You responded that this possibility made no difference - you were still obliged to go ahead with the rescue. It seems, then, that you do not think the mere fact that undeserving people might benefit as a result of an action that would be otherwise obligatory is enough to cancel its obligatory character. It follows that if you have good reason to suppose that at least some part of any donation you make to an overseas aid agency will end up helping those in desperate need, then you can’t argue, without pain of inconsistency, that the possibility that some significant proportion of your donation will get swallowed up by corruption and the like (if indeed this were true) cancels your obligation to make the donation.**

 

[Marc_Anthony]

(Continued…)

The Pushback Variations 2

**4. But I’ve Already Donated to an Overseas Aid Agency

This objection is quite straightforward. It holds that one’s moral obligation to make a donation to an overseas aid agency is annulled if one has previously, and perhaps even recently, made a similar donation. At first sight, this has intuitive appeal - surely one cannot always be under an obligation to make a charitable donation - but translated into the terms of the drowning child scenario, it’s a lot less clear that the objection works. To look at this issue, we asked you the following question:

Last week on your way home from work you heard cries as you passed by a local reservoir and when you investigated you found that a young boy had fallen in and was struggling to drag himself out. Happily, he was quite near to dry land, so you were able to reach into the water and pull him out, albeit you did ruin one of your work shirt in the process. The question is, does the fact you saved a child's life last week mean you're not obliged to go ahead with the rescue on this occasion?

You responded that it made no difference, you were still obliged to go ahead with the rescue. This means that even if you have donated to an overseas aid agency in the recent past, it’s not clear that you can argue that you have no obligation to do so now, because you have already fulfilled your obligations in this respect without falling into inconsistency. In your own terms, the fact that any donation you make right now might contribute towards saving a life seems to be enough to make the donation obligatory.

1. Just a Sticking Plaster Solution

This objection holds that there is no moral obligation to perform some action, even if it would prevent a great harm, if it’s the case that the action doesn’t contribute towards solving the root cause of the problem that led to the situation that necessitated the action in the first place. We tested your views about this issue by asking the following question:

Let's suppose that there are other people walking past who would equally be able to rescue the child but are not doing so. Does the fact that saving this particular child's life won't contribute towards solving the more general problem of water safety mean that you're not obligated to save the child after all?

You responded that it made no difference that your act of rescue would not contribute to solving the more general problem of water safety - you were still obligated to save the child. This means it is not easy to see that you can consistently argue that the fact that an individual donation to an overseas aid agency is merely a sticking plaster solution to a very complex problem - assuming that this is the case - means that your obligation to make such a donation is annulled or diminished.

1. Love Thy Neighbours

There are a number of variations of this objection, but in essence it holds that we owe a greater moral concern to people who are in various ways proximate to us - for example, our neighbours, fellow citizens, and so on - than we do those who are not. Peter Singer rejects this possibility, arguing that “if we accept any principle of impariality…we cannot discriminate against someone merely because he is far away from us (or we are far away from him).” We tested where you stood on this issue by asking the following question:

Would it make any difference if the child were far away, in another country perhaps, but similarly in danger of death, and equally within your means to save, at no great cost – and absolutely no danger – to yourself?

You responded that it made no difference, and that in this situation you would remain obliged to rescue the child. It seems, then, that you cannot consistently argue that while you are morally obliged to help a person who is drowning in front of you, your moral obligations do not extend to help those who are in similarly dire need in faraway countries.**

 

[Marc_Anthony]

And One More:

**The Drowning Child - Objections

There is the strong possibility that at least some people will object to being told they have a moral obligation to make a charitable donation to an overseas aid agency if (a) they think otherwise; and/or (b) they’ve not made such a donation and have no intention of doing so. In fact, they might just object anyway. So it’s probably wise that we talk about some of the more obvious objections to the analysis we’ve offered here. (And in all likelihood we’ll add to the list of objections as and when new ones come up).

1. I Don’t Donate Because I’m a Non-Cognitivist Crypto-Anarchist Virtue Ethicist

This objection is just that the test has failed to detect some incredibly involved and convoluted reason why a donation isn’t obligatory given a particular combination of responses.

The rejoinder is easy. Get a grip! It’s an interactive online activity, not an exercise in mind reading. Of course there might be some vasty complex reason why in any particular instance a donation is not morally obligatory. The issues raised by Singer’s arguments are still being debated, from which it is possible to deduce two things: (1) it isn’t clear that his argument - or, indeed, the version of it here - works; and (2) if you think you’ve come up with a knock down argument to show it doesn’t work, then (a) good for you; and (b) likely you haven’t.

1. How Many Drowning Children, You Say!? - Part 1

This objection holds that there would be some number of drowning children at which point any moral obligation to attempt a rescue would be dissolved. So, for example, while it might be true that if you had saved a drowning child last week, you would still be obliged to save a drowning child this week, it might not be true that if you had saved 100 drowning children in the last week, you woud still be morally obliged to save the 101st. The point of this objection is that if you’re already making a regular donation to a charity such as Oxfam, then it’s not obviously the case that you’re obliged to make a larger donation simply because by doing so you might save additional lives.

This is undoubtedly a complex issue. However, there are a couple of things that can be said. First, most people are just not in this situation: unless you’re giving away a significant proportion of your income, the burden upon you is much closer to that exerienced by the person who has to rescue a drowning child once a week than it is to the person who saves 100 children every week. Second, although the situation where you’re constantly coming across drowning children, and having to choose whether to save them, is undoubtedly dystopic, it is at least arguable that if a successful rescue has marginal utility (i.e., it prevents more suffering than it causes, where your suffering, and that of your dependants, is part of the calculus) , then you do have obligations in this regard (though working out exactly how this cashes out in the sort of situation we’re talking about is monumentally complicated).

1. How Many Drowning Children, You Say!? - Part 2

A related objection holds that if one kept coming across drowning children, it would demonstrate that simply rescuing children wasn’t working, and that another approach is required. The point here is that merely donating to an overseas aid agency isn’t necessarily morally obligatory, because actually the extent of on-going suffering shows that some other approach is necessary.

There is something to this argument, of course, but it isn’t obvious that it gets people off the hook in the context of this activity. Partly because the test dealt with this sort of argument by asking a question about the wider problem of water safety: if you responded that it was still obligatory to rescue the child even though it wouldn’t solve the wider problem of water safety, then it isn’t clear that you can invokve this sort of argument without being inconsistent. But also because it’s entirely possible to donate to an overseas aid agency that doesn’t merely opt for a “sticking plaster” solution to the problem of suffering, but rather looks to facilitate wider structural changes. In other words, you can choose a charity that best fits with your broader view of these issues.

1. Hang On a Minute, There’s No Way of Knowing That My $50 Dnation is Going To Save a Life

This objection is that acting at a distance via an overseas aid agency is not the same as saving a drowning child through your own actions, because in the former case you can never be sure that any donation you make will actually save a life.

Again this objection has some force, but isn’t decisive. The first point to note is that the test dealt with the issue of uncertainty, which means that unless you claimed that uncertainty annuled your obligation to save the child, it’s not easy to see you can invoke uncertainty in the case of overseas aid in order to argue that a donation is not required.

Moreover, even if you think that uncertainty is a relevant moral factor here, it doesn’t follow that in this sort of situation it would simply cancel your obligation to make a donation. So, for example, perhaps the fact you can’t be sure that a small donation made to a large aid agency will actually save a life means that you’re obliged to make a larger, targeted donation (where it will be easier to see its results).

There are complexities here, of course, but a couple of things are certain: (1) if people stop making small donations to overseas aid agencies, then more people will end up dying; and (2) a small amount of money can make a real difference (for example, a common estimate is that $50 will provide a single person with clean water for three months).

1. Overseas Aid Agencies? No thanks.

This objection is straightforward enough. It holds that overseas aid agencies are not the best way to deliver aid, that they’re inefficient, sometimes corrupt, etc.

Obviously, it is true that overseas aid agencies are not perfect, that there are inefficiencies in the delivery of aid, and so on. However, it is important to note, as Peter Singer points out, “that even if a substantial proportion of our donations were wasted, the cost to us of making the donation is so small, compared to the benefits that it provides when it, or some of it, does get through to those who need our help, that we would still be saving lives at a small cost to ourselves – even if aid organizations were much less efficient than they actually are.”

Moreover, in the terms of this interactive test, the objection lacks force unless your response to the stolen bike version of the drowning child scenario indicates that you think waste and corruption function to dissolve our moral obligation to give aid.

Summing Up

Of course, these brief words do not constitute a definitive rejoinder to these objections. However, they do show how such objections might be handled, and also that the complexities of these issues mean that likely there aren’t straightforward knock down arguments that demonstrate that Professor Singer’s thought experiment doesn’t show what it is designed to show; namely, that we are at the very least morally obliged to make a small donation to an overseas aid agency.**

 

[kompaz]

The correct question to ask here is this: if we are morally obliged to donate to Oxfam etc. why don’t we do this?

The answer is very simple. One drowning child next to you is tangible, a million children dying in Africa is abstract.

 

[Marc_Anthony]

The correct question to ask here is this: if we are morally obliged to donate to Oxfam etc. why don’t we do this?

The answer is very simple. One drowning child next to you is tangible, a million children dying in Africa is abstract.

So you’re saying you agree that this is a valid argument then?

 

[BlueEyedLady]

I love Peter Singer. I love the drowning child analogy. I do believe in the principle of comparable moral value, which is what he’s driving at here.

When I was doing my undergrad I took several philosophy classes but my favorite was Logic. I had to write a paper analyzing Singer’s arguments when it came to the drowning child, comparable moral value, and overseas charity. I’m not going to go too deeply in to this because I am a utilitarian, and that outlook is incompatible with a Catholic worldview, so that would just be a distraction. But I just wanted to pop in and say that no matter which side you take this is a fun subject to kick around and kudos to the OP for posting it.

 

[Taestron]

What if we expanded the objection about the inefficiency of foreign aid? Instead of it being a respectable charity, the organization in question is actually a front for a drug/gun running operation. In order to be a realistic front, the organization does actually do charitable works which save lives, but the money you donate still is supporting the immoral operation. I know that this changes the situation a bit, I believe it highlights something, the fact that you are directly in control of saving the child but not in control of the deeds of the charity. So, you are not saving the children in Africa; you are supporting a charity who is performing the good deed. This way we can see that saving a life is an unqualified good and donating to charity is only a qualified good.

 

[kompaz]

So you’re saying you agree that this is a valid argument then?

No, it’s completely valid. (Actually, all of Singer’s arguments have iron-clad logic. It’s his conclusions which make people uncomfortable. Which is why so many people go crazy about him: they disagree with his conclusions, but can’t attack his logic )

Anyway, let’s review what we have. You agree with Singer that you should donate to Oxfam… But you don’t donate to Oxfam. So it’s your behavior which is illogical. You violate your own moral code. Why is that? Why don’t you feel morally obliged to donate to such charities, when the logic obviously dictates that you should be?

I posit that it’s all due to simple psychology. A drowning child is an immediate, tangible reality, and you feel a strong urge to act, and you act. (*) At the same time, a newspaper headline about a million dead children in Africa is just that: a newspaper headline. One death is a tragedy; a million is a statistic – Joseph Stalin.

(*) Actually, Singer’s argument is psychologically impossible. Nobody (except for sociopaths (**)) will do a cost / benefit analysis when seeing a drowning child. They will attempt rescue, the only thing which may intervene in their decisions are concerns for their own safety (i.e. self-preservation instict).

(**) And for that reason, Singer’s philosophy, which reduces everything to a cost / benefit analysis, is deeply antisocial!

 

[kompaz]

Here’s an interesting argument from the horrible and morally repugnant Peter Singer.

Do you have any evidence of Peter Singer engaging in horrible and morally repugnant activities? And even if you did, it would just be an ad hominem.

 

[Marc_Anthony]

Here’s another issue I see with the experiment. I don’t think it makes enough of a distinction of what one ought to do and what one is obligated to do.

Let’s say, as the scenario dictates, that we’re in the situation where there are other people who are walking by that can save the child-there’s a 55-60 percent chance they will. And over the past 100 days you have saved various people, not all drowning children, from different places in the world. Now you see this drowning kid. You help a lot of people all the time. Other people can help, and PROBABLY will. Are you OBLIGATED to save the child?

I would say no.It would be very virtuous of you to save the child, but you don’t have to; other people can help and you’ve fulfilled your charitable obligation by helping others.

Take my fireman example again and translate it into practical terms. I CAN donate to save people overseas. But I don’t donate that much (I do donate occasionally). Why?

Because I’m saving my money and energy for other charities. I think there IS a charitable obligation, just not a specific “overseas aid” charitable obligation.

 

[Marc_Anthony]

Do you have any evidence of Peter Singer engaging in horrible and morally repugnant activities? And even if you did, it would just be an ad hominem.

It would not be an ad hominem because I was not using it at all in reference to the argument. I freely admit that it is 100% unrelated to the argument.

In fact, I think the argument is very good and worth discussing, and initially I agreed with it until I tried to think it through step by step.

As for me believing him to be morally repugnant, Singer thinks that children up to the age of two don’t have full moral status.

uchv.princeton.edu/Life_Choice/

firstthings.com/blogs/secondhandsmoke/2010/11/23/peter-singer-says-full-moral-status-not-earned-by-babies-until-after-2-years/

Before you say, "This blog is biased! (which, of course, it is ), he gives the specific source of the quotes ,and types them out:

From my transcription of Panel II on 10/15/10 (press “Event Videos,” 20101015-panel two, to link to access streamed session) :

**Q (beginning at 1:25:22): When discussing at which point after birth we would give full moral status, you gave…a legal or public policy point about practicality… Forgetting the practical or public policy questions, if a person is a self aware individual and self awareness isn’t conferred by birth, and we use mirror tests to determine self awarness…at what point do you think an infant would pass the mirror test and therefore be self aware and be considered a person.

Singer (beginning at 1:27:18): … My understanding is that it is not until after the first birthday, so somewhere between the first and second, I think, that they typically recognize the  image in the mirror as themselves…Really, I think this is a gradual matter. If you are not talking about public policy or the law, but you are talking about when you really have the same moral status, I think that does develop gradually. There are various things that you could say that are sufficient to give some moral status after a few months, maybe six months or something like that, and you get perhaps to full moral status, really, only after two years. But I don’t think that should be the public policy criteria.**

**

 

[Marc_Anthony]

Anyway, let’s review what we have. You agree with Singer that you should donate to Oxfam

I DON’T think we HAVE TO donate to Oxfam. I think if you do, that’s wonderful!

I DO think we have an obligation to donate to charity, just not specifically overseas aid. And I DO contribute to charity (a group of friends and I are actually trying to start one, so “donate” is not the right term really).

 

[kompaz]

Here’s another issue I see with the experiment. I don’t think it makes enough of a distinction of what one ought to do and what one is obligated to do.

You are muddying the water. You are not obligated (*) to save the child, you ought to. Singer’s argument is dead simple: if you feel a moral obligation to save a drowning child, you should feel a moral obligation to donate to an overseas charity.

Other people can help, and PROBABLY will.

Uh-oh. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diffusion_of_responsibility

Are you OBLIGATED to save the child? I would say no.It would be very virtuous of you to save the child, but you don’t have to; other people can help and you’ve fulfilled your charitable obligation by helping others.

Let’s turn the tables. You are drowning in a lake. You see a guy on the shore and you cry for help. The guy says: “No, sorry, I have already saved three people today, so my quota is done!”

You know what the real paradox is? Under Singer’s ethical system, there is no doubt that this guy ought to save you from the lake, views on infants notwithstanding.

(*) Unless you are in a jurisdiction which has a so-called Good Samaritan’s law. Then refusing to help is a criminal offense.