A Peter Singer Argument

[Marc_Anthony]

Let’s turn the tables. You are drowning in a lake. You see a guy on the shore and you cry for help. The guy says: “No, sorry, I have already saved three people today, so my quota is done!”

I’ll get to the rest of your responses later, but I’ll start with this.

This is not the full story. We have already said that there’s a 55-60 percent chance other people around will help. I’d say that they have more of an obligation than you do, yes.

Fireman scenario again. You have saved three people today, but there are other firemen around who have saved one. Are you equally responsible for not saving the final one as the other three? I don’t think so.

Or the person on the shore could say, as they were running, “I’m sorry, but I really can’t…I’m a fireman, and if I don’t get there now other people will die!”

It’s not that simple.

 

[Marc_Anthony]

You are muddying the water. You are not obligated (*) to save the child, you ought to. Singer’s argument is dead simple: if you feel a moral obligation to save a drowning child, you should feel a moral obligation to donate to an overseas charity.

“Ought” and “obliged” have an important difference in this context. If you are obliged to do something, at least from my perspective, it is a grave sin not to. If you merely “ought” to do something than it is at worst a venial sin. Culpability is decreased. The question here is whether or not in the final situation you OUGHT to help or you are OBLIGED to help.

Uh-oh. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diffusion_of_responsibility

Very interesting. Let’s move on.

 

[timotheos]

Thoughts?

Hi Marc,

My honest thought is that Pete Singer seems to love to play games with the hypothetical in order to create the illusion that what is absurd is actually reality. Once you accept that, say, children come back every day to swim in the killer pond, then defense of less extreme common-sense realities becomes more difficult.

Complete evil is easy to spot. More difficult is finding a little evil snuck into a bunch of good. You gotta watch their hands carefully …

 

[kompaz]

This is not the full story. We have already said that there’s a 55-60 percent chance other people around will help. I’d say that they have more of an obligation than you do, yes.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kitty_Genovese

Let me rephrase that for you. A woman was stabbed to death while 38 other people watched. Nobody did anything, because everyone else though that there’s good chance that people around will help. And since everyone thought so, nobody did anything. Her death spurned a wave of research, and scientists have found that it is a typical human behavior! That behavior even has a name: it’s called the bystander effect.

In fact, last time I was taking a first aid class, we were specifically taught how to counter the bystander effect. When you’re rescuing someone, other people just stand there and stare at you, and nobody will want to help. The way to counter that is that you start shouting orders like: “You! In the red jacket! Call the ambulance!” You have to expressly identify a person you are talking to (to avoid discussion of responsibility) and the expressly tell them what to do. Then they will help.

That’s why your argument self-destroys. You are effectively invoking the bystander effect as a source of morality. In reality, the bystander effect counts against you, as since it makes others less likely to attempt rescue, your culpability increases!

Fireman scenario again. You have saved three people today, but there are other firemen around who have saved one. Are you equally responsible for not saving the final one as the other three?

Yes! Why would any prior events have bearing on the situation at the pond?

You seem to involve to a typical Catholic fallacy that God is an accountant who ticks off your deeds. “That dude has already saved three people today, I’ll take him to Heaven; now, that other one…” Sorry, God does not work that way.

Or the person on the shore could say, as they were running, “I’m sorry, but I really can’t…I’m a fireman, and if I don’t get there now other people will die!”

Now you shoot yourself in the foot. The trained fireman if the best person around to save the drowning. In other words, if he attempts rescue, then the chances of saving the drowning are the highest. Now, one could argue that people will die when the fireman gets to work late. I don’t buy it, because firemen work as a team, and such teams by design can work with someone missing. He could break his leg or something. His boss is paid to ensure that the team can work if he’s missing or delayed.

The argument would make more sense if the guy was a surgeon who was rushing to hospital to operate a dying man. Then you could argue, that he should go to hospital, because only he can save the guy on the table, while anyone else can rescue a child from the pond. My counter-argument to this is that the guy on the table already has a grim prognosis anyway, while the drowning child is virtually sure to be OK if someone gets it out of water in time. So in statistical terms, expected value of lives saved is higher when the surgen rescues the child. Heck… if I died on the table because the surgeon was busy saving a drowning child, I would not complain.

Also, another mistake you are making is that saving a drowned child does not take that much time. We’re talking about several minutes. Situations when being late for work by several minutes result in someone dying are very rare.

“Ought” and “obliged” have an important difference in this context. If you are obliged to do something, at least from my perspective, it is a grave sin not to. If you merely “ought” to do something than it is at worst a venial sin. Culpability is decreased. The question here is whether or not in the final situation you OUGHT to help or you are OBLIGED to help.

Oh Jesus. I feel like reading Matthew. So the Pharisees asked Him…

Sorry to break it to you, but Singer’s ethical system does not involve sophisticated gradation of guilt. He judges actions by consequences, nothing else. So, if you pass by the pond without attempting rescue, then the consequence of your inaction is a dead child. A dead child is bad (okay, it’s Singer: a dead child more than 1 year old is bad), ergo your inaction is bad. End of story.

I’m starting to think that the reason Catholics hate Singer so much is that his arguments cut through all the empty wording they use for self-justification.

 

[Sair]

I love Peter Singer. I love the drowning child analogy. I do believe in the principle of comparable moral value, which is what he’s driving at here.

When I was doing my undergrad I took several philosophy classes but my favorite was Logic. I had to write a paper analyzing Singer’s arguments when it came to the drowning child, comparable moral value, and overseas charity. I’m not going to go too deeply in to this because I am a utilitarian, and that outlook is incompatible with a Catholic worldview, so that would just be a distraction. But I just wanted to pop in and say that no matter which side you take this is a fun subject to kick around and kudos to the OP for posting it.

Agreed. Peter Singer may not be the most popular figure amongst Catholics - or religious believers of any stripe - but he does practise what he preaches, being a committed ethical vegetarian despite not being particularly fond of other animals in any sentimental respect, and also donating at least a quarter of his income to charitable causes. His stated aim, in his writings about ethical philosophy, is to encourage consistency in our ethical thinking and to expose arbitrary distinctions and excuses wherever they may lie. Personally, I have a lot of respect for his stance.

 

[kompaz]

Besides, how does a presence of someone else at the pond lessen your culpability?

That someone else is not rescuing the child. Why is this? Maybe he can’t swim. Maybe he can’t see it. Maybe he thinks that you should do it. Maybe he wants the child to drown. You can’t know! So why assume that he would rescue the child?

 

[Sair]

I DON’T think we HAVE TO donate to Oxfam. I think if you do, that’s wonderful!

I DO think we have an obligation to donate to charity, just not specifically overseas aid. And I DO contribute to charity (a group of friends and I are actually trying to start one, so “donate” is not the right term really).

I would also agree that we have an obligation to help where we can - suffering is suffering, no matter where it takes place, after all, so location is not necessarily a factor (although in particular cases, such as the 2004 Asian tsunami, the ravaging of New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina in 2005, or the 2009 Black Saturday bushfires in Victoria, Australia, there’s obviously an immediate crisis to be addressed). I donate to both local and overseas charities (for humans and other animals) when I’m able to, and also give money to people on the street in my home city from time to time - there’s a great deal of truth in the statement that “every little bit helps”, especially if you adopt the utilitarian maxim that reducing suffering is always a morally sound action…

 

[Sair]

Another thing to bear in mind, when discussing Singer’s stance on overseas aid, is his claim that grinding poverty such as people experience in many developing nations could be ended at a stroke if everyone in wealthier nations who has income to spare (that is, who could afford to downgrade their spending on consumer luxuries) gave that income to organisations that work to end such extreme poverty. It’s a bit like the bystander effect, but in reverse - I think this is what philosophers call the categorical imperative…

 

[Marc_Anthony]

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kitty_Genovese

Let me rephrase that for you. A woman was stabbed to death while 38 other people watched. Nobody did anything, because everyone else though that there’s good chance that people around will help. And since everyone thought so, nobody did anything. Her death spurned a wave of research, and scientists have found that it is a typical human behavior! That behavior even has a name: it’s called the bystander effect.

In fact, last time I was taking a first aid class, we were specifically taught how to counter the bystander effect. When you’re rescuing someone, other people just stand there and stare at you, and nobody will want to help. The way to counter that is that you start shouting orders like: “You! In the red jacket! Call the ambulance!” You have to expressly identify a person you are talking to (to avoid discussion of responsibility) and the expressly tell them what to do. Then they will help.

That’s why your argument self-destroys. You are effectively invoking the bystander effect as a source of morality. In reality, the bystander effect counts against you, as since it makes others less likely to attempt rescue, your culpability increases!

Not quite. In Singer’s argument there is ALWAYS a 55-60 percent chance somebody will help-no matter what I do. It’s a thought experiment. In a literal “pond” situation, yeah, the effect is real, but this isn’t a real pond, it’s a thought experiment.

Yes! Why would any prior events have bearing on the situation at the pond?

You seem to involve to a typical Catholic fallacy that God is an accountant who ticks off your deeds. “That dude has already saved three people today, I’ll take him to Heaven; now, that other one…” Sorry, God does not work that way.

1. You don’t believe in God, so stop saying how God works, it’s not going to help here.
2. What I’m saying is that a person isn’t obligated to do a good deed every single time they can. That’s why I make a difference between “obligated” and “ought”.

Now you shoot yourself in the foot. The trained fireman if the best person around to save the drowning. In other words, if he attempts rescue, then the chances of saving the drowning are the highest. Now, one could argue that people will die when the fireman gets to work late. I don’t buy it, because firemen work as a team, and such teams by design can work with someone missing. He could break his leg or something. His boss is paid to ensure that the team can work if he’s missing or delayed.

The argument would make more sense if the guy was a surgeon who was rushing to hospital to operate a dying man. Then you could argue, that he should go to hospital, because only he can save the guy on the table, while anyone else can rescue a child from the pond. My counter-argument to this is that the guy on the table already has a grim prognosis anyway, while the drowning child is virtually sure to be OK if someone gets it out of water in time. So in statistical terms, expected value of lives saved is higher when the surgen rescues the child. Heck… if I died on the table because the surgeon was busy saving a drowning child, I would not complain.

This is a THOUGHT experiment. While we’re at it then, let’s just do this to the whole argument and see what happens:

1. You almost certainly won’t see a kid drowning in a pond daily.
2. You can’t transport yourself around the globe.
3. Maybe you can’t swim
4. Maybe there’s an excellent chance you could fall into the pond yourself!

These arguments are all irrelevant, because they’re besides the point. As are all your practical objections to the fireman experiment.

Also, another mistake you are making is that saving a drowned child does not take that much time. We’re talking about several minutes. Situations when being late for work by several minutes result in someone dying are very rare.

Yet I still think they’re perfectly valid objections; they’re merely to show that this obligation isn’t always true for wealthy Americans. If I donate a lot of money to an AIDS charity, does that mean I’m equally obligated to donate to charities to correct every single human rights abuse around the world?

Anyway, why would the guy necessarily have a grim prognosis? Maybe his appendix is about to burst, and you have an excellent chance to get there before it does, unless you help the child.

Oh Jesus. I feel like reading Matthew. So the Pharisees asked Him…

Sorry to break it to you, but Singer’s ethical system does not involve sophisticated gradation of guilt. He judges actions by consequences, nothing else. So, if you pass by the pond without attempting rescue, then the consequence of your inaction is a dead child. A dead child is bad (okay, it’s Singer: a dead child more than 1 year old is bad), ergo your inaction is bad. End of story.

I’m starting to think that the reason Catholics hate Singer so much is that his arguments cut through all the empty wording they use for self-justification.

Oh, geez. That’s what I object to. He judges actions by consequences. I don’t. I think that’s a flaw.

Anyway, I think donating to charity is an obligation. But Singer’s argument leads to absurdities; it means that every day I need to donate money to every single charity to help everybody around the world for every problem. I can’t just focus on one charity.

That’s what I disagree with. If I donate a lot to Habitats for Humanity but have some money left over that now means I have to donate to an AIDS charity? AND a famine charity? AND a human rights abuse charity?

These are just off the top of my head. The list goes on and on. Not to mention that means every time I see a collection can either in a pizza place or by some guy coming up to my car on the road looking for cash for a charity I’m actually obligated to donate? Even if I already donate a lot of money to other charities?

Sometimes getting rid of the analogy and just saying what exactly we’re arguing for here can clear things up.

I DO think there’s an obligation to donate to charities. I’ll even concede that certain charities have a bigger need for money than others, like when a disaster has recently occurred. I just think Singer’s argument leads to absurdities.

Singer’s argument is good for proving that there’s no difference donating to local charities and overseas charities. But I think that if you take this argument to its full extent it leads to problems. That’s it.

I actually agreed with the argument initially until I tried to consider what it implied. But its implications are rather ridiculous.

 

[Marc_Anthony]

I would also agree that we have an obligation to help where we can - suffering is suffering, no matter where it takes place, after all, so location is not necessarily a factor (although in particular cases, such as the 2004 Asian tsunami, the ravaging of New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina in 2005, or the 2009 Black Saturday bushfires in Victoria, Australia, there’s obviously an immediate crisis to be addressed). I donate to both local and overseas charities (for humans and other animals) when I’m able to, and also give money to people on the street in my home city from time to time - there’s a great deal of truth in the statement that “every little bit helps”, especially if you adopt the utilitarian maxim that reducing suffering is always a morally sound action…

Hmmm, I agree with you (most of the time…I’m not utilitarian but I agree with you enough that any differences are negligible). But I don’t think this is the argument’s conclusion. I think his conclusion is more extreme than this, which is what I take issue with.

 

[Marc_Anthony]

Another thing to bear in mind, when discussing Singer’s stance on overseas aid, is his claim that grinding poverty such as people experience in many developing nations could be ended at a stroke if everyone in wealthier nations who has income to spare (that is, who could afford to downgrade their spending on consumer luxuries) gave that income to organisations that work to end such extreme poverty. It’s a bit like the bystander effect, but in reverse - I think this is what philosophers call the categorical imperative…

True.

Said in this way, I can actually get behind it.

Singer’s conclusion actually isn’t morally horrible. I just think it’s too extreme (and I don’t think it hold true in every circumstance).

I also think “obligated” and “ought” are important distinctions. I’m obligated to donate to charity. I don’t think I’m obligated to donate to an overseas charity even if I’m donating to a similar charity at home, but perhaps I ought to.

 

[danserr]

True.

Said in this way, I can actually get behind it.

Singer’s conclusion actually isn’t morally horrible. I just think it’s too extreme (and I don’t think it hold true in every circumstance).

I also think “obligated” and “ought” are important distinctions. I’m obligated to donate to charity. I don’t think I’m obligated to donate to an overseas charity even if I’m donating to a similar charity at home, but perhaps I ought to.

Marc, the distinction is not between “obligated” and “ought” but between moral value (good) and moral duty (obligation). Just because something is good it does not follow that I must do it, because it might be contradictory with another good. It is morally good to become a teacher. It is also morally good to become a fireman, but I cannot do both and so I am not obligated to do both.

One problem I would have with Singer’s position is that even if I grant the analogy (which I am not inclined to), then it is not clear where to draw the line. In one sense, if you grant the analogy, then Singer is too modest. If I am to equate not giving a dollar to a “feed African children” canister in a supermarket to watching a child I could save die, then it seems like I am obligated to do much more.

I mean, if I grant this comparison and Singer’s conclusion, then I am actually responsible for the death of children if I do not empty my wallet into the canister. By returning home with cash in my wallet, I have done the equivelant of standing by and watching multiple children I could save, die. But it probably gets even worse. If the action of not donating is equal to letting children die, then I am probably morally obligated to bankrupt myself in order to donate money. By giving only 25% of his income to charity and reserving 75%, then Singer himself is guilty of terrible crimes against humanity by allowing children to die who he could otherwise save.

Consider this. If there were three children on the street and a gunman threatened to kill them unless I walked to the nearest ATM and gave him my entire bank account, wouldn’t I be morally obligated to do so? Even if doing so wiped me out completely and I have little chance of getting the money back?

In short, if Peter Singer’s analogy is right, then it seems like I (and everyone else) are morally obligated to bankrupt ourselves to send our money to foreign (and presumably local) charities.

Now, on one hand Jesus did indeed tell one young man “if thou wouldst be perfect, sell what you have, give to the poor, and follow men.” But He told the man this after the young man asked for a higher way. First, Jesus suggested that it sufficed to follow the law as he knew it. So I think it could be admirable for a person to fully bankrupt himself to serve the poor (one reason for instance that St. Francis and mother Teresa are so admirable), but I don’t think that everyone is morally obligated to do that. This is the distinction between a moral good and moral duty.

I do think it an obligation of everyone to give to charity and to give even until it hurts, but I am not inclined to think Singer’s argument as I understand it here works. Of course it is possible I misunderstand it and then would be happy for clarification.

 

[Marc_Anthony]

Marc, the distinction is not between “obligated” and “ought” but between moral value (good) and moral duty (obligation). Just because something is good it does not follow that I must do it, because it might be contradictory with another good. It is morally good to become a teacher. It is also morally good to become a fireman, but I cannot do both and so I am not obligated to do both.

One problem I would have with Singer’s position is that even if I grant the analogy (which I am not inclined to), then it is not clear where to draw the line. In one sense, if you grant the analogy, then Singer is too modest. If I am to equate not giving a dollar to a “feed African children” canister in a supermarket to watching a child I could save die, then it seems like I am obligated to do much more.

I mean, if I grant this comparison and Singer’s conclusion, then I am actually responsible for the death of children if I do not empty my wallet into the canister. By returning home with cash in my wallet, I have done the equivelant of standing by and watching multiple children I could save, die. But it probably gets even worse. If the action of not donating is equal to letting children die, then I am probably morally obligated to bankrupt myself in order to donate money. By giving only 25% of his income to charity and reserving 75%, then Singer himself is guilty of terrible crimes against humanity by allowing children to die who he could otherwise save.

Consider this. If there were three children on the street and a gunman threatened to kill them unless I walked to the nearest ATM and gave him my entire bank account, wouldn’t I be morally obligated to do so? Even if doing so wiped me out completely and I have little chance of getting the money back?

In short, if Peter Singer’s analogy is right, then it seems like I (and everyone else) are morally obligated to bankrupt ourselves to send our money to foreign (and presumably local) charities.

Now, on one hand Jesus did indeed tell one young man “if thou wouldst be perfect, sell what you have, give to the poor, and follow men.” But He told the man this after the young man asked for a higher way. First, Jesus suggested that it sufficed to follow the law as he knew it. So I think it could be admirable for a person to fully bankrupt himself to serve the poor (one reason for instance that St. Francis and mother Teresa are so admirable), but I don’t think that everyone is morally obligated to do that. This is the distinction between a moral good and moral duty.

I do think it an obligation of everyone to give to charity and to give even until it hurts, but I am not inclined to think Singer’s argument as I understand it here works. Of course it is possible I misunderstand it and then would be happy for clarification.

Your reservations with the analogy are exactly the same as mine. It’s not that I disagree with the obligation to donate to charity; I just think his conclusions lead to a moral obligation that is so extreme it’s absurd.

(BTW, your clarification/correction on my obligated/ought distinction is spot on and I agree).

Where do you think the analogy falls apart?

 

[Sair]

I do think it an obligation of everyone to give to charity and to give even until it hurts, but I am not inclined to think Singer’s argument as I understand it here works. Of course it is possible I misunderstand it and then would be happy for clarification.

From everything I have read and heard of Peter Singer’s stance, I don’t think he’s necessarily advocating the “give until it hurts” approach. His argument generally seems to be that if you can give, you ought to give - in the same way that if you are in a position to rescue a drowning child (that is, you have knowledge of the circumstances and the physical/mental ability to act) then you ought to rescue the drowing child. His proposal that most first-world citizens ought to donate part of their income to the relief of profound poverty is based on the assumption that most of us have both the ability to do this and the awareness of the circumstances that require our help.

 

[danserr]

From everything I have read and heard of Peter Singer’s stance, I don’t think he’s necessarily advocating the “give until it hurts” approach. His argument generally seems to be that if you can give, you ought to give - in the same way that if you are in a position to rescue a drowning child (that is, you have knowledge of the circumstances and the physical/mental ability to act) then you ought to rescue the drowing child. His proposal that most first-world citizens ought to donate part of their income to the relief of profound poverty is based on the assumption that most of us have both the ability to do this and the awareness of the circumstances that require our help.

I think that probably is Singer’s position too, and if so, it is not unreasonable, though I would probably go further than him. However, I think that his attempt to argue that position here is ineffective. This is because he equates the failure to give money with standing by and watching a drowning child die. Carried to its logical conclusion, this seems absurd for the reasons I give above. If it is really the case that not giving or any individual choice not to give is the moral equivelant of watching a child you could save die, then it seems that I am obligated to wipe myself out in order to give to overseas charities. It seems that Singer himself is a moral monster for only giving 25% of his income to charity. Surely, he could give more, but by not doing so, he is essentially standing by watching children die.

If his position is just what you say, and it makes sense to me that it is, then I have little objection except I would say that people probably are obligated to give until it hurts, at least a little (and volunteering in blood or time if money is lacking is an option). I simply think that his argument as I understand it here rests on a bad analogy.

 

[Marc_Anthony]

I think that probably is Singer’s position too, and if so, it is not unreasonable, though I would probably go further than him. However, I think that his attempt to argue that position here is ineffective. This is because he equates the failure to give money with standing by and watching a drowning child die. Carried to its logical conclusion, this seems absurd for the reasons I give above. If it is really the case that not giving or any individual choice not to give is the moral equivelant of watching a child you could save die, then it seems that I am obligated to wipe myself out in order to give to overseas charities. It seems that Singer himself is a moral monster for only giving 25% of his income to charity. Surely, he could give more, but by not doing so, he is essentially standing by watching children die.

If his position is just what you say, and it makes sense to me that it is, then I have little objection except I would say that people probably are obligated to give until it hurts, at least a little (and volunteering in blood or time if money is lacking is an option). I simply think that his argument as I understand it here rests on a bad analogy.

Yeah, if this is Singer’s actual position, I agree. The argument just doesn’t seem to lead to that conclusion.

If people pay attention to me on the forums ( ), they’ll know that my favorite philosopher is Dr. Edward Feser. I e-mailed him about the argument yesterday and he actually got to me within the day, albeit with a brief response. Here is what he said:

Hello, only time for a brief reply. One problem with Singer’s argument is that it ignores the special relationships we have to particular human beings, which entail that our duties are primarily to those closest to us and only secondarily to others, in proportion to their “distance” from us: first family and friends, then localities, then the nation, and only then those in other countries. And that means those who have the primary duty to aid those in other countries, tons, etc. are those people closest to them. There is also the fact that sending money to bureaucracies far away is often a pretty inefficient way to help anyone since you can’t know how they are run, what they do with the money, etc. Both these points are included in the idea of “subsidiarity,” which is central to Catholic moral theology and natural law ethics.

I’m not so sure if I completely agree with his point on the inefficient bureaucracies; the argument more or less addresses this (if you look at the objections and responses you’ll see how). But his point about location is interesting; the concept of subsidiarity relates to allowing a smaller system handle things if possible; a bigger system should only handle what’s necessary. So I wonder how that’s related to location.

 

[Taestron]

If people pay attention to me on the forums ( ), they’ll know that my favorite philosopher is Dr. Edward Feser. I e-mailed him about the argument yesterday and he actually got to me within the day, albeit with a brief response. Here is what he said:

Aw man, I was thinking about morality a few months ago, and thought of a system remarkably like this one. I even thought of using the terminology of “distance” as an analogy. And here I thought I might be original. Oh well.

I’m not so sure if I completely agree with his point on the inefficient bureaucracies; the argument more or less addresses this (if you look at the objections and responses you’ll see how). But his point about location is interesting; the concept of subsidiarity relates to allowing a smaller system handle things if possible; a bigger system should only handle what’s necessary. So I wonder how that’s related to location.

Remember it is not physical location but moral location, although the physical helps determine the moral. You would have more obligation if your mother was starving in Africa than say a classmate. The implication here is that the members of the smaller system have more moral obligations to these fellows than their fellows in the larger system.

However, I am not sure this helps us get out of Singer’s argument. Sure, the people of Africa have more responsibility to help their fellow Africans than Americans, but since this smaller system has proven that it cannot or will not do so, is it not up to us members of the larger system to step in and try to solve the problem? And remember, some of those who are suffering are our brothers and sisters in Christ, and as such, they become closer to us morally speaking. Furthermore, awareness does wonders for bringing people to a closer moral distance. The fact that these charities exist and our asking for our money should be enough to bring those suffering to a close enough moral distance that we are obligated to help.

You know, as I am writing this it occurred to me that the above argument might not excuse us from Singer’s argument, but it can explain the apparent paradox. It is not that we should not donate as we can, but that we have more moral obligation to the child because s/he is closer to us morally than the people benefiting from overseas charity. So if we do not donate, we do incur moral guilt, just not as much as if we ignore the drowning child.

 

[Marc_Anthony]

So if we do not donate, we do incur moral guilt, just not as much as if we ignore the drowning child.

I’m not sure if this dodges the major problem with Singer’s proof, which danserr p(name removed by moderator)ointed better than me. The point is: Where do we stop?

At what point is donating merely virtuous and not a moral obligation? And how many different organizations need to be funded?

Also, the smaller system almost certainly CAN do so; just because they’re corrupt means their moral guilt is greater. Perhaps it might make what we do more virtuous, and maybe make some sort of obligation we have become a little more prominent, but there still seems to be a problem here of obligation vs. virtue.

 

[danserr]

Yeah, if this is Singer’s actual position, I agree. The argument just doesn’t seem to lead to that conclusion.

If people pay attention to me on the forums ( ), they’ll know that my favorite philosopher is Dr. Edward Feser. I e-mailed him about the argument yesterday and he actually got to me within the day, albeit with a brief response. Here is what he said:

I’m not so sure if I completely agree with his point on the inefficient bureaucracies; the argument more or less addresses this (if you look at the objections and responses you’ll see how). But his point about location is interesting; the concept of subsidiarity relates to allowing a smaller system handle things if possible; a bigger system should only handle what’s necessary. So I wonder how that’s related to location.

That’s a very interesting suggestion about our obligation to help people closer to us is greater, hence, family, locality, and so on. I’m not sure whether or not it totally solves the question, but it does seem to be a factor that Singer doesn’t take into account.

You asked earlier where exactly I thought Singer’s analogy broke down. My answer (at least for now) is that I am not really sure. It is easier to show the flaw in his argument by showing that it leads to an implausible conclusion than to show exactly where the flaw is. So since it seems obvious that there is a problem equating not donating to a charity with allowing a child one could save to drown, I would have to think of ways that not giving to a charity is different from letting a child drown.

If you flip the argument around though, I wonder if even Singer would buy the conclusion. Let’s take two men. One of them gives 50 dollars to the red cross for aid to Africa. The other jumps into a lake to rescue a drowning child. Would any serious person really think that giving that donation was the moral equivelant to rescuing the child? It seems unlikely. But’s it’s still hard to say exactly where it breaks down.

 

[Marc_Anthony]

However, I am not sure this helps us get out of Singer’s argument. Sure, the people of Africa have more responsibility to help their fellow Africans than Americans, but since this smaller system has proven that it cannot or will not do so, is it not up to us members of the larger system to step in and try to solve the problem? And remember, some of those who are suffering are our brothers and sisters in Christ, and as such, they become closer to us morally speaking. Furthermore, awareness does wonders for bringing people to a closer moral distance. The fact that these charities exist and our asking for our money should be enough to bring those suffering to a close enough moral distance that we are obligated to help.

You know, as I am writing this it occurred to me that the above argument might not excuse us from Singer’s argument, but it can explain the apparent paradox. It is not that we should not donate as we can, but that we have more moral obligation to the child because s/he is closer to us morally than the people benefiting from overseas charity. So if we do not donate, we do incur moral guilt, just not as much as if we ignore the drowning child.

I think you might be onto something here, but I’d go a step further. I think that, in a lot of the cases, because of “moral location”, as we’re calling it, or in other words, the principle of subsidiarity, the moral obligation may actually be eliminated, and it would turn into a mere moral good.

The thing is, a lot of Africans CAN help people in their countries. They just DON’T. And while we should and do help I’m not so sure that EVERYBODY is obligated to help in EVERY circumstance just because we theoretically CAN as long as there are very good, in some cases equally good, charities we can donate to in our community or in our state or in our country. I mean, my friends and I are hoping to start a charity to help teens cope with depression, self-harm, and suicide, and it’s in our area.

Considering that I know for a fact that it’s a big issue here due to personal experience, I think that, because I’m personally involved in it, I know people who can benefit from a charity such as this, and because it’s located locally, I fulfill a moral obligation to charity by participating in this.

I probably have an obligation to donate to places that need immediate aid, such as when the tsunami struck in Asia, but I’m not sure if donating to something such as Oxfam as much as I can, every time the opportunity arises is an obligation.

Make sense?