A Philosophical Arguement against Abortion

[hatsoff]

How are passions any less careless and ill-appreciative? Passions are often arbitrary and impulsive.

Certain words may have similar usages but different connotations. Perhaps you do not notice that here, or notice it differently than I do. If so, then you may use whichever word you think is most appropriate. My point, of course, is that people tend to take moral values very seriously. As long as we all agree on that much, I am satisfied.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

*Well, the word “whim” implies carelessness and ill-appreciation, which are not usually associated with ethical positions, although they can be in some cases. I think it’s best to say instead that morals are based on passions. *

The word “whim” really implies an action performed by impulse and without well thought out justification.

You don’t offer any reason why you should not value the life of the unborn. You just say you don’t value it. We’ve offered you well thought out reasons why you should value that life … because it is the same as the life you once lived in your mother’s womb. Your mother valued you enough to give you birth rather than value you so little as to kill you because you were a temporary inconvenience.

We should all be for life rather than for death, and least of all the death of the innocent unborn.

 

[hatsoff]

The word “whim” really implies an action performed by impulse and without well thought out justification.

You don’t offer any reason why you should not value the life of the unborn. You just say you don’t value it. We’ve offered you well thought out reasons why you should value that life … because it is the same as the life you once lived in your mother’s womb. Your mother valued you enough to give you birth rather than value you so little as to kill you because you were a temporary inconvenience.

We should all be for life rather than for death, and least of all the death of the innocent unborn.

I do not know of any possible rational “justification” for values, which are not matters of fact. Rather, you have offered me your own value judgments, but as I indicated earlier, I simply do not share them.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

hatsoff

I do not know of any possible rational “justification” for values, which are not matters of fact. Rather, you have offered me your own value judgments, but as I indicated earlier, I simply do not share them.

Well, this doesn’t do much to further the dialogue.

It is a fact that we should prefer life to death. You disagree?

 

[hatsoff]

It is a fact that we should prefer life to death. You disagree?

Absolutely I disagree, yes. It is never a fact that we should do anything. As I indicated before, values (e.g. “should” statements) are not matters of fact.

That said, we might ask, do I share your value judgment that we should prefer life to death? To that, I can only respond that, according to my moral position, we should sometimes prefer life to death, and other times death to life, and still other times we should not necessarily have any preference at all.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

hatsoff

*and other times death to life, and still other times we should not necessarily have any preference at all. *

What would be such a time when you would not have any preference at all? When you are asleep?

It is never a fact that we should do anything.

It is not a fact that we should pay our taxes, or else go to the slammer?

 

[hatsoff]

What would be such a time when you would not have any preference at all? When you are asleep?

Killing crop pests, for instance, is permissible according to my morality. So is early-term abortion.

It is not a fact that we should pay our taxes, or else go to the slammer?

Of course not. Although it’s a fact that we might go to jail if we fail to pay taxes, it is not a fact that we should therefore pay our taxes. That’s a value judgment.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

hatsoff

*Although it’s a fact that we might go to jail if we fail to pay taxes, it is not a fact that we should therefore pay our taxes. That’s a value judgment. *

But not if the IRS has anything to say about it!

It’s a fact that certain actions produce certain consequences.

The fact is that if you don’t pay your taxes, you may go to jail. Do not pass Go. Do not collect $200. Go straight to jail.

The fact is that an abortion kills a life, and one must live with that fact for the rest of one’s life.

The fact is: if you don’t want to live with guilt, don’t kill, and especially don’t kill your own child.

These are all facts, not value judgments.

 

[hatsoff]

It’s a fact that behaviors have consequences, but when we make value judgments based on knowledge of those consequences, we are still making value judgments!

Whenever we talk about what a person should or should not do, we’re talking about value judgments.

 

[Betterave]

Absolutely I disagree, yes. It is never a fact that we should do anything. As I indicated before, values (e.g. “should” statements) are not matters of fact.

‘Values’ are not ‘matters of fact’ only because the terms “value” and “matter of fact” have been defined to be mutually exclusive. This particular definitional/conceptual distinction is a contingent and parochial matter of fact and the fact remains that (real) values very much are matters of (real) fact.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

hatsoff

*Whenever we talk about what a person should or should not do, we’re talking about value judgments. *

You are confusing value judgments with matters of taste. You want value judgments to be entirely subjective, rather than objective.

If I prefer chocolate ice cream to vanilla, yes, that is a value judgment that is an entirely subjective value judgment. But if I prefer to eat ice cream and ice cream only, that is an objectively (factually) bad value judgment, because sooner or later I will die.

Abortion kills a human being. That is a factually bad value judgment.

 

[hatsoff]

hatsoff

*Whenever we talk about what a person should or should not do, we’re talking about value judgments. *

You are confusing value judgments with matters of taste. You want value judgments to be entirely subjective, rather than objective.

If I prefer chocolate ice cream to vanilla, yes, that is a value judgment that is an entirely subjective value judgment. But if I prefer to eat ice cream and ice cream only, that is an objectively (factually) bad value judgment, because sooner or later I will die.

Abortion kills a human being. That is a factually bad value judgment.

I have no idea what you mean when you talk about a “factually bad” value judgment. What is factual badness?

Maybe you want to say that something is factually bad iff most people will agree that it is bad. But then you’re just talking about the common values of the majority. Or, perhaps instead of defining it by what most people think, you instead wish to define it by what most reasonable people think. But while it’s comparatively easy to assess individual behaviors/positions/etc., how do we decide what makes a person reasonable versus unreasonable overall? And if we are able to do so, then we are still merely appealing to the collective values of some specified demographic.

It seems to me that any way you cut it, you’re going to have to reference to the values of an individual or group.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

hatsoff

I have no idea what you mean when you talk about a “factually bad” value judgment. What is factual badness?

Choosing to eat ice cream and nothing else is a factually bad value judgment. If you can’t understand that, I think we are at an impasse. You don’t want to understand it because it disrupts your notion that all value judgments are purely subjective.

If what you say was true, we would have to abolish all the courts, the police, and the prisons, because there is no such thing as a** factually bad value judgment**. There is only what you prefer versus what I prefer.

Pope Benedict called this the “dictatorship of relativism,” which means that without objective moral values, morality will be dictated by the person with the biggest club or the nation with the biggest bombs.

 

[hatsoff]

Choosing to eat ice cream and nothing else is a factually bad value judgment.

If that’s a specific example, okay, but I require from you a generalized definition.

If you can’t understand that, I think we are at an impasse. You don’t want to understand it because it disrupts your notion that all value judgments are purely subjective.

I would be happy to consider an alternate account of value judgments! But thus far you have presented no such account. You offer a label, “factually bad,” but you haven’t connected that label to a concept. Until you do so, I simply have no idea what you’re talking about.

If what you say was true, we would have to abolish all the courts, the police, and the prisons, because there is no such thing as a** factually bad value judgment**. There is only what you prefer versus what I prefer.

I have no idea why you think we would “have to” do anything. It seems that you’re importing your own value judgments into the situation, but there’s no need to do so. Nonreligious people get along just fine without appealing to a divine moral code.

Pope Benedict called this the “dictatorship of relativism,” which means that without objective moral values, morality will be dictated by the person with the biggest club or the nation with the biggest bombs.

I have yet to hear from you (or anyone else, for that matter) how that’s any different from the Christian account, in which God is the most powerful being and enforces his own preferred moral code.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

If that’s a specific example, okay, but I require from you a generalized definition.

A factually bad value judgment is one which adversely impacts us or others.

Preferring chocolate to vanilla ice cream has no adverse impact. That is a matter of subjective taste. De gustibus non est disputandum.

Choosing to eat ice cream and nothing else produces an adverse impact on health, and therefore is a factually bad value judgment.

Abortion adversely impacts the unborn child, and therefore is a factually bad value judgment.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

hatsoff

*I have yet to hear from you (or anyone else, for that matter) how that’s any different from the Christian account, in which God is the most powerful being and enforces his own preferred moral code. *

God cannot enforce His own moral code. Haven’t you heard of free will?

 

[Spirithound]

If I may play devil’s advocate, or at least present objections I have heard to your points…

1. Biologically speaking, I exist as a person now in virtue of my conception.

Conception is a necessary but insufficient component of personhood. The sufficient component is self-awareness.

1. If we truly believe in right and wrong and correct moral conduct, then we must presuppose that human life has intrinsic moral value.

I don’t truly believe in right and wrong.

1. If human life has intrinsic moral value, and if you value my life now, then you must value my conception since i am the result of that conception.

Conclusion of Premise 1 and 2 is unsound because of falsity of 1 and 2.

1. If you value my conception, then you must agree that a human embryo has the same value as a person in virtue of the fact that it will become “me” in the here and now.

Extension of Conclusion 3 is unsound because of unsoundness of Conclusion 3.

1. All of the potentialities of a person is contained in a human embryo, and it is evident that the human embryo is ordered to the development of a person, and it will develop to that end unless somebody or something stops it from happening.

True, but…

1. In that respect, it would be correct to perceive the human embryo as being in fact a “person in development” in virtue of the end to which embryonic development is in act, which we know to be me in the here and now. Thus we are forced to conclude that to destroy embryonic development is to destroy a developing person.

…the concept of a “person in development” does not equate to a “person”, and thus does not receive the rights and privileges of a “person”.

1. It is intrinsically immoral to kill a person at any stage of development, regardless of whether they exist inside the womb or outside of the womb.

Value-judgement is unsound. No proof is given.

Conclusion: Therefore abortion is a form of infanticide and is thus murder.

Conclusion is unsound due to massive falsity of premises.

Pro-Life Spirithound is back!
Your argument falls apart because of a lack of definitions. As in Premise 1, we need to define a person as co-terminous with a human being. Person=human being, human being=person.

As in Premise 2, we need to stipulate moral absolutism. The relativist has no guidelines but her own.

A further weakness in your argument is that you go back and forth from saying “person” to “person in development” back to “person”. In Premise 1, what precisely does “in virtue of” mean? Is conception as sufficient, or merely necessary component of personhood? (I hold that it is sufficient, the pro-choicer would say it is only necessary). If it is sufficient, you cannot degrade the person back to “person in development”, as you do in Premise 5 and 6. If it is only necessary, then there must be another threshold of personhood. Then in Premise 7, you upgrade the “person in development” back to a person, and this would not sit well with the pro-choicer.

 

[hatsoff]

God cannot enforce His own moral code. Haven’t you heard of free will?

What does free will have to do with the fact that God enforces his own moral code by condemning sinners to Hell, and otherwise punishing people for their disobedience?

 

[hatsoff]

A factually bad value judgment is one which adversely impacts us or others.

Preferring chocolate to vanilla ice cream has no adverse impact. That is a matter of subjective taste. De gustibus non est disputandum.

Choosing to eat ice cream and nothing else produces an adverse impact on health, and therefore is a factually bad value judgment.

Abortion adversely impacts the unborn child, and therefore is a factually bad value judgment.

It sounds like you’re taking the Dan Barker approach to morality: A behavior is immoral iff it reduces net harm. Now, I agree that kind of standard makes for a pretty good rule of thumb, but it doesn’t work as a robust account of morality, for a variety of reasons. To give a few examples, consider:

(1) How do we deal with the disparity between direct versus indirect results? Suppose, for instance, we discover that a person is about to donate a large sum of money to a hate group. His donation, we know, will cause great harm. Suppose further that we have an opportunity to steal that money, preventing him from making the donation. This will cause him a little bit of harm, but it will prevent the hate group from using his would-be donation to spread even greater suffering. According to the reduce net harm model, we ought to steal that person’s money. However, many people, perhaps yourself included, are very uncomfortable with that sort of conclusion.

(2) Who gets counted? You mention abortion, but this takes for granted that unborn fetuses get the same rights as grown adults.

(3) How do we weigh harm? What do we do about, say, animal rights? Most people will agree that we should not ignore their well-being, but few would be willing to treat them as equal to humans when weighing our collective interests.

These are just three examples.

More importantly, though, even if you refine your account to deal with these issues, you’re still just offering another code of conduct. That you have used it to define the novel term “factually bad” doesn’t change what it is: your preferred moral code.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

*What does free will have to do with the fact that God enforces his own moral code by condemning sinners to Hell, and otherwise punishing people for their disobedience? *

Are you confusing “enforcement” with “consequences”?

God cannot force us to to good or avoid evil. He can promise consequences, whereby he offers to persuade us one way or the other. But the decision is ours to make. God does not choose hell for our disobedience. We do.