A Philosophical Conundrum. No.2

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Everybody knows what a sock is. We wear it on our feet, to serve a specific purpose. (well…most of us do).

Is a sock really a sock in an objective reality free of our imagination and will? If human beings never existed but the object we call a sock existed, would it still be a sock (in the sense that it serves the function of being worn on a foot), or would it be merely a grouping of atoms)?
 
I think it would still be a sock, in that it would still have been designed for that specific purpose, however, whether or not it would be used for feet is another matter. If you gave a sock to someone who had never heard of such a thing, they might use it as a pouch of some kind, however, it would still be a sock. By that same logic, if you use a screw driver as a chisel, that does not make it so, it simply is being misused.
 
MindOverMatter2 said:
Everybody knows what a sock is. We wear it on our feet, to serve a specific purpose. (well…most of us do).

Is a sock really a sock in an objective reality free of our imagination and will? If human beings never existed but the object we call a sock existed, would it still be a sock (in the sense that it serves the function of being worn on a foot), or would it be merely a grouping of atoms)?
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No. A sock is an artificial object whose meaning is only in the mind. It is no longer a sock once there are no minds to perceive it to be a sock, since a form must be in something to exist.
 
The function of the object is accidental to it’s nature; a sock would be a sock independant of it’s use; it would also be a sock irrespective of the means by which it emerged.

Thus; if we were to find a sock on the moon; it would still be a sock; even if the sock originated from some odd or unintentional formation of accidents without intent of the causing agency for the article to function in this manner.

Also; if a sock existed on the moon; that arose through some unconscious agency or function (I am careful to avoid a discussion of random emergence) but let us say that it appeared entirely coincidentally; and it’s cause was neither conscious or intentful - the sock would still be a sock. Furthermore this sock would still be a sock irrespective of our discovery of the sock. Even if the sock were to go undiscovered it would still be a sock.

This would be the case because the quiddity (whatness) of the sock shares a formal unity with other socks; insofar as something essential is inhered in an object that makes it fundementally a sock; and by consequence everything of this form is within the species of sock. A sock is quiddically a sock because of the form of the matter; and not because of the function of the object.

Ie; if I were to wrap cloth around my feet as a sock; this cloth would not; despite it’s useage be a sock; unless it adhered to what a sock fundementally is. Now; we could argue that function implies causal intent; but in the case of food; there is no causal intent; but the function remains - thus; function does not necessarily mean that causal intent is required. I would argue that it is clear that an object that resembled a sock in every way and shape would be fundementally a sock even if it were to appear in a manner that was entirely unintentional.

For example; If I were sewing some clothes (let us say a hat); and did it very badly; I could say “I have accidentally produced a sock”. There was no intent to produce it; but the object I have created does resemble a sock. Thus; a sock requires no intent.
 
Matter, form and substance again.

Its matter is yarn, its form is the woven arrangement of the yarn. The substance is what we perceive that arrangement means to us.

A ‘sock’ exists only as far as our perception of its arrangement permits. Otherwise it is just a squiggle of yarn - the understanding of which, of course, depends on how we perceive the fibres that make up yarn, etc, etc, etc…

A sock exists in its ‘sock-ness’ as a manufactured reality in our minds. If humans had never existed and somehow the matter of a ‘sock’ came to exist in a ‘sock-like’ form it would never be perceived as a human sock and therefore it would not BE a sock since there would be noone to manufacture that reality.
 
It certainly is a conundrum, but not because it may or may not be considered a ‘sock’…

But because if humans didn’t exist, there would be no need for socks as they never would have been invented. Thus socks would simply not exist in a world devoid of humans.

So as a non-existent object, the question of whether a ‘sock’ is a group of letters or a group of atoms is moot and not worth pondering.

That is the way I view it philosophically…

Snert
 
Matter, form and substance again.
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Its matter is yarn, its form is the woven arrangement of the yarn. The substance is what we perceive that arrangement means to us.
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A ‘sock’ exists only as far as our perception of its arrangement permits. Otherwise it is just a squiggle of yarn - the understanding of which, of course, depends on how we perceive the fibres that make up yarn, etc, etc, etc…
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A sock exists in its ‘sock-ness’ as a manufactured reality in our minds. If humans had never existed and somehow the matter of a ‘sock’ came to exist in a ‘sock-like’ form it would never be perceived as a human sock and therefore it would not BE a sock since there would be noone to manufacture that reality.
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That is nominalism, or at the very best conceptualism. Most Catholic philosophers are either Realist or moderate Realists., such as Aquinas, Scotus and Mayrone. The Nominalists such as Ockham have been refuted on these points by systematic application of logic. I will give an example from Scotus Ordinatio II. D3, part 1, QQ3 : 59-64

““Because what is not of itself distinct or determinate cannot be what first distinguishes or determines something else. But the being of existence, in the sense in which it is distinguished from the being of essence, is not itself distinct or determinate. For the being of existence does not have its own differences other than the differences of the being of essence, because in that case one would have to posit a proper heirardchy of existences other than the heirarchy of essences. rather the being of existence is precisely determined from something else’s determination. Therefore, it does not determine anything else;
From this, one could argue another way; what presupposes the determination and distinction of another is not th ereason for distungishing or determining that other. But existence, as determined and distinct, presupposes te heirarchy and distinction of essences. Therefore etc.
If it is said that it presupposes every other distinction than the distinction into individuals, but it causes the distinction that so to speak results in the individual, then to the contrary; in a categorical heirarchy, there are contained all the things that pertain by themselves to that heirarchy, disregarding whatever is irrelevant to the hierarchy. According to Aristotle (Posterior Analytics I; 20,82a21-24) “there is an end-point in each category, at the high end and at the low end” therefore, just as there is found a highest in a genus, considering it precisely under the aspect of essence, so there are found intermediate genera, and species and differences. There is also found there a lowest, namely, the silgular – actual existence, being disregarded altogether. This is plainly evident because “this man” does not formally include actual existence any more than “man” in general does.
Furthermore there is the same question about existence as there is about nature; by what and from where is it contracted, so that it is “this” if the specific nature is the same in several individuals, it has the same king of existence in them. Just as it is proved in the solution to the first Question; that the nature is not of itself a “this” so too it can be asked what it is through which existence is a “this” because it is not “this” of itself. So it is not enough to give existence as that by which the nature is a “this”.””

Clearly from this it follows that that within a genus is individuated by that which is within it; or that which is intrinsic to it; for although an act distinguishes; only an essential act distinguishes essentially - and an accidental act (as that of a nominalism) does only distinguish accidentally; and thus although generative has no meaningful distinction; wheras that which distinguishes as to the material substance of an object distinguishes as to what it is inhered; and not to that which is accidentally predicated thereof.

The act of a sock in praxis is only an accidental act; and cannot distinguish essentially; thus that distinction as to what individuates a sock is that which is inhered; and not that which is predicated in accidents; such as an accidental praxis.
 
We can only know that it is a sock through our perception.

We know “something” reached our senses from outside and we call that a sock.

We know that our self exists and that we experience things.

Personally, I believe God (and only God) can reveal the true nature of things, miraculously, by “seeing through God’s eyes” (somehow) and not our own. This is how God “show us ourselves”. (Something worth praying for!).

Otherwise, everything we know is filtered through a human mind/perception.

We have very good reason to trust that what we know reflects “real reality”. But we are creatures living within it. We cannot see things fully objectively (that is, from God’s point of view).

see Dinesh D’Souza’s Life after Death, 2009 – a superb (mostly philosophical!) argument against materialism. He discusses this very topic.
 
Maybe a bit of levity in this discussion won’t hurt much.

I say it’s still a sock, and here’s my proof.

For many years, socks have disappeared in my house. I have had various thoughts about that. I have sometimes thought there is something in the manufacturing process that turns them into either dust bunnies or wire clothes hangers. I’m tentatively persuaded that it’s the former, since I’m not sure how fabric can be turned into steel.

Last weekend, I finally got around to seriously cleaning my now-adult son’s old bedroom. (He’s living elsewhere now) and I found many, many socks; some in places so improbable that they had to have simply appeared there. Plainly, those socks self-generated somehow, since my son assured me he had removed all of his clothing from his room some time ago.

So, I took those spontaneously generated socks to my wife, who laundered them, and I have added them to my theretofore dwindling sock inventory. (re: “dwindling-causes”, see above) They have behaved in every way like socks. I have even worn some of them, and the empirical data establishes beyond question that they really are socks.

Therefore, if a sock somehow appeared on the moon, it would still be a sock.
 
Thank you everyone for getting involved:thumbsup:. I was getting tired with the usual battles between theists and atheists on this forum, and so I wanted to try something different. Although I do not agree with all your replies, I did very much enjoy reading your posts, and how you have all approached it from different angles and intelligently so. You have also been very respectful. I thought that you were all going to ignore it and call the questions stupid. But instead your answers have cheered me up:).

Actually, I already have a philosophical position on the matter which I will discuss with you all a.s.a.p. Have patients for now. I will be back latter on tonight.

Peace and Godbless.:cool:
 
Apollos said:
No. A sock is an artificial object whose meaning is only in the mind. It is no longer a sock once there are no minds to perceive it to be a sock, since a form must be in something to exist.
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I agree with you Apollos. The sock (In serving a purely ideological function) does not exist objectively, since the function we predicate to it is not intrinsic to what it is naturally; it is purely ideological. We did not discover socks in nature. We invented them in reference to a concept. A sock is not a sock until its on your foot serving the purpose of a sock, and when its off the foot we can only justify calling it a sock because we intend to use it as such. In reality it is merely a grouping of atoms with a shape that we find useful for our feet. The fact that we use it for a sock does not give it the intrinsic nature of a sock. A sock has no meaning outside of the fact of what it is used for. Thus if you wrap a different piece of material around your foot, so long as it sufficiently serves its purpose, this to would be serving the ideological function we call a sock.

But I would take the issue even further. Take even a human hand for instance. We give the hand meaning in terms of its function in respect of the whole form which we call a person. We command the hand to do this and that through the power of the mind. Its serves a purpose in reference to the potential activities of our minds. We refer to it in respect of its potentiality or activity. A human hand is only a hand in so far as it functions as such in respect of the whole form of which it is a functional part. But if you cut it off from the rest of the form, it is no longer a hand, since it has lost the potentiality or functions that defines it as such. It becomes something else. Thus even a synthetic bionic replacement hand can perhaps be correctly referred to as a hand, so long as it is directed by a personal mind, simply because, in its potentiality, its serves the function of a hand in respect of a personal mind.

I would even argue that a dead body is no-longer a person; since a person is specifically the union of a soul and body. A dead body used to be a person. (I reject Descartes definition of the soul in reference to the body) The person is the concious activity and potentiality of the body? Something like that.
 
I agree with you Apollos. The sock (In serving a purely ideological function) does not exist objectively, since the function we predicate to it is not intrinsic to what it is naturally; it is purely ideological. We did not discover socks in nature. We invented them. A sock is not a sock until its on your foot, and when its off the foot we can only justify calling it a sock because we intend to use it as such. In reality it is merely a grouping of atoms with a shape that we find useful for our feet. The fact that we use it for a sock does not give it the intrinsic nature of a sock. A sock has no meaning outside of the fact of what it is used for. Thus if you wrap a different piece of material around you foot, this to would be serving the ideological function we call a sock.
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Is a sock puppet not composed of a sock used contrary to it’s purpose? But does it not retain that which made it a sock even if it’s function is abused?

Furthermore; is a sock in my wardrobe only a sock when it is an object in my mind? - If I were to die; and no one to know of the sock in my wardrobe - does it not retain something intrinsic that when discovered, will be recognised as a sock?
But I would take the issue even further. Take even a human hand for instance. We give the hand meaning in terms of its function in respect of the whole form which we call a person. We refer to it in respect of its potentiality or activity. A human hand is only a hand in so far as it functions as such in respect of the whole form of which it is a functional part. But if you cut it off from the rest of the form, it is no longer a hand, since it has lost the potentiality or functions that defines it as such. It becomes something else. Thus even a synthetic bionic replacement hand can perhaps be correctly referred to as a hand, so long as it is directed by a personal mind, simply because, in its potentiality, its serves the function of a hand in respect of a personal mind.
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If I were the only person alive; and were in a coma - would not my hand be still a hand despite neither it’s functional use; nor it’s existence as a mental object?

Further; were we to cut off a hand; does it not still retain what makes it essentially a hand? - Further; if a hand when cut off ceases to be a hand, can it become one again were it reattached to a person; if so - would it matter which person (or animal); also; would it matter if; when reattached it served no function (viz. paralysed)?
I would even argue that a dead body is no-longer a person; since a person is specifically the union of a soul and body. A dead body used to be a person. (I reject Descartes definition of the soul in reference to the body) The person is the concious activity and potentiality of the body? Something like that.
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Clearly a person is a unity of body-and-soul; without a soul we have no person. The personhood is the rational soul present and inhered within the body.
 
MindOverMatter2 said:
I would even argue that a dead body is no-longer a person; since a person is specifically the union of a soul and body. A dead body used to be a person. (I reject Descartes definition of the soul in reference to the body) The person is the concious activity and potentiality of the body? Something like that.
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How about a fetus?
 
JohnDamian said:
Is a sock puppet not composed of a sock used contrary to it’s purpose? But does it not retain that which made it a sock even if it’s function is abused?
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I would not even call it a “sock-puppet”. Its just a piece of material, the matter involved is now being use to serve a different ideological purpose; the idea of a puppet. The sock is only a sock in reference to what we want to use it for. The material is neutral. It can potentially serve the ideological purpose of a sock, or it can potentially serve the ideological purpose of a puppet. The idealogical purpose involved in each case is manufactured. We wanted something to serve the purpose of wrapping around our feet. We called this service a “sock” in respect of its intended purpose. The sock ceases to be a sock when we no-longer require its to serve that purpose or when we want the material to serve some other idealogical purpose.
JohnDamian said:
Furthermore; is a sock in my wardrobe only a sock when it is an object in my mind? - If I were to die; and no one to know of the sock in my wardrobe - does it not retain something intrinsic that when discovered, will be recognised as a sock?
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If an alien from another world came in to your room when you were not there and saw a picture of you with material of your feet with the symbols “s o c k” printed on them, the alien would assume that you put the material on your feet in order to serve some kind of purpose like keeping your feet warm, and in-so-doing, you have chosen to label the material with the symbols “s o c k”. If the same alien, saw another picture of you with the same material on your hand, the alien would think that you use the same material to serve a different function. The alien would have no justification in thinking that you were using the material in a fashion that it was not by its intrinsic nature meant to serve.

If you happened to walk in the room at that moment and then said I was using the socks as a puppet but it is not meant to serve that function, the alien could only assume that you have a “subjective cultural preference” for using that same material for the feet alone and thus was using them out of character in respect of that subjective preference. If you then said that the shape of the material is intrinsically ordered to serve the feet alone, the alien would then laugh and say “this is your human cultural preference for that shape and material; because in our world we have the same shape and material, and our male companions use it to keep their genitals warm!!!”. What sense would it make to then claim that this is not the natural use of a sock? They do not use the material or the shape for the human ideological purpose of a sock; they use it to warm their genitals, because given the shape and nature of their genitals it serves that purpose sufficiently.😃
 
I would not even call it a “sock-puppet”. Its just a piece of material, the matter involved is now being use to serve a different ideological purpose; the idea of a puppet. The sock is only a sock in reference to what we want to use it for. The material is neutral. It can potentially serve the ideological purpose of a sock, or it can potentially serve the ideological purpose of a puppet. The idealogical purpose involved in each case is manufactured. We wanted something to serve the purpose of wrapping around our feet. We called this service a “sock” in respect of its intended purpose. The sock ceases to be a sock when we no-longer require its to serve that purpose or when we want the material to serve some other idealogical purpose.
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You are reffering to the word sock as an act or operation of an object; and not of an object itself. It appears that this seems to be causing some equivocal misunderstanding (or perhaps disagreement).

When a sock is refferred to as an act of an object; then it is correct to say that in terms of it’s purpose it is; but if it is reffered to as the quiddity of an object; we can only say that it is in regards to a property inhered within the object.
If you happened to walk in the room at that moment and then said I was using the socks as a puppet but it is not meant to serve that function, the alien could only assume that you have a “subjective cultural preference” for using that same material for the feet alone and thus was using them out of character in respect of that subjective preference. If you then said that the shape of the material is intrinsically ordered to serve the feet alone, the alien would then laugh and say “this is your human cultural preference for that shape and material; because in our world we have the same shape and material, and our male companions use it to keep their genitals warm!!!”. What sense would it make to then claim that this is not the natural use of a sock? They do not use the material or the shape for the human ideological purpose of a sock; they use it to warm their genitals, because given the shape and nature of their genitals it serves that purpose sufficiently.
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This is precisely why it is absurd to refer to an object in regards to it’s function; at least in regards to reffering how an object is individuated. Because the object of a sock does not fundementally change if it is used either for feet; other organs, or indeed a sock puppet - the sock itself retains something individual and inhered within it that makes it a fundemental sock. The sock has properties that inhere to make it such; so that despite it’s act (which is an accident) the sock is what it is; and not changed fundementally.

The sock does not cease to be a sock; if we are refferring to a sock as the object of that form; even if it’s use or act is engaged in the most absurd of manners; as this act does not causally change the nature of the sock itself ; and the purpose of the sock is not the nature of the sock; as purpose implies design; and not all natures have purposes; so not all natures are necessarily done so by a necessary purpose; but instead sometimes inhere an accidental purpose.

If you were to observe some person or being using a sock in a different way to you and I (presumably) use it; let us say they put it on their hand instead; then the sock does not fundementally change; it is still a sock - we would say “he is wearing a sock on his hand”. The object is not altered by it’s use.

A person observing me using a sock for a puppet may say it is my preferance; and to which I would reply that the object I am using in my puppet show remains a sock fundementally; even if my cultural preferance is to engage that object in a manner different to the way the other person uses it - perhaps I prefer slippers anyway; so “sock” has no purpose for me; even though I know what one is; can identify it; even if it is being used (or abused) in ways contrary to the purposes of it’s designer; it is not limited to those predicted purposes; which are as accidental to the sock as the act to which the sock is engaged.

Perhaps however my argument socks…
 
Apollos said:
How about a fetus?
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Very good question. I define a foetus as a person only because it is in act pending the birth of what we understand to be a person. A foetus is in the developmental process of manufacturing a living person, and thus the word “person” has to be included in the value of the foetus. To destroy the foetus would be to destroy the ontological end of that the foetus was in the process of becoming - a living person. Thus abortion cannot be considered as a harmless act since it is evident to us that we are not simply allowing the destruction of growing objects. It is the destruction of a growing person, and must be considered as such because of the end to which it is in act. That’s why abortion is wrong and it is the only reason why it is wrong. We recognise abortion as wrong because we know what the foetus develops into. If it developed in to an orange we would not consider it wrong to have an abortion. We know that the intrinsic function of a foetus is the development of a living person, and thus the foetus can be legitimately described as a person in reference to the pending ontological end to which the foetus in act.

When the body of a person is asleep or in a coma, we continue to consider that body as still being personal in nature because we have knowledge of that particular body’s potentialities in reference to our own personal natures and medical records. Unless we are lead to believe otherwise we must assume that the soul and the body is still united in its personal potentiality despite brain damage and the impediment of personal expression. We must also assume this in persons that have brain damage due to some birth defect or disorder in later life, simply because we have no moral authority to assume otherwise.

A new born baby, in terms of its limited actions in that specific point in time, isn’t that much different from an irrational animal. But it is different in one vital respect, and this is the baby’s pending “potentiality” as a being that can communicate itself rationally; and we must respect that vital difference even though the end to which it is in act is not yet actual. Otherwise we would think it good to kill a born baby.

Once a person is dead however, we are no-longer talking about a person, accept in memory. We are in actual fact talking about the object of what use to be a living person.
 
JohnDamian said:
If you were to observe some person or being using a sock in a different way to you and I (presumably) use it; let us say they put it on their hand instead; then the sock does not fundamentally change; it is still a sock - we would say “he is wearing a sock on his hand”. The object is not altered by it’s use.

…
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No it would not be fundamentally a “sock” because we describe something as a sock only in virtue of an idealogical concept that we would like to have serve us. If we see something with a specific shape and size that we could use to warm our feet, that object then becomes, conceptually speaking, a “sock” because it is serving that particular function at that particular moment. The concept is invented, it is not natural. It is purely artificial. For you, conceptually speaking, it is a sock. For the alien it is a object used to warm ones genitals. When viewed apart from idealogical preferences, it is neither a sock or a genital warmer, it is just an object of some sort which happens to have a specific shape and size that you can utilise for the purpose of warming your feet. You are calling the material a sock only because you use it as a sock or you see others use it as such, and thus this is proof enough that the word sock is purely functional in nature and thus does not refer to the objective intrinsic nature of an actual object; but rather the usage value of that object.

In other words, there is a substantial form which has an “accident” (in thomistic terms) that we call a “sock”
 
MindOverMatter2 said:
I see you have a sense of humour after all my friend 👍😃

Personally, I would describe it as an intelligent mistake.
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I’ll never surrender!

👍
No it would not be fundamentally a “sock” because we describe something as a sock only in virtue of an idealogical concept that we would like to have serve us.
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The key to this is that “we describe something”; clearly a thing has an existence prior to it’s recognition; and it’s subsequent naming is therefore posterior; and as it is not causally essential for the object; accidental to the object. Thus; the name we give to it is irrelevant to the existence of; and form (viz. quiddity) of the object.
If we see something with a specific shape and size that we could use to warm our feet, that object then becomes, conceptually speaking, a “sock” because it is serving that particular function at that particular moment.
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The fact that we describe it in a particular manner is irrelevant; the matter is that the object has qualities condusive to the fitting; spacial specifications; and retention of heat that make up the essential “essence” of the sock; thus the matter is a sock (regardless of how we so choose to name it). The object has a specific form; which is identical to the forms of other such objects; which is a real form; that is independant of conceptualising; and naming.

It is not essential for a fitting, warming, correctly sized object to be named a sock; although it is essential for a sock to be a (potentially) fitting, warming, correctly sized object.

The mental image of a sock, or the phantasmal extrapolation of the form is entirely posterior (after) to the form; and is also irrelevant to the existence of the form. Furthermore; the useage of the object is irrelevant; for the potential to be used as a sock is enough to make it a sock – ie; a sock on the floor is as much a sock as a sock on the foot. Also; a sock on the moon is as much a sock as the sock on my foot; and also an unknown sock floating in space is also as much a sock as the sock on my foot; even if it has not been realised as that; which is accidental to the sock.
The concept is invented, it is not natural. It is purely artificial.
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The definition or specificity of the essence or quiddity is conceptual; but the existence of the qualities of the essence or quiddity are real; and inhered in the object; later recognised and compartmentalised into particular groupings owing to function or other arrangements.

Thus; we have objects of the genus of “wool objects”; all the objects in this genus are really woolen. Although we may choose to specify and apply concepts to the objects; we might note that one object in the genus of “wool objects” is softer; and one coarser; this differentia seperates the woolen objects further into different species; and eventually into different individuals. However; when we take an object of the “wool object” genus and differentiate it; we are not differentiating it based upon a concept alone; we base it upon a particular quality within the object; the “sock shaped wool object” is recognised as a “sock shaped wool object”; and differentiated based upon that – however; nowhere in the definition of a “sock shaped wool object” is it necessary for that object to be recognised! - The recognition of inherant qualities or potentialities in the object are subsequent and accidental (irrelevant) to the differentia of the objects.
For you, conceptually speaking, it is a sock. For the alien it is a object used to warm ones genitals.
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For me; the object is a “sock shaped object”; for the alien; it is a “sock shaped object”. The different actions they do with the object are irrelevant; as is the name of the object. We could now refer to the “sock shaped object” as the “genital warming object” – this would not fundementally change the object; but merely IMPLY the desired functions of the object from the perspective of the one giving it the name.

To both me and the hypothetical alien; we recognise inherant qualities in the shape; texture; and heat retention of the object and differentiate it based upon that. What we choose to then do when we apply this specific object is entirely irrelevant.

CONTINUED
 
CONTINUED
You are calling the material a sock only because you use it as a sock or you see others use it as such,
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I am calling it a sock because that is the word I use for objects of that shape; texture; size and heat retention. We could call it a Blearljerkoj for all that matters; the name is irrelevant. I am calling the object “sock” because when I grew up other people called the object “sock”.

If I was French I would call it a “socquette”. When a Frenchman calls a “Sock” a “Socquette” we both mean the same thing; we both apply this word to a real object; with particular qualities inherant in the object. The name doesn’t matter.
and thus this is proof enough that the word sock is purely functional in nature and thus does not refer to the objective intrinsic nature of an actual object; but rather the usage value of that object.
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The word “Sock” or “Socquette” is purely fictional; however it is used in what is called “suppositio” in this case the word “Sock” is used with what is called “personal suppositio”. This is a Philosophical construct used for the relationship of words and object devised by William of Ockham – when I use the word “Sock” I am using the word as a supposition of the properties of the article I am reffering too; namely an object of the shape; size; texture; and heat retention of a sock.

So whilst the word is fictional; the suppositio that the word is is real.

When we use a word we can use it in a number of ways; when I use the word Sock; with “personal suppositio” I am reffering to the ontological qualities of the object “sock/socquette” and not to the useage of that article.
In other words, there is a substantial form which has an “accident” (in thomistic terms) that we call a “sock”
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More like; in other words there is a substantial form which is represented by the word “sock”.

If I were to show you a picture of a sock and point at it; I show you a representation of an object – you do not deny that if I showed you a picture of a sock on the floor that it was a sock?

So then; why is it that it can be denied that when I give a verbal (rather than pictoral) representation of “sock” that it is any different?

👍

NB: I don’t want to give the impression I have no sense of humor or am taking this too seriously; it is somewhat difficult to express humor without digressing into endless parenthesis; to the despair of both my argument and the reader; neither of which appreciate British humor.
 
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