A Philosophical Conundrum. No.2

[JDaniel]

You are reffering to the word sock as an act or operation of an object; and not of an object itself. It appears that this seems to be causing some equivocal misunderstanding (or perhaps disagreement).

When a sock is refferred to as an act of an object; then it is correct to say that in terms of it’s purpose it is; but if it is reffered to as the quiddity of an object; we can only say that it is in regards to a property inhered within the object.

This is precisely why it is absurd to refer to an object in regards to it’s function; at least in regards to reffering how an object is individuated. Because the object of a sock does not fundementally change if it is used either for feet; other organs, or indeed a sock puppet - the sock itself retains something individual and inhered within it that makes it a fundemental sock. The sock has properties that inhere to make it such; so that despite it’s act (which is an accident) the sock is what it is; and not changed fundementally.

The sock does not cease to be a sock; if we are refferring to a sock as the object of that form; even if it’s use or act is engaged in the most absurd of manners; as this act does not causally change the nature of the sock itself ; and the purpose of the sock is not the nature of the sock; as purpose implies design; and not all natures have purposes;

Johner:

Would you mind giving us an example of a nature that has no purpose. Idiomatically, did not most words originally come to be precisely because the sound used to depict the object, as an object of thought, seemed most like the object? Or, at least, what the object was useful for?

so not all natures are necessarily done so by a necessary purpose; but instead sometimes inhere an accidental purpose.

So that a purpose, in order to be a purpose, must be substantial, not accidental?

If you were to observe some person or being using a sock in a different way to you and I (presumably) use it; let us say they put it on their hand instead; then the sock does not fundementally change; it is still a sock - we would say “he is wearing a sock on his hand”. The object is not altered by it’s use.

True; but, what was its original and primary use? Or, would that even matter?

A person observing me using a sock for a puppet may say it is my preferance; and to which I would reply that the object I am using in my puppet show remains a sock fundementally; even if my cultural preferance is to engage that object in a manner different to the way the other person uses it - perhaps I prefer slippers anyway; so “sock” has no purpose for me; even though I know what one is; can identify it; even if it is being used (or abused) in ways contrary to the purposes of it’s designer; it is not limited to those predicted purposes; which are as accidental to the sock as the act to which the sock is engaged.

Does a “nature” have to be substantial form? Or, can it be, or, have been, merely an accidental form or purpose, considering that was the reason why it was designed in the first place?

God bless,
jd

 

[MindOverMatter2]

If I were to show you a picture of a sock and point at it; I show you a representation of an object – you do not deny that if I showed you a picture of a sock on the floor that it was a sock?

First of all, what is a sock? A sock, conceptually speaking, (before socks as we understand them were invented) is its function, to fit on the foot and warm the foot. We knew that we needed something to go on our foot before we went about looking for a suitable material, shape, or colour. That function required certain materials and a certain shape. The function is what we call a sock. The materials used is the substance by which we actualise the fulfilment of our conceptual and biological needs. We name the substance a sock, not because we recognise an objective intrinsic purpose for which it exists, but rather only in virtue of the fact that it can serve a function which we describe as a sock. The substance by itself, objectively speaking, is not a sock. The sock is a conceptual invention and remains conceptual regardless whether the object we call a sock is on our foot or not. While we utilise a specific shape and material for our feet, it is evident that there is not something in nature which exists for the purpose of fitting on our foot. The purpose is invented, it is evidently not something which exists in the intrinsic nature or form of the object that we utilise for our feet. You are confusing conceptual purpose, with objective purpose.

 

[JohnDamian]

You are confusing conceptual purpose, with objective purpose.

No; I am denying the role of purpose altogether in the definition of an object.

First of all, what is a sock? A sock, conceptually speaking, (before socks as we understand them were invented) is its function, to fit on the foot and warm the foot. We knew that we needed something to go on our foot before we went about looking for a suitable material, shape, or colour.

I am wearing slippers right now. The difference between a slipper and a sock is not a conceptual difference; but a real difference because of the properties of the objects.

That function required certain materials and a certain shape. The function is what we call a sock.

I think it’s the object which we call a sock; this is why if I walked up to someone in the street with the object “sock” on my hand they could still identify it as a sock. Even if I was using it’s function differently to the norm.

The materials used is the substance by which we actualise the fulfilment of our conceptual and biological needs. We name the substance a sock, not because we recognise an objective intrinsic purpose for which it exists, but rather only in virtue of the fact that it can serve a function which we describe as a sock.

When we say the word “sock” we conjure up a phantasm of the object “sock”. This phantasm is a supposition of the image of the object sock; in verbal form; equivalent to a photograph of a sock.

The substance by itself, objectively speaking, is not a sock. The sock is a conceptual invention and remains conceptual regardless whether the object we call a sock is on our foot or not.

The sock is a real thing; with a conceptually abstracted function. If there were no people left alive; all the object “sock” left on the planet would still be the same. They would not be fundementally changed. Thus; a sock is not changed by either a concept; or a lack thereof.

While we utilise a specific shape and material for our feet, it is evident that there is not something in nature which exists for the purpose of fitting on our foot.

Just because no “sock” has emerged through natural processes does not mean that a sock is a purely conceptual thing. The object “sock” is the product of a mental phantasm; and has become a real object through the workings of man. In the same way as the Pyramids are real objects; and not mental concepts - a sock; like a pyramid - continues to exist as what it fundamentally is even if we cease to conceive them. Our conception is only part of an accidentally ordered sequence which produced the object; which is now real.

(Incidentally; an accidentally ordered sequence is one where the cause does not need to continue existing for what it has caused to continue or to continue to cause – ie; I can continue to exist; and even have children even though my cause (parents) are dead. – a sock can continue to exist; even if it’s cause (the concept + praxis) is gone).

The purpose is invented, it is evidently not something which exists in the intrinsic nature or form of the object that we utilise for our feet.

The purpose of an object is invented; but it is irrelevant to the existence of the object; except in retrospective terms; as the object is part of an accidentally ordered sequence.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

The purpose of an object is invented; but it is irrelevant to the existence of the object; except in retrospective terms; as the object is part of an accidentally ordered sequence.

Purpose is very relevant to what we call a “sock”, although I agree that it is not relevant to the materials or the shape that the sock is made of or forms. Human beings, using artificial means, invented materials or used materials for which they could create a specific shape. The purpose of this object was for use on the foot. We called this object a “sock” in-order to define and differentiate the artificial purpose of that object in respect of other objects. People in turn agreed that this so called “sock” could serve the function it was invented for quite nicely. Outside of that purpose, “socks” do not exist. But the “materials” and the “shape” does exist. Evidently It is not in the intrinsic nature and purpose of the materials or the shape of the materials to fit on the foot. This is to say that it does not exist to put on ones foot. It just so happens that the materials and the shape in question is as such that it would make a great “sock”.

 

[Windfish]

I think I am in agreement with good 'ol JohnDamian, here. I hope you guys continue the discussion so that we can get to some kind of agreement.

 

[JDaniel]

Everybody knows what a sock is. We wear it on our feet, to serve a specific purpose. (well…most of us do).

Is a sock really a sock in an objective reality free of our imagination and will? If human beings never existed but the object we call a sock existed, would it still be a sock (in the sense that it serves the function of being worn on a foot), or would it be merely a grouping of atoms)?

MoM:

The choice of the ‘sock’ is an interesting one. Certainly at least the meaning of the word, if not its name, conveys its purpose. And it is clearly an object that is artificial. One might be led to believe that its discovery was accidental: perhaps someone used a mitten as sort of ‘sock’ and voilà, it caught on. But, as we can see from the below, that was not the case. The sock was a modification, a refinement, as it were, from an earlier design of a different purpose.

Origin:
Old English socc ‘light shoe’, of Germanic origin, from Latin soccus comic actors shoe, light low-heeled slipper’, from Greek sukkhos – The Oxford Dictionaries

However, the conundrum is still relevant and essentially can be asked of any object but with less assertiveness of those objects that are naturally created, or rather, created by God. Such objects are for the most part a priori. Artificial objects are for the most part a posteriori. If the sock had existed a priori then it would have had to have been created either by God, or some other creature created by God but before man: as a priori is a term related to the “knowing” of man. In either case the object would be a factuality that exists whether or not there is anyone alive to regard it with a vital power. It would be a part of the physical strata: that which exists at the moment of its coming to be, as the factical of the future perfect tense.

The factical of the future perfect tense is expressed as truth that is grounded in the actuality of whatever it is. That there are sentient creatures around to verify the facticity of it is irrelevant. Its factuality resides precisely its authority of actuality. This cannot be said of things that have never existed, whether in actuality or as a conceptual being.

The next question is: does it have (a) purpose? Everything that exists has (a) purpose, in my opinion, whether we recognize those purposes or not. An artificial object is nothing more than a borrowing from nature to fill a need: which is the precursor of its purpose. The human discovery of a thing’s purpose might be happenstance: that is the use he makes of a thing, such as a radioactive isotope. And, things might have move than one use. That is part of the economy of nature. But, a thing’s ultimate purpose is in the end what it was made for: that which completely satisfies and terminates the desires of the agent. All other purposes attached to an object are intermediate purposes.

So, what is it that completely satisfies the desires of maker of a sock? Does it matter that the maker of the sock persist? Does it matter that the wife or husband of the maker persist? Does it matter that anyone persist? Or, does the factical of the moment that a thing-in-being completely satisfies the desires of its maker instead persist precisely because of its sheer existence?

God bless,
jd