Your “anything” is far too general. For some things being outside a particular range of values, then yes. But variation within that range would not have such dire effects. For other things than changing them would have essentially zero impact.
Actually, according to the butterfly effect, it could be.
Thank you for such a clear example of the “No True Scotsman” logical fallacy.
Depends. St. Thomas Aquinas held that an infinite regress like this could not be ruled out. However, some (not all) Thomists who came after him disagree, and certainly the popular Kalam Cosmological Argument makes an argument that it’s impossible.Freddy:
This would cause an infinite regress, wich is logically impossible.
There are two “worlds” that you are discussing, the physical world and a philosophic model of that world.
I think there’s a difference between something potentially divisible, but actually indivisible, and something potentially and actually divisible. The fact that we can’t actually divide quanta doesn’t mean that they aren’t potentially divisible. Every physical being is potentially divisible because it is extended. Unextended point particles are an idealization used in order to give simpler, but not strictly accurate, descriptions.
Exactly, so you’re talking about a very specific type of series…a temporal series. But what about a series that isn’t temporal? In which the cause doesn’t precede the effect. In fact, any theory that posits the existence of God is just such an atemporal series. Because the “first” cause…God, doesn’t precede the first effect, but is instead cotemporal with it.
I thought that was what I said. In the model, everything is potentially divisible as per the principle in your first note.
Not strictly accurate because they rely on a philosophical infinite regress instead of physical measurement.
It is indistinguishable from 0 in our capacity of measure it. But it isn’t actually 0. Again, when we talk about unextended point particles we are talking about an idealization that man conventionally established in order to simplify the epistemological enterprise.
So if the skeptic and the theist are talking about the same “first” cause, then why should we accept the skeptic’s description of a “natural” first cause over the theist’s description of a “supernatural” first cause…simple…because it makes more sense…and is more in keeping with our observations of reality.
The Planck length is based on a fundamental constant like c. It has nothing to do with our measuring capabilities and whether they can be improved. It is built into the physical world.
That is to say, they are a part of the philosophical model of reality, not the actual physical world.
But it’s still extended, wich means that it is composed of parts, even thought they can’t actually subsist on their own (if they did, reality wouldn’t be the way it is )
This is not true of the Big Bang theory. Regress is not infinite, but stops at the Planck epoch. It does reach the smallest possible length time etc. The problem you proposed in your original note has been addressed. There is no infinite regress.
Just to clarify. It’s very likely that a cyclical universe would not involve an infinite regress, because each iteration would arise from what would appear to be the very same cause. It may actually be a misnomer to refer to it as being cyclical, because if no information passed from one iteration to the next, then there would be no discernible causal order between each iteration.
I am not a defender of the Kalam Cosmological Argument, but to play devil’s advocate, its defenders make a distinction between (1) the abstract mathematical concepts and applications of infinity and (2) what they call an actual infinity existing in an actual or physical/natural sense, whether all at once or over time. A common analogy they use is called “Hilbert’s Hotel.” Then the analogy is applied to the age of the universe. The claim is that actual infinities lead to nonsense paradoxes and so can’t actually exist.LeonardDeNoblac:
Why? The integer numbers are an infinite regress back to minus infinity yet they are far from logically impossible. The real numbers r in {r: 0.0 < r <= 1.0} are an infinite regress back towards, but never quite reaching, 0.0. Again, real numbers are not logically impossible.
Are you a defender of the Five Ways of Saint Thomas Aquinas? They are actually very similar.
I am a defender of the Five Ways and other arguments that follow similarly. It should be noted, however, that St. Thomas basically rejects a form of the KCA in the Summa Theologica (ST I:I Q46 A2) as he did not think it can be shown that an infinite regress in an accidentally ordered series is illogical. It’s why none of his Ways demonstrate that the universe has a beginning, nor do any of his Ways assume a beginning as a premise, and why he explicitly says that a beginning to the universe cannot be demonstrated from reason alone.Wesrock:
Are you a defender of the Five Ways of Saint Thomas Aquinas? They are actually very similar.