A Priori Proof for God's Existence

[reggieM]

Greatness is relative concept therefore it can always be defined when we have two things with some measurable property.

Greatness is a value on a hierarchical scale. Less great, more great. Greater, greatest. So, yes it is relative and comparative.

 

[reggieM]

In what sense, then, can a man, absolutely speaking, be greater than a horse?

The rational capability in man makes him greater than all non-rational beings. Through reason, man has creative ability to connect with and make use of immense powers - far beyond that of a horse. In the same way, we wouldn’t ask if a horse is more powerful than an angel since a horse has bigger muscles. The angel has far more perfection and is therefore a much greater being. The horse is deprived of many powers in that sense.

And here is the kicker: Can we answer this from the concept of greatness itself without resort to the Great Chain of Being or to causal arguments?

Greatness is a value on a scale. As Anselm put it, “no greater can be conceived”. So, we have less great, more great and no greater.

The concept of greatness begins with the foundation of rationality and reason - that is the distinction between true and false, a distinction that does not come from reason, but which reason depends upon. True is assigned with good - otherwise, we wouldn’t value a true syllogism over a false one. So, goodness moves on the scale of value upwards to perfection.

Can we understand the concept of perfection without causal arguments?

I don’t know but I think we can understand that which is perfect in a negative sense, by observing flaws and defects in things, privations if we will - and removing them. Eventually anything that is contingent is less perfect than that which sustains itself.

 

[ferdgoodfellow]

Hi Reggie and STT,

Thank you for your thoughts.

Reggie sed this, which is helpful:

The concept of greatness begins with the foundation of rationality and reason - that is the distinction between true and false, a distinction that does not come from reason, but which reason depends upon. True is assigned with good - otherwise, we wouldn’t value a true syllogism over a false one. So, goodness moves on the scale of value upwards to perfection.

I think Anselm’s definition of “greater” ultimately rests on the concept of the good. What does it mean to be greater? To better in every way in which it is better to be. Better means “gooder” or more good.

I am inclined just to leave it at that. Granted this definition of greatness is extremely abstract and indefinite. In that sense it is “empty.” But, assuming the meaningfulness of “goodness” it makes sense to me.

I don’t think it is hopelessly subjective, as Vera maintains, for that would amount to denying that there can be absolute value judgments and comparisons of this being better than that.

 

[reggieM]

What does it mean to be greater? To better in every way in which it is better to be. Better means “gooder” or more good.

Goodness can be related to what is true - so therefore in relation to reality. And it’s based on the idea that only what exists is capable of being good. As something moves to “less existence” - or “privation of being” it is less good.

 

[ferdgoodfellow]

Thanks Reg,

All this makes sense within a metaphysics of being. Thank you Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Augustine, and Aquinas.

 

[ferdgoodfellow]

I don’t have time to lay it out fully now–and it is dangerous to post when under the influence of my evening highball–so I have to leave you only with this: I am ready to make my case for an a priori argument for God’s existence. Thank you all for your contributions so far. And God bless you!

 

[ferdgoodfellow]

Here is full the argument as laid out in 137:

1. God is that than which nothing greater can be thought (TTWNGCBT).
   [This is Anselm’s definition of God]
2. It is possible to consistently conceive of an entity as TTWNGCBT.
   [Our conception of God is thinkable or contains no contradictions.]
3. It is possible to conceive of an entity which cannot fail to exist.
   [Necessary existence is possible, the only other possibility being contingent existence.]
4. An entity as in 3 is greater than one which conceivably could have failed to exist.
   [This is Anselm’s principle from Proslogion 3. Note that it is different from the principle in Proslogion 2 which asserts that existence is greater than non-existence.]
5. It is conceivable that TTWNGCBT does not exist.
   [Assumption that TTWNGCBT exists contingently for reductio ad absurd argument]
6. But 5 leads to a contradiction because I could then conceive of something greater, namely something which exists without the conceivable alternative of not existing.
7. 5 is therefore rejected.
8. Therefore TTWNGCBT cannot conceivably fail to exist.
   [There being no other alternative.]
9. Therefore God exists.

In short, if TTWNGCBT is conceivable, and if necessary existence is possible, then God’s necessary existence is implicit in the idea of God itself.

The task is to show the soundness of the argument by defending premises 2 and 3. What’s more, this has to be done from an analysis of the concepts (greatness and necessary existence) themselves, without resort to any causal arguments.

Starting first with necessary existence, it is proposed in 3 that it is possible to conceive of an entity which cannot fail to exist. Vera argued that necessary existence is impossible because, when examined this in terms of possible worlds, the very idea leads to a contradiction. Via his world reduction thought experiment, he arrived at one world with only an X (and no Y) and another with only a Y (and no X). Given that necessary existence requires that all possible worlds contain an X, necessary existence is impossible.

But three of us on this thread (myself, Inocente, and Perplexity) found this argument to be circular. What he wanted to prove was built into and assumed by his possible worlds analysis, i.e. that all existence is contingent. In other words, we can always conceive a possible world in which X does not exist. Vera didn’t need to work his thought experiment. The answer was predetermined by how he conceives of possible worlds.

In favor of the possibility of necessary existence I offered Parmenides’ insight that absolute nothingness is inconceivable. Any attempt to refer to nothing except in a relative sense leads to a contradiction. Therefore we can conclude that something or other must exist. Brian Leftow points out, however, that this doesn’t mean any particular thing must exist. For example, reality could be an infinite series of contingent beings (one damn penguin after another). But it could be one necessarily existing entity, and possibility is all we need for the argument.

One can also successfully attack the positivist dogma itself. Why should we take it for granted that all existential propositions are contingent, given that the foundations of logical positivism are so shaky?

So I conclude that there are good grounds to believe premise 3.

 

[ferdgoodfellow]

But is our definition of God meaningful? Intuitively, it seems to satisfy the needs of a religious person as it is consistent with the idea of worship. Worship is the exaltation of something above all others—to love something with one’s whole, heart, soul, mind, and strength. We only worship the greatest (if we want to be rational, anyway).

But what is meant by “greater”? As Hartshorne explains, “x is greater than y insofar as x is, and y is not, something ‘which it is better to be than not to be’. Greater thus means superior, more excellent, more worthy of admiration and respect.” And to be the greatest conceivable being is to be better in whatever way it is better to be.

Again, this intuitively makes sense. To be sure, it assumes some notion of the good, which is a primary idea (like truth and beauty) and hard to define.

But however intuitively appealing our definition is, there are objections. First there is the problem of quantity. With numbers, there is no greatest conceivable number. Take any number and just add 1. We can always conceive of a greater number. Why shouldn’t this be the case with beings? Take any candidate for the greatest possible being and just increase it or improve it in some way. So just like a greatest conceivable number is impossible, so it is with a greatest conceivable being. In other words, there is a contradiction inherent in the definition. We posit ultimate greatness, but there can’t be ultimate greatness.

Hartshorne acknowledged this problem but resolves it by recognizing there is ambiguity in our definition. There are two ways of being ultimately great. First, one can be unsurpassable by any other entity, including oneself. Second, one can be unsurpassable by any other entity except oneself. God has to be unsurpassable by any other conceivable entity. But can God surpass himself? In other words, can God outdo himself? Charles Hartshorne thinks so, and ends up qualifying Anselm’s definition. A greater than God cannot be conceived, except God himself in a greater state.

Hartshorne argues that his “neo-classical” notion of God, which allows for increase in Deity, handles the quantity problem. If our candidate for greatest possible being can conceivably be improved in some possible world, so what? That is just God out-doing himself.

It is also argued that absolute comparisons aren’t possible because they aren’t possible in our everyday experience. Comparisons are inevitably subjective, we are told. In addition, comparisons between two concrete things, say a horse and man, are always relative and with respect to specific attributes. We can say that a man is more intelligent than a horse. But a man is not greater than a horse in every way. For example, a horse is stronger and faster. So it is difficult to see how a man can be judged to be absolutely greater than a horse without assuming some hierarchy of being or some other causal arguments. This, perhaps, remains a problem for our project of advancing a purely a priori argument.

But while we seem to encounter difficulties when making absolute comparisons between concrete objects, we don’t have such difficulties when we operate at an abstract level. For example, where is the difficulty in saying “A whole is always greater than its parts.” Or, “It is greater to exist necessarily than contingently.”

So it seems to be problematic to maintain that all absolute comparisons are impossible. It amounts to saying that it is necessarily the case that things are not greater or more perfect in absolute sense. And the response is: Why necessarily? Here we again seem to be running into unquestioned positivist dogma.

So, in grand conclusion, a decent case can be made that Anselm’s argument, as advanced by Hartshorne, is a successful a priori argument. Necessary existence is implicit in the idea of God.

 

[Vera_Ljuba]

The answer was predetermined by how he conceives of possible worlds.

The concept of possible worlds was not invented by me. It is simply something that is different from the existing world in some way.

In order to show my proof invalid, you need to prove that the “downsizing” method somehow leads to a logically contradictory state of affairs. None of you even attempted that. So my proof stands.

Necessary existence is implicit in the idea of God.

You worked hard to create a TRULY circular definition. God exists necessarily, because necessary existence is implicit in the idea of God.

But if you want to have some fun, just read: Hundreds of proofs for God’s existence

 

[reggieM]

But if you want to have some fun, just read: Hundreds of proofs for God’s existence

More painful than the thought that someone actually wrote all of those, is that someone actually read them and thought they were funny.

ARGUMENT FROM VISION OF THE VIRGIN MARY
(1) There are many famous places where somebody saw the Virgin Mary.
(2) People can be healed at some of them.
(3) Therefore, God exists.

Yes, I can imagine an atheist laughing hysterically about that.
It says nothing except “I’m not interested in anything that challenges my views”.

 

[ferdgoodfellow]

You worked hard to create a TRULY circular definition. God exists necessarily, because necessary existence is implicit in the idea of God.

Hi Vera,

Necessary existence is not part of Anselm’s definition of God. God is defined in terms of unsurpassable greatness. The proof demonstrates that only necessary existence is compatible with greatness. Nothing circular about it.

Wouldn’t a circular argument begin with a definition of God as a necessary being?

 

[Vera_Ljuba]

Necessary existence is not part of Anselm’s definition of God. God is defined in terms of unsurpassable greatness. The proof demonstrates that only necessary existence is compatible with greatness. Nothing circular about it.

Well, it was your post that I used to make the quote. You said: “Necessary existence is implicit in the idea of God.” We already discussed the “greatness” concept.

But, just for the fun of it, let me say something else. In MY concept of “greatness”, there is something that is even “greater” than “mandatory or necessary existence”. Some being, who is able to suspend his existence at will, and restore his existence whenever he wishes it, is even “greater” than the poor sucker who MUST exist necessarily. This being would be able to set some internal “alarm clock”, which works even when the being is in “suspended existence”.

Of course this whole “greatness” is baloney.

 

[ferdgoodfellow]

Hi Vera,

Well, it was your post that I used to make the quote. You said: “Necessary existence is implicit in the idea of God.” We already discussed the “greatness” concept.

What does “implicit” mean to you?

But, just for the fun of it, let me say something else. In MY concept of “greatness”, there is something that is even “greater” than “mandatory or necessary existence”. Some being, who is able to suspend his existence at will, and restore his existence whenever he wishes it, is even “greater” than the poor sucker who MUST exist necessarily. This being would be able to set some internal “alarm clock”, which works even when the being is in “suspended existence”.

Once this entity goes out of existence, what would give it the power to come back into existence? If you say say it comes from the entity itself, then it didn’t go out of existence.

 

[Vera_Ljuba]

What does “implicit” mean to you?

The same as it means to you. Integral, inseparable part.

Once this entity goes out of existence, what would give it the power to come back into existence? If you say say it comes from the entity itself, then it didn’t go out of existence.

That is a “mystery”. Maybe our understanding of “existence” is deficient. There was a time when the physicists thought that something is either a “particle” or a “wave”. They thought that these two are contradictory. Now we know better. The same is applicable to “existence”. Who says that existence is as “simple” as we now conceive?

Of course I am only semi-joking. The point is that the whole concept of “greatness” is nonsense. There is no way to “maximize” a composite attribute, even if someone gives it a singular name.

 

[ferdgoodfellow]

Of course I am only semi-joking. The point is that the whole concept of “greatness” is nonsense. There is no way to “maximize” a composite attribute, even if someone gives it a singular name.

Hi Vera,

Hope yer havin a good day. Anudder luffly day here in Norddakotah.

Let’s say that Greatness is a composite attribute comprised of attributes A, B,…Z. As you pointed out earlier, some attributes, say A and B, are competing or conflicting. So if I turn up the dial on A “all the way to 11” (ala Spinal Tap) and max it out, B is prevented from being maximized.

So, yes, it doesn’t make sense to define Greatness as having all attributes dialed all the way up to 11. But we can still make sense of Greatness as having all its attributes dialed up in some manner and in such combination in a way that doesn’t lead to a contradiction and that exceeds any other conceivable being, save itself in a different state.

 

[Vera_Ljuba]

Hi Vera,

Hope yer havin a good day. Anudder luffly day here in Norddakotah.

Another steamy and hot (maybe sultry?) day in the Carolinas. But there is air conditioning. That reminds me that air-conditioning was pretty lousy invention. Before you disagree, just think: Before there was air-conditioning, Congress took a summer recess, the senators and the representatives all took a vacation. That meant that they were unable to do their usual damage to the country. If I sound rather cynical, it is because I am. There is another old, but very true saying: “Sh*t floats”.

By the way, your writing style reminds me of another poster, who also used unconventional spelling to make his posts even more pleasurable to read. For example, he liked to use “udder” instead of “other”. Always good for a good grin. But let’s get on.

Let’s say that Greatness is a composite attribute comprised of attributes A, B,…Z. As you pointed out earlier, some attributes, say A and B, are competing or conflicting. So if I turn up the dial on A “all the way to 11” (ala Spinal Tap) and max it out, B is prevented from being maximized.

So, yes, it doesn’t make sense to define Greatness as having all attributes dialed all the way up to 11. But we can still make sense of Greatness as having all its attributes dialed up in some manner and in such combination in a way that doesn’t lead to a contradiction and that exceeds any other conceivable being, save itself in a different state.

There is still a problem. Let’s just consider two attributes: “A” and “B”. If we can maximize “A” to 11, then the maximum value for “B” is 10. Conversely, if we maximize “B” to 11, then the highest value for “A” is only 10. So the two “greatness vectors” are [11, 10] and [10, 11]. Which one is “greater”? So even considering only two attributes, the question is unsolvable. One may say that attribute “A” is more important than attribute “B”, but others may disagree. And this brings up the subjectivity of the problem.

This also reminds me of an anecdote. It is said that Isadora Duncan told George B. Shaw that they should have a child together. She said: “Can you imagine, if she would inherit your brains, and my beauty”? Shaw answered: “But what if she inherited MY beauty, and YOUR brains”? A typical problem of the multi-variant programming.

Have a nice day, or as they say it here in the Deep south: “Ya’ll have a good 'un now!” - with a slightly threatening voice (and a Suthurn drawl).

 

[STT]

Another steamy and hot (maybe sultry?) day in the Carolinas. But there is air conditioning. That reminds me that air-conditioning was pretty lousy invention. Before you disagree, just think: Before there was air-conditioning, Congress took a summer recess, the senators and the representatives all took a vacation. That meant that they were unable to do their usual damage to the country. If I sound rather cynical, it is because I am. There is another old, but very true saying: “Sh*t floats”.

By the way, your writing style reminds me of another poster, who also used unconventional spelling to make his posts even more pleasurable to read. For example, he liked to use “udder” instead of “other”. Always good for a good grin. But let’s get on.

There is still a problem. Let’s just consider two attributes: “A” and “B”. If we can maximize “A” to 11, then the maximum value for “B” is 10. Conversely, if we maximize “B” to 11, then the highest value for “A” is only 10. So the two “greatness vectors” are [11, 10] and [10, 11]. Which one is “greater”? So even considering only two attributes, the question is unsolvable. One may say that attribute “A” is more important than attribute “B”, but others may disagree. And this brings up the subjectivity of the problem.

This also reminds me of an anecdote. It is said that Isadora Duncan told George B. Shaw that they should have a child together. She said: “Can you imagine, if she would inherit your brains, and my beauty”? Shaw answered: “But what if she inherited MY beauty, and YOUR brains”? A typical problem of the multi-variant programming.

Have a nice day, or as they say it here in the Deep south: “Ya’ll have a good 'un now!” - with a slightly threatening voice (and a Suthurn drawl).

He should be maximum in each attribute, so [11,11] is the greatest.

 

[Vera_Ljuba]

He should be maximum in each attribute, so [11,11] is the greatest.

Ferd already understands that it is not necessarily possible. Read his post above.

 

[STT]

Hi Vera,

Hope yer havin a good day. Anudder luffly day here in Norddakotah.

Let’s say that Greatness is a composite attribute comprised of attributes A, B,…Z. As you pointed out earlier, some attributes, say A and B, are competing or conflicting. So if I turn up the dial on A “all the way to 11” (ala Spinal Tap) and max it out, B is prevented from being maximized.

So, yes, it doesn’t make sense to define Greatness as having all attributes dialed all the way up to 11. But we can still make sense of Greatness as having all its attributes dialed up in some manner and in such combination in a way that doesn’t lead to a contradiction and that exceeds any other conceivable being, save itself in a different state.

Why God’s attribute should be competing?

 

[reggieM]

Why God’s attribute should be competing?

Because some people cannot understand that they are united.