A Priori Proof for God's Existence

[reggieM]

Please see above. One issue is that God could exist as an abstract concept in all possible worlds, but then an invisible pink unicorn could exist as a concept too. So there needs to be a proposition in which God is substantial rather than just an idea.

Yes, but distinctions between things are not abstract concepts (I mean, for the sake of even talking about anything). They are necessary in order to even distinguish that a thing exists.

We could say that a neutron is exactly the same as a proton. The reason we don’t do that is because of abstractions. So, in order to even talk about possible worlds, those ideas must exist and the ideas are based on Identity which is a necessary part of existence.

Beyond that, some would argue, since God is a spiritual Being that ideas are one with His substance - eternal.

 

[Vera_Ljuba]

I think the concept started with Leibiz, as in ‘the best of all possible worlds’ (his possible worlds are those which God could have willed instead of this one). The idea then got resurrected to explore modal logic. I’m not sure it’s a very helpful concept as it gets misunderstood big-time.

As long as we agree that “possible world” is simply a “state of affairs without a contradiction”, it does not matter if someone else thinks it otherwise.

Trouble with what you say here is God isn’t a member or property of this world. He created it so he can’t be. Likewise for all possible worlds.

There is not ONE word about God, so there is no problem. The purely philosophical question of “necessary existence” is being contemplated, within the framework of “possible worlds”.

What you have to do instead is start with something which can exist in all possible worlds. You could start with a proposition such as ‘God is all powerful’’.

That proposition can be made in any possible world, but could be true or false.

Propositions can only be MADE by some entities which are able to conceptualize and UTTER propositions. In the physically possible minimal worlds of “one ontological entity” there are no propositions. In the logically possible “null world” there is nothing, not just physical entities, but no abstractions either. We can make propositions ABOUT other worlds, but that does not mean that the propositions exist in THOSE worlds.

 

[ferdgoodfellow]

I’m not following this. I believe you are saying that A and B do not have anything in common, right?

No. I am saying that A and B do not have X (and Y) in common.

But nevertheless Vera’s thought experiment doesn’t prove that necessary existence is impossible (i.e. that it is impossible for X to exist in all possible worlds).

 

[IWantGod]

Is an a priori proof for God’s existence even possible? ut resorting to causal or cosmological (a posteriori) arguments?

Premise 1. We can agree that a necessary being exist because something cannot come from nothing

Premise 2. A necessary being by definition cannot change because it is essentially necessary in every respect.

Premise 3. Physical reality changes and is therefore not a necessary being

Premise 4. It follows that a necessary being is not physical reality and is therefore not limited by physical dimensions or is not quantifiable.

Conclusion: A necessary being exists and it is not physical. This is God

 

[Bradski]

Premise 1. We can agree that a necessary being exist because something cannot come from nothing.

Kinda falls down right there. To rephrase:

‘We can agree that something exists because something cannot come from nothing’.

So something must exist. Because if nothing exists, there is no something to bring something from nothing.

Clear as day…

 

[IWantGod]

Kinda falls down right there. To rephrase:

‘We can agree that something exists because something cannot come from nothing’.

So something must exist. Because if nothing exists, there is no something to bring something from nothing.

Clear as day…

Nothing cannot exist by definition so some being is necessarily real.

 

[inocente]

Yes, but distinctions between things are not abstract concepts (I mean, for the sake of even talking about anything). They are necessary in order to even distinguish that a thing exists.

We could say that a neutron is exactly the same as a proton. The reason we don’t do that is because of abstractions. So, in order to even talk about possible worlds, those ideas must exist and the ideas are based on Identity which is a necessary part of existence.

Beyond that, some would argue, since God is a spiritual Being that ideas are one with His substance - eternal.

What I was getting at is suppose reggieM only existed as a character in a novel. There is no real you, eating meals, climbing up hills, posting on CAF, only a character named reggieM in a Harry Potter story.

So as such reggieM would exist, but only as an idea. We could make propositions about reggieM and determine their truth values, but we would only be playing with ideas. There’s a big difference between being a breathing, living reggieM and only being a fictional character.

In the same way, the proposition about God needs to be about more than the mere idea, or we’ve only proved that the idea of God exists, and said nothing about whether the idea is fiction or fact.

 

[inocente]

As long as we agree that “possible world” is simply a “state of affairs without a contradiction”, it does not matter if someone else thinks it otherwise.

My experience is many people find the concept inaccessible and/or unconvincing.

There is not ONE word about God, so there is no problem. The purely philosophical question of “necessary existence” is being contemplated, within the framework of “possible worlds”.

You said “If we consider only ontological entities (of which God would be one), then the “super-simple worlds” of one electron / one neutron are possible, and therefore there is no necessarily existing ontological entity.”

I’m saying that’s irrelevant, as both worlds could have been created by God. If every possible world is created by God then God has necessary existence whether or not he is in any of their inventories of objects and properties.

Propositions can only be MADE by some entities which are able to conceptualize and UTTER propositions. In the physically possible minimal worlds of “one ontological entity” there are no propositions. In the logically possible “null world” there is nothing, not just physical entities, but no abstractions either. We can make propositions ABOUT other worlds, but that does not mean that the propositions exist in THOSE worlds.

Well if it’s ALL CAPS then you must be right . I’d have thought propositions don’t have any independent existence, they’re just statements, and that possible worlds are just devices for considering propositions.

I think this is one of the areas where the concept of possible worlds obfuscates. I mean what’s the difference between a world of nothing, and no world? None. Nothing doesn’t exist, because if it did. it would be something.

There’s lots of debate in the literature between philosophers on all this, and if you were right and it could be short-circuited simply by comparing a one neutron and a one electron world, they would all agree. They don’t.

 

[IWantGod]

What I was getting at is suppose reggieM only existed as a character in a novel. There is no real you, eating meals, climbing up hills, posting on CAF, only a character named reggieM in a Harry Potter story.

So as such reggieM would exist, but only as an idea. We could make propositions about reggieM and determine their truth values, but we would only be playing with ideas. There’s a big difference between being a breathing, living reggieM and only being a fictional character.

In the same way, the proposition about God needs to be about more than the mere idea, or we’ve only proved that the idea of God exists, and said nothing about whether the idea is fiction or fact.

I don’t like the ontological argument. But lets put the concept of God aside.

If i could think of a thing that couldn’t possibly not exist because of its very nature then doesn’t it follow that it actually exists?

Of course, we cannot arbitrarily string words together and say that thing exists because i say its necessary. But perhaps we can think of a nature that has to exist because of its nature?

We can at least say that certain things necessarily cannot exist like a square-triangle.

 

[ferdgoodfellow]

Not so fast .

The idea of possible worlds was invented by philosophers to explore logic. There’s no requirement that a possible world contains anything in particular or that it has any given laws of nature. The only requirement is that it doesn’t involve any logical contradictions (after all, we’re exploring logic). Therefore, as it were, the laws of logic must necessarily exist in all possible worlds.

The question then is, is there anything else that must necessarily exist in all possible words? The answer is yes, but only if it can be proved as a theorem from the laws of logic alone. It’s then as necessary as the laws of logic. Otherwise, like X, it’s contingent and need only exist in some worlds or in one world.

Hi inocente,

Thanks for yer thots and the references.

It still appears to me that possible worlds analysis assumes that there are no necessary beings. Any entity in the actual world can be conceived of not existing in some possible world, by definition. The only criterion for conceiving a possible world is logical consistency. In this system of thought there is never anything inconsistent in conceiving that any X does not exist in a possible world.

So this whole attempt to determine the possibility of necessary existence within the framework of possible worlds is futile. We are asking a system of thought which assumes there cannot be an X which exists in all possible worlds whether there can be an X which exists in all possible worlds.

 

[ferdgoodfellow]

So, without reference to possible worlds, what justifies denying the possibility of necessary existence. Why can’t there be an entity which cannot fail to exist?

 

[ferdgoodfellow]

So far the case for the possibility of necessary existence (that there can be an entity which cannot fail to exist) seems to be this:

1. As discovered by Parmenides long ago, it is nonsense to speak of nothingness. Therefore, something or other must exist. This conclusion doesn’t require that one particular entity must exist, but that certainly is a possibility, and maybe that’s all we need.
2. The dogma that we can always deny the existence of any thing seems to be a common thread running from Hume, Kant, and the logical positivists of the last century. But how can we trust this dogma? It amounts to saying that it is necessarily true that all existence is contingent. The only necessity is logical necessity, we are told. No such thing as existential necessity. But this school of thought, in reducing all necessity to logical necessity, also teaches that logical necessity is ultimately conditional necessity because, in all cases, it is based on the definitions of terms and the conventions of language. So, when we apply that to the dogma itself, we have to conclude that, at best, it too is only conditionally true. It therefore seems to reasonable to conclude that there still could be some (at least one) cases of necessary existence.

 

[Vera_Ljuba]

My experience is many people find the concept inaccessible and/or unconvincing.

So what? I once had the misfortune to teach a kid who simply did not understand the concept of “per cent”. We, who understand this concept can have a conversation about it, even if some outsiders cannot follow our reasoning.

You said “If we consider only ontological entities (of which God would be one), then the “super-simple worlds” of one electron / one neutron are possible, and therefore there is no necessarily existing ontological entity.”

Yes, this is correctly quoted.

I’m saying that’s irrelevant, as both worlds could have been created by God. If every possible world is created by God then God has necessary existence whether or not he is in any of their inventories of objects and properties.

This is smoke and mirrors. “Could have been created” is not an argument. God is supposed to be the end result of a purely philosophical - therefore secular - line of reasoning. It is a fallacy to include God into the argument itself. During the presentation of the argument it is “forbidden” to try to “smuggle in” God.

I’d have thought propositions don’t have any independent existence, they’re just statements, and that possible worlds are just devices for considering propositions.

The possible world is just “something” that is different from our existing world in some respect or another.

I think this is one of the areas where the concept of possible worlds obfuscates. I mean what’s the difference between a world of nothing, and no world? None. Nothing doesn’t exist, because if it did. it would be something.

Nothing wrong with this. I already stipulated that the “null world” is not physically possible, but the concept of “possible world” does not demand that it should be physically possible, only that it does not contain a contradiction. In the original analysis I only considered the physically possible worlds (which are a subset of the ontologically existing worlds), and the final result (the one-electron vs. one neutron world) is clearly physically possible.

But many people wish to extend the world to abstractions, which is erroneous, since abstractions do not exist ontologically - no matter what Plato asserted. So, I wished to accommodate these people, and allowed that the possible world could also composed of “non-ontological” aka. “abstract” entities. But this extension also includes the “null world” (a well known mathematical abstraction). So, no matter how one twists it, there is no entity which exists in all the possible worlds, therefore no necessary being.

Of course this has nothing to do with God’s existence of lack of it. It is just a refutation of the attempt that God’s existence can be established in an “a priori” manner. But that is not a disaster, after all the other attempts also failed. If I recall correctly, you also said that if a purely secular argument could be found, it would make “faith” unnecessary. (Maybe my memory is faulty. )

There’s lots of debate in the literature between philosophers on all this, and if you were right and it could be short-circuited simply by comparing a one neutron and a one electron world, they would all agree. They don’t.

I have never seen this argument anywhere else. I suspect that the reason is that philosophers are not mathematicians and they simply did not think along these lines.

 

[reggieM]

What I was getting at is suppose reggieM only existed as a character in a novel. There is no real you, eating meals, climbing up hills, posting on CAF, only a character named reggieM in a Harry Potter story.

So as such reggieM would exist, but only as an idea. We could make propositions about reggieM and determine their truth values, but we would only be playing with ideas. There’s a big difference between being a breathing, living reggieM and only being a fictional character.

In the same way, the proposition about God needs to be about more than the mere idea, or we’ve only proved that the idea of God exists, and said nothing about whether the idea is fiction or fact.

I’m not following this, I don’t think.
An idea has to come from somewhere. It references something.
If the proposition of God is that He is “the power that sustains all being” - then wherever there is being, there is God.
Yes, if the idea we were talking about was Harry Potter, that would be different - although Harry Potter references a human being.
The idea of a human being exists wherever there are human beings.
The idea of existence being different from non-existence is present wherever there is some kind of being.
Beyond that, when talking about a neutron, there are many things needed to support the existence of a neutron.

 

[Vera_Ljuba]

Beyond that, when talking about a neutron, there are many things needed to support the existence of a neutron.

You said that before, but failed to give an argument for it. What are those things?

 

[reggieM]

You said that before, but failed to give an argument for it. What are those things?

I’m not following you here. I was responding to inocente and looking in terms of world possibility and how Catholic theology proves God’s empowerment within the structure of reality or existence, depending on how we may evaluate the data and draw inferences from the objective evidence.

 

[ferdgoodfellow]

So, given our definition of God (for now anyway), and given that there are reasonable grounds for the possibility of a necessary existing entity, this argument works.

Here is a version based mostly on Hartshorne:

1. God is that than which nothing greater can be thought (TTWNGCBT).
   [This is Anselm’s definition of God]
2. It is possible to consistently conceive an entity as TTWNGCBT.
   [Our conception of God is thinkable or contains no contradictions.]
3. It is possible to conceive of an entity which cannot fail to exist.
   [Necessary existence is possible, the only other possibility being contingent existence.]
4. An entity as in 3 is greater than one which conceivably could have failed to exist.
   [This is Anselm’s principle from Proslogion 3. Note that it is different from the principle in Proslogion 2 which asserts that existence is greater than non-existence.]
5. It is conceivable that TTWNGCBT does not exist.
   [Assumption that TTWNGCBT exists contingently for reductio ad absurd argument]
6. But 5 leads to a contradiction because I could then conceive of something greater, namely something which exists without the conceivable alternative of not existing.
7. 5 is therefore rejected.
8. Therefore TTWNGCBT cannot conceivably fail to exist.
   [There being no other alternative.]
9. Therefore God exists.

 

[ferdgoodfellow]

Keep in mind that, in order for this to be a successful a priori argument, the soundness of the main premises (the definition of God and the possibility of necessary existence) has to be established from the meaning of the terms without resort to any a posterior proof.

 

[Vera_Ljuba]

Here is a version based mostly on Hartshorne:

1. God is that than which nothing greater can be thought (TTWNGCBT).
   [This is Anselm’s definition of God]

The argument dies right here. “Greatness” is a composite attribute. Your concept of greatness can and does differ from someone’s concept of greatness. There is no reason to continue, because the basic premise “greatness” is undefined. In other words, greatness is subjective.

There is a branch of mathematics, which is called “operations research”. It deals with finding optimal solutions given certain circumstances. The “objective function” describes what kind of “maximum” or “minimum” we are looking for. If there is only one objective function, for example “maximizing the profit” or “minimizing the cost” for a specific production problem, then there can be an optimal solution. If, however, one wishes to “maximize the profit AND minimize the cost at the same time” (a composite function) then there is no “optimum”, even in principle.

Anselm’s line of thought has been discarded and rightfully so.

 

[reggieM]

If, however, one wishes to “maximize the profit AND minimize the cost at the same time” (a composite function) then there is no “optimum”, even in principle.

Maximum possible profit at zero cost.