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Cecilianus
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Not sure I see this - I’m inclined to agree with Kant rather than with Scotus on this question - but I’d like to hear why.
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JohnDamian
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Well, 0, 1 and other numbers can be used as either numbers or as real entities; they are only real however when they are observed in reality; thus infinity (for example) cannot be a real number. That is not to say it is not a practical object that can be used to illuminate certain facts about the universe.
I think it’s clear that virtual particles exist; the fact that their function or operation is distinct from other particles does not mean that they don’t exist; merely that they exist differently. If they have an efficient causal effect on objects or interactions then it is clear that they exist (in some fashion).
Things are clearly quantatative in light of their real(univocally speaking) and modal unities; but it is apparrent that they are not quantatative in light of their formal and conceptual unities. For quantatative unity is a numerical unity; and not a formal one - so we can analyse things quantatively only in regards to their reality and modality; but the form and concept of a thing is not by definition formed in terms of quantity; for else all formal and conceptual unity or distinction would be a numerical or quantatative distinction; which does not appear to be the case - unless we presuppose all things are both individuated and inhered in numerical individuals; which appears absurd to myself; even if they can be measured numerically. But I see no objection to both modal and real unity being numerical; hence your discussion on the “greenness” or “heat” is agreeable.
Do you mean “Duns Scotus’ Theory of the Categories and of Meaning” Translated by H.Robbins?
For an essence to have a real existence it must be inhered in the individual; if essences exist then they exist as inhered; and not as concepts – we cannot also conceive essences without conceiving existence; thus for a conceptual existence a conceptual essence is the case; but in a real existence a real essence is the case – in this regards; they have a real unity; and only a formal distinction - this is against the idealism of Kant and the Nominalism of Aquinas.
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Cecilianus
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Archbishop Villeneuve and Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange forget that Thomism itself is eclectic in the same manner that they complain about. One of the Dominicans in Fr. Ashley’s priory pointed out to me that Thomism is not a “system” (the huge complaint of the Orthodox against Thomism) - he did not take first principles and derive their conclusions irregardless of whether those conclusions seem true or not, and irregardless as to whether he was still being faithful to the heart of Aristotelian of Platonic philosophy. He simply took and borrowed truth from all over the place, from all the Greek and Arab philosophers at hand, whether they were Platonists or Aristotelian. That’s eclecticism. Eclecticism isn’t motivated by a “false idea of fraternal charity”, but rather by the fact that we see partial aspects of truth elucidated by lots of different schools.
And, as I said, phenomenology in the manner of Sartre and Wojytla should be the groundwork and foundation of true philosophy (I’m a little skeptical of Husserl with his bracketing). I would like to re-derive Heidegger’s glorious metaphysic, the whole scholastic metaphysic, science viewed as the phenomenology of measurement, and Hegel’s grandiose vision all from phenomenology (transcendental philosophy should be perfectly possible and should complement natural philosophy, provided we don’t make Schelling’s silly mistake of confusing the transcendental ego with God; I would like to systematically re-derive Schelling’s system of transcendental philosophy preserving that distinction).
I take strong objection to Garrigou-Lagrange’s statement that “the Church has repeatedly declared that she holds to Thomism”. Actually, the Church HAS declared that Thomists cannot declare non-Thomists to be heretics and vice versa (in the predestination controversy), and she has always permitted Scotism, Augustinianism, and other schools of theology. All the Church did is declare Thomism to be a suitable worldview to teach to seminarians to combat modern heresies. Only Roman Catholicism has adopted the Thomist worldview; the Eastern rites of the Church (such as the Byzantine, which I practice) have our own theology which is not Thomist. (We have a generally more Platonic theology than the West does, one heavily informed by the idea of viewing the world as ikon and sacrament. Our soteriology is Palamist.)
I do see the silliness in trying to twist Aquinas to say whatever you want him to say. I do not see the necessity of making Aquinas agree with you. Truth is determined by the reality out there; texts only tell us other people’s attempts to find that truth. Philosophers have an insufficient understanding of the difference between doing philosophy and doing exegesis. Philosophy studies reality, not any individual’s thoughts on reality.
I also fail to see how Thomism can explain, as G-L says it can, such phenomena as electricity. And saying that “extension has its source in matter” seems to fall back on the Cartesian idea of extension being the essence of matter, whereas in reality all matter consists of point particles.
And, finally, Thomism cannot - without striking at the heart of the actual thought of St. Thomas - synthesize the transcendental approach to philosophy initiated by Kant.
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itinerant1
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“Nominalism of Aquinas”? I can’t say I’ve heard anyone refer to Aquinas as a “nominalist” before now, especially since his philosophy is opposed to what is traditionally and usually meant by the term.
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Cecilianus
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Infinity isn’t a number anyway, from a mathematical point of view. It’s a limit, but it’s not a number.
I would say - keeping in mind that given my views on forms as being a description of the structure of something, I have no problem with something having a plurality of substantial forms as long as it can be viewed in different ways as different substances (I could be viewed as a man, or as an animal, or as a body, or as a nerd, and all of these are substances - something is a substance if it’s the subject of a sentence) - that numerical unity has to be a formal unity because our intellect has to isolate an individual thing (to give it numerical unity) by looking at some sort of intellectual content that that thing has that makes it different from some other thing (formal unity). In other words, in order to tell one thing apart from another you have to see its haeccity.
Yes; I’ve been trying to get it for three years.
True, but when I use the term “essence” I mean as a mental concept considered apart from its existence in a real thing. It is possible to think of the essence of something that doesn’t exist. This essence would have no real existence; I’m perfectly happy with that amount of nominalism.
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itinerant1
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Yet, we can and do make the distinction between an essence and that fact that it does or does not exist. And we have reason to maintain the conceptual distinction is grounded in the ontological. Some essences have only potential existence and may never receive actual existence.
God is existence itself, “I Am”, and He communicates or gives existence to finite essences. Before they are given existence, they existed as ideas in the mind of God. Each of us pre-existed as an idea in the Divine before we were given actual existence.
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JohnDamian
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I was being ambiguous; but Aquinas moderate realism in light of his esse-essence distinction places essences as mental objects; as for a practical theology we must assume a real unity between esse-essence; or the essences of a thing are generative instead of recognative; which allows for an easy dismissal of Scholasticism as speculative rather than critical.
Perhaps that was a bad example; zero has no existence in real objects; only in regards to a lack of real entities or properties; which is only a negative existence.
You are only substantially what you are; you can be viewed as Species Man; of Genus Animal; which can be further differentiated from energetic rather than physical entities. You are not individuated by accidents; such as you say “nerd”; but by an essential substance to which properties inhere. It would be ambiguous to say all subjects are substances; for not all subjects are real; and thus a contrarity would be entailed; unless substance is understood generatively rather than recognatively; which would then violate the possibility of a critical rather than speculative philosophy. As Aristotle points out; Substance is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject; what you talk about is the secondary substance of the subject; rather than the primary subject. You are right in pointing out that all things must be isolated and the act of isolating gives a numerical unity; but the act of isolation only acts insofar as it isolates the real unity; the formal unity or distinction of an individual is not quantified in numerical terms.
It is not correct to say that to tell one thing apart it’s haeccity must be seen; but only that the primary substance must be observed; such an observation may come through the secondary substance; but it must not by necessity do so through that, or the total, of that substance; and thus it is not the case that the whole haeccity must be known for the subject to be known; thus we can see that all that is required is the real unity of the primary substance; rather than the formal unity of the secondary substance. The formal unity is not manifest in numerical individuals (such as Greenness); even if such formal unities are distinct modally in numerical terms (such as more or less green) the latter modal distinction is recognative and manifest proportionally; but the prior unity (that of form) is not numerical; as quantity cannot have a contrarity; yet the formal may be contrary in distinction; and thus is not numerical.
I can see that it is possible to conceive an essence for a thing with no current existence; but I cannot see how one could conceive an essence without conceiving existence - thus it appears they have a real unity.
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JohnDamian
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It is entirely possible to conceive the essence a thing without presupposing the thing to exist; but I cannot conceive a thing without conceiving that thing in existence - thus they have a real unity.
However I am not an expert, if you could give me an example of something that can have a conceived essence without conceiving it’s existence; do tell!
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itinerant1
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In regard to knowledge, Aquinas’ realism was specifically not critical, even though some modern neo-Thomists have disagreed, Gilson settled the matter.
Aquinas does not say essences exist only in the mind. Essences or natures have both intentional existence and non-intentional or real existence.
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itinerant1
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One cannot rely on the phantasm here, in fact the mind’s images only obstruct the reflection. The intellectual distinction of essence and existence is most difficult and profound. It is one area where Aquinas advanced the metaphysics of Aristotle to a deeper understanding of being. The metaphysical distinction has been aided by philosophical reflection on the name of God revealed to Moses: “I Am”.
The fact that we are even talking about the essence - existence distinction is revealing in itself. Even though we may not be able to, or cannot, make a clear conception of the distinction, it does not follow, *by that fact alone, *that we are not talking about a genuine determination of being. For example, try to seriously conceive of *creatio ex nihilo. *The mind utterly rebels at such an attempt, yet it is a reality nonetheless.
To lay out Aquinas’ reasoning for the reality of the distinction, it not being just conceptual, would be lengthy, but perhaps I can find some choice statements.
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itinerant1
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I can create imaginary creatures in my mind without any references to them having anything other than intentional existence. Is that what you mean?
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JohnDamian
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That would be particularily helpful - having never academically studied philosophy I fear I may be missing something essential in this distinction as everyone appears to disagree with me!
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JohnDamian
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Well intentional existence seems to share a unity with a conceptual essence; I cannot conceive an essence which lacks any unity with an existence of any type (intentional or real).
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itinerant1
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“Intentional” existence refers to the type of existence things have in the mind. Essences, as they exist in the mind (intentional existence) are universals. As they exist in nature, are neither universal nor particular. The Thomistic position here requires some explanation, but I will save that for later. I’m working on a not so difficult explanation of the Thomistic notions of essence and existence. I will post that soon.
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itinerant1
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Essence and existence:
Here is an brief intro to how the intellect works in regard to knowing a thing, and knowing that it exists. For part of my post, I followed somewhat closely the explanation given by the Thomist Bro. Benignus, since he has a real talent for clarifying philosophical concepts.
Everything we experience we judge to be (exists) and to be something. This initial judgment is prior to any judgment we make classifying things as different kinds of beings, because it is impossible to judge things to be different (different kinds of being) without first judging them to be. So, our first judgment, when the intellect is aroused by an object presented to it through sense experience, is that this thing is and is something.
The key point here is that when we judge a perceived object to be and to be something, we are making two affirmations: that the thing is, and that it is something. When we reflect on our judgment, new ideas immediately appear that are grounded in the perceived object.
Two of the primary ideas are the notions of essence and existence. “Being” is asserted in two different ways: that a thing is, and that it is something. To assert that a thing is, is to assert that it “exists”. To assert that it is something, is to assert that it is has an essence.
The judgment that a thing is, includes the concepts of a subject, and the act whereby that subject exists. The subject, when conceived as real, a requirement for the intellect to grasp it in a concept, gives the intellect, upon analysis, the concept of essence. Essence is that whereby a thing is what it is, or that whereby it is a certain thing.
The other aspect of the judgment is that it asserts, following the evidence of the senses, that this particular thing is, that it exists. Reflective analysis on the intellect’s primary or most primitive judgment engenders the concept of essence (the intelligible character of a thing), and the act whereby the thing is an actuality in the real order of being.
As soon as we explicitly consider what a thing is, essence, and that it is, existence, we can see that a thing can be conceivable without necessarily existing. We conceive it necessarily as some essence, a determinate subject of existence, but that conception in not dependent on knowing whether the thing exists. Reflecting on this gives rise to the notion of possible being in contrast to actually existing being.
Existence is a real act whereby an essence is made to be or exist. No created thing or essence posseses existence necessarily. We say its existence is contingent. Existence comes to things, and things cease to exist. Only God, who is Existence itself, exists necessarily. In God essence and existence are one.
Here is an brief intro to how the intellect works in regard to knowing a thing, and knowing that it exists. For part of my post, I followed somewhat closely the explanation given by the Thomist Bro. Benignus, since he has a real talent for clarifying philosophical concepts.
Everything we experience we judge to be (exists) and to be something. This initial judgment is prior to any judgment we make classifying things as different kinds of beings, because it is impossible to judge things to be different (different kinds of being) without first judging them to be. So, our first judgment, when the intellect is aroused by an object presented to it through sense experience, is that this thing is and is something.
The key point here is that when we judge a perceived object to be and to be something, we are making two affirmations: that the thing is, and that it is something. When we reflect on our judgment, new ideas immediately appear that are grounded in the perceived object.
Two of the primary ideas are the notions of essence and existence. “Being” is asserted in two different ways: that a thing is, and that it is something. To assert that a thing is, is to assert that it “exists”. To assert that it is something, is to assert that it is has an essence.
The judgment that a thing is, includes the concepts of a subject, and the act whereby that subject exists. The subject, when conceived as real, a requirement for the intellect to grasp it in a concept, gives the intellect, upon analysis, the concept of essence. Essence is that whereby a thing is what it is, or that whereby it is a certain thing.
The other aspect of the judgment is that it asserts, following the evidence of the senses, that this particular thing is, that it exists. Reflective analysis on the intellect’s primary or most primitive judgment engenders the concept of essence (the intelligible character of a thing), and the act whereby the thing is an actuality in the real order of being.
As soon as we explicitly consider what a thing is, essence, and that it is, existence, we can see that a thing can be conceivable without necessarily existing. We conceive it necessarily as some essence, a determinate subject of existence, but that conception in not dependent on knowing whether the thing exists. Reflecting on this gives rise to the notion of possible being in contrast to actually existing being.
Existence is a real act whereby an essence is made to be or exist. No created thing or essence posseses existence necessarily. We say its existence is contingent. Existence comes to things, and things cease to exist. Only God, who is Existence itself, exists necessarily. In God essence and existence are one.
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Anselm33
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itinerant1
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For starters, all knowledge begins with sense perception. Quantities are originally abstracted from sense data. Mathematical entities are beings of reason, they have intentional existence. We cannot form the concept of number, without first relying on sense data. The intellect abstracts from all of the particularizing notes of the phantasm, and forms the concept, which is a universal.
For example, we perceive objects in the world that are round, square, triangular, and so on, but none of them is a perfect figure. The perfect circle cannot be found in nature, yet our concept is of a perfect circle. It applies to all particular circles regardless of color, size, location, and so on.
The basic point is that from the data of sense perception, the mind abstracts and forms the universal concept. We can work with these concepts, forming related mathematical concepts and so on, and thereby develop our mathematical fomulas, etc.
If Beethoven had always been deaf, he would not have any musical sounds in memory from which to compose.
I forget the name, but there is one contemporary Catholic theologian who memorized every musical piece or score written by Mozart. He listened to Mozart music frequently. At one point he no longer needed to physically listen to Mozart to “hear” the music. It was all in his memory, and he could “hear” any concerto, for example, at his pleasure.
We have sense memory and intellectual memory. For every concept there is a corresponding image or phantasm. The interesting thing about universal concepts, is that nothing in nature is a universal. All material or physical things in the universe are particular things. You will never encounter a “universal” tree in nature. Yet, universals exists in the mind, which must then necessarily be immaterial. Concepts and the mind in which they exist are immaterial or spiritual. Concepts are modifications of the soul. They are the means “by which” we know things. We perceive a particular tree with the senses. The senses only apprehend the particular. We “know” that this thing perceived is a “tree” by means of the universal concept of “treeness”. Our general concept of tree applies to all particular trees regardless of type, size, color, dimensions, location, and so on.
We started by talking about math and I ended by talking about trees. The purpose is to convey some sense about the nature of sense and intellectual knowledge. The process of intellectual abstraction of the universal from the particular image is important to grasp in order to understand how the mind can form mathematical concepts.
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Cecilianus
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I’m not sure that this “easy dismissal of Scholasticism as speculative” follows from the esse-essentia distinction. Any science, including mathematical physics, discusses essentia. A particle doesn’t come into existence simply by me talking about it at a blackboard.
We are individuated by our haeccitas, which inheres in matter.
We can talk about substances that don’t exist, however; this isn’t a problem if we accept the esse-essentia distinction. Can you please explain to me the difference between critical and speculative philosophy, and what exactly you mean by substance being understood “generatively” (though I’m pretty sure I understand it recognatively)?
I’m using the term substance in the same way Aristotle is, but I don’t know what the distinction is between the primary subject and secondary substance. Can you please tell me?
Agreed, but the individual which has a formal unity - which qua its individuality I understand to be the same as its haeccitas - still only exists as the composite of essentially quantitative parts.
But you have to see enough of its haeccity in order to tell that it’s one thing and not a different one. As you said earlier, you need to know what something is in order to know that it is, or you wouldn’t know what exists. Again, I need you to explain the distinction between primary and secondary substance to me.
You can’t think of something except as existing, but this doesn’t mean that it actually does exist. This is because, as Kant pointed out, existence is not one of the “notes” that you describe a substance by. A hundred real pennies has no properties that make them different from a hundred imaginary pennies; conceptually they are the same.
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Cecilianus
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These do not come into the mind from sense experience - though the mind initially learns how to understand mathematical entities from sense experience, from counting - since many mathematical entities are abstract and can’t be directly perceived in physical manifestations (imaginary numbers, for example - you can’t see the imaginary portion of a wave, and you have to square complex wavefunctions in order to get a measurable quantity [in this case, the probability of a particle appearing]).
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Geremia
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But this is usually called impetus, and it is different from a force that changes momentum. This distinction is encapsulated in Newton’s 1st law.
How so?
So you are a Parmenidean?
Specifically, locomotion. Calculus can describe change only analogically when describing qualities.
In certain inertial frames, yes, but not in all, e.g., not in the one affixed to the body considered in locomotion by another frame.
I think you are equivocating “matter” here. If you don’t believe in the potency/act distinction, then it seems you can’t believe there can matter nor form, either, since matter is that which is in potency.
For beings that modern physics studies, matter and form are inextricably bound. It is only with beings like angels can one have form apart from matter, but this falls outside the realm of physics.
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