A Proof Of God Using Quantum Physics

[itinerant1]

thank you both, itinerant1 and cecilianus, for your thoughts on this.

Classical philosophy has its own methods for arriving at truth. Once a truth is discovered, it is incorporated into philosophy’s patrimony.

Science, on the other hand, is revolutionary. It’s conclusions or truths, especially its broader statements or theories, are always tentative. This is clearly seen in the revolutions in astronomy over the centuries, as each new theory debunks the previous one as astronomy more closely approximates the truth. Thus there are false scientific theories and tentatively true theories. Also, in accordance with Godel’s incompleteness theorem, no mathematically based scientific theory can ever be conclusively proven, regardless of the falsifiability criterion, if one accepts that as valid.

Philosophy differs in that, correctly speaking, there is no such thing as false philosophy. Philosophy’s patrimony is always and forever true. There are what we commonly call “false philosophical” systems, eg. Kantianism, Skepticism, Cartesianism, and so on, but strictly speaking these are not philosophy since, while they may contain some truths, they, in general, remain outside the truth of what we call the philosophia perrenis.

*See Section *VII. IS PROGRESS IN PHILOSOPHY INDEFINITE OR IS THERE A PHILOSOPHIA PERENNIS?

 

[Anselm33]

.

Science, on the other hand, is revolutionary. It’s conclusions or truths, especially its broader statements or theories, are always tentative. This is clearly seen in the revolutions in astronomy over the centuries, as each new theory debunks the previous one as astronomy more closely approximates the truth. Thus there are false scientific theories and tentatively true theories.Also, in accordance with Godel’s incompleteness theorem, no mathematically based scientific theory can ever be conclusively proven

 

[Ed_CA]

Cosmology is one area in which physicists pretend to be philosophers. In 1948, Fred Hoyle, Thomas Gold, etc. postulated the steady state universe. Those physicists who embraced the “big bang” predicted the 1965 discovery of the cosmic microwave background radiation, and the steady state universe died. Likewise, up to the mid-1990s, some physicist embraced an infinite succession of big bangs and big crunches. Unfortunately, certain supernovae observed in distant galaxies show by their red shift that the universe is expanding at an accelerated rate. Thus, an infinite succession of big bangs and crunches died. Requiem in Pacem ,Requiem in Partibus. Multi-verses are in vogue now. Philosophers and physicists do become embroiled in the various anthropic principles such as the weak, strong, and participatory principles, either to prove or disprove the existence of God. The trouble is that one may posit a variety of hypotheses, but will such hypotheses be elevated to the privileged status of a scientific theory?

 

[itinerant1]

Cosmology is one area in which physicists pretend to be philosophers. In 1948, Fred Hoyle, Thomas Gold, etc. postulated the steady state universe. Those physicists who embraced the “big bang” predicted the 1965 discovery of the cosmic microwave background radiation, and the steady state universe died. Likewise, up to the mid-1990s, some physicist embraced an infinite succession of big bangs and big crunches. Unfortunately, certain supernovae observed in distant galaxies show by their red shift that the universe is expanding at an accelerated rate. Thus, an infinite succession of big bangs and crunches died. Requiem in Pacem ,Requiem in Partibus. Multi-verses are in vogue now. Philosophers and physicists do become embroiled in the various anthropic principles such as the weak, strong, and participatory principles, either to prove or disprove the existence of God. The trouble is that one may posit a variety of hypotheses, but will such hypotheses be elevated to the privileged status of a scientific theory?

Einstein believed science had no use for theories of multi-verse.

It takes only a moment of reflection to see that he was right. If another universe has no connection with our own, we could never know that it exists. And thus what use to science is such speculation? If another uinverse does have a connection to our own, then on what grounds is it being asserted that it is a multi-verse rather than a uni-verse?

Originally, I thought the anthropic principle was a sort of neat idea. However, there does not seem to be much at all of the observable universe that would be anything but an impossible environment for man.

 

[itinerant1]

I agree with some of what you’ve written above but not all. I don’t believe Godel’s theorem limits the applicability of mathematics to science. 1) Godel’s theorem states that a mathematical system is either incomplete (i.e. there are “true” theorems which cannot be proved from axioms of the system), or contains false theorems. Mathematics which applies to physical theories does not constitute a mathematical system per se,but takes applicable pieces, as, for example, group theory applied to molecular vibrations. Moreover, physics isn’t “proven” as are mathematical theorems; it is verified empirically. You can have elegant mathematical treatments, as in string theory, but without the possibility of empirical verification or falsification it isn’t science. See, for example, “Not Even Wrong” by Peter Woit.
is.

Good point. I will have to think whether I just need to re-phrase my statement to clarify my meaning, or whether your response settles it.

Again I disagree. I haven’t read the scholastics, but have read much in philosophy of science: van Fraassen, Rescher, Salmon, Dukas, Koons, d’Espagnat. They propose contradictory doctrines, and while one may prefer one over another (I’m a realist in the spirit of d’Espagnat–“veiled reality”), there’s no way of verifying one school over another, even though one may be able to pick out specific logical arguments that are false. It’s the same thing with interpretations of quantum mechanics–Copenhagen, Many World, Many Minds, Hidden Variables (with non-locality)–as long as they make the same predictions one’s choice is based on other preferences than empirical validation. By the way, I believe the other poster in this thread (Cecilianus ?) made the statement that the experimental violations of Bell’s Theorem show that the hidden variables interpretation of quantum mechanics does not hold. That’s not quite correct; it shows that hidden variables models with locality do not hold.
With religious faith, it’s a different matter. That doesn’t come from empirical verification. There are no experiments to prove the existence of God (or the Holy Trinity), although science points to the existence of God, as does music, art and other human endeavors
Thank you again for your comments.

“…as long as they make the same predictions one’s choice is based on other preferences than empirical validation.” That sounds most reasonable to me.

 

[Cecilianus]

This does not address the problem of the elimination of causality, not in the science per se of QM, but in the Copenhagen interpretation or philosophy of QM.

As to solipsism, we shall look at a few facts.

Historically, Einstein and few other prominent physicists deplored the “dangerous game” which the “Copenhagen people” were playing with reality. (See “Letters on Wave Mechanics: Shrodinger, Planck, Einstein, Lorentz”)

…]

This was the temper of the times, with Einstein maintaining a defense of reality in a debate with Max Born that carried on for three decades.

Let me analyze the logical structure of your argument:

1. Heisenberg, Planck, and Bohr interpreted quantum mechanics in a solipsistic sense.
2. Quantum mechanics is the theory developed by Heisenberg, Planck, and Bohr (more associated with the former two).
3. Therefore, quantum mechanics implies solipsism.

I’m sure you could refine this formulation to make it more clear that there are three terms as Aristotelian rules dictate, but what I find problematic is the middle term - your reduction of the Copenhagen interpretation to the philosophical interpretations of Heisenberg and Planck. Most people, including physicists such as me who accept the Copenhagen interpretation, still regard Heisenberg as a sloppy philosopher. The fact that some very well-known physicists made some quite unjustified claims - such as having had disproven causality and proven solipsism - does not mean that the hard physics of the Copenhagen interpretation is false. That they should do so is understandable, in light of Heisenberg’s immersion in logical positivism and the radical nature of quantum mechanics. But like the “many-worlds” theories, they are not science, but rather what physicists pejoratively call “philosophy” - unjustified conclusions based on shaky reasoning. You could make a much stronger argument for the many-worlds theory than for solipsism based on Copenhagen, but I’ve never met a physicist who took it seriously. You mention “many-worlds” around someone like an experimentalist or a condensed matter physicist and they’ll shrug it off with the words “that’s philosophy”.

The story gets stranger as physicists like E.P. Tyron claimed that according to QM, any small system with a very small net energy can “appear from nothing” exist for a brief moment and disappear. “These ‘virtual particles’, or quantum fluctuations, are observed in the laboratory and appear spontaneously throughout space and time.”

Contrary to Tyron’s assertion, no particles insofar as they are “virutal” have ever been observed anywhere, much less emerge “spontaneously” all the time. Tyron is a good example of a physicist out of touch with reality, thanks to the elimination of causality. Tyron went on to explain, in line with his view that there is no limit to the size of quantum fluctuations, and so entire universes can create themselves.

“Observed in the laboratory”??? What in the world is he talking about? We know perfectly well that they do emerge spontaneously all the time - and who do you think you are, a non-scientist, to deny it? - but I’ve never heard of them being observed. Even if Hawking radiation - in which a virtual particle-antiparticle pair emerges, one is captured by a black hole and is preserved by time dilation and the other escapes and must therefore continue in existence in order to preserve angular momentum - were observed, one could argue that the radiation observed has become “real” rather than “virtual” since it in order for it to remain in existence it has to borrow energy from the black hole (this is how black holes evaporate).

Tyron is technically correct that entire universes could “create themselves”, but they could only exist for so short a time as to be absolutely negligible - my rough guess given the size of the universe compared to the size of virtual particles would be about one-googleth. And Tyron is absolutely correct in saying that virtual particles DO emerge spontaneously everywhere.

Oh yes, back to Neils Bohr. Bohr abolished the ontological reality of the universe itself. Bohr finally spilled the beans, saying “There is no quantum world. There is only an abstract quantum physical description. It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about nature.”
(Quoted in A. petersen, “The Philosophy of Niels Bohr,” in A.P. French and P.J. Kennedy, “Niels Bohr: A Centenary Volume”; Harvard U.P.)

In other words, according to Bohr, physics is not about the real world. The logical implication of the Copenhagen philosophy of QM was followed through by Bohr --human language is deprived of real objects and thus communicable meaning. In other words, it ends in solipsism.

Oh, the “dangerous game” which the “Copenhagen people” played with reality.

QED

Again, you gave the implications of logical positivism, not of Copenhagen. All you have proven is that some philosophers who also happened to be physicists believed that physics is not about the real world. You did not even mention the actual Copenhagen interpretation itself - just a whole lot of opinions from history textbooks. This sort of “argumentation” may work in philosophy courses and scholastic summae, but not for physicists. I would also still like to know by what authority you can tell physicists that well-established scientific facts like virtual particles are false.

 

[Cecilianus]

Classical philosophy has its own methods for arriving at truth. Once a truth is discovered, it is incorporated into philosophy’s patrimony.

Science, on the other hand, is revolutionary. It’s conclusions or truths, especially its broader statements or theories, are always tentative. This is clearly seen in the revolutions in astronomy over the centuries, as each new theory debunks the previous one as astronomy more closely approximates the truth. Thus there are false scientific theories and tentatively true theories. Also, in accordance with Godel’s incompleteness theorem, no mathematically based scientific theory can ever be conclusively proven, regardless of the falsifiability criterion, if one accepts that as valid.

Philosophy differs in that, correctly speaking, there is no such thing as false philosophy. Philosophy’s patrimony is always and forever true. There are what we commonly call “false philosophical” systems, eg. Kantianism, Skepticism, Cartesianism, and so on, but strictly speaking these are not philosophy since, while they may contain some truths, they, in general, remain outside the truth of what we call the philosophia perrenis.

*See Section *VII. IS PROGRESS IN PHILOSOPHY INDEFINITE OR IS THERE A PHILOSOPHIA PERENNIS?

All is approximation. But “tentatively true” is still true; the fact that we can always get more precise and less approximated (which is something we can always do when our work is inherently quantitative) just means that we know more and can get better. And, like with philosophy, once a truth is discovered, it is incorporated into science’s patrimony. (Actually, that’s better said of science than philosophy, since when was the last time philosophy discovered anything? HAS philosophy "discovered’ anything?)

But just as science is model-based and not some kind of complete divine revelation, philosophy is even worse. By refusing to approach reality in its quantitative aspects, philosophy is the biggest approximation of all. A philosophical description of something is a qualitative description useful for defining our terms and figure out what we are talking about before we actually learn anything about the subject through mathematical physics. If it is always true it is because it is always phenomenological - it describes reality only by seeing that it has an intelligibility or “form”, whereas you need science to actually tell us WHAT the “form” of something is.

 

[itinerant1]

Let me analyze the logical structure of your argument:

1. Heisenberg, Planck, and Bohr interpreted quantum mechanics in a solipsistic sense.
2. Quantum mechanics is the theory developed by Heisenberg, Planck, and Bohr (more associated with the former two).
3. Therefore, quantum mechanics implies solipsism.

I’m sure you could refine this formulation to make it more clear that there are three terms as Aristotelian rules dictate, but what I find problematic is the middle term - your reduction of the Copenhagen interpretation to the philosophical interpretations of Heisenberg and Planck. Most people, including physicists such as me who accept the Copenhagen interpretation, still regard Heisenberg as a sloppy philosopher. The fact that some very well-known physicists made some quite unjustified claims - such as having had disproven causality and proven solipsism - does not mean that the hard physics of the Copenhagen interpretation is false. That they should do so is understandable, in light of Heisenberg’s immersion in logical positivism and the radical nature of quantum mechanics. But like the “many-worlds” theories, they are not science, but rather what physicists pejoratively call “philosophy” - unjustified conclusions based on shaky reasoning. You could make a much stronger argument for the many-worlds theory than for solipsism based on Copenhagen, but I’ve never met a physicist who took it seriously. You mention “many-worlds” around someone like an experimentalist or a condensed matter physicist and they’ll shrug it off with the words “that’s philosophy”.

I guess you did not, once again, read my posts very carefully. I made it clear several times in different posts that I was talking about the Copenhagen philosophy of QM and not the science of QM. I do not see how you could of overlooked so many references to that effect. As a result, what you said above is based on a strawman fallacy.

Possibly you just overlooked my necessary disctinctions since you do not, as you have repeatedly shown, recognize the difference between philosophy and physics. You think that in doing physics you are doing philosophy. That confusion on your part has now come into play.

BTW, There is no basis in history or fact for your assumption that the philosophical probem was Heisenberg’s logical postivism. Apparently, you do not understand the difference between logical positivism and extreme idealism. You can protest by saying that you do, but the facts tell a different story…

“Observed in the laboratory”??? What in the world is he talking about? We know perfectly well that they do emerge spontaneously all the time - and who do you think you are, a non-scientist, to deny it? - but I’ve never heard of them being observed. Even if Hawking radiation - in which a virtual particle-antiparticle pair emerges, one is captured by a black hole and is preserved by time dilation and the other escapes and must therefore continue in existence in order to preserve angular momentum - were observed, one could argue that the radiation observed has become “real” rather than “virtual” since it in order for it to remain in existence it has to borrow energy from the black hole (this is how black holes evaporate).

The operative phrase here was “as virtual”. This is “virtual” intended according to the context. And the context of my dicussion was the Copenhagen philosophy of QM. A virtual event, as uncaused, or even not fully caused, cannot exist. It either “is” or “is not”. “To be” or “not to be” is the question. No-thing can be the cause of its own existence, whether a particle or a universe, all arguments derived from Copengagen philosophy of QM, notwithstanding.

Tyron is technically correct that entire universes could “create themselves”, but they could only exist for so short a time as to be absolutely negligible - my rough guess given the size of the universe compared to the size of virtual particles would be about one-googleth. And Tyron is absolutely correct in saying that virtual particles DO emerge spontaneously everywhere.

Really? You have bought into the Copenhagen philosophy, while simultaneously denying it. That is about as logical as the illogic involved in asserting an “uncaused action”, or no-thing is some-thing.

Again, you gave the implications of logical positivism, not of Copenhagen. All you have proven is that some philosophers who also happened to be physicists believed that physics is not about the real world. You did not even mention the actual Copenhagen interpretation itself - just a whole lot of opinions from history textbooks. This sort of “argumentation” may work in philosophy courses and scholastic summae, but not for physicists. I would also still like to know by what authority you can tell physicists that well-established scientific facts like virtual particles are false.

Balderdash. I provided quotes from Heisenburg on his interpretation of the indeterminancy principle. Apparently you do not think Heisenburg’s interpretation has anything to do with the Copenhagen school’s philosophy of QM. What in th world are you talking about?

I provided quotes from Bohr, Einstein, and other scientists regarding the indeterminancy principle of what is implied to say what cannot be measured exactly does not occur exactly.

Since you have bought into that philosophy of QM, without really understanding it, which is apparent by your references to logical positivism, you are in no position to critique what I have said.

 

[itinerant1]

All is approximation. But “tentatively true” is still true; the fact that we can always get more precise and less approximated (which is something we can always do when our work is inherently quantitative) just means that we know more and can get better. And, like with philosophy, once a truth is discovered, it is incorporated into science’s patrimony. (Actually, that’s better said of science than philosophy, since when was the last time philosophy discovered anything? HAS philosophy "discovered’ anything?)

The history of philosophy is the history of discoveries of those matters proper to philosophy. It is not “discovery” in the sense of scientific discovery, such as discovering a new species of Laginidium or the common ancestor to closely related species.

For example, philosophy has discovered the very secret of knowledge, how some thing can be in the mind, as known, while not existing in the mind in the manner in which it exists in nature.

But just as science is model-based and not some kind of complete divine revelation, philosophy is even worse. By refusing to approach reality in its quantitative aspects, philosophy is the biggest approximation of all. A philosophical description of something is a qualitative description useful for defining our terms and figure out what we are talking about before we actually learn anything about the subject through mathematical physics. If it is always true it is because it is always phenomenological - it describes reality only by seeing that it has an intelligibility or “form”, whereas you need science to actually tell us WHAT the “form” of something is.

Classical philosophy, according to its own principles, does not, and cannot neglect “reality in its quantitative aspects”, as for one, it claims all knowledge begins in sense experience. Classical philosophers resort to scientific knowledge of biological evolution in order to treat of the philosophical aspects of evolution theory. These kinds of discussions occur frequently on CAF, especially in regard to understanding the nature of man, as rational animal, and what that distinction implies in relation to non-rational animal, a diiference in degree only, or a difference in kind, and is that difference in kind one that is superficial or radical. Understanding the nature of man has problems specifically for science, specifically for philosophy, and specifically for theology.

The fallacy in your statement regards quantities. The quantifiable aspects of things and their relation is specifically the privilege and proper domain of the natural sciences, not philosophy or theology. You can try to judge philosophy by science, but such endeavors alway ends in gibberish. One cannot judge a higher science from a lower one.

And you equivocate on “form”. Philosophy treats of “formal” causes, one of the ultimate causes, which you previously denied had an meaning. Besides contradicting yourself here, you go on to speak of “form”, as it seems, as physical form. To the contrary, “Form” in the sense of the "eidos" of metaphysics, besides being another discovery of philosophy, is not what the natural sciences investigate. You can’t quantify, that is measure, weigh, observe, and so on, the "eidos" of a thing.

Consequently, your statement is hopelessly confused.

 

[itinerant1]

I don’t believe Godel’s theorem limits the applicability of mathematics to science. 1) Godel’s theorem states that a mathematical system is either incomplete (i.e. there are “true” theorems which cannot be proved from axioms of the system), or contains false theorems. Mathematics which applies to physical theories does not constitute a mathematical system per se,but takes applicable pieces, as, for example, group theory applied to molecular vibrations. Moreover, physics isn’t “proven” as are mathematical theorems; it is verified empirically. You can have elegant mathematical treatments, as in string theory, but without the possibility of empirical verification or falsification it isn’t science. See, for example, “Not Even Wrong” by Peter Woit.
is.

In the area of physics, I usually concern myself with cosmological theories, as it is an area where scientists often speak about the philosophy of their science. And this is where I think Gödel’s theorems pose a warning to modern endeavors to construct a theory of everything.

As you know, according to Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, no non-trivial set of arithmetic propositions can contain the proof of its consistency. Recognizing the role arithmetic has in all mathematics, we see the relevance and import of Gödel’s theorems on mathematics in general.

Now, the universe does reveal its secrets to particular mathematical formalisms, which plays a strong motivating factor with those scientists who endeavor to create an ultimate cosmological theory. As long as Gödel’s theorems remain valid, any ultimate cosmological theory may be true, but it can never be necessarily true.

Any theory claimed to be necessarily true cannot contain the proof of its own consistency. This puts a limit on those endeavors, inspired by Hawking, to create a cosmological theory in which the universe has no need of God. The primary implication here of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems is that the contingency of the cosmos cannot be contradicted. Hawking, et al, cannot strictly prove what they hope to prove.

Any ultimate cosmological theory, or theory of everything, cannot be considered necessarily true. And the long arm of Gödel may mean even more, that some particular theory of everything is but a theory of nothing.

 

[itinerant1]

Again I disagree. I haven’t read the scholastics, but have read much in philosophy of science: van Fraassen, Rescher, Salmon, Dukas, Koons, d’Espagnat. They propose contradictory doctrines, and while one may prefer one over another (I’m a realist in the spirit of d’Espagnat–“veiled reality”), there’s no way of verifying one school over another, even though one may be able to pick out specific logical arguments that are false.

You are speaking of philosophy of science. And when you say “there’s no way of verifying one school over another” is that supposed to refer to various schools of philosophy? If so, the claims sounds like an assertion of “philosophical neutrals”. It’s tantamount to saying the mind cannot achieve philosophical truth. Philosophy becomes a matter of taste, rather than a way of understanding the way things really are.

Of course, “if” there is no way of verifying one school over another, then there is no way of verifying the truth of the position that says “there is no way of verifying one school over another.” Hence, one is making a claim that is unjustified and unjustifiable. That is, since we cannot verify the truth of a school that says “there is no way of verifying one school over another”, on what grounds does one hold to a proposition that is neither proven or provable? It’s not very scientific, or philosophically sound.

It would seem to contain the same inherent logical contradiction involved in Skepticism, which says we cannot know truth. If the statement “we cannot know truth” is true, then we know at least one truth, which therefore disproves the statement “we cannot know truth.” Other truths are also implied in my refutation of Skepticism.

So, if it is asserted that all we can do is “pick out specific logical arguments that are false”, then that’s what I have just done with Skepticism, which is sufficient to show the falsity of that particular school. Also, I have consequently demonstrated the falsity of the school or position that says “there’s no way of verifying one school over another.”

 

[Anselm33]

You are speaking of philosophy of science. And when you say “there’s no way of verifying one school over another” is that supposed to refer to various schools of philosophy? If so, the claims sounds like an assertion of “philosophical neutrals”. It’s tantamount to saying the mind cannot achieve philosophical truth. Philosophy becomes a matter of taste, rather than a way of understanding the way things really are.

 

[itinerant1]

I’m talking of empirical verification, which I thought was clear from context. As I said, there are other ways of judging the truth, but they aren’t empirical.

I understood the empirical verification reference, but then I thought you were saying something else, in addition. However, your response makes it clear this was a misunderstanding on my part.

This is a self-referential statement, like the Cretan Liar paradox or Russell’s the set of all sets that doesn’t contain itself. You need something like a Theory of Types to deal with it and I don’t consider it to be a convincing argument. If indeed such self-referential arguments were convincing, would there be any rational skeptics (or non-empiricists) left? Or are you saying that all skeptics are irrational? I am not, by the way, a skeptic–I maintain there are other avenues to finding the truth than philosophical enquiry; there is on one hand truth validated by empirical findings, and on the other hand, truth validated by what one knows in one’s heart, i.e. faith. When I say no way of verifying the truth of one position over another, I’m referring to no empirical way. One can make judgments, but they’re based on other considerations. And these are not always logic; I’ll challenge you to find the holes in Van Fraassen’s logical arguments (who is a proponent of constructive empiricism) and the diametrically opposed views of Robert Koons (who is a scientific realist). One chooses between them on grounds other than logic.
Again, thank you for your comments. They’ve helped me to tighten up my own thoughts.

I did not actually think you were a skeptic, even though “skepticism” covers a number of ideas and schools of philosophy. There is everything from a healthy skepticism, which every thinking person should embrace, to a radical skepticism that denies the possibility of attaining any truth.

I was referring to the latter type, and to which I believe is self-contradictory. Hence, I am not saying that “all” skeptics are irrational, but some philosophical positions are indeed irrational. There are extreme philosophical skeptics who do not “act” as if there skepticism is true. If that sounds contradictory, it’s because it is a contradiction.

The skeptic who on a “philosophical” basis denies that sense data give reliable information about the world, certainly does not act that way if a car is headed straight for him. He abandons his skepticism and jumps out of the way.

Pseudo-philosophical positions that imply solipsism are a radical skeptcism that is irrational to boot.

Also, while not a skeptic, Descartes’ epistemology, nonetheless, implies solipsism. Locke and Berkeley are two notable responses to Descartes’ solipsism. Hume saw the flaw in the responses, and responded with his answer of skepticism. It was the logical conclusion.

The irrational skepticism of Hume awoke Kant from his “dogmatic slumbers.” However, Kant failed to save knowledge with his a priori categories, despite the enthusiasm of his followers, of which non-Euclidian geometries pose a real problem for their postion.

You challenge me “to find the holes in Van Fraassen’s logical arguments.” Thanks for the offer, but I do not know much about Van Fraassen. However, all of this has certainly interested me enough to look into his works.

Regards,
Thomas

 

[Cecilianus]

I guess you did not, once again, read my posts very carefully. I made it clear several times in different posts that I was talking about the Copenhagen philosophy of QM and not the science of QM. I do not see how you could of overlooked so many references to that effect. As a result, what you said above is based on a strawman fallacy.

Possibly you just overlooked my necessary disctinctions since you do not, as you have repeatedly shown, recognize the difference between philosophy and physics. You think that in doing physics you are doing philosophy. That confusion on your part has now come into play.

Right. I started out as a philosophy major and went over to the physics department since that was where all the philosophy was being taught.

 

[Cecilianus]

You can try to judge philosophy by science, but such endeavors alway ends in gibberish. One cannot judge a higher science from a lower one.

Truth is truth. A fact discovered in science is true, and if it contradicts philosophical beliefs one of the two must be false. However, scientific facts like quantum mechanics (and your separation of the Copenhagen interpretation as “philosophy” rather than “science” is forced - it is just as certain, verified both empirically and theoretically through Bell’s Theorem, as all other facts in QM) are well-established and settled, while all the “refutations” of it I have seen either picked a straw man (solipsism) or simply declared it logically contradictory - that is to say, literally non-sensical. Since thousands of people can in fact understand it, the mental blocks to understanding it are the fault of the people who see it as contradictory and not with the theory itself. I understand it, and therefore you can’t possibly hope to convince me that it’s nonsensical, any more than you can convince me that I am not visually seeing whatever is front of my eyes - even if our senses are deceptive, we cannot deny that we have sense-perceptions, and likewise even if our reasoning is flawed, I cannot deny that I understand the concept of a virtual particle.

 

[Anselm33]

Truth is truth

. A fact discovered in science is true, and if it contradicts philosophical beliefs one of the two must be false. However, scientific facts like quantum mechanics (and your separation of the Copenhagen interpretation as “philosophy” rather than “science” is forced - it is just as certain, verified both empirically and theoretically through Bell’s Theorem, as all other facts in QM) are well-established and settled, while all the “refutations” of it I have seen either picked a straw man (solipsism) or simply declared it logically contradictory - that is to say, literally non-sensical.

I don’t agree with your statement that the Copenhagen interpretation of QM is validated through the various experiments violating Bell’s theorem. Rather I’d say that QM is validated, but that says nothing about which of the various interpretations–Copenhagen, Many Worlds, Many Minds, etc–do not hold. The only interpretation that is not consistent with the violation of Bell’s theorem is Bohm’s hidden variables in the version that has locality. I recall (and unfortunately cannot give a specific reference right now) that there is a new version of the Hidden Variables—pilot wave–theory that does not include locality and so would be consistent with the Aspect experiments. Bell himself was partial to the pilot wave theory (see “Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics”). QM, as a theoretical/mathematical framework is validated by experimental results; interpretations of QM are not so validated at this stage of the game. Most physicists I think prefer the Copenhagen interpretation, but in my opinion that’s a position based on mental laziness and conservatism. On the other hand, many of the great physicists originally involved in the formulation of QM were not particularly happy with the Copenhagen interpretation: Schrodinger, Wigner, von Neumann.

I’d recommend some texts to broaden your understanding of possible QM interpretations–
Quantum Enigma (possibly a little bit horseys and duckeys for your taste), “Mind, Brain and the Quantum”(Michael Lockwood), “Quantum Reality: Theory and Philosophy” (Jonathan Allday), “On Physics and Philosophy” (Bernard d’Espagnat); “From Physics to Metaphysics” (Michael Redhead)

Happy reading!
PS–I should add that I’m a physicist with 57 years of academic and medical physics practice behind me, and that I’ve written (and published) papers involving quantum mechanics–density matrix theory applications, mainly–and have taught graduate courses in quantum mechanics.

 

[itinerant1]

Truth is truth. A fact discovered in science is true, and if it contradicts philosophical beliefs one of the two must be false. However, scientific facts like quantum mechanics (and your separation of the Copenhagen interpretation as “philosophy” rather than “science” is forced - it is just as certain, verified both empirically and theoretically through Bell’s Theorem, as all other facts in QM) are well-established and settled, while all the “refutations” of it I have seen either picked a straw man (solipsism) or simply declared it logically contradictory - that is to say, literally non-sensical. Since thousands of people can in fact understand it, the mental blocks to understanding it are the fault of the people who see it as contradictory and not with the theory itself. I understand it, and therefore you can’t possibly hope to convince me that it’s nonsensical, any more than you can convince me that I am not visually seeing whatever is front of my eyes - even if our senses are deceptive, we cannot deny that we have sense-perceptions, and likewise even if our reasoning is flawed, I cannot deny that I understand the concept of a virtual particle.

Your response is argumentative and opinionated rather than factual. Hence, it would be pointless for me to attempt a reply.

Nonetheless, I wish you well.

 

[itinerant1]

Right. I started out as a philosophy major and went over to the physics department since that was where all the philosophy was being taught.

Regardless of the many philosophy departments around the country, there are only a handful of unviversities in the U.S. that actually do philosophy. And I must take with a grain a salt your assertion that physics departments teach philosophy since you have demonstrated your confusion and misunderstanding regarding the distinction between the natural sciences and philosophy.

 

[Ed_CA]

In the Middle Ages, physics and philosophy were considered different aspects of the same subject. However, with the advance in mathematics and calculus, these became separate fields of inquiry. All one needs to do is look at a typical catalog at a university to see how subject material has branched.
Quantum mechanics is a successful branch of physics in that the energy spectra of nuclei, atoms and molecules are successfully predicted. Likewise, lasers, super-conductors, quantum computers, etc are some useful outcomes.
Will quantum theory be superseded as was Newtonian mechanics by special and general relativity and quantum mechanics? This is very likely because quantum theory has some interesting problems such as wave functions travelling forward in time and backward in time, or whether time and space itself quantized, the two slit problem, etc. Is the natural world indeterminate on the scale of 10e-7-10e-8 meters and smaller or is it solely due to inability to obtain simultaneously precise measurements of position and velocity? It preferable personally to be a fence sitter on the various schools of interpretation because more than likely these will be shown to be incorrect in the future.

 

[itinerant1]

Is the natural world indeterminate on the scale of 10e-7-10e-8 meters and smaller or is it solely due to inability to obtain simultaneously precise measurements of position and velocity?

The inability to obtain simultaneously precise measurements of position and velocity, as far as I am concerned, is strictly an observational limitation, as you probably have seen from my posts.

The QM interpretation that says what cannot be measured precisely does not occur precisely was not made on strictly scientific grounds. The pre-existing tendency among certain physicists to deny the principle of causality was based on ideological grounds. This ideology or philosophy, which involved an extreme form of idealism combined with a rank pragmatism, later came into play with Heisenberg when interpreting quantum events and writing his paper on quantum indeterminancy.

Science cannot prove “ontological” indeterminancy, and the history reveals that the particular interpretation which denies the principle of causality at the quantum level, and hence for all natural laws, was never grounded on strictly scientific considerations.

So, for myself, I see no need to withhold judgement on the issue. I believe that in time more physicists will come around to their senses on this matter, but for now there are tests to take and papers to write.