phuong:
You might have seen this question/answers before from a non-believer. Not sure if I have a good reply, so would like to poke on some of the minds in this forum
What would be yours?
“If God is truly omnipotent (all powerful), can he created a rock that’s so heavy that he cannot lift it?” If he can’t than he’s not all that powerful; if he can, he’s not all that powerful!
Maybe there is an equivocation here, a confusion between different senses of the words “God can…”
For example:
“God can - be eaten by a giant rat”
“God can - turn lettuces into giant purple munchkins”
“God can - turn water into wine”
“God can - commit a mortal sin”
The objection is a purely verbal one, which treats all phrases beginning “God can…” as though they were the same sort of phrase - and, as though they were all the same kind of thing. It is not a statement about realities. It’s like insisting that because apples and pears are both kinds of fruit, all apples are pears. Or, that because the Holy Spirit bears fruit in us, therefore, goodness and kindness must be on sale at the fruiterer’s.
IOW, all sorts of things are being lumped together, purely by having those two words “God can…” put in front of them. That does not confer meaning on them.
“God can Bush Alpha Tripod”, is meaningless. Writing “God can…” in front of them, dpes not make an intelligible sentence - still less does it state anything about God. Unless one is going to argue that anything we can think, is therefore intelligible, even if we cannot see how. I have not yet seen this position defended.
Of the four phrases at the top, the third is intelligible - it is no contradictory, it communicates information about how God acts, it does not state anything about God that we know is contradictory to God’s moral character.
Saying “God can do X/Y/Z” is only intelligible if we already know something about God - if there is something realy existing to which our assertions can correspond. As there is no evidence for the objective existence of munchkins, we cannot know that our statements about them mean anything: we do not know our knowledge about them. With God, we do; so, we make statements about God. So statements abour munchkins and about God are not the same
type of statement - because the existence of God and of munchkins outside our intellects
is not of the same ontological status; certainly not as far as we know. So we have no firm foundation for being as certain that munchkin-statements mean anything real, as that God-statements do.
Therefore, God-statements are more intelligible than munchkin-statements; so we make the former, and not the latter. With one exception: munchkin-statements are intelligible in discussions of the “Wizard of Oz” - but, God-statements are far more widely intelligible.
Another vital point: God-statements are analogical. This should be emphasised. It is why picture language for God is needed - we have indirect knowledge of God; not the knowledge that comes from face-to-face vision. How can we have
that, “until we have faces” ?
Which is why the NT talks about the fruits of the Holy Spirit - analogies are not lies, but representations to help the mind think about realities that are hard - or impossible - to express in words.
Hope this helps
Sorry if it’s a little dense. ##
