A question concerning the ontological argument

[Philus]

We had a unit in my philosophy class where we discussed the existence of god, and later wrote a paper discussing one of the arguments (cosmological, teleological, etc.). In my paper, I criticized the ontological argument. It is about time for finals, and we need to go back over one of our papers and strengthen it. I was wondering if anyone on this forum was up for some healthy debate, which hopefully could give me some ideas on how to strengthen my paper. Thanks. Here is my paper as it stands:

Anselm’s Ontological argument for the existence of God begins by citing god as a being that which no greater can be conceived in respect to the great making qualities of omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence, etc. Therefore, if you conceive of a being, and then conceive of one greater, the first being you conceived would not be god. He states that this sort of being can at least be conceived in the mind. However, since a being that can exist both in the mind and in reality would be greater than one that just exists in the mind, God must really exist in reality to be a truly great being, or else we could imagine a being greater than god, which is impossible. Furthermore, a being that exists necessarily is greater than a being that does not exist necessarily. Therefore, by the above logic, God must exist necessarily.
Guanilo presents a counterargument to Anselm’s Ontological argument. This counter is known as Guanilo’s Island . Guanilo asks us to use parallel logic for the idea of a perfect island. Guanilo says that we can conceive of a perfect island in our minds i.e. an island that which no greater can be conceived. This island can be conceived in the mind, but an island that existed both in the mind and reality would be greater than an island that just existed in the mind. Therefore, Guanilo concludes by parallel logic, a perfect island must exist in the reality. However, Guanilo states that it is unlikely that such an island really does exist. Therefore, the argument for the existence of the perfect island must be incorrect, and by parallel, so must Anselm’s argument for the existence of god. Anselm rebuffs Guanillo by stating that since an island is a physical thing, a greater can always be conceived (an island with one pineapple isn’t as great as an island with two pineapples). However, God is, by definitition, that than which no greater can be conceived, and therefore the ontological argument works once and only once to prove the existence of god. While I do not believe Guanilo did a very good job of explaining why the Ontological Argument is flawed, I do believe that the argument does have its problems. Namely, I question whether existence is actually a great making quality. I shall explore this question in the following paragraphs.
Anselm states that existence is a great making property, but I contest that existence is not a great making property at all. Rather, it is a state of being in much the same way that ice is a state of water. For our purposes, a great making quality will be defined as a nonphysical quality that can be measured on a continuous scale of increasing magnitudes, while a state will be defined as different forms of an object that can only be measured on noncontinuous tiers. To clarify the latter, we can use the states of matter as an example. Matter can be defined as a solid, liquid, or a gas. Since there is no transition period between solids, liquids, and gases where the object is half liquid, half solid, we consider these forms of matter as mutually exclusive. Furthermore a transformation in state will not change the essence of the object. For example, water is still water even if it freezes or evaporates.
God is defined by 3 qualities: omnipotence, omnipresence, and omnibenevolence. These qualities fit the definition of great making qualities because they are not actual physical, tangible qualities, and because there is a countinuous scale of increasing magnitudes for these qualities. For example, considering the concept of power there could be the power to lift a rock, the power to heat a solar system, the power to create the universe, etc. a similar logic can be extended to omnibenevolence and omniscience without too much difficulty. Do note that properties such as furriness and brightness do not qualify as great making qualities, as they are indeed physical qualities and therefore can not qualify. The given definition of great making qualities is the most concise way to encompass the characteristics of god to the exclusion of non-great making qualities.
However, Existence does not exhibit this sort of scalar property; there are only two, arguably three, levels of existence: nonexistence, existence, and arguably necessary existence. One being cannot be more existent than another being, for such a property cannot be conceived. Furthermore, there can be no being that can both exist and not exist, for it is logical contradiction for a being to be so. Finally, there is no intermediate between nonexistence and existence, for this sort of existence cannot be conceived. The three previous statements prove that there are strictly defined tiers of existence, and there is no gradual increase in levels of existence. therefore, existence would be defined as a state and not a great making property. Furthermore, since existence is a state, if an object shifts from a state of nonexistence to a state of existence, the essence of the object would remain unchanged. Therefore, an object that exists and an object that doesn’t exist would still constitute the same object. Therefore, an existence is not greater than non-existence and therefore a being that which no greater can be conceived must not necessarily exist. If the previous statement is accurate, then the ontological argument fails to prove that god must exist.

 

[ProdglArchitect]

I really hope you use paragraph breaks when writing your paper…

Also, you will find plenty of people up for some good debate here. I’ll try to read through what you have and answer to it, but I’m not the best at philosophy

(Please note, this was not an ad hominim attack on your argument, I haven’t read it yet so I cant’ say anything about it… but please consider going back and adding in breaks to illustrate the divisions in the argument, it’ll make reading the whole thing a lot easier. Since it’s a pain to indent, the best way is to put an extra empty line after each paragraph.

…Also…if you copy-pasted this right from your paper, you really need to work on your punctuation skills. Not meaning to be insulting, but you’re missing commas, have spaces -before- periods, have random extra spaces… drop this thing into a word editor and run it through a grammar check…)

 

[tafan]

Philus,

I too have been critical of the ontological argument on this forum. I wish I had time today to read and study your paper, and to provide my comments. Unfortunately I do not.
I will post the excerpt from Fr Ronald Knox’s book: The Belief of Catholics. It sums up my views on the ontological argument quite well, I will bold the points that I think are critical. I do not know if this helps you out or is even applicable, but maybe it will give you some further food for thought:

This attempt to prove the existence of God, or to declare the proof of it
unnecessary, without reference to the effects of his power which we
experience in his visible creation, is a permanent temptation to the human
mind. Intellects as far removed from one another as those of Anselm,
Descartes, and de Bonald have umdertaken it, and it is probable that they
will never lack successors. Protestant thought, in our day, is much wedded
not to these but to similar speculations. Thus, you will seldom read any
piece of non-Catholic apologetic without coming across some reference to
man’s sense of his need for God, or man’s notion of holiness, a notion
which can only be perfectly realised in God. The implication of all such
language is that it is possible to argue directly from the existence of
concepts in our own mind to the existence of real objects, to which those
concepts correspond.

The Catholic Church discountenances all such methods of approach to the
subject; some of them, at the Vatican Council, she has actually condemned.
She discountenances them, at least, if and in so far as they claim to be
the sole or the main argument for the existence of God. The main if not the
sole, argument for the existence of God–so she holds, and has always held-
-is the argument which proves the Unseen from the seen, the existence of
the Creator from his visible effects in Creation.

All these efforts at the solution of the problem really depend for their
plausibility on a postulate which we do not grant–namely, that it would
have been impossible for the human race to infer God’s existence from his
creatures. If this were true, then it might be argued that the notion of
God must be an idea directly communicated to our minds. Such an argument is
perfectly valid if applied to our sense of right and wrong; it must be
native to the mind, because there is nothing outside ourselves which could
possibly have suggested such a notion to us. But this is a simple idea,
directly entertained, whereas the idea of God is a composite idea, and the
attributes which we associate with it, power, wisdom, etc., are derived
from our Own experience. “If there had been no God,” said Napoleon, “it
would have been necessary to invent him”–at least, we may say it would
have been possible to invent him. Thus the fact that the idea of God is
conceived by Our minds does not necessarily mean that it is inborn in us or
that it is directly communicated to us by some supernatural light.

The supposition is an unnecessary one, and now, what has it to say for
itself? If it were true, as Descartes held, that the idea of God was a
clear and distinct idea, like that of our own existence, why is it that
there are so few fools in the world who doubt their own existence, so many
who say “there is no God”? If the existence of God was one of the first
principles of all our mental process, then the contrary idea, that there is
no God, should be unthinkable-- but is it unthinkable? People think it
every day. “But at least,” St. Anselm would retort, “it is impossible to
think of an imperfect God, and therefore it is impossible to think of a
non-existent God.” To which the atheist replies with some justice that,
since God does not exist, it is not necessary to think about him at all.
You cannot argue from the ideal to the real order of things.

 

[mymamamary]

I am not a big fan of St. Anslems’ argument either, although I love the Saint. The Five Proofs are much more solid. I have yet to see a solid refutation on any of the five proofs of St. Thomas Aquinas.

 

[JDaniel]

Philius:

Well, I gathered up some courage and read further. It appears that you do address it, sort of. the point I was trying to make is that, if a person allegedly conceives of that than which nothing greater can be conceived, but excludes “existence,” then he has altered the argument into a red herring. Or, he is a “fool.”

God bless,
jd

 

[Joe_5859]

You might want look at a copy of Anselm’s works.

This online version shows criticisms of the ontological argument from a number of philosophers (Descartes, Locke, Kant, etc.).

Personally, I think the ontological argument properly understood is a very tough argument to refute. But it’s a very difficult to properly understand it.

 

[JDaniel]

Philius:

The denial you bring up is just about the only denial that might refute the Saint’s argument. But, if one then denies that “existence” is not a maximal attribute - notice I didn’t say property - then there’s no reconciliation of the argument for that person. Although, I don’t see that denial as anything more than a last-ditch attempt. That person believes that all is imaginary. And, that’s for another thread.

God bless,
jd

 

[ProdglArchitect]

Anselm’s Ontological argument for the existence of God begins by citing god as a being that which no greater can be conceived in respect to the great making qualities of omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence, etc. Therefore, if you conceive of a being, and then conceive of one greater, the first being you conceived would not be god. He states that this sort of being can at least be conceived in the mind. However, since a being that can exist both in the mind and in reality would be greater than one that just exists in the mind, God must really exist in reality to be a truly great being, or else we could imagine a being greater than god, which is impossible. Furthermore, a being that exists necessarily is greater than a being that does not exist necessarily. Therefore, by the above logic, God must exist necessarily.

Seems pretty straight forward, let’s see why you refute it. (I would like to preface this by saying that this is probably my least favorite of the proofs. If you’re really looking for a challenge, check out Aquinas’ five proofs.)

Guanilo presents a counterargument to Anselm’s Ontological argument. This counter is known as Guanilo’s Island . Guanilo asks us to use parallel logic for the idea of a perfect island. Guanilo says that we can conceive of a perfect island in our minds i.e. an island that which no greater can be conceived. This island can be conceived in the mind, but an island that existed both in the mind and reality would be greater than an island that just existed in the mind. Therefore, Guanilo concludes by parallel logic, a perfect island must exist in the reality. However, Guanilo states that it is unlikely that such an island really does exist. Therefore, the argument for the existence of the perfect island must be incorrect, and by parallel, so must Anselm’s argument for the existence of god.

Perfect place for a paragraph break.

As to the argument.

This argument does not hold up for one reason: It is based on the assumption that the perfect island probably doesn’t exist. There are two main flaws with this. One, you cannot use a potential negative to disprove and absolute positive and two: His frame of reference is apparently limited to our current existence.

For the first point: He assumes that because the island probably doesn’t exist, God probably doesn’t exist. His entire premise is based on the assumption of the island not existing. If the ontological argument were based on the assumption that God -does- exist then this may be a valid response. The ontological argument, however, begins with no assumption, and presents a rational reason for the existence of God. And argument that is based on an assumption is not adequate to disprove an argument that is based on no assumption.

As a note, it is true that Anselm does believe in God, but his arguemnt is not based on that belief. His argument is based on human nature, therefore his own belief in God does not shade it.

For the second point: As someone who rejects the existence of God, it is necessary for him to present the mechanics by which our reality came into being, if not explicitly, then at least through an assertion that some non-God mechanic exists which brought our reality into being. If this mechanic exists, then it is logical to conclude that this may not be the first, nor the last, instance in which it was set in motion. Therefore, we can conclude that these mechanics present the potential for an infinite number of realities. (Note, I recognize that this is an assumption, but since Guanilo’s assertion is based on an assumption, my rebuttal may also be based on an assumption.)

Given an infinite number of realities, it is absolutely necessary that the island which he speaks of DOES exist, therefore negating his own argument, since his entire argument is based on the premise of the island NOT existing.

Anselm rebuffs Guanillo by stating that since an island is a physical thing, a greater can always be conceived (an island with one pineapple isn’t as great as an island with two pineapples). However, God is, by definitition, that than which no greater can be conceived, and therefore the ontological argument works once and only once to prove the existence of god.

A logical rebuttal, given the nature of the ontological argument.

While I do not believe Guanilo did a very good job of explaining why the Ontological Argument is flawed,

Agreed

I do believe that the argument does have its problems. Namely, I question whether existence is actually a great making quality. I shall explore this question in the following paragraphs.

I’ll be honest, I do not understand what you mean by this. We’ll see if I pick it up as I continue to read your argument.

Anselm states that existence is a great making property, but I contest that existence is not a great making property at all. Rather, it is a state of being in much the same way that ice is a state of water. For our purposes, a great making quality will be defined as a nonphysical quality that can be measured on a continuous scale of increasing magnitudes, while a state will be defined as different forms of an object that can only be measured on noncontinuous tiers.

Thank you for the definition, it was much needed.

To clarify the latter, we can use the states of matter as an example. Matter can be defined as a solid, liquid, or a gas. Since there is no transition period between solids, liquids, and gases where the object is half liquid, half solid, we consider these forms of matter as mutually exclusive. Furthermore a transformation in state will not change the essence of the object. For example, water is still water even if it freezes or evaporates.

continued in next post…

 

[ProdglArchitect]

…continued from previous post.

God is defined by 3 qualities: omnipotence, omnipresence, and omnibenevolence.

This is an exceptionally limited definition, I’m assuming it was the definition given by Anselm?

These qualities fit the definition of great making qualities because they are not actual physical, tangible qualities, and because there is a countinuous scale of increasing magnitudes for these qualities. For example, considering the concept of power. There could be the power to lift a rock, the power to heat a solar system, the power to create the universe, etc. A similar logic can be extended to omnibenevolence and omniscience without too much difficulty.

I disagree with this assertion. Omnibenevolence and omniscience imply infinite knowledge, understanding and goodness. By it’s nature, something that is infinite does not have tiers / varying levels. Therefore, these things do not meet your own definition of making qualities. To be honest, at this point, I’m not sure if that helps or hurts your argument, but I felt it needed to be pointed out.

Do note that properties such as furriness and brightness do not qualify as great making qualities, as they are indeed physical qualities and therefore can not qualify. The given definition of great making qualities is the most concise way to encompass the characteristics of god to the exclusion of non-great making qualities.

Again, this is a flawed assertion, based on what I said previously. You are applying finite limits to something that, based on the ontological argument, has no finite limits. This is a major flaw in your paper, because you cannot refute an argument by circumventing what the argument is actually saying.

However, Existence does not exhibit this sort of scalar property; there are only two, arguably three, levels of existence: nonexistence, existence, and arguably necessary existence. One being cannot be more existent than another being, for such a property cannot be conceived. Furthermore, there can be no being that can both exist and not exist, for it is logical contradiction for a being to be so.

This argument is negated by what I have said. I believe the issue is with your definition of Making Qualities. If you are to define making qualities based on the three qualities your set forth (omnipotence, omnipresence, and omnibenevolence) then the definition would be:

a nonphysical quality that can be subjectively measured, but to which no apparent limit is set.

I offer this definition for the following reason:

1. 
   *]I agree that it is a non-physical quality.
   *]Measurement of non-physical characteristics is, by it nature, subjective. Therefore, valid tiers cannot be assigned becasue these tiers would have different starting and stopping points based on the observer.
   *]It is neither possible nor necessary to tier an infinite quality. I conclude that the quality is infinite because it is the “characteristic of which no greater can be conceived.” I argue that it is absolutely necessary for this to be infinite because, were it to have a finite qualifier, we would be able to think of something larger than that finite amount.
   
   Following this new definition based on the qualities presented in the ontological argument, your own argument actually present proof of God, because it is true that Existence does not present scalar qualities.
   
   I agree with your three states of being, so long as the top tier, the necessary existence, is only applied to the God posited by the argument.
   

   Finally, there is no intermediate between nonexistence and existence, for this sort of existence cannot be conceived.

   Agreed
   

   The three previous statements prove that there are strictly defined tiers of existence, and there is no gradual increase in levels of existence. therefore, existence would be defined as a state and not a great making property. Furthermore, since existence is a state, if an object shifts from a state of nonexistence to a state of existence, the essence of the object would remain unchanged. Therefore, an object that exists and an object that doesn’t exist would still constitute the same object.

   There is a problem with this, namely, non-existence cannot have an “essence.” If it does not exist, there is nothing to it. An essence (any qualifier which defines the properties of the object) implies that there is something, and therefore not nothing. If there is something, then it must exist. Based on this, it is impossible for an object which exists to have the same properties of one that does not, which is a major underlying requirement of your argument.
   

   Therefore, an existence is not greater than non-existence and therefore a being that which no greater can be conceived must not necessarily exist. If the previous statement is accurate, then the ontological argument fails to prove that god must exist.

   The previous statement is not accurate, because the premises behind it are not accurate, as I have demonstrated. Also, and I don’t mean to sound mean, but this arguemnt really doesn’t address the point of the ontological argument, which is namely that because we can conceive of something, it is necessary for that conception to reach an ultimate expression of its existence. That ultimate expression of existence necessarily implies the existence of a being to display this ultimate expression, otherwise this ultimate expression would have no way of existing. This necessary being is what we refer to as God.
   
   I look forward to your rebuttal. ^^

 

[Kilbourne]

Hi Philus:

Anselm’s ontological argument has always beguiled me. Anselm actually articulated two forms of the argument, the first being the one featured in your paper. It is found in Proslogion II. The second argument is found in Prosl. III and wasn’t generally recognized as such until the 20th century after it was rediscovered by Norman Malcolm and Charles Hartshorne. The first form of the argument is generally acknowledged to be defective, although some recent scholarship seems to strengthen it. Hartshorne et al have argued that the second form is sound, but he still is largely ignored (for no good reason, IMHO).

So, to begin with, you need to distrust most standard treatments of the argument. Scholars over the centuries have beat up on what they take to be the first argument and totally ignored the second.

Kilbourne

 

[Kilbourne]

You also need, as much as possible, to deal with Anselm directly and not through secondary sources. Use Anslem’s definition of God: that than which nothing greater can be thought (TTWNGCBT), not other formulations which can lead to subtle distortions in his meaning. For example, Father Robert Barron points out that “Greatest Conceivable Being” used by some scholars (e.g. Kreeft) wrongly implies that God is just a being among many, just on top of the heap, as it were.

 

[Kilbourne]

Anselm’s Ontological argument for the existence of God begins by citing god as a being that which no greater can be conceived in respect to the great making qualities of omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence, etc. Therefore, if you conceive of a being, and then conceive of one greater, the first being you conceived would not be god. He states that this sort of being can at least be conceived in the mind. However, since a being that can exist both in the mind and in reality would be greater than one that just exists in the mind, God must really exist in reality to be a truly great being, or else we could imagine a being greater than god, which is impossible. Furthermore, a being that exists necessarily is greater than a being that does not exist necessarily. Therefore, by the above logic, God must exist necessarily…

It is important to understand the structure of Anselm’s arguments. First is the definition. Then different premises including a “greater than” principle. Then the reductio ad absurdam argument leading to the conclusion that God exists.

The traditional formulation (over-simplified) of the first argument goes like this:

1. God is TTWNGCBT
2. It is greater to exist in reality than in the mind alone. (Often misleadingly stated as: “existence is greater than nonexistence”).
3. Suppose God exists in the mind alone. But this leads to a contradiction, for I then could conceive of a greater, namely that which also exists in reality.
4. Therefore God cannot exist in the mind alone.
5. Therefore God must exist in reality.

Note that there is no discussion of God’s various attributes, just his unsurpassed greatness.

 

[Kilbourne]

The second form goes like this:

1. God is TTWNGCBT.
2. It is greater to exist necessarily than contingently.
3. Suppose God exists contingently (i.e. entertain the possibility that God possibly could not exist.)
4. But this leads to a contradiction, etc.

I gotta get to work. Hope this helps.

Kilbourne

 

[Kilbourne]

Hi Prod and Philus,

…continued from previous post.

This is an exceptionally limited definition, I’m assuming it was the definition given by Anselm?

Actually it is not. Anselm merely defines God as that than which nothing greater can be thought.

 

[Kilbourne]

Prod and Philus,

Here is the first argument with additional explanation:

1. Definition: God is TTWNGCBT.
2. Premise: TTWNGCBT can be thought (i.e. is conceivable and not nonsense)
3. Premise: Whatever can be thought exists in the mind.

Note that Anselm treats ideas as really existing, a type of being. Norris Clark, the noted Thomist, agrees and calls them “mental beings.” We therefore can draw the preliminary conclusion that TTWNGCBT exists in the mind.

1. Premise: Whatever exists in the mind either exists in the mind alone or also in reality.
2. Premise: It is greater to exist in reality than in the mind alone.

This is the crucial “greater than” principle. Note that it is comparing whatever exists in reality to whatever (anything) exists in the mind. e.g. a tiny speck of dust is greater than the grandest imagined castle. Why? Because the speck of dust has real existence and existence independently, whereas an imagined castle is a mere mental being with no independent existence. All mental beings are dependent on a thinking subject for their existence.

6 Reductio argument: Suppose God exists in the mind alone. But this leads to a contradiction, for I then could conceive of a greater, namely that which also exists in reality.

If TTWNGCBT exists in the mind alone, then the atheists are right. God is just a figment of our imagination. But then this would mean that any real being (e.g. Barack Obama) would be greater God, which is absurd.

1. Therefore God cannot exist in the mind alone.
2. Therefore God must exist in reality.

I think this argument works. Note that the “greater than” principle is not “That which exists in reality is greater than that which doesn’t exist,” or even “It is greater to exist than not to exist.” It simply ask to accept that any real being is greater than any mental being.

 

[fred_conty]

Isn’t the problem with Anselm’s argument that there can be more than one GTWNCBT?
Equals could be thought of as GTWNCBT.

Just a thought.

 

[belorg]

Prod and Philus,

Here is the first argument with additional explanation:

1. Definition: God is TTWNGCBT.
2. Premise: TTWNGCBT can be thought (i.e. is conceivable and not nonsense)
3. Premise: Whatever can be thought exists in the mind.

Note that Anselm treats ideas as really existing, a type of being. Norris Clark, the noted Thomist, agrees and calls them “mental beings.” We therefore can draw the preliminary conclusion that TTWNGCBT exists in the mind.

1. Premise: Whatever exists in the mind either exists in the mind alone or also in reality.
2. Premise: It is greater to exist in reality than in the mind alone.

This is the crucial “greater than” principle. Note that it is comparing whatever exists in reality to whatever (anything) exists in the mind. e.g. a tiny speck of dust is greater than the grandest imagined castle. Why? Because the speck of dust has real existence and existence independently, whereas an imagined castle is a mere mental being with no independent existence. All mental beings are dependent on a thinking subject for their existence.

6 Reductio argument: Suppose God exists in the mind alone. But this leads to a contradiction, for I then could conceive of a greater, namely that which also exists in reality.

If TTWNGCBT exists in the mind alone, then the atheists are right. God is just a figment of our imagination. But then this would mean that any real being (e.g. Barack Obama) would be greater God, which is absurd.

Why would this be absurd? **If **God exist only in the mind, then indeed, ant real being would be greater.
I am greater than an imaginary God.

I think this argument works. Note that the “greater than” principle is not “That which exists in reality is greater than that which doesn’t exist,” or even “It is greater to exist than not to exist.” It simply ask to accept that any real being is greater than any mental being.

I have also lots of porblems with premise 2. I have no idea what “beings” can be thought of or not. I also happen to think that a being who can create soemthing from nothing is nonsense since I happen to belivee that ex nihilo nihil fit

 

[Kilbourne]

Isn’t the problem with Anselm’s argument that there can be more than one GTWNCBT?
Equals could be thought of as GTWNCBT.

Just a thought.

Hi Fred,

A very good point and one that has never occurred to me. Hmm. My shoot from the hip response would be that a God that exists without rivals (even equals) is greater than one which could possibly have an equal.

Kilbourne

 

[Kilbourne]

Why would this be absurd? **If **God exist only in the mind, then indeed, ant real being would be greater.
I am greater than an imaginary God.

It is absurd because it contradicts the definition of God as TTWNGCBT.

I have also lots of porblems with premise 2. I have no idea what “beings” can be thought of or not. I also happen to think that a being who can create soemthing from nothing is nonsense since I happen to belivee that ex nihilo nihil fit

Of course you can conceive of all kinds of beings. I think they fall into these categories:

1. Concrete actual things such as Mount Everest and mah huntin dawg Zoe.
2. Hypothetical or fictional things that certainly could exist but actually don’t in the real world, such as the State of New Califraggia, a reporter named Clark Kent, or maybe even a beam me up Scotty matter transporter.
3. Fictional things that are physically impossible, such Faster Than the Speed of Light Man.
4. Logical absurdities, such as round squares (technically we can’t conceive these, only connect the irreconciable concepts).

 

[Kilbourne]

Also, when we ponder all that exists in the natural world, we discern a hierarchy of being, ranging from the teeniest Higgs Boson to the entire material universe, and beyond. This trajectory of thought, where we attempt to conceive of the ever greater, ends up in the realm of metaphysics.