Dear Soc and all: I hope you all do not mind an additional voice at this late date on this most interesting (and polite) thread. I have read all up to page 38; but then skipped to this current page. I will view the intervening pages next, but I am moved to put this post in now in case it can help the discussion.
Is there still some confusion as to the terms of the discussion?
Caveat: I do not reference Aristotle below because he is an authority–nor would he want me to! He proposes and argues and works things out–and so must all humans. But it
is his work we are benefitting from when we use the words substance, accident, etc. And we are using these words because they best describe the philosophical aspect of transubstantiation–and were therefore adopted organically by the Catholic Church in order to talk about It.
2nd Caveat: Human thought cannot
comprehend God or the Eucharist, true. But we are meant to humanly think about Him and the Sacred Host as best we can. Which I see you all doing here. Just because we cannot plumb the depths while on earth does not mean we cannot do our best to plumb the depths! And then place our thought in the heart of faith. With that in mind:
Here are some concepts which I think true, which are Aristotelian, and which may help you all make some distinctions and connections in your discussion.
- Prime matter and substance exist at the level underneath matter. They underlie and make possible material things.
- Matter individuates substance in natural things.
- The soul is the substantial form of the body.
- An angel is an immaterial substance
- A dog is a material substance
- There are four causes of each natural thing: Material, Agent, Formal and Final
a. The material cause of a thing is its matter–what it is made of, as particular atoms in particular modes make up particular molecules: and down the line, as the wood is the cause of the cross or the boat.
b. The agent cause of a thing is the trigger or operator whose action brought about the thing: as a father is the cause of his son, and the boatwright the cause of the boat.
c. The formal cause is its definition–the essence or nature of a thing: as Rational Animal causes me to be human as opposed to a member of the fish kingdom
d. The final cause is its purpose–the end for which it exists: so, because this poster is meant for heaven, I am designed/composed such that I have the appetite, skills and potential to go there.
- Accidents inhere in substances.
- Substance inheres in nothing, but underlies every accident.
- God is pure substance–being–actuality. There is no potency in God.
- Substantial change is going from potency to act–what is already present and real though only potential becomes unpacked, unfolded, worked-out–actual. An example is the change from zygote to elderly man named Joe–thoughout his lifetime from womb to deathbed, Joe is the same, one unique individual known fully only to God. A sign of this sameness is Joe’s DNA–which remains identical throughout. A sign of the reality of the change is that the zygote looks nothing like the old man.
- Substantial change was the great puzzle of the pre-Aristotelians. To preserve the self-evident truth that the baby Joe IS the man Joe, given the continuum inbetween, some thinkers decided that all the apparent changes are nothing but accidental–so that change itself is an illusion, and that the reality is that all actually remains the same.
The other side of the controversy decided, in order to preserve the self-evident radicalness of such change as that from embryo to man, that everything changes, nothing remains the same, and that all attempt to identify anything *as itself *is futile–thus nothing has any definition or any nature; all things are each other, all differences are illusion, and that thus in reality all is in random flux.
Aristotle separated out the notion of Substantial Change–which preserves BOTH the underlying sameness of the substance through all its changes AND the concrete reality of the changes. He discovered that there must be an unchanging essence or substrate underlying all the apparent/observable/measurable changes which changes he then called accidental (as opposed to substantial).
- The nature of a thing is its essence–its definition–its Formal Cause.
- No artificial thing has a nature–only accidentally. The “nature” of an artificial thing is usually only that by courtesy, and is really rather its function or outward shape.
14 Only natural, non-manmade things have true natures. An atom would have a nature, recipe known only to God ( but having something to do with being a building block of matter) which we can just designate “atomness”. That we don’t know the secret recipe does not mean there isn’t one–there MUST be one in order to preserve Substantial Change.
15 Non-living natural things have natures but no souls.
- The soul is the inbuilt source of motion or rest in a natural living thing. (“motion” here includes locomotion, generation, nutrition, corruption…)
- For only one natural thing do we have the actual definition–the statement of its essence/nature: MAN IS A RATIONAL ANIMAL. That’s it. And we only know that because we are that. For dog, the best we can do is state that dogness has something to do with predator/companion to man…we can only call it dogness, but we know that God knows the definition, because dogs are definitely dogs and not cats. So the recipe is in safe hands.
So my answer to Soc’s question about the picture of the burning ship, “What is this a picture of?” is “a burning ship.” What is a ship? An artifact, primary purpose to transport on water. It may be set on fire for a Viking Funeral upon occasion. What is the nature of a ship? Being an artifact, it has no actual nature.
So my humble suggestion is: Try confining your examples of essence to dogness, treeness, etc., you won’t get into detours about burning ships and crosses which though wooden are really trellises.
Soc is right that, in the sense of
material cause, the snowball is its atoms–but not in the higher senses of
cause. But snowball doesn’t really work for very long because it is an artifact without a true nature–as others noted, because it can be made of other things…