A Teleological Argument

[Sophia]

Gorgias hit the nail on this quite well, but to expand, it was telling that when previously asked whether you were a mathematical realist or a mathematical nominalist, you said neither and just said you are a mathematician.

I am not interested in made-up categorizations. Gorgias did not understand the significance of my post, and neither did you.

Well, the root of the word “essence” isn’t to imply some type of mystery or anything ethereal. It comes from the idea of “what is essential to being a human being?” “What is essential to being a triangle?” And so on. There’s nothing mysterious, cryptic, or arbitrary about it.

The abstract phrase “essence is what it is” has no informational value. If you cannot get from the generic to the particular, then all you have is an empty, useless definition. Start with something simple: “what is the essence of a chair?” it other words, what are the attributes that are necessary for an object to be called a “chair”? This is not a trivial question, and I have yet to meet a Thomist who can answer it.

 

[Wesrock]

Wesrock:

Gorgias hit the nail on this quite well, but to expand, it was telling that when previously asked whether you were a mathematical realist or a mathematical nominalist, you said neither and just said you are a mathematician.

I am not interested in made-up categorizations. Gorgias did not understand the significance of my post, and neither did you.

I’m not impressed. And rather disappointed. You’re not willing to really analyze why you believe what you believe.

We understood just fine. You’re the one missing the significance of what Gorgias said.

Wesrock:

Well, the root of the word “essence” isn’t to imply some type of mystery or anything ethereal. It comes from the idea of “what is essential to being a human being?” “What is essential to being a triangle?” And so on. There’s nothing mysterious, cryptic, or arbitrary about it.

The abstract phrase “essence is what it is” has no informational value. If you cannot get from the generic to the particular, then all you have is an empty, useless definition. Start with something simple: “what is the essence of a chair?” it other words, what are the attributes that are necessary for an object to be called a “chair”? This is not a trivial question, and I have yet to meet a Thomist who can answer it.

You’re being nonsensical. We can get to particulars, but that’s what scientific method is for. It’s as simple as saying “we can learn what things are by studying them.” Are you objecting just to the word essence (a ridiculous objection, it’s just a term), or are you denying that there are types of things at all, even unique types, and that we can’t learn about what a thing is?

As for the essence of a chair, that’s a bit nonsensical to a Thomist. Chairs are entirely a human construct, a human artifact.

 

[Sophia]

You’re being nonsensical. We can get to particulars, but that’s what scientific method is for. It’s as simple as saying “we can learn what things are by studying them.” Are you objecting just to the word essence (a ridiculous objection, it’s just a term), or are you denying that there are types of things at all, even unique types, and that we can’t learn about what a thing is?

No. I deny that there is an intrinsic property that can be considered essence, without the intent of the user who wishes to use it for some specific purpose. The word “essence” has a perfectly obvious meaning - for example a “rum essence” is a condensed extract.

As for the essence of a chair, that’s a bit nonsensical to a Thomist. Chairs are entirely a human construct, a human artifact.

Don’t make me laugh. Especially since in the eyes of believers there is nothing “natural”, everything is an artifact created by God. But even if you speak of a dog, which is not an artifact, it can be used for many purposes, to win a medal at the dog show, or served as a meal in some cultures, or just a companion for people.

All you declared (though refused to admit) that the essence is a nonsensical term.

 

[Wesrock]

I deny that there is an intrinsic property that can be considered essence, without the intent of the user who wishes to use it for some specific purpose. The word “essence” has a perfectly obvious meaning - for example a “rum essence” is a condensed extract.

What is essential to being a triangle? What is non-essential? It would belong to the essence of a triangle to be a closed polygon with three straight sides. It would not belong to the essence of being a triangle to be written in blue pen, or be carved from wood. Both are inherent to a particular triangle, but you have a “property” that is essential and a “property” that isn’t.

What is essential to being a human being? You and I may disagree on that, and that’s okay for the present discussion. To me it would seem a human being is essentially a rational animal (whether that manifests as intelligence in all particulars is another matter). Now, feel free to have a different idea on what is essential to being a human being. But some things I wouldn’t consider essential are a particular hair or skin color, or a particular height, intelligence, and so on.

Thomists make some further distinction between essential, substantial, accidental, and relational attributes, but my only intent here is to point out that there can be properties intrinsic to a particular human being (or triangle) which are not essential to being a human being (or being a triangle).

 

[Wesrock]

Wesrock:

As for the essence of a chair, that’s a bit nonsensical to a Thomist. Chairs are entirely a human construct, a human artifact.

Don’t make me laugh. Especially since in the eyes of believers there is nothing “natural”, everything is an artifact created by God. But even if you speak of a dog, which is not an artifact, it can be used for many purposes, to win a medal at the dog show, or served as a meal in some cultures, or just a companion for people.

All you declared (though refused to admit) that the essence is a nonsensical term.

Ah, actually, interesting point. This is where most Thomists have a bone to pick with Paley’s intelligent design argument and intelligent design in general, because we see Paley as treating all things as artifacts, where Thomists do not. God doesn’t “design” essences. God can’t change the essence of water in the sense that what would be present afterwards is still water. It would be something that is essentially different than water.

As for a dog, I have no disagreement with the idea that humans can use dogs or other non-artifacts for their own purposes: that is, a purpose imposed by something else rather than inherent. But I would still see dogs having ends intrinsic to themselves, even if, just in general, we resort to considering that a dog is an animal and it’s an intrinsic end of animal life to generate progeny. There may be more intrinsic ends to a dog than that, but I’d argue that one, at least, proceeds from its nature (and not even imposed by God) while “winning a dog show” is an end imposed on it by something else. But this is quite a long aside.

 

[TechieGuy]

We have established that physical reality is unnecessary.

Of course physical reality is necessary - that’s where I keep all my stuff!

 

[Sophia]

What is essential to being a triangle?

The concept of “essence” is not applicable to axiomatically defined objects. Or to simple objects, like atoms, or molecules. “Purposes”, “ends” are human imposed categories, implying the existence of a conscious user. They do not exist in and of themselves.

What is essential to being a human being? You and I may disagree on that, and that’s okay for the present discussion. To me it would seem a human being is essentially a rational animal (whether that manifests as intelligence in all particulars is another matter).

I have no problem with that. But that would make a sapient animal (a mutant dolphin), or a well-designed AI, or a space alien also a “human”. Not to mention a mutant with a 3000 IQ, who is able to move at will between planetary systems. That is perfectly fine by me: “human is as human does”, regardless of the building material. Are you going to agree? That would be a huge step toward finding a common platform.

God can’t change the essence of water in the sense that what would be present afterwards is still water. It would be something that is essentially different than water.

What about “heavy water”? Or isotopes in general?

As for Paley’s watch, I also think that it is nonsensical. But how can you declare anything to be natural, and also assert that the world was created and that everything is exactly as God intended due to God’s omniscience and omnipotence? The idea of having a “natural and created object” is an oxymoron.

 

[Wesrock]

Wesrock:

What is essential to being a triangle?

The concept of “essence” is not applicable to axiomatically defined objects.

I disagree with abstract objects being entirely a subjective system, but that’s not important here. I did provide a physical example, and hope that it least clarifies how it could be used in a discussion of ontology, or even how discussions on ethics could follow.

Or to simple objects, like atoms, or molecules.

Disagree here, too.

“Purposes”, “ends” are human imposed categories, implying the existence of a conscious user. They do not exist in and of themselves.

I disagree also with them being human imposed, though they’d have to be discovered empirically, even if one couldn’t design an experimental test.

Wesrock:

What is essential to being a human being? You and I may disagree on that, and that’s okay for the present discussion. To me it would seem a human being is essentially a rational animal (whether that manifests as intelligence in all particulars is another matter).

I have no problem with that. But that would make a sapient animal (a mutant dolphin), or a well-designed AI, or a space alien also a “human”. Not to mention a mutant with a 3000 IQ, who is able to move at will between planetary systems. That is perfectly fine by me: “human is as human does”, regardless of the building material. Are you going to agree? That would be a huge step toward finding a common platform.

There isn’t sufficient reason to consider dolphins as rational animals, and I have reason to believe it would be impossible for an AI to qualify (that’d make a nice philosophy of the mind topic of discussion), but yes, an alien under this definition could essentially be a human being. Not as a biological species, there would be substantial and accidental differences, but they could have the same essence. But note these aren’t absolute commitments that any particular aliens are the same essentially, just that it can’t be excluded from possibility. Maybe we could learn more about ourselves and them if we ever actually encounter any. We’d need empirical data, basically.

Wesrock:

God can’t change the essence of water in the sense that what would be present afterwards is still water. It would be something that is essentially different than water.

What about “heavy water”? Or isotopes in general?

There are some nuances we may never observe, or some that require better technology. What it means to essentially be water may be very, very specific, or may have some range. But there is something to observe.

 

[Wesrock]

As for Paley’s watch, I also think that it is nonsensical. But how can you declare anything to be natural, and also assert that the world was created and that everything is exactly as God intended due to God’s omniscience and omnipotence? The idea of having a “natural and created object” is an oxymoron.

From a naturalist or anti-realist perspective, yes. Not so from a realist (philosophical, in regards to universals) perspective. But that requires a lot more discussion… I would like, at some point, to make a topic specifically to make a case for Realism over Anti-Realist philosophy. I’ve been toying with the idea since I made the “Argument From Motion” topic, but haven’t gotten to it, yet. If I ever do make it, that would be the place to discuss it.

This may be my last post for the night. Might make one or two more, but I’m looking to “clock out” of the computer. These discussions are a little too addicting and time consuming.

 

[Gorgias]

First thing: “propositions do not have objective, ontological existence”.

Never claimed anything about that. And, I think I’d claim that they have existence, but not being.

Second: “propositions cannot be separated from their encoding”.

You made the case that they could, when you talked about bases and such.

Third: “if there is no mutually accepted meaning, then the proposition is a meaningless jumble of symbols”.

No… in that case, the symbols or their ordering are meaningless. The proposition, as distinct from its various encodings, might not be.

Fourth: "there is no objective, intrinsic meaning of symbols and the words comprised of those symbols.

Talk to Plato and Cratylus. They might teach you a thing or two.

I could present a perfectly good proposition in a language that is unknown to you, and all you would see a meaningless mumbo-jumbo.

You realize you’re making my point, don’t you? The proposition itself would have meaning, even if the encoding is indecipherable to me (and therefore, perhaps, I don’t have access to that meaning).

You need a whole lot of study of linguistics before you can claim that you “clarified” anything…

Pot, meet kettle.

Gorgias did not understand the significance of my post, and neither did you.

Maybe because, as you put it, you’re speaking in a language known only to you (Sophiastry, perhaps?), and all we see is meaningless mumbo-jumbo.

 

[Sophia]

I disagree with abstract objects

Well, I deny the “reality” of abstract objects. Abstractions are fine, but the word “object” is inapplicable in this context. The word “object” designates an ontologically existing “entity”.

There isn’t sufficient reason to consider dolphins as rational animals, and I have reason to believe it would be impossible for an AI to qualify (that’d make a nice philosophy of the mind topic of discussion), but yes, an alien under this definition could essentially be a human being. Not as a biological species, there would be substantial and accidental differences, but they could have the same essence.

I cannot see any reason why a dolphin cannot undergo a bunch of successive (maybe artificially induced) mutations, at the end it would have “rationality”. As for an AI, the new development is getting very close to an AI, which will pass the Turing test. After all “what is intelligence”, or what is “rationality”? It is a behavior which can deal with complex problems. The building blocks of the “being” is irrelevant. What about a cyborg with a human head, supported by an artificial body.

In a thought experiment it is irrelevant that the proposed hypothetical scenario is plausible or not, the only thing that matters that it should be without logical contradiction.

Just contemplate a thought experiment, in which a “bona-fide” human being’s organs are systematically replaced by identically working prostheses. The result will be a “cyborg”, but there is no reason to assume that during the transplant process the “rationality” would disappear.

This bring up the really interesting question: “at what point does the imitation become undistinguishable from the original”? And does it make any sense to say: “this is the original and that is the replica” if there is no way to tell them apart…

Imagine a perfect copy machine, which scans an object (for example the Mona Lisa) reads each and every atom, and places an identical atom into its corresponding place in the “replica”. There is no way to test, which was the “original” and which is the “copy”. Now, we know that one of them was touched by the hands of Leonardo, but there is no test which could find out “which one was it”? As such the question: “which is the original” is a nonsensical question.

 

[Sophia]

Never claimed anything about that. And, I think I’d claim that they have existence, but not being.

You claim all sorts of things.

You made the case that they could, when you talked about bases and such.

This remark means that you don’t understand what I said. The meaning of “1+1=2” is contingent upon the meaning of the symbols.

No… in that case, the symbols or their ordering are meaningless. The proposition, as distinct from its various encodings, might not be.

The proposition cannot be separated from its presentation.

Talk to Plato and Cratylus. They might teach you a thing or two.

Or the other way round. Too bad Plato is dead and Cratylus is just an imaginary character.

You realize you’re making my point, don’t you? The proposition itself would have meaning, even if the encoding is indecipherable to me (and therefore, perhaps, I don’t have access to that meaning).

Except there is no objective meaning separate from the encoding and the proposition. As long as you don’t understand this, there is no reason to trying to educate you.

 

[Gorgias]

This remark means that you don’t understand what I said. The meaning of “1+1=2” is contingent upon the meaning of the symbols.

This remark means that you don’t understand the distinction between symbols and propositions. The meaning of “1+1=2” is constant. If you encode the proposition improperly (say, by writing “1+1=3”, then you haven’t changed the meaning of the proposition – you’ve written down a different proposition!

Or the other way round. Too bad Plato is dead and Cratylus is just an imaginary character.

Oddly, then, a dead man and an imaginary man have more insight in this area than some around here…

there is no reason to trying to educate you.

And yet, painfully, you persist.

 

[Sophia]

This remark means that you don’t understand the distinction between symbols and propositions. The meaning of “1+1=2” is constant. If you encode the proposition improperly (say, by writing “1+1=3”, then you haven’t changed the meaning of the proposition – you’ve written down a different proposition!

I never mentioned “1+1=3”… that is your own invention.

The meaning of the proposition “1+1=2” is not absolute. It depends on the meaning of the symbols of “1” and “+” and “=” and “2”. These are contingent on the environment we refer to. Regular algebra, Boolean algebra, the numbering system etc. I was hoping that you understood it the first time. I guess I was wrong.

Oddly, then, a dead man and an imaginary man have more insight in this area than some around here…

“Have” or “had” or “would have had”?
Actually an average teenager has a deeper understanding of reality than those characters. Sitting in a cave and observing the shadow on the wall?

Reality is what we can see, hear, touch, taste and smell - either directly, or through the extension of these senses. These are the only ways to gather information about the RAW reality. Of course we must process the RAW data, but that is a secondary problem here. And then we can extrapolate from what we learned, but that is a tertiary question.

And yet, painfully, you persist.

Yes, that is my fault. Mea maxima culpa. But it is hard to accept that a seemingly rational person (because you are way above the average poster around here) can turn so irrational when his basic beliefs are questioned. I will have to work on this fault of mine.

But, in the meantime ponder these propositions:

1 + 1 = 2
1 + 1 = 10
1 + 1 = 11
1 + 1 = 0
Almost forgot:
1 + 1 = 1

All of these can be true propositions - depending on the circumstances. Do you understand this? Write a short summary if you comprehended it. A few lines, just for the fun of it, to prove that you understand.

 

[Gorgias]

The meaning of the proposition “1+1=2” is not absolute. It depends on the meaning of the symbols of “1” and “+” and “=” and “2”. These are contingent on the environment we refer to. Regular algebra, Boolean algebra, the numbering system etc. I was hoping that you understood it the first time. I guess I was wrong.

Propositions in various contexts – even if they’re encoded in identical symbols (but signifying different things) – aren’t the same proposition. I was hoping that you understood it the first time. I guess I was wrong.

“Have” or “had” or “would have had”?

“Have”, given what I’ve seen out of “Sophiastry” lately…

But, in the meantime ponder these propositions:

1 + 1 = 2
1 + 1 = 10
1 + 1 = 11

These are identical – they’re a single proposition, expressed in various bases (the first is in any base > 2, the second is binary, the third is unary). It’s a single proposition, encoded three ways. The meaning isn’t in the encoding – it’s in the proposition!

1 + 1 = 0

This could be one of many propositions, depending on how you define the symbols. Still, they’d be distinct propositions, once we understood your encoding scheme.

Almost forgot:
1 + 1 = 1

Again, how do you define the symbols? Is this a simple ‘or’ equation? Without an understanding of the encoding, they’re not meaningless – just uninterpretable.

All of these can be true propositions

Yep.

Write a short summary if you comprehended it. A few lines, just for the fun of it, to prove that you understand.

OK: I understand that the way you say things – or, perhaps, the way you read what others write – has some serious disconnects with the way others do.

There. How’s that for a summary?

 

[Sophia]

These are identical – they’re a single proposition, expressed in various bases (the first is in any base > 2, the second is binary, the third is unary). It’s a single proposition, encoded three ways. The meaning isn’t in the encoding – it’s in the proposition!

Yes, but you have to understand that the meaning is the same, expressed in different forms of encoding.

This could be one of many propositions, depending on how you define the symbols. Still, they’d be distinct propositions, once we understood your encoding scheme.

The “+” sign describes a Boolean XOR. Again, the encoding designates a different operator.

Again, how do you define the symbols? Is this a simple ‘or’ equation? Without an understanding of the encoding, they’re not meaningless – just uninterpretable.

The “+” sign is a Boolean OR operation. That was the whole point. The meaning of the proposition is contingent upon the meaning of the “symbols”. And the meaning of the operator is NOT intrinsic, we have to agree upon what we mean by the symbol “+”.

In your previous post you said:

The meaning of “1+1=2” is constant.

Now you realize that it is contingent upon the meaning of the symbols. And the “meaning” is not intrinsic. Well done, good job. These kinds of posts give hope, that maybe we can have a meaningful conversation. (When you deny that every prayer is an informal test of God, my hope is diminishing.)

 

[Gorgias]

That was the whole point. The meaning of the proposition is contingent upon the meaning of the “symbols”.

You’ve got it backwards, I’m afraid. The proposition isn’t the encoding. The proposition is the proposition. You may choose an encoding, and the encoding is what a person reads and decodes – and hopefully, in decoding it, he understands what the encoding was intended to portray – but the proposition stands on its own.

Now you realize that it is contingent upon the meaning of the symbols. And the “meaning” is not intrinsic. Well done, good job.

Again, backwards. The proposition doesn’t depend on the symbols.

(When you deny that every prayer is an informal test of God, my hope is diminishing.)

Maybe you could pray to God for more hope. Without demanding it, that is, and thereby testing Him.

 

[Sophia]

You’ve got it backwards, I’m afraid. The proposition isn’t the encoding. The proposition is the proposition. You may choose an encoding, and the encoding is what a person reads and decodes – and hopefully, in decoding it, he understands what the encoding was intended to portray – but the proposition stands on its own.

I guess, finally I can see where the problem lies. You say that there is a “proposition” without any symbols, without any encoding. Maybe you believe in the existence of some “abstract objects”, like the Platonic monads? But that is nonsense. How could you convey your proposition without any language and encoding? How could I understand what your proposition is without telling me - using some language and encoding?

There is no proposition without the symbols. A proposition is simply a SENTENCE in some language. There are no propositions in some “empty space”. I wonder, just WHAT is the meaning of the word PROPOSITION in your vocabulary?

You said: “The proposition is the proposition”. If that is not a meaningless tautology, I don’t know what is?

Again, backwards. The proposition doesn’t depend on the symbols.

You misunderstand. I said that the MEANING of the proposition is contingent upon the MEANING of the symbols.

Maybe you could pray to God for more hope. Without demanding it, that is, and thereby testing Him.

Oh, I did. I even added “if it be thy will”. Nothing happened, and I predict that nothing will ever happen. I am willing to bet my “salvation” on it. And asking IS testing, even if one does not designate it (or intend it) as “testing”. This is called “informal” testing.

 

[Gorgias]

You say that there is a “proposition” without any symbols, without any encoding.

Does the proposition only exist once it is encoded? Does it not exist in the mind of the person doing the encoding?

What about when it’s encoded in multiple, various forms? Does it exist doubly or triply then?

But that is nonsense. How could you convey your proposition without any language and encoding?

You’re not asking a question of conveyance, however, but rather, of existence. Something that doesn’t exist cannot be conveyed.

You misunderstand. I said that the MEANING of the proposition is contingent upon the MEANING of the symbols.

No, that’s backward. The meaning of the proposition is a thing unto itself. The meaning of the symbols – if encoded properly – conveys the meaning of the proposition. (If the encoding is inaccurate, then a different proposition has been encoded!)

Oh, I did. I even added “if it be thy will”. Nothing happened

That’s an answer unto itself. Ask Geddy Lee about ‘decisions’ and ‘choices’…

 

[Sophia]

Does the proposition only exist once it is encoded? Does it not exist in the mind of the person doing the encoding?

You are talking about “thoughts”, in the mind of someone. Thoughts are not necessarily “propositions”. If a thought is meaningful for the one who thinks it, then it can be uttered in a sentence, and THEN it becomes a proposition. It is important to differentiate between thoughts and propositions. No woman would be in the position to accept or reject a “marriage proposition” if the guy just “thinks it”.

You’re not asking a question of conveyance, however, but rather, of existence. Something that doesn’t exist cannot be conveyed.

The aim of languages is to have information exchange. The thoughts are TRANSLATED into linguistic symbols and presented as SENTENCES - thereby becoming PROPOSITIONS.

The meaning of the proposition is a thing unto itself.

That is a meaningless proposition - for me. Maybe it is meaningful for you, but then your encoding does not reveal the meaning. Are you talking about Platonic monads?

That’s an answer unto itself. Ask Geddy Lee about ‘decisions’ and ‘choices’…

I have no idea what or whom are you talking about. Your proposition has no meaning for me.

My proposition is and was that every supplicative prayer is an informal testing of God. Of course you can use the same technique for someone else, too. You can ask someone to perform some act on your behalf, and she may or may not perform it. If you keep asking again and again (the same or a different plea) and nothing ever happens then the only rational conclusion that the person either does not hear you, or does not care about you… or maybe you just talk into “nothingness” - and there is no one out there… This last option is the rational one, IF the other party never even responds - in a linguistic fashion…

By the way, silence is not an “answer”. It is the “lack of an answer”. I see that many believers have problem with simple linguistic constructs, especially when it comes to “nonexistence”. They believe that “atheism” is a religion, and consequently that “baldness is a hairstyle”. Makes communication very difficult.