Abortion Argument

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In a recent debate I had with someone who is pro-choice, we were on the discussion point of personhood. I asked whether someone who is in a coma could be killed since at the present moment, they are not able to function as persons. Their response was that someone in a coma may not be able to immediately exercise their “personhood” since they are in a coma, but their brains have the capacity to do so, which grants them the right to life. This is different from a fetus/embryo/zygote who does not have a brain and therefore, doesn’t even have the capacity for personhood, which allows it to be killed. Any thoughts?
 
A fetus as a member of the human species has the inherent capacity to form a brain and the capacity to express personhood

Properly defined personhood is not defined by development within a species but by membership in the human species. Personhood does not depend on skill, intelligence level or size

A fetus has the 7 signs of life thus is a person
 
SNOM,

I’m not quite sure what you missed, but it appears that your posts are entirely out of context. This thread is not about abortion or the personhood of an embryo, it is about the personhood of a person in a coma…
 
I think there is an important point that needs to be considered here. There is a categorical difference between scientific fact and philosophical argument. For instance, it is a scientific fact that the transition to rudimentary consciousness, and then more complex consciousness, occurs during the second trimester in most fetuses. Categorically, it is not a scientific fact, in the sense that it can be empirically measured, that personhood begins either before, during, or after this stage. Although I generally accept the statement that “human life begins at conception,” this assertion is grounded primarily in metaphysics; science probably cannot further inform one’s position on this particular problem.

I do accept the metaphysical view that conception represents the most natural point to delimit the start of a human life, although there are philosophical objections to this view. (Thomas Aquinas, for one, argued that human life does not begin until the fetus has a human soul–sometime during the second trimester, in his estimation. Incidentally, neurobiology has shown that this is the same period during which the gradual transition to consciousness begins. It seems that regardless of one’s opinion of Aquinas’ argument, the argument itself was based on reasonably accurate biological observations).

So the problem we run into here is a philosophical problem, not a factual problem. It is a fact that the genetic blueprint of the individual comes together (50% from each parent) shortly after conception. It is a fact that many zygotes spontaneously abort soon after conception. It is a fact that the infrastructure necessary for a transition to rudimentary consciousness does not develop until the second trimester. It is a fact that a full-term fetus has sophisticated neurobiology and a considerable degree of consciousness. It is a fact that humans share by descent many of the same biological pathways to development as other mammals, and indeed, non-mammal organisms. It is a fact that the human fetus has, on average, a greater capacity for subsequent intellectual development than any other organisms on Earth. These are all facts that a scientifically informed individual should have no problem accepting (more or less, although one could perhaps quibble on some minor details). The philosophical problem we are confronted with is the question, “What do these facts mean, fundamentally, about the nature of human life?” Unfortunately, although we are not entitled to our own facts, those facts necessarily must be interpreted through one’s own metaphysical filter.

In the end, I think the problem is one of differing philosophy, not differing fact. Unfortunately, few on either side of the debate will consider this true problem underlying the debate. I think more pro-choice folks should concede that a genetically unique individual truly is created shortly after conception. Likewise, more pro-life folks should accept that neural development sufficient for rudimentary consciousness does not take place till the second trimester. But abortion is more a theological debate than a biological debate, anyways. The Catholic who is sincere about taking the Catholic position on the issue needs to look to the church for guidance, not to the biological sciences. On the basis of facts alone, the biology argument is an un-winnable argument for either side. Those in the best position to use biological data for successful arguments are those folks who would like to see a compromise (i.e., abortions generally only in the first trimester except when the woman’s life is in danger).
 
SNOM,

I’m not quite sure what you missed, but it appears that your posts are entirely out of context. This thread is not about abortion or the personhood of an embryo, it is about the personhood of a person in a coma…
Take back what I said. I reread the thing. :rolleyes: I don’t know WHAT thread I was reading before… :o

Self-kick in the rear. :manvspc::banghead::banghead::banghead:
 
So do mentally handicapped or insane people have less (if any) right to life than an ordinary person? Try to get them to admit that.
 
SNOM,

I’m not quite sure what you missed, but it appears that your posts are entirely out of context. This thread is not about abortion or the personhood of an embryo, it is about the personhood of a person in a coma…
Then why is the thread titled Abortion Argument":confused:
 
Oh, I see the confusion about the post. I though the scenario as described was meant to pose a question about the fact that although we all agree that killing a person in a coma is wrong, what about killing a fetus without developed consciousness? This is an interesting philosophical problem you have suggested.

The biggest difference between someone in a (potentially reversible) coma and a fetus without a developed consciousness is that the person in the coma has a fully developed brain, with all the parts necessary for consciousness and the electrical activity indicative of some uncertain degree of consciousness. One could argue that the important distinction here is between a fetus as a consciousness-free biological entity (i.e., not a conscious being), and a conscious-imbued biological entity (i.e., a conscious being). Since we know the coma patient has the potential for consciousness, and we don’t know what level of consciousness is actually present, we might be inclined to consider the coma patient a conscious being, despite our inability to communicate with him or her. I suppose the same logic that applies in the case of a sleeping person should be applied in the case of a comatose person.

If the person in the coma shows an absence of the necessary functionality required for consciousness, the decision often is made to allow the person to die. It is true that the person is “alive” (in the biological sense that the cells of the body are functioning), but it is not true that the person is a conscious being. Regarding abortion, some pro-choice folks might be inclined to take the view that one needs to have been a conscious being to have a universal right to life. Pro-life folks generally will take the view that one needs not ever have been a conscious being to have a universal right to life. This might be an essential difference between most pro-life people and most pro-choice people, and it is a difference that can not be solved by additional facts so much as philosophical agreement.
 
So do mentally handicapped or insane people have less (if any) right to life than an ordinary person? Try to get them to admit that.
I think pro-choice folks would say the same universal right to life would necessarily apply to mentally disabled or insane people. Again, they are conscious beings, so ‘personhood’ is still fully realized in them. I suspect the primary argument is that anyone whose development of consciousness is sufficient for awareness of one’s existence gets the right to life now and until death, regardless of the details that follow. This would include details like loss of sanity, loss of mental capacities, coma, etc. A person committed to this position has a hard time justifying abortion after the first trimester, as the second trimester is the timeframe in which consciousness begins to develop. So someone whose pro-choice views rest on this philosophy must not advocate for late-term abortion or anything approaching it. Whether each of us agrees with this standpoint, it seems to be nonetheless a self-consistent philosophy.

Where inconsistency comes into the picture is with those (admittedly uncommon) pro-choice individuals who advocate for the ability to terminate pregnancy up until the moment of natural delivery. I think such people are philosophically inconsistent, because the ‘conscious being’ criterion is violated, leaving no discernible basis for discriminating against the fetus. I guess then the person falls back to the old ‘dependent on the mother for life’ (i.e. ‘parasite’) argument, which is of course an unreasonable justification for abortion. Naturally, infants that are born are also dependent on the mother for life, so this argument quickly escalates out of control. And the same goes for coma patients, who are dependent on medical intervention for survival.
 
Oh, I see the confusion about the post. I though the scenario as described was meant to pose a question about the fact that although we all agree that killing a person in a coma is wrong, what about killing a fetus without developed consciousness? This is an interesting philosophical problem you have suggested.

The biggest difference between someone in a (potentially reversible) coma and a fetus without a developed consciousness is that the person in the coma has a fully developed brain, with all the parts necessary for consciousness and the electrical activity indicative of some uncertain degree of consciousness. One could argue that the important distinction here is between a fetus as a consciousness-free biological entity (i.e., not a conscious being), and a conscious-imbued biological entity (i.e., a conscious being). Since we know the coma patient has the potential for consciousness, and we don’t know what level of consciousness is actually present, we might be inclined to consider the coma patient a conscious being, despite our inability to communicate with him or her. I suppose the same logic that applies in the case of a sleeping person should be applied in the case of a comatose person.

If the person in the coma shows an absence of the necessary functionality required for consciousness, the decision often is made to allow the person to die. It is true that the person is “alive” (in the biological sense that the cells of the body are functioning), but it is not true that the person is a conscious being. Regarding abortion, some pro-choice folks might be inclined to take the view that one needs to have been a conscious being to have a universal right to life. Pro-life folks generally will take the view that one needs not ever have been a conscious being to have a universal right to life. This might be an essential difference between most pro-life people and most pro-choice people, and it is a difference that can not be solved by additional facts so much as philosophical agreement.
Yeah, you pretty much hit the nail on the head with this one. Sorry if I wasn’t clear.
 
Just because the brain belongs to a baby doesn’t mean that the brain doesn’t exist.

We don’t let our young kids make adult decisions, specifically because they are immature and don’t really understand the consequences of their actions.

However, they still have brains that are learning and growing into maturity.

Being in a coma is the result of a brain injury - which means that the brain is impaired in someway which is forcing the rest of their body not to function.

So, following this person’s logic, it’s okay for someone who’s brain isn’t working well enough for the rest of the body to function is somehow more of a person than the fetus, whose brain is tiny and immature, but functioning properly. Huh?

Either you are a person or you aren’t.

Even a fully functional person only utilizes only 10% of their entire brain capacity. Scientists don’t know much about the other 90%, except that it exists. So, does that mean that we shouldn’t exist, even though we only utilize 10% of our brain power? Of course not!

A lot of this is more about morals/ideology than actual science. We all know how humans are created.
 
In a recent debate I had with someone who is pro-choice, we were on the discussion point of personhood. I asked whether someone who is in a coma could be killed since at the present moment, they are not able to function as persons. Their response was that someone in a coma may not be able to immediately exercise their “personhood” since they are in a coma, but their brains have the capacity to do so, which grants them the right to life. This is different from a fetus/embryo/zygote who does not have a brain and therefore, doesn’t even have the capacity for personhood, which allows it to be killed. Any thoughts?
Science and the various laws concerning the protection of endangered species across the world disagree. Back when the Bald Eagle was on the list you would have faced the same punishment for intentionally destroying a Bald Eagle egg as you would for intentionally killing an adult Bald Eagle. Under your friend’s argument I should be able to destroy any eggs or embryos of protected species without any worry about being punished since they aren’t “persons” of that species and therefore aren’t protected by law.

You could also argue that the law to a degree also disagrees. In some areas a person can be charged with two murders if he or she murders a pregnant woman (you can’t be charged for murdering a non-person) and you can draw up a will leaving stuff to an unborn child (who would have legal standing if the will is contested prior to their birth).
 
In a recent debate I had with someone who is pro-choice, we were on the discussion point of** personhood**. I asked whether someone who is in a coma could be killed since at the present moment, they are not able to function as persons. Their response was that someone in a coma may not be able to immediately exercise their “personhood” since they are in a coma, but their brains have the capacity to do so, which grants them the right to life. This is different from a fetus/embryo/zygote who does not have a brain and therefore, doesn’t even have the capacity for personhood, which allows it to be killed. Any thoughts?
Moral relativism strikes again. The argument regarding abortion was never about personhood, it’s about life. Although now they are trying to use “personhood” as their excuse since life beginning at conception is undoubtedly the scientific beginning of life and they know this very well.
 
Moral relativism strikes again. The argument regarding abortion was never about personhood, it’s about life. Although now they are trying to use “personhood” as their excuse since life beginning at conception is undoubtedly the scientific beginning of life and they know this very well.
Well said,you nailed it!👍
 
In a recent debate I had with someone who is pro-choice, we were on the discussion point of personhood. I asked whether someone who is in a coma could be killed since at the present moment, they are not able to function as persons. Their response was that someone in a coma may not be able to immediately exercise their “personhood” since they are in a coma, but their brains have the capacity to do so, which grants them the right to life. This is different **from a fetus/embryo/zygote who does not have a brain **and therefore, doesn’t even have the capacity for personhood, which allows it to be killed. Any thoughts?
The human brain begins to develop when the human embryo is around 6-7 weeks. Does your friend seriously wish to define “personhood” based on the size and age of a human’s brain?
 
Moral relativism strikes again. The argument regarding abortion was never about personhood, it’s about life. Although now they are trying to use “personhood” as their excuse since life beginning at conception is undoubtedly the scientific beginning of life and they know this very well.
There are a couple points of confusion common in this type of debate that I think merit clearing up. A common rhetorical tactic in discussions is to dismiss all who disagree with one’s own view as uniformly extreme in their views, despite the heterogeneity of viewpoints inherent in any complex debate. Another is to dismiss all who have different moral values as moral relativists, when this usually is not the case.

You are right that, unfortunately, there are pro-choice people out there who insist biological life does not begin at conception. This seems to me a difficult argument for such individuals to defend, and it certainly reduces the credibility of the pro-choice movement overall. And it may be true that some pro-choice folks who use the word ‘life’ in the context of the abortion debate really do mean the biological textbook definition of life… However, I think it’s also clear the argument most pro-choice folks make has always been about personhood. And I think personhood generally has been meant to refer to the point at which one has moral obligations toward the developing life. But I do agree with you that anyone who says biological life doesn’t begin at conception (or shortly after) is making a losing argument. 🙂

Regarding moral relativism, I think it is not necessarily (and usually not even likely) to be a factor in this debate. Moral relativism is the view that absolute moral obligations do not exist and that cultures and individuals around the world can all be “moral” despite having different moral standards. Here, the debate isn’t about whether there are or aren’t objective moral obligations–rather, the debate is about what moral obligations we actually have to zygotes/fetuses at various stages of development. This debate is coherent even when those on either side (or anywhere in between) are all moral absolutists. In fact, one could hold the most reprehensible views imaginable and be a moral absolutist (and vice-versa, for that matter). I just think it’s important to caution against applying the label ‘moral relativism’ against those with whom you disagree. You are certainly free to feel they are morally wrong in this case, but believing them to be moral relativists is probably factually incorrect in most instances 🙂
 
The human brain begins to develop when the human embryo is around 6-7 weeks. Does your friend seriously wish to define “personhood” based on the size and age of a human’s brain?
I may be mistaken, but I think the original poster’s friend is NOT advancing the argument that ‘personhood’ is based on the size and age of a human’s brain. Rather, he or she is advancing the argument that personhood is based on the biological capacity for consciousness, with the supposition that we do not have moral obligations to things that have never been conscious.

Presumably (although I’m not sure… it would be interesting to ask the friend this question) if a fetus with 6-7 week neurological development had the same consciousness as a newborn infant, the friend would not advocate for abortion using the ‘personhood’ argument. He or she would be required to accept either that abortion at this early stage is morally disallowed, or he or she would need some other fantastic argument in favor of abortion here (but I’m sure such arguments are difficult to find if the fetus is conscious!). Someone who would argue that the size/age of the brain is the primary criterion is inherently unreasonable; it is the degree of consciousness (or unconsciousness) that goes along with that size/age/structure of the developing brain that should form the basis for the ‘personhood’ argument, regardless of whether you accept it as valid.

An example: if an adult human is in a terrible accident, and some parts of the brain die (e.g., by trauma or infection), by what criterion do we apply the personhood argument to determine the most appropriate course of action? I think we would not look at the age of the brain or the size of the remaining tissue so much as whether the parts of the brain necessary for consciousness are living. Whether such portions persist is a generally straightforward scientific question, as this question has been well-studied by biologists. If the doctors know that consciousness is not possible based on the surviving brain tissue, the decision likely is made to withdraw life support. Is this morally acceptable? After all, the individual depends upon the life support for biological survival, but what moral obligations do we have to a being without the capacity for consciousness? The question of what to do with such information in the case of the accident victim is similar to the question of what moral obligations we have to a fetus that has never known consciousness. My analogy unfortunately breaks down in some important ways, but I think it’s a fairly reasonable illustration of why the argument isn’t about brain size/age.
 
Science and the various laws concerning the protection of endangered species across the world disagree. Back when the Bald Eagle was on the list you would have faced the same punishment for intentionally destroying a Bald Eagle egg as you would for intentionally killing an adult Bald Eagle. Under your friend’s argument I should be able to destroy any eggs or embryos of protected species without any worry about being punished since they aren’t “persons” of that species and therefore aren’t protected by law.

You could also argue that the law to a degree also disagrees. In some areas a person can be charged with two murders if he or she murders a pregnant woman (you can’t be charged for murdering a non-person) and you can draw up a will leaving stuff to an unborn child (who would have legal standing if the will is contested prior to their birth).
The endangered species question is an interesting one to pose to pro-choice folks out there! I think the only coherent argument that a pro-choice individual can make here is to agree that we as humans don’t have a moral obligation to the unconscious egg/zygote/fetus of an animal, since it has never known consciousness. Rather, the argument about moral obligation would need to be directed toward one (or more) of the following entities:
  1. the living/conscious organisms of the species that invest the time/energy to produce the offspring
  2. the species, as an intrinsic component of the natural world, is something bigger than the individual and is worth preserving for its intrinsic worth, or perhaps because the survival or destruction of an entire species creates effects that cascade throughout the broader ecosystem?
  3. the human beings who inhabit the earth and should not be deprived of the opportunity to experience the wonder of such a species; I guess here the question is whether anyone could have the moral authority to intentionally destroy components of our natural world that cannot be easily replaced?
In the context of the ‘personhood’ argument, I think assertion #3 would hold the most merit to the most people, as we generally accept that we have moral obligations to other people. This logic behind assertion #3 holds merit if the logic behind the following argument holds merit: “Nobody has the moral authority to destroy the Shroud of Turin, because it is wrong to deprive other living humans of the opportunity to experience the wonder of such a relic.”

Personally, I also find some merit in assertion #2, but none in assertion #1.
 
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