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gerryconnor
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Sorry, I don’t follow your logic. Could you explain?
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Gorgias
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We need to be a bit more precise with our terminology, then, because the situations are not equivalent: ‘aggression’ implies intent (whether imputable or not), whereas ‘threat’ does not imply any intent, regardless of imputability. One can easily make a ‘self-defense’ case for moral action against an aggressor; one cannot as easily make a morally acceptable case for action against a non-aggressor threat…
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gerryconnor
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I don’t agree that “‘aggression’ implies intent”. Cancer can be aggressive, but it has no intent.We need to be a bit more precise with our terminology, then, because the situations are not equivalent: ‘aggression’ implies intent (whether imputable or not), whereas ‘threat’ does not imply any intent, regardless of imputability. One can easily make a ‘self-defense’ case for moral action against an aggressor; one cannot as easily make a morally acceptable case for action against a non-aggressor threat…
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Gorgias
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OK… but you’re using the word ‘aggression’ in a way that moral theologians do not use it. ‘Aggressive’, in this (medical) context, means something different: it speaks to the speed of the cancer and its damage-causing potential. In a moral context, which is our context here, it speaks to something different.
I appreciate that ‘aggression’ is an appropriate term in medical parlance, but it’s not equivalent in the context of moral theology. That’s why I’ve suggested that we be more precise in our terminology.
Now – if you want to propose a term that means ‘potential for fast and deeply-damaging effects’, that’s fine. But that term will have a distinct meaning that’s different from the meaning of ‘aggressor’ in the realm of moral theology. (And therefore, it won’t help the argument that you’re trying to make, even though you’re attempting to make the argument in good faith.)
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gardenswithkids
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The word “termination” means ended, and I wrote that in response to a comment you made about pregnancy in the third trimester. Healthy pregnancies typically terminate with live birth at the end of the third trimester. But in the case of maternal health problems, by the time the woman is in her third trimester, the child is viable and may be able to survive outside the womb.
I point out a woman who died during an abortion and you tell me you don’t think it’s relavant. Yet you continue to point out the case of Savita Halappanavar, as if you’re sure she would have survived if only she’d had an abortion. Last I read, the medical records showed no request for an abortion, her husband was not cooperative with the investigation into her death and the investigation had not yet come to any conclusions. Here’s a story where the original reporter, Holland, who first broke the story later wrote in the Observer the disclaimer, “The fact that Savita had been refused a termination was a factor in her death has yet to be established”. lifesitenews.com/news/breaking-reporter-who-broke-savita-story-there-may-have-been-no-request-for Her sad story is a case that went viral by people who push for legalized abortion–but those same reporters and news agencies seem to conveniently ignore any story of women who die during abortions. By the way, had you even heard of the death of that lovely 29 yo kindergarten teacher during a 33 week abortion before I shared it with you? How about the Gosnell murder trial? Have you heard anything about the death of Karnamaya Mongar during an abortion from an overdose of sedatives and narcotics administered by untrained staff at a filthy abortion clinic in Philadelphia? Her murder trial is going on right now and the media is virtually silent on it.
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Reverie
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Reverie
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Toxoplasmosis originates in an infected mother and is passed to the child. There are medicines that can treat the mother and the baby in the womb. Again, aborting the child only kills the child, it does not cure the mother.
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gerryconnor
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You make an important point that “in the case of maternal health problems, by the time the woman is in her third trimester, the child is viable and may be able to survive outside the womb.” That has the effect of making abortion (‘expedited delivery’/’termination’ etc) easier to justify in late stage pregnancy since fetal death is no longer certain.
I use Savita Halappanavar as an example for the purpose of examining the issue of abortion to save a mother’s life just as you use the example of the woman who died in an abortion as an example to illustrate the dangers of abortion. Both examples are legitimate and, as you point out, are open to reinterpretation based on new evidence that may arise. I acknowledge that the specifics of any given case may change and make what seemed an appropriate example become an inappropriate one. We could use purely hypothetical examples instead. Here I’m interested in discussing the possibility of using Double Effect to justify abortion to save a mother’s life. I find the Doctrine of Double Effect implausible, but I’m interested in what appears to me to be a failure by traditional moralists who accept the Doctrine to apply it consistently.
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gerryconnor
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Yes, toxoplasmosis infection is passed from the mother to the fetus. Most fetal infections originate in the mother, but once they spread to the fetus medical difficulties are exacerbated and the risk to the mother increases. In the case of Savita Halappanavar sepsis led to septicemia and then to her death.
That’s why a women’s obstetrician is constantly monitoring the health of both of the pregnant women and her fetus for any signs or symptoms that might indicate sepsis. If sepsis occurs and septicemia follows, the continued presence of the fetus and placenta significantly increase the risk to the mother. In such cases, an expedited delivery provides the best chance of saving the mother’s life. An “unintended consequence” (to use “double effect speak”) of that delivery is the death of the fetus. In other words, expedited delivery (‘abortion’) can be justified using Double Effect since the intention is to save the mother and the death of the fetus is a foreseen but unintended consequence.
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gerryconnor
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I don’t see the relevance of “moral theologians’” use of the word “aggressive” to my point that an insane attacker represents an equally lethal and equally innocent threat to life as the continued presence of a fetus and the placenta in a women with septicemia. You may be right that moral theologians have failed to recognize those parallels, but that is their failing, not mine.OK… but you’re using the word ‘aggression’ in a way that moral theologians do not use it. ‘Aggressive’, in this (medical) context, means something different: it speaks to the speed of the cancer and its damage-causing potential. In a moral context, which is our context here, it speaks to something different.
I appreciate that ‘aggression’ is an appropriate term in medical parlance, but it’s not equivalent in the context of moral theology. That’s why I’ve suggested that we be more precise in our terminology.
Now – if you want to propose a term that means ‘potential for fast and deeply-damaging effects’, that’s fine. But that term will have a distinct meaning that’s different from the meaning of ‘aggressor’ in the realm of moral theology. (And therefore, it won’t help the argument that you’re trying to make, even though you’re attempting to make the argument in good faith.)
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gerryconnor
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On this we are in complete agreement. I’ve not suggested either point.
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GodHeals
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Discussion with a friend, please help me better explain to my friend…
I told him the Double Effect is rare, but what my friend and I are talking about with the mother dying is probably even rarer. He said, “danger to mother’s life during pregnancy is not rare in developed countries & very common in the 3rd world.”
Not sure what medical situations those would be.
What my friend is saying is that the mother’s life always is before the child (for his priority reasons). I said to him the double effect would solve most problems. What medical situation falls outside of the DOUBLE EFFECT that would be a moral injustice due to abortion of the baby where the mother couldn’t be saved unless the baby was aborted? I am trying to explain the double effect to my friend and that seems to me at least, to make sense.
My friend and I have been arguing the following scenario. My friend was comparing me holding the hands of a friend and family member and if i choose to let one go, the other would die, to choosing the mother over choosing the life of the unborn child. I said…
“Choosing” (to let go of my friend’s hand) in the sense that you are using the word doesn’t mean choosing murder, it means lacking the ability to save my friend. With regards to the unborn child, I would need to do something to be guilty of murder, that is choose to physically end the life of the innocent unborn child. If I have chosen to do nothing, the child would possibly live and the mother may naturally die.
Is there a medical situation like the above mentioned that falls outside the double effect where the mother would or most likely would die if nothing is done to save her, but the child would live?
I told him the Double Effect is rare, but what my friend and I are talking about with the mother dying is probably even rarer. He said, “danger to mother’s life during pregnancy is not rare in developed countries & very common in the 3rd world.”
Not sure what medical situations those would be.
What my friend is saying is that the mother’s life always is before the child (for his priority reasons). I said to him the double effect would solve most problems. What medical situation falls outside of the DOUBLE EFFECT that would be a moral injustice due to abortion of the baby where the mother couldn’t be saved unless the baby was aborted? I am trying to explain the double effect to my friend and that seems to me at least, to make sense.
My friend and I have been arguing the following scenario. My friend was comparing me holding the hands of a friend and family member and if i choose to let one go, the other would die, to choosing the mother over choosing the life of the unborn child. I said…
“Choosing” (to let go of my friend’s hand) in the sense that you are using the word doesn’t mean choosing murder, it means lacking the ability to save my friend. With regards to the unborn child, I would need to do something to be guilty of murder, that is choose to physically end the life of the innocent unborn child. If I have chosen to do nothing, the child would possibly live and the mother may naturally die.
Is there a medical situation like the above mentioned that falls outside the double effect where the mother would or most likely would die if nothing is done to save her, but the child would live?
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Reverie
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I think the flaw in this scenario is that neither the friend nor family member’s life is sustained by holding your hand. Letting go of their hand isn’t what would kill them.
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Gorgias
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Hmm… I would disagree; the failure here, I think, is the lack of distinction between a threat to life that’s based on ‘aggression’ (as you’ve noted) and one that’s based on simple ‘presence’ (as you’ve also noted). Given that you’ve identified the salient point (aggression vs simple presence), I’m surprised that you’re not seeing that the ‘parallel’ you assert isn’t parallel at all!
Let’s look at it another way: the means by which to stop an armed aggressor is thwart the action that he’s about to take. Tell me, please: what action is a fetus taking, in the case of impending maternal septicemia? (This difference – action vs inaction, is why the ‘parallel’ fails in your example…
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Gorgias
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No, it cannot be justified under double effect. Although your appeal to the notion of ‘intention’ fits double effect, you’re ignoring two important criteria: first, the nature of the act must be either morally good or amoral (it cannot be morally evil); abortion is inherently evil, since it’s the direct taking of innocent life. Second, the bad effect must not be the means by which the good effect is achieved. In the case of a woman with uterine cancer, the death of the child isn’t what resolves her medical condition; rather, the removal of the cancerous uterus is what resolves her condition. In your case, however, the ‘expedited delivery’ is precisely the means by which the good effect (saving the mother’s life) occurs. Therefore, it cannot be justified under the principle of double effect.
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Reverie
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In Savita’s case, once her baby had died it was removed (aborted) from her womb. Savita died three days later.
I can’t make the jump in logic that an infection already present in the mother will go away by removal of her unborn child and placenta. I can see maybe that you are saying a fetus adds an added strain on a pregnant woman’s body because it does take extra energy from the mother to support the life in her womb. But where does that argument end? A woman assumes a natural “risk to life” whenever she is pregnant. Her blood pressure can go up. Should her baby be killed in the womb because she might have a heart attack? A heart attack risk is a risk to life after all. Is it okay for doctors to pressure obese mothers to abort because the added strain on their bodies is a risk to their life? But you might say, “these instances aren’t imminent or emergencies”. The fact is, doctors and practitioners are already pressuring woman to abort their unborn babies for these reasons.
I think we are going to have to agree to disagree on terminating the life of a fetus is a reasonable cure for infections and cancer. (I shouldn’t say cure. I think I know what you mean, I just don’t know how to phrase it. Perhaps a reasonable alleviation to symptoms of a disease to increase the chance at restoring the health of the mother.)
I still don’t think this falls under double effect.
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gerryconnor
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Your first point illustrates the implausibility of the Doctrine of Double Effect which runs counter to many people’s intuitions including my own. Superficially, what you say makes good sense. Killing, it seems, is wrong and so can’t pass the first condition of Double Effect that an action must, at worst, be morally neutral. But consider Aquinas arguing for the right to kill in self defence. He wrote “the act of self-defence can have a double effect: the preservation of one’s own life, and the killing of the aggressor…. The one is intended, the other is not.” Either Aquinas fails at the first hurdle of Double Effect, because the act of killing is evil, or he succeeds because killing, in itself, is not evil. It would be ironic if the moral theologian credited with introducing the Doctrine of Double Effect failed at the first step.
Your second point, that the evil effect must not be the means to the good effect illustrates further implausibility for the Doctrine of Double Effect. Once again, consider self-defence. Is the killing of an aggressor the means to saving one’s life? If it is, then Aquinas fails again. How might he escape a second failure? One strategy would be to argue (once again implausibly) that the death of the aggressor is the foreseen but unintended side-effect of forcing one’s hand forward while holding the knife until it plunges deep into the aggressor’s heart. The action is the movement of a knife - morally neutral in itself - but the effect (unintended of course!) is deadly. In the same way, pulling the trigger of a gun is morally neutral. It’s not bad ‘in itself’.
In the same way the act of removing the placenta and fetus from the womb is morally neutral. Cesarean sections are routine. Sometimes the effect may be deadly, but if that deadly effect is unintended Double Effect gives you a ‘get out of jail free’ card!
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gerryconnor
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The difference between action vs inaction is often used, with doubtful effect, in debates about end of life care, but it’s not relevant here.Hmm… I would disagree; the failure here, I think, is the lack of distinction between a threat to life that’s based on ‘aggression’ (as you’ve noted) and one that’s based on simple ‘presence’ (as you’ve also noted). Given that you’ve identified the salient point (aggression vs simple presence), I’m surprised that you’re not seeing that the ‘parallel’ you assert isn’t parallel at all!
Let’s look at it another way: the means by which to stop an armed aggressor is thwart the action that he’s about to take. Tell me, please: what action is a fetus taking, in the case of impending maternal septicemia? (This difference – action vs inaction, is why the ‘parallel’ fails in your example…
In abortion and self-defence the focus is action. We ask, ‘What action is justified?’
Both abortion and self-defence involve:
(1) life saving action
(2) life ending action
Moral culpability is normally relevant in self-defence but not in abortion, a point made earlier in this thread. The insane attacker brings the self-defence and abortion justifications into line by removing moral blame (evil intention) from the self-defence scenario.
One could remain logically consistent by arguing that, in cases where the attacker is insane, there is no right to kill in self-defence. This would bring the self-defence argument into line with that used for abortion.
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Reverie
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I don’t understand the correlation here. Unborn babies are not attacking their mothers.
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gerryconnor
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If it enables us to get to the point of the argument, I’m happy to run with your suggestion that “a fetus adds an added strain on a pregnant woman’s body” to the point that it becomes life threatening.
I’m not suggesting that abortion is best described as a ‘cure’. What I’m suggesting is that the Doctrine of Double effect provides a justification, at least in some cases, to undertake an abortion in order to save the life of a mother. I’m interested to hear why you think it does not.
I think your slippery slope argument fails. Just because you believe abortion is justified in one case doesn’t mean you must accept that it is justified in another. If you believe that allowing abortion in some cases that are justified is still wrong because it will ‘open the floodgates’ and allow abortion in cases that are unjustified, then you are using the argument of a consequentialist, not a deontologist.
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