Abortion - DOUBLE EFFECT questions

[Reverie]

I’m not suggesting that abortion is best described as a ‘cure’. What I’m suggesting is that the Doctrine of Double effect provides a justification, at least in some cases, to undertake an abortion in order to save the life of a mother. I’m interested to hear why you think it does not…

I think that your example of providing an abortion for a maternal emergency does not fall under the doctrine of double effect because an abortion would be the direct killing of the unborn life. If a hysterectomy were provided in a maternal emergency, that would be double effect.

I think your slippery slope argument fails. Just because you believe abortion is justified in one case doesn’t mean you must accept that it is justified in another. If you believe that allowing abortion in some cases that are justified is still wrong because it will ‘open the floodgates’ and allow abortion in cases that are unjustified, then you are using the argument of a consequentialist, not a deontologist.

I don’t believe abortion is justified in any case.

 

[Reverie]

I think this conversation is starting to fly over my head. :hypno:

 

[gerryconnor]

I think that your example of providing an abortion for a maternal emergency does not fall under the doctrine of double effect because an abortion would be the direct killing of the unborn life. If a hysterectomy were provided in a maternal emergency, that would be double effect.

I don’t believe abortion is justified in any case.

This is a matter of controversy among Catholic moralists. Many well known moral theologians disagree with you and, as is not uncommon in such debates, have been accused “grave doctrinal error” by those on the conservative side.

In my discussion with Gorgias I’ve pointed out the parallels between Aquinas’ use of Double Effect in self-defence and the application of Double Effect to abortion. Traditional moralists allow “direct killing” (a tricky concept in itself) when applying Double Effect to self-defence but not to abortion. What’s the difference? Evil intent on the part of the attacker vs the innocence of the fetus doesn’t work as a differentiator if the attacker is suffering psychotic delusion and is therefore free of evil intent. Rather than repeat myself here, I’d be grateful if you could take a look at my discussion with Gorgias in this thread and tell me your thoughts.

 

[gerryconnor]

I don’t understand the correlation here. Unborn babies are not attacking their mothers.

The fact that Aquinas introduced ‘Double Effect’ using the example of an attack doesn’t mean that we can only apply the principle when there is an attack. “Attack” is just a word. A cancer, a virus and even our own immune system can “attack” an organ. A doctor who minimises the pain of a dying patient (intended effect) by injecting a large dose of morphine would act consistently with Double Effect even though he knows that this will hasten the patient’s death (unintended effect). The absence of the word “attack” in this scenario is irrelevant, just as it is in the case of abortion.

You are correct that the absence of the word “attack” in discussions of abortion differentiates them from discussions of self-defence. But that’s not a relevant differentiation.

 

[Gorgias]

consider Aquinas arguing for the right to kill in self defence. He wrote “the act of self-defence can have a double effect: the preservation of one’s own life, and the killing of the aggressor…. The one is intended, the other is not.” Either Aquinas fails at the first hurdle of Double Effect, because the act of killing is evil, or he succeeds because killing, in itself, is not evil.

The reason that you’re failing to see the logic here is that you’re stopping too early: the issue isn’t ‘killing’, per se, it’s ‘killing an aggressor’. Killing may be moral, amoral, or immoral, depending on the intent and the situation. In Aquinas’ case, the action isn’t ‘killing’, it’s ‘self-defense’. In the act of self-defense, the aggressor might be killed. Since the aggressor was in the commission of an immoral act (unjustifiable aggression against another), then the death of the aggressor was not immoral.

It would be ironic if the moral theologian credited with introducing the Doctrine of Double Effect failed at the first step.

He doesn’t. You’re failing to see why not, though, it seems…

Is the killing of an aggressor the means to saving one’s life? If it is, then Aquinas fails again.

No – one’s self-defense is the means to saving one’s life. Think about it: what is morally licit, in the case of an aggressor attacking you, is to stop the aggressor’s action. If you can do so without the use of lethal force, then you must do so. It’s important to note that, if you can defend yourself without lethal force, then killing your aggressor is an immoral act. Therefore, it should be clear that the action in play is ‘self-defense’, not ‘killing’.

How might he escape a second failure? One strategy would be to argue (once again implausibly) that the death of the aggressor is the foreseen but unintended side-effect of forcing one’s hand forward while holding the knife until it plunges deep into the aggressor’s heart. The action is the movement of a knife - morally neutral in itself - but the effect (unintended of course!) is deadly. In the same way, pulling the trigger of a gun is morally neutral. It’s not bad ‘in itself’.

Right. This is not the argument that Aquinas makes.

In the same way the act of removing the placenta and fetus from the womb is morally neutral.

Right: when considered outside the context of the situation and one’s intent, any action may be spun to be considered amoral. If this were the case, then moral theology would be a dead letter. It’s not, because the arguments must consider the situation and the actors’ intent.

 

[Gorgias]

The fact that Aquinas introduced ‘Double Effect’ using the example of an attack doesn’t mean that we can only apply the principle when there is an attack. “Attack” is just a word. A cancer, a virus and even our own immune system can “attack” an organ.

A cancer, a virus, or an immune system is not a moral agent, however: that’s why it cannot be used in an argument for a case of moral agency. I really do understand what you’re trying to say; it just happens to be irrelevant in the case of morality. Sorry.

 

[Gorgias]

Traditional moralists allow “direct killing” (a tricky concept in itself) when applying Double Effect to self-defence but not to abortion.

Just out of curiosity … would you please provide a citation in which a moral theologian calls a case of self-defense ‘direct killing’? Thanks!

Rather than repeat myself here, I’d be grateful if you could take a look at my discussion with Gorgias in this thread and tell me your thoughts.

I did.

 

[Reverie]

This is a matter of controversy among Catholic moralists. Many well known moral theologians disagree with you and, as is not uncommon in such debates, have been accused “grave doctrinal error” by those on the conservative side.

In my discussion with Gorgias I’ve pointed out the parallels between Aquinas’ use of Double Effect in self-defence and the application of Double Effect to abortion. Traditional moralists allow “direct killing” (a tricky concept in itself) when applying Double Effect to self-defence but not to abortion. What’s the difference? Evil intent on the part of the attacker vs the innocence of the fetus doesn’t work as a differentiator if the attacker is suffering psychotic delusion and is therefore free of evil intent. Rather than repeat myself here, I’d be grateful if you could take a look at my discussion with Gorgias in this thread and tell me your thoughts.

I thought I would re-read what the CCC has to say about this. It has been a while since I read it.
The catechism of the Catholic Church does not refer to double effect in its section on abortion (2270). It only mentions it in the section on legitimate defense (2263). Therefore, that leads me to wonder should double effect even be applied to abortion at all.

The catechism does not make a distinction between mentally ill aggressors and sane aggressors. We are required to deal with unjust aggressors (no matter their mental state) with whatever force is necessary to render them unable to inflict harm. But no more than what is necessary because that would be wrong.

The difference is a fetus is not an unjust aggressor and it “must be defended in its integrity, cared for, and healed, as far as possible, like any other human being.” (2274)

 

[GodHeals]

I thought I would re-read what the CCC has to say about this. It has been a while since I read it.
The catechism of the Catholic Church does not refer to double effect in its section on abortion (2270). It only mentions it in the section on legitimate defense (2263). Therefore, that leads me to wonder should double effect even be applied to abortion at all.

The catechism does not make a distinction between mentally ill aggressors and sane aggressors. We are required to deal with unjust aggressors (no matter their mental state) with whatever force is necessary to render them unable to inflict harm. But no more than what is necessary because that would be wrong.

The difference is a fetus is not an unjust aggressor and it “must be defended in its integrity, cared for, and healed, as far as possible, like any other human being.” (2274)

Thank you all for the posts… For the most part, it seems logical that abortion is always wrong, based on what you said, and my convictions on Church teaching.

I asked in the past, but haven’t gotten an answer, what medical condition would render a pregnant mother and father to choose between the life of the mother and child without being able to apply the double effect?

It seems INTENTION to murder is one of the moral “keys” to understanding morality. My friend argues that he would always put the life of the mother before the child. Then I said the double effect covers it. Are there cases double effect doesn’t cover and the mother would die and child may live?

I am not sure the argument against the double effect and Catholic teaching on abortion always be 100% wrong. It seems always to be wrong.

Thank you!

 

[gerryconnor]

The reason that you’re failing to see the logic here is that you’re stopping too early: the issue isn’t ‘killing’, per se, it’s ‘killing an aggressor’. Killing may be moral, amoral, or immoral, depending on the intent and the situation. In Aquinas’ case, the action isn’t ‘killing’, it’s ‘self-defense’. In the act of self-defense, the aggressor might be killed. Since the aggressor was in the commission of an immoral act (unjustifiable aggression against another), then the death of the aggressor was not immoral.

He doesn’t. You’re failing to see why not, though, it seems…

No – one’s self-defense is the means to saving one’s life. Think about it: what is morally licit, in the case of an aggressor attacking you, is to stop the aggressor’s action. If you can do so without the use of lethal force, then you must do so. It’s important to note that, if you can defend yourself without lethal force, then killing your aggressor is an immoral act. Therefore, it should be clear that the action in play is ‘self-defense’, not ‘killing’.

Right. This is not the argument that Aquinas makes.

Right: when considered outside the context of the situation and one’s intent, any action may be spun to be considered amoral. If this were the case, then moral theology would be a dead letter. It’s not, because the arguments must consider the situation and the actors’ intent.

You reinforce my point. We can recast abortion in the same way you recast killing an aggressor. Just as plunging the knife into the heart until the aggressor is dead isn’t an act of “killing” (fascinating how the Doctrine of Double Effect twists words isn’t it!) but is an act of “self-defence”, so the removal of a fetus from the womb isn’t an act of “killing” either. It’s merely “defending” a mother’s life. In both cases Double Effect Speak claims that the killing is “unintended”. (I admit, it’s a very strange notion of intention.)

I noted above that Aquinas doesn’t fail if you recast the act and instead of calling it “killing” you call it “plunging the knife”, “pulling the trigger” or, to use Aquinas’ generic term, “self-defence”. Once again it’s a peculiar and counter-intuitive recasting of language, but it’s not incoherent. The act of a doctor who uses Double Effect to justify hastening a dying patient’s death with a large dose of morphine isn’t the act of “killing” either. It’s the act of “pain relief”! (More Double Effect Speak.) Similarly, the act of abortion isn’t “killing” either, it’s “saving a life”! Intention is everything. Just meet a few conditions, direct your will to the happy effect and away from the nasty effect and BINGO! Your problems are solved!

Just as killing an aggressor can be recast as “self-defence”, so aborting a fetus can be recast as “saving a mother’s life” or simply “defence” (See above.). Killing in self defence is justified (“made licit”) because of the application of Double Effect. I agree that “self-defense” doesn’t always necessitate killing, but as soon as we hypothesize a scenario requiring the killing of an aggressor to save one’s life - not hard to do - your point fails.

I wonder if Aquinas didn’t try to make a similar argument because he’d just come up with the idea of Double Effect and didn’t realise the knots he was tying himself and future generations of moral theologians into. I put the argument forward as one way he could try to untie a knot, though I admit, it’s unconvincing. Aquinas has to explain how killing the aggressor is not the means to saving one’s life. In the paragraph above, we’ve both suggested that a “way out” might be to suggest that the act is not really “killing”, it’s really “self-defence”. Not very convincing in a scenario where the only means of self defence requires foreseen killing (unintended of course), but at least it leaves the door open for the same line argument to support morphine overdoses for dying patients and abortions to save mothers’ lives as “not really ‘killing’”.

 

[GodHeals]

A cancer, a virus, or an immune system is not a moral agent, however: that’s why it cannot be used in an argument for a case of moral agency. I really do understand what you’re trying to say; it just happens to be irrelevant in the case of morality. Sorry.

A virus has no intention either way that is what it is amoral, correct?

As I mentioned to Reverie:

Thank you all for the posts… For the most part, it seems logical that abortion is always wrong, based on what you said, and my convictions on Church teaching.

I asked in the past, but haven’t gotten an answer, what medical condition would render a pregnant mother and father to choose between the life of the mother and child without being able to apply the double effect?

It seems INTENTION to murder is one of the moral “keys” to understanding morality. My friend argues that he would always put the life of the mother before the child. Then I said the double effect covers it. Are there cases double effect doesn’t cover and the mother would die and child may live?

I am not sure the argument against the double effect and Catholic teaching on abortion always be 100% wrong. It seems always to be wrong.

Thank you!

 

[Reverie]

I asked in the past, but haven’t gotten an answer, what medical condition would render a pregnant mother and father to choose between the life of the mother and child without being able to apply the double effect?

I wonder this as well. I have not gotten a satisfactory answer as to if there is some threat to life where abortion will save the life of the mother.

Ectopic tubal pregnancy - with time and monitoring, usually resolves them selves. The baby often dies naturally and can be surgically moved.

Uterine Cancer- The difficult decision of chemo during pregnancy or withhold chemo until aster delivery must be made.

Infection/disease - Treat the infection or disease in the mother and the baby until the baby can be born without disproportionate risk to its life, or the baby dies naturally.

The only emergency I can think of where it could be a threat to life would need the removal of the uterus as well and would fall under double effect if allowable is Gestational trophoblast disease. This is very very rare to have with a fetus. This would be something one should, I feel, call a good priest for and even their bishop to help determine the most licit direction to take.

Are there cases double effect doesn’t cover and the mother would die and child may live?

I don’t know the answer to this. Perhaps placental abruption? I suspect the disorders, diseases and the risks naturally associated with pregnancy are not related to whether the baby lives or dies. Sometimes a mother will die in childbirth and the child will live. Killing the baby wouldn’t save the mother.

 

[Gorgias]

You reinforce my point. We can recast abortion in the same way you recast killing an aggressor. Just as plunging the knife into the heart until the aggressor is dead isn’t an act of “killing” (fascinating how the Doctrine of Double Effect twists words isn’t it!) but is an act of “self-defence”

No; this isn’t accurate. If there’s the opportunity to act in self-defense without ending the life of the aggressor, then “plunging a knife into the heart until the aggressor is dead” is an act of murder! (In fact, if someone, acting in self-defense, stops the aggressor, but continues harming his aggressor, he acts immorally. Can you recognize this fact?)

so the removal of a fetus from the womb isn’t an act of “killing” either. It’s merely “defending” a mother’s life.

‘Defending’ against whom? The question you consistently refuse to answer is, in this case, who is the aggressor who has made the decision to threaten the life of the mother? If there is no such aggressor (and there cannot be – the baby in the womb cannot be accused of having made such a decision, or having acted with such an intent), then you cannot ‘defend’ against a non-aggressor!

I noted above that Aquinas doesn’t fail if you recast the act and instead of calling it “killing” you call it “plunging the knife”, “pulling the trigger” or, to use Aquinas’ generic term, “self-defence”.

Again: these three terms are not equivalent from a moral perspective – the first two do not address intent at all, and therefore, have no moral content per se (although they can be part of an act which has moral content); the third explicitly deals with a moral action (a response to unjust aggression).

The act of a doctor who uses Double Effect to justify hastening a dying patient’s death with a large dose of morphine isn’t the act of “killing” either. It’s the act of “pain relief”! (More Double Effect Speak.)

No! You’re so close to getting it! OK, look: if the doctor gives a “large dose of morphine” with the intent of “hastening a dying patient’s death”, then he cannot claim double effect – actually, he’s murdering his patient! However, if he gives a dose of morphine that will alleviate his patient’s suffering, that’s ok.

Similarly, the act of abortion isn’t “killing” either, it’s “saving a life”! Intention is everything. Just meet a few conditions, direct your will to the happy effect and away from the nasty effect and BINGO! Your problems are solved!

I take that back. You’re not getting it at all…

I put the argument forward as one way he could try to untie a knot, though I admit, it’s unconvincing.

You’re right, of course. That argument you offered completely divorces intention from action, and therefore, doesn’t help.

 

[Reverie]

You reinforce my point. We can recast abortion in the same way you recast killing an aggressor. Just as plunging the knife into the heart until the aggressor is dead isn’t an act of “killing” (fascinating how the Doctrine of Double Effect twists words isn’t it!) but is an act of “self-defence”, so the removal of a fetus from the womb isn’t an act of “killing” either. It’s merely “defending” a mother’s life. In both cases Double Effect Speak claims that the killing is “unintended”. (I admit, it’s a very strange notion of intention.)

I noted above that Aquinas doesn’t fail if you recast the act and instead of calling it “killing” you call it “plunging the knife”, “pulling the trigger” or, to use Aquinas’ generic term, “self-defence”. Once again it’s a peculiar and counter-intuitive recasting of language, but it’s not incoherent. The act of a doctor who uses Double Effect to justify hastening a dying patient’s death with a large dose of morphine isn’t the act of “killing” either. It’s the act of “pain relief”! (More Double Effect Speak.) Similarly, the act of abortion isn’t “killing” either, it’s “saving a life”! Intention is everything. Just meet a few conditions, direct your will to the happy effect and away from the nasty effect and BINGO! Your problems are solved!

Just as killing an aggressor can be recast as “self-defence”, so aborting a fetus can be recast as “saving a mother’s life” or simply “defence” (See above.). Killing in self defence is justified (“made licit”) because of the application of Double Effect. I agree that “self-defense” doesn’t always necessitate killing, but as soon as we hypothesize a scenario requiring the killing of an aggressor to save one’s life - not hard to do - your point fails.

I wonder if Aquinas didn’t try to make a similar argument because he’d just come up with the idea of Double Effect and didn’t realise the knots he was tying himself and future generations of moral theologians into. I put the argument forward as one way he could try to untie a knot, though I admit, it’s unconvincing. Aquinas has to explain how killing the aggressor is not the means to saving one’s life. In the paragraph above, we’ve both suggested that a “way out” might be to suggest that the act is not really “killing”, it’s really “self-defence”. Not very convincing in a scenario where the only means of self defence requires foreseen killing (unintended of course), but at least it leaves the door open for the same line argument to support morphine overdoses for dying patients and abortions to save mothers’ lives as “not really ‘killing’”.

The catechism does not suggest the use of double effect in its section on Euthanasia. It does address the use of painkillers.
Catechism of the Catholic Church:

2279 Even if death is thought imminent, the ordinary care owed to a sick person cannot be legitimately interrupted.
The use of painkillers to alleviate the sufferings of the dying, even at the risk of shortening their days, can be morally in conformity with human dignity if death is not willed as either an end or a means, but only foreseen and tolerated as inevitable
Palliative care is a special form of disinterested charity.
As such it should be encouraged.

I think I have lost sight of what you are actually trying to convince us of, Gerry. It seems like it takes mental gymnastics to agree to unecessary violence against an unjust aggressor is A-okay, overdosing a patient to end his suffering so long as you convince yourself that you are only doing it to alleviate pain is A-okay, and killing an unborn baby because the life of the mother is more important is A-okay.

Convincing oneself of doing good when one is actually doing something evil does not negate guilt. If one truly does not know they are committing an evil, then they may not be culpable, but that does not mean they are not guilty.

 

[GodHeals]

The catechism does not suggest the use of double effect in its section on Euthanasia. It does address the use of painkillers.

I think I have lost sight of what you are actually trying to convince us of, Gerry. It seems like it takes mental gymnastics to agree to unecessary violence against an unjust aggressor is A-okay, overdosing a patient to end his suffering so long as you convince yourself that you are only doing it to alleviate pain is A-okay, and killing an unborn baby because the life of the mother is more important is A-okay.

Convincing oneself of doing good when one is actually doing something evil does not negate guilt. If one truly does not know they are committing an evil, then they may not be culpable, but that does not mean they are not guilty.

So an abortionist or mother/father is guilty of murder even if any of them thought they are doing a good for whatever reasons (“saving the child from a life of possible suffering for eg.”)… but they may not be culpable

or did you mean, they might FEEL guilt, but not be morally culpable for their sins of abortion / murder?

 

[Reverie]

So an abortionist or mother/father is guilty of murder even if any of them thought they are doing a good for whatever reasons (“saving the child from a life of possible suffering for eg.”)… but they may not be culpable

or did you mean, they might FEEL guilt, but not be morally culpable for their sins of abortion / murder?

I’m not a moral theologist, but I would say yes, perhaps, to both.

Let’s use Gerry’s mentally ill unjust attacker scenario. Let’s say he punches you in the face because he heard a voice that told him you are the devil and he needs to protect himself from you.

Is he guilty of attacking you?
Yes.

Is he culpable for attacking you?
Maybe not.

Could he feel guilty later when he realizes that you aren’t the devil and he accosted you?
Certainly he could.

Does that feeling of guilt then make him culpable?
I don’t know the answer to that. That’s what priests and moral theologians are for.

 

[gerryconnor]

Just out of curiosity … would you please provide a citation in which a moral theologian calls a case of self-defense ‘direct killing’?* Thanks.

There aren’t any. Double Effect, when it is applied by moral theologians, is often an attempt to recast what a normal person would call “direct killing”; e.g. stabbing someone in the heart or delivering a lethal dose of morphine, as “indirect killing”. Most Catholic theologians think that Double Effect somehow makes killing “indirect”, but they’re having a hard time convincing others that they make sense . (Some Catholic “proportionalists” might not be guilty of the same mangling of language.) Stabbing someone in the heart is not “indirect killing” if we use words normally. Among other things, the direct/indirect killing distinction is in need of a plausible doctrine of intention. But I don’t have time for that longer discussion here.

The reason I’ve visited this thread is to seek something I’ve not been able to find elsewhere - a justification, by those who believe Double Effect makes sense, for not using it to justify saving a mother’s life during pregnancy.

If you can call stabbing someone in the heart to save your life “indirect killing” then the moral thing to do would be to apply the same strange logic to save a woman’s life. Many pregnant women, husbands, children, friends and relatives would be grateful for that small mercy.

 

[Gorgias]

GodHeals:

So an abortionist or mother/father is guilty of murder even if any of them thought they are doing a good for whatever reasons (“saving the child from a life of possible suffering for eg.”)… but they may not be culpable

or did you mean, they might FEEL guilt, but not be morally culpable for their sins of abortion / murder?

I’m not a moral theologist, but I would say yes, perhaps, to both.

Let’s use Gerry’s mentally ill unjust attacker scenario. Let’s say he punches you in the face because he heard a voice that told him you are the devil and he needs to protect himself from you.

Is he guilty of attacking you?
Yes.

Is he culpable for attacking you?
Maybe not.

Hold on, though. The ‘mentally ill attacker’ scenario only works because he is held to be incapable of making a reasonable moral judgment. We wouldn’t say that about a doctor who is actively practicing medicine, are we? Or, even if we want to shrug and say, “well, it’s possible…”, we’re still saying that it would be the exceptional case to find a doctor who’s considered sufficiently bereft of reason that he would be held unable to make a moral judgment, right?

Does that feeling of guilt then make him culpable?

I don’t know the answer to that. That’s what priests and moral theologians are for.

No. There’s no ‘ex post facto’ attribution of guilt. If a person is not guilty of mortal sin from a particular action, no later knowledge can make him guilty of mortal sin from that act in the past.

 

[Reverie]

Hold on, though. The ‘mentally ill attacker’ scenario only works because he is held to be incapable of making a reasonable moral judgment. We wouldn’t say that about a doctor who is actively practicing medicine, are we? Or, even if we want to shrug and say, “well, it’s possible…”, we’re still saying that it would be the exceptional case to find a doctor who’s considered sufficiently bereft of reason that he would be held unable to make a moral judgment, right?

You’re right. I couldn’t use a doctor or abortionist as an example because I couldn’t see how one could be guilty but not culpable. My point was just to show an example that someone could be guilty of something but not also culpable.

No. There’s no ‘ex post facto’ attribution of guilt. If a person is not guilty of mortal sin from a particular action, no later knowledge can make him guilty of mortal sin from that act in the past.

Thanks for clearing that up for me.

 

[gerryconnor]

Hold on, though. The ‘mentally ill attacker’ scenario only works because he is held to be incapable of making a reasonable moral judgment. We wouldn’t say that about a doctor who is actively practicing medicine, are we? Or, even if we want to shrug and say, “well, it’s possible…”, we’re still saying that it would be the exceptional case to find a doctor who’s considered sufficiently bereft of reason that he would be held unable to make a moral judgment, right?

Perhaps I misunderstand your point. I don’t understand the relevance of the insane doctor. Are you addressing a different question?

The mental state of the doctor is not relevant to the abortion argument we’ve been having above. The insane attacker wasn’t introduced to parallel the doctor, but to parallel the fetus. Both are innocent - free of evil intent. Both are threats to innocent life. Both are killed.