Abortion - DOUBLE EFFECT questions

[Gorgias]

Perhaps I misunderstand your point. I don’t understand the relevance of the insane doctor. Are you addressing a different question?

Yes: GodHeals asked whether the ‘insane knife-wielding aggressor’ argument could be used in the case of an abortion doctor (if he thought he wasn’t doing anything wrong), and it was answered “possibly”. I disagreed with that assessment, since the reason that an ‘insane knife-wielding aggressor’ isn’t considered culpable is only that he’s incapable of making a moral judgment. We’re operating under the assumption that the doctor is capable of making a moral judgment, and therefore, this consideration cannot be utilized.

The insane attacker wasn’t introduced to parallel the doctor, but to parallel the fetus. Both are innocent - free of evil intent. Both are threats to innocent life. Both are killed.

This is where you and I differ in our understanding of the issue. The insane attacker is guilty, but not culpable. The fetus is neither guilty nor culpable. The fetus is not a threat, per se. In Aristotelian terms, the insane attacker is the efficient cause of the defender’s threat: it’s his knife-wielding attack that threatens the defender. The fetus, on the other hand, is not the efficient cause of the mother’s illness: rather, an abnormality in the pregnancy or in the mother is the efficient cause. What’s inaccurate about your spin on the situation is that you’re killing the baby in order to remove the pathology, and attempting to equate that to an action against an attacker. The baby isn’t attacking his mother, which is why it’s not the same example, and can’t be used to support the logic you’re imposing on the situation.

 

[gerryconnor]

This is where you and I differ in our understanding of the issue. The insane attacker is guilty, but not culpable. The fetus is neither guilty nor culpable. The fetus is not a threat, per se. In Aristotelian terms, the insane attacker is the efficient cause of the defender’s threat: it’s his knife-wielding attack that threatens the defender. The fetus, on the other hand, is not the efficient cause of the mother’s illness: rather, an abnormality in the pregnancy or in the mother is the efficient cause. What’s inaccurate about your spin on the situation is that you’re killing the baby in order to remove the pathology, and attempting to equate that to an action against an attacker. The baby isn’t attacking his mother, which is why it’s not the same example, and can’t be used to support the logic you’re imposing on the situation.

I don’t think your suggestions that the insane attacker is “guilty, but not culpable” and that the fetus “is not a threat, per se” is relevant to the application of Double Effect and its ‘direct killing’/‘indirect killing’ distinction. You need to show that the application of Double Effect to abortion violates the conditions of Double Effect in a way that its application in self-defense and end-of-life care does not.

A dose of morphine, intended as pain relief, that hastens a patient’s death is indirect in the way a bullet to the head, intended as pain relief, is not. The problem with using a bullet is that pain relief is brought about by means of the bad effect itself - death. It fails at least one condition of Double Effect.

That provides an interesting parallel with self-defense which isn’t as easy to justify as proponents of Double Effect would like. A bullet to the head of an attacker seems as much a case of “direct killing” as a bullet to the head of a dying patient. Remember, if the death of the attacker provides the means to the end of saving one’s life, then the act of self-defense fails the test required for it to qualify as “indirect killing”.

The situation is easier in abortion. The removal of the fetus need not be simultaneous with the death of the fetus, and in the third trimester there may even be a chance for survival. So it’s not the death of the fetus that is the means to the end of saving a pregnant woman’s life, it’s merely the removal of the fetus and placenta from the womb. Fetal death, in Double Effect Speak, is the foreseen but unintended effect. Saving the woman’s life is the intended effect.

 

[Reverie]

Yes: GodHeals asked whether the ‘insane knife-wielding aggressor’ argument could be used in the case of an abortion doctor (if he thought he wasn’t doing anything wrong), and it was answered “possibly”. I disagreed with that assessment, since the reason that an ‘insane knife-wielding aggressor’ isn’t considered culpable is only that he’s incapable of making a moral judgment. We’re operating under the assumption that the doctor is capable of making a moral judgment, and therefore, this consideration cannot be utilized.

I didn’t understand Godheal’s question to mean that. GodHeals was asking me to clarify whether I meant the abortionist, mother/father could be guilty and not culpible or whether they -feel- guilty but not culpible.

I used the mentally ill unjust attacker as an example that -anyone- could be guilty of something but not culpible.

Thinking about it since last night. If a doctor didn’t know abortion is a sin, is he not culpible? Knowledge of sin is one of the requirements for culpibility, isn it?

 

[Reverie]

The situation is easier in abortion. The removal of the fetus need not be simultaneous with the death of the fetus, and in the third trimester there may even be a chance for survival. So it’s not the death of the fetus that is the means to the end of saving a pregnant woman’s life, it’s merely the removal of the fetus and placenta from the womb. Fetal death, in Double Effect Speak, is the foreseen but unintended effect. Saving the woman’s life is the intended effect.

In what situations do you think abortion saves a pregnant mother’s life?

 

[GodHeals]

In what situations do you think abortion saves a pregnant mother’s life?

Can you help me understand the terms:

Is morally neutral the same as amoral since amoral is not moral or immoral? Or is amoral mean not having any relation to morality?

So there are these four terms relating to morality?
moral, immoral, amoral, and morally neutral

I read on here:
dictionary.reference.com/browse/amoral

Thanks!
Brian

 

[Reverie]

Can you help me understand the terms:

Is morally neutral the same as amoral since amoral is not moral or immoral? Or is amoral mean not having any relation to morality?

So there are these four terms relating to morality?
moral, immoral, amoral, and morally neutral

I read on here:
dictionary.reference.com/browse/amoral

Thanks!
Brian

I would have trouble explaining since it is confusing to me. This is what a Franciscan says about it. americancatholic.org/Messenger/Mar2006/Wiseman.asp#top

 

[GodHeals]

I would have trouble explaining since it is confusing to me. This is what a Franciscan says about it. americancatholic.org/Messenger/Mar2006/Wiseman.asp#top

Thank you, and thank you for asking those last questions you posted.

 

[aux1]

I point out a woman who died during an abortion and you tell me you don’t think it’s relavant. Yet you continue to point out the case of Savita Halappanavar, as if you’re sure she would have survived if only she’d had an abortion.

My understanding of the case was that Savita aborted by herself (miscarried), i.e. the amniotic sac was ruptured. Once that happens, the fetus is doomed.

Savita’s problem, though, was that she aborted incompletely – meaning, that her body should have expelled the doomed fetus, but it did not. The doctor should then finish what the nature failed to do and remove the fetus and placenta from her uterus. This is what is being referred to as her requesting an abortion.

However, there was a problem: the doomed fetus still had a heartbeat, so by the Irish law, it was alive and as such, it was illegal for the doctors to remove it. (Removal of a live fetus = abortion = illegal. No, it does not matter it it’s C-Section or D&C.) All they could do was wait until the fetal heartbest stops… Well, after several days of carrying that in her uterus, the patient contracted an infection (hardly surprising, really) and died.

Had the doctors evacuated her uterus in time, she would have probably lived – alas, that was illegal.

See also: ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2636458/

 

[aux1]

There aren’t any. Double Effect, when it is applied by moral theologians, is often an attempt to recast what a normal person would call “direct killing”; e.g. stabbing someone in the heart or delivering a lethal dose of morphine, as “indirect killing”.

Indeed!

In a self-defense scenario, note that it’s near impossible to kill an attacker if you use purely defensive measures, such as blocking the knife, restraining the attacker, or using a shield. What is being argued in reality, is that in case of a direct threat (i.e. you know that the attacker will kill you) you are allowed to use an offensive weapon (i.e. a gun) to kill (or maim) the attacker before he kills you.

 

[gerryconnor]

See also: ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2636458/

Thanks for sharing that link aux1. It’s very informative.

 

[gerryconnor]

In what situations do you think abortion saves a pregnant mother’s life?

Abortion “saves a pregnant mother’s life” whenever it results in a woman surviving who otherwise would not. In a previous post you seemed to give credence to the suggestion that a “fetus adds an added strain on a pregnant woman’s body because it does take extra energy from the mother to support the life in her womb.” When a woman is very weak through illness and the strain is very great, that situation can be life-threatening.

If aux1’s characterization of Savita Halappanavar’s predicament is accurate, then that would seem to be a clear case where abortion provided the best chance of saving a woman’s life. It’s important to note, that we don’t need to know that this particular case would have resulted in saving a life. We only need to know that such situations exist. It’s clear that the medical profession thinks they do. Medical professionals disagree about whether or not abortion is justified, but it’s conventional wisdom that, in some situations, abortion offers a woman significantly improved chances of survival. Countless women have died from complications during pregnancy and childbirth. It’s not controversial to suggest that there are situations where ending a pregnancy early can improve a woman’s chances of survival.

 

[vames]

Had the doctors evacuated her uterus in time, she would have probably lived – alas, that was illegal.

Yes; that’s why therapeutical abortion is the standard treatment (in non-Catholic hospitals) for a patient who has the signs of a miscarriage (cervical dilation and ruptured membranes). Because waiting for the baby to die and waiting for the mother’s body to expell it carries the risk of septic infection, which can start before the ceasing of fetal heartbeat.
So how do you determine the actual risk? If you intervene too early, you are punished by the Irish law; if you wait for too long and refuse to intervene, the fetal tissues of the dying baby begin necrotizing, which causes sepsis and the subsequent death of the woman.
drjengunter.wordpress.com/2012/11/20/how-sick-must-a-pregnant-woman-be-in-ireland-for-her-doctor-to-say-her-life-is-at-risk/

Elsewhere on the same blog, a poster wanted to defend the Church’s position (the statement of Irish bishops regarding double effect in cases like Savita’s) and said this:

The bishop’s statement is not a medical one. His point is that the woman’s life should not have been endangered and the operation should have been performed to remove the uterus. Furthermore, in the event that it were removed it would not have been an abortion, which in this case is understood to be the direct termination of a pregnancy for the sake of doing just that, i.e., ending a pregnancy. The operation to remove a uterus from a woman who would die if that uterus were not removed — whether or not she is pregnant — is not an abortion. So to blame the Church in this case is in fact a straw man argument, because the Church is not opposed to this type of operation, even if it does result in the termination of a pregnancy.

If this is the doctrine of double effect in action (butcher a woman so that her dying baby’s body can remain intact), then the only logical conclusion is that any sane woman should avoid Catholic hospitals.

And another thing. Post #17 offers examples of pregnant women with cancer who refused abortions. The keyword here is REFUSED - it means they had the chance of choosing between their lifes and the life of their babies and they opted for sacrificing their own lifes. They were not ignored by their doctors, they were not condemned to death by their doctors.
Not all the women with cancer have that chance to choose:
irishtimes.com/news/state-settled-with-cancer-patient-1.555035

 

[gerryconnor]

drjengunter.wordpress.com/2012/11/20/how-sick-must-a-pregnant-woman-be-in-ireland-for-her-doctor-to-say-her-life-is-at-risk/

If this is the doctrine of double effect in action (butcher a woman so that her dying baby’s body can remain intact), then the only logical conclusion is that any sane woman should avoid Catholic hospitals.

irishtimes.com/news/state-settled-with-cancer-patient-1.555035

Thanks for sharing those links vames. They illustrate how the Church hierarchy has had difficulty understanding and coming to terms with the important issue of abortion to save a woman’s life. Given the ingeniously inventive and convoluted complexity of discussions around “Double Effect” and “direct/indirect”, along with elaborate discussion of related philosophical and theological questions surrounding ‘intention’, ‘animation’, ‘formation’ and even the grading of penances relative to the reconciliation of sinners, I sympathize with their inability to apply their own principles consistently. I’ve argued that Double Effect, unsatisfactory as it is, can be used to justify abortion when it saves a woman’s life. Unfortunately it seems that bishops and many, though not all, moral theologians have been scared away from re-thinking this question more logically by prior “authoritative” thinkers who were afraid of this conclusion and its likely consequences.

If, as you suggest, ‘Double Effect’ really does require that we let women die during pregnancy, then it’s time to ditch it. But the adoption of a simpler and more intuitive consequentialist or proportionalist ethic is unlikely to be accepted by the Church any time soon. That’s why it’s worth applying ‘Double Effect’ more liberally, such in pregnancy to save a woman’s life and in the use of condoms to reduce the spread of aids. It’s easy to do both.

 

[Usagi]

Gerry, you seem intent on presenting the idea of double effect as a terrible one, so I don’t know if you’ll accept this, but there are answers to some of your questions.

The distinction between abortion and self-defense doesn’t hinge on redefining “direct killing” or using incredibly narrow definitions of the action one is performing (“thrusting the knife forwards” or whatever). It relies on a couple of things.

First, the Church does not actually consider homicide to be intrinsically evil in all cases. Remember, the Church permits (though she presently strongly discourages) capital punishment, which is certainly the premeditated killing of someone who is not an immediate threat. So you are wrong to focus on the broad category of “killing” as the source of the intrinsic evil of abortion. Rather, there is a recognized difference between killing the innocent (whether purely so, like an infant, or relatively so, like an adult who poses no threat to you) and killing the guilty (like an attacker or, in extreme circumstances, someone guilty of a heinous crime).

Second, the question to be asked for the purposes of double effect is whether the death of the aggressor is the actual goal or merely a likely but undesired result. Even if I use potentially lethal force in self-defense (i.e., I stab or shoot my attacker), I do not insist that the guy actually die as long as he stops attacking me. As others have pointed out, I am not allowed to insure his death, and indeed I would say I have a moral obligation to summon medical aid if there is any possibility of his survival. I would say that the same should apply in cases where medical action is taken that risks the life of a fetus (or, indeed, any other patient). A very early C-section or a “termination by live birth” to enhance the mother’s chances could, it seems to me, be licit if the fetus is neither directly killed nor simply allowed to die, but given all possible care even if the chances are slim. Basically, if everyone involved would be absolutely thrilled if the kid pulls through (and does whatever can be done to make that happen), I think double effect could apply. If the actual goal is the child’s death (as in the majority of procured abortions, to the point that survival of the child is considered a failure mode), or if the fetus is removed by cutting it apart or evacuating its skull so that survival is not merely unlikely but impossible, double effect would not apply.

I do tend to agree with you that the Church could stand to look again at the “condoms to reduce HIV transmission” issue as a matter of double effect. The Church already permits the use of contraceptive chemicals for medical purposes, and does not forbid Catholics using such medications from engaging in marital intercourse while they are in effect, even though the contraceptive effect is likely to occur. Similarly, condom use by an HIV patient is not meant to prevent pregnancy (even though it does) but to prevent transmission of the virus. Just as in the cases above where the survival of the attacker/fetus would be awesome even if unlikely, presumably if there were a way for an HIV-infected husband or wife to produce children without passing on the virus to either spouse or child, that method would be welcomed in preference to the undesired contraceptive side effect of using condoms to protect the spouse.

Usagi

 

[aux1]

First, the Church does not actually consider homicide to be intrinsically evil in all cases.

However, it does consider abortion to be intrinsically evil in all cases. If the Church simply equated abortion with homicide, then therapeutic abortion would be allowed under double effect in the same manner self-defense is.

So the Church does not consider a fetus to be equally valuable to an adult (woman), as it is often claimed; it considers the fetus to be more valuable! It is so valuable, that ectopic preganancy calls for removal of women’s reproductive organ just to extract the embryo, because the surgeon is not allowed to touch it directly.

A very early C-section or a “termination by live birth” to enhance the mother’s chances could, it seems to me, be licit if the fetus is neither directly killed nor simply allowed to die

You are attempting to distinguish between a procedure which removes the fetus in pieces (i.e. destroying it in the process) and one which removes it intact (theoretically allowing it to survive).

Whart you are missing, is that if the fetus is under 22-24 weeks, it has no lungs. Even if you manage to extract it intact, it will suffocate to death within minutes. That’s what viability is all about.

 

[gerryconnor]

Gerry, you seem intent on presenting the idea of double effect as a terrible one, so I don’t know if you’ll accept this, but there are answers to some of your questions.

The distinction between abortion and self-defense doesn’t hinge on redefining “direct killing” or using incredibly narrow definitions of the action one is performing (“thrusting the knife forwards” or whatever). It relies on a couple of things.

First, the Church does not actually consider homicide to be intrinsically evil in all cases. Remember, the Church permits (though she presently strongly discourages) capital punishment, which is certainly the premeditated killing of someone who is not an immediate threat. So you are wrong to focus on the broad category of “killing” as the source of the intrinsic evil of abortion. …

Second, the question to be asked for the purposes of double effect is whether the death of the aggressor is the actual goal or merely a likely but undesired result. Even if I use potentially lethal force in self-defense (i.e., I stab or shoot my attacker), I do not insist that the guy actually die as long as he stops attacking me. As others have pointed out, I am not allowed to insure his death, and indeed I would say I have a moral obligation to summon medical aid if there is any possibility of his survival. I would say that the same should apply in cases where medical action is taken that risks the life of a fetus (or, indeed, any other patient). A very early C-section or a “termination by live birth” to enhance the mother’s chances could, it seems to me, be licit if the fetus is neither directly killed nor simply allowed to die, but given all possible care even if the chances are slim. Basically, if everyone involved would be absolutely thrilled if the kid pulls through (and does whatever can be done to make that happen), I think double effect could apply. If the actual goal is the child’s death … double effect would not apply.

I do tend to agree with you that the Church could stand to look again at the “condoms to reduce HIV transmission” issue as a matter of double effect. The Church already permits the use of contraceptive chemicals for medical purposes, and does not forbid Catholics using such medications from engaging in marital intercourse while they are in effect, even though the contraceptive effect is likely to occur. Similarly, condom use by an HIV patient is not meant to prevent pregnancy (even though it does) but to prevent transmission of the virus. Just as in the cases above where the survival of the attacker/fetus would be awesome even if unlikely, presumably if there were a way for an HIV-infected husband or wife to produce children without passing on the virus to either spouse or child, that method would be welcomed in preference to the undesired contraceptive side effect of using condoms to protect the spouse.

Usagi

I agree with much of what you say.

My chief problem lies with deontological ethics itself, but I don’t expect to win converts to consequentialism here, so I’m hoping to help people recognize the Church’s inconsistent application of Double Effect across issues that include self-defence, just war, capital punishment, abortion, euthanasia and contraception. I agree that, within each of these discussions, the Church’s particular position is often buttressed by other arguments, but that doesn’t remove the inconsistencies in the application of the logic of Double Effect.

I agree with your first point that, “the Church does not actually consider homicide to be intrinsically evil in all cases”. That’s one of the more glaring inconsistencies that hasn’t been satisfactorily explained despite the volumes written by moral theologians claiming to uphold the “Sanctity of Life” while justifying killing. Of course the killing they justify is always “indirect”, which is just another way of saying that it is justified using the ubiquitous magic elixir called the “Doctrine of Double Effect”. To be justified, any killing must be “indirect”, meaning, among other things, that it must not be “intended”. (This notion of “intention” should not be confused with the garden variety of intention familiar to normal people. It’s an inventive recasting of that enables you to label the foreseen consequences of your actions as “unintended”. “If you attack me with that knife, I will kill you with this gun - unintentionally of course!”)

This goes directly to your second point. I agree that an important “question to be asked for the purposes of double effect is whether the death of the aggressor is the actual goal or merely a likely but undesired result.” The goal or intention must be self-defence, saving the pregnant woman’s life, preventing the spread of aids, reducing the pain suffered by a dying patient etc… Directing our will towards the “correct” intention is easy (too easy if you ask me, but that’s just another problem with Double Effect.) I acknowledge that many situations would enable you to shoot the knife attacker in the leg or the abdomen and achieve effective self-defence. The problem lies with those situations where the only way you can be sure of saving yourself is to deliver a lethal shot. That might be a minority of situations, but they exist.

The two conditions that moral theologians most often tie themselves in knots over are the first, that an act must be good or morally neutral “in itself”, and the third condition that the bad effect must not be the means to the good effect. Both sound good on paper, but theologians have failed dismally to apply them consistently across the broad range of issues I mentioned above.

 

[gerryconnor]

First, the Church does not actually consider homicide to be intrinsically evil in all cases.
Usagi

Usagi, my comment above doesn’t do justice to your point about homicide not being “intrinsically evil in all cases”. It’s true that “direct killing” of those who are not innocent is permitted by the Church. Pacifists would say the Church is wrong, but that’s a separate, though related debate.

 

[gerryconnor]

It’s interesting that Aquinas introduces the Doctrine of Double Effect using the example of self defence. Given that ‘direct killing’ of the guilty is permitted by the Church in some situations (e.g. just war, capital punishment), does he still need to use Double Effect to justify the use of a lethal defence against a guilty attacker?

(Given the heading of this discussion should I post this question somewhere else in the forum? It’s relevant to abortion because it has consequences for the debate, but I understand that it’s also a separate question.)

 

[Usagi]

However, it does consider abortion to be intrinsically evil in all cases. If the Church simply equated abortion with homicide, then therapeutic abortion would be allowed under double effect in the same manner self-defense is.

So the Church does not consider a fetus to be equally valuable to an adult (woman), as it is often claimed; it considers the fetus to be more valuable! It is so valuable, that ectopic preganancy calls for removal of women’s reproductive organ just to extract the embryo, because the surgeon is not allowed to touch it directly.

The rest of my paragraph there did explain why abortion (specifically “direct procured abortion”) is classed as murder rather than merely homicide. Deliberately targeting an innocent is never allowed even in view of a result that saves many lives. Hence why the Church’s moral theology condemns the atomic bombings of Japanese cities in spite of the usual argument that more lives were ultimately saved than taken.

So, no, the woman’s/mother’s life is not less valuable than her fetus’s life. Neither may be sacrificed deliberately to save the other; it’s just that “have to kill mom to save baby” seems to be an even more vanishingly rare circumstance than the other way around, so we don’t run into cases of the Church publicly condemning that (as she, and undoubtedly most people, certainly would) because it does not happen. Even in St. Gianna’s case, she only chose to reduce her own chances to increase her daughter’s and lost the gamble; she did not commit suicide nor was she killed by her physicians.

The “remove the bit of Fallopian tube rather than the embryo directly” technique does strike me as a considerable stretch in order to avoid “direct killing.” I suspect, though, that rather than being evidence of the Church’s disregard for women and their bodies, the idea was devised by a moral theologian looking for a way to save the woman in such a situation without, technically, murdering the embryo.

You are attempting to distinguish between a procedure which removes the fetus in pieces (i.e. destroying it in the process) and one which removes it intact (theoretically allowing it to survive).

Whart you are missing, is that if the fetus is under 22-24 weeks, it has no lungs. Even if you manage to extract it intact, it will suffocate to death within minutes. That’s what viability is all about.

Thank you. You have taught me something today. I was under the impression that “viability” was more of a moving target that medical technology had pushed earlier and earlier and could theoretically continue to do so. If we have already backed up against the development of lungs, than clearly a “delivery” earlier than that would be just as surely fatal as destroying the fetus before removal and would not fall under my “could be licit” category.

Personally, I look forward to the invention of functioning artificial wombs so that “terminating a pregnancy” and “killing the offspring” never have to overlap again. I would hope that would immediately defuse the abortion debate and expose anyone on either side who really does hold the opposition’s stereotype of their position (want babies to die/want women to be trapped in unwanted or dangerous pregnancies).

Usagi

 

[aux1]

The rest of my paragraph there did explain why abortion (specifically “direct procured abortion”) is classed as murder rather than merely homicide.

The difference between murder and homicide is intent and circumstances. A priori classifying abortion as murder means that circumstances are ignored. It’s an exercise in circular reasoning. Abortion is an intrinsic evil because it cannot be licit in any circumstances; it cannot be licit, because it is an intrinsic evil.

However, this is irrelevant, because Catholic Church does not view abortion as murder/homicide. As per CCC 2271 it is a crime separate from homicide, and, contrary to homicide, cannot be excused under any circumstances – which exempts it from the double effect.

Deliberately targeting an innocent is never allowed even in view of a result that saves many lives.

Not true. You are allowed to use a deadly force against a mentally unstable (and thus innocent) person. You are also allowed to use a deadly force against an enemy soldier in combat (although he was forcibly drafted and really has nothing against you).

Attacker’s culpability does not enter the equation, it’s whether he is a threat or not.

Hence why the Church’s moral theology condemns the atomic bombings of Japanese cities in spite of the usual argument that more lives were ultimately saved than taken.

Staw man. The bombing of Hiroshima was immoral because the people of Hiroshima didn’t pose an immediate threat to US forces. It would have been however perfectly permissible to nuke Japanese troops.

Even in St. Gianna’s case, she only chose to reduce her own chances to increase her daughter’s and lost the gamble; she did not commit suicide nor was she killed by her physicians.

The operative word being “chose”. As Savita’s case demonstrates, once someone legislates the Catholic position, you have doctors refusing to carry out life-saving abortion out of fear that they would be prosecuted. Evoking St. Gianna here is the ultimate hypocrisy, as those invoking her want to force martyrdom on the women in similar situation.

The “remove the bit of Fallopian tube rather than the embryo directly” technique does strike me as a considerable stretch in order to avoid “direct killing.” I suspect, though, that rather than being evidence of the Church’s disregard for women and their bodies, the idea was devised by a moral theologian looking for a way to save the woman in such a situation without, technically, murdering the embryo.

That’s exactly what happened; when the procedure involving removal of the tube has been devised back in 19th century, a smart theologian devised a way to make it licit. The problem is that his ad-hoc interpretation has now become a cornerstone of the Church’s position on the issue, which now pushes for mutilating women when it can be avoided by using methrotrexate.

I was under the impression that “viability” was more of a moving target that medical technology had pushed earlier and earlier and could theoretically continue to do so. If we have already backed up against the development of lungs,

This should help: embryology.ch/anglais/rrespiratory/phasen01.html

than clearly a “delivery” earlier than that would be just as surely fatal as destroying the fetus before removal and would not fall under my “could be licit” category.

Sacrifice a woman, then?