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Usagi
Guest
Hmm, can’t agree with you there.(This notion of “intention” should not be confused with the garden variety of intention familiar to normal people. It’s an inventive recasting of that enables you to label the foreseen consequences of your actions as “unintended”. “If you attack me with that knife, I will kill you with this gun - unintentionally of course!”)
Even criminal law, which doesn’t concern itself overly much with the deep moral underpinnings of bad actions, recognizes a difference between foreseen and intended consequences. If I do something stupid (or fail to do something sensible) that I ought to know will get people hurt, that’s reckless or negligent endangerment/homicide. If I kill someone because I want him dead, that’s murder (or maybe manslaughter if I was crazy emotional at the time).
Nope, I’m not talking about “deliberately shooting to wound” (which, as I understand it, is a profoundly stupid thing to try in a life or death situation). I am saying that I can shoot a guy center mass and not be intending his death as my end. What I want is for him to stop attacking me, which is proven by the fact that if he runs away when I draw the gun or shoot and miss, I sink to the ground relieved rather than chasing him to make sure he dies for the offense of scaring me. (And if I did give chase, it would stop being self-defense at that point both morally and legally.)This goes directly to your second point. I agree that an important “question to be asked for the purposes of double effect is whether the death of the aggressor is the actual goal or merely a likely but undesired result.” The goal or intention must be self-defence, saving the pregnant woman’s life, preventing the spread of aids, reducing the pain suffered by a dying patient etc… Directing our will towards the “correct” intention is easy (too easy if you ask me, but that’s just another problem with Double Effect.) I acknowledge that many situations would enable you to shoot the knife attacker in the leg or the abdomen and achieve effective self-defence. The problem lies with those situations where the only way you can be sure of saving yourself is to deliver a lethal shot. That might be a minority of situations, but they exist.
It’s actually kind of hard to know for sure that you are taking a lethal shot, especially if the other guy is moving around. It’s even harder with a knife, which certainly can kill in one strike but usually requires multiple ones even for deliberate murder. Thus, I would not agree that there are times when knowingly killing the other person is the only alternative. You have to be willing to kill the other person if you are engaging in violent self-defense at all,especially with a firearm – one of the big rules of gun safety is that you do not point a gun at anything you are not willing to see destroyed – but the likelihood that you will consciously decide “this guy’s death is the only thing that will discourage him” is low.
That moral theologians have failed at applying the concept does not make the concept itself a bad one.The two conditions that moral theologians most often tie themselves in knots over are the first, that an act must be good or morally neutral “in itself”, and the third condition that the bad effect must not be the means to the good effect. Both sound good on paper, but theologians have failed dismally to apply them consistently across the broad range of issues I mentioned above.
Usagi