Abortion, Euthanasia and Capital punishment

[Ender]

Data regarding the effectiveness of Capital Punishment does not in any way inform the foundational moral principles at the core of the Church’s teaching on Capital Punishment.

One would certainly think this was true, however data regarding the effectiveness of prisons has become the determining factor in deciding the moral question of when capital punishment is acceptable. I’m not convinced that is a valid basis for resolving moral questions.

Capital Punishment is regarded as a right of the state to be exercised only as a means of directly protecting the lives of innocent human beings from a particular harm.

This sets up the bizarre situation where a person who kills someone cannot be executed for that crime but may be executed if he is judged to present a significant risk of killing someone else. That is, he can’t be executed for having killed someone in the past but he can be executed if it is reasonably believed he will kill someone in the future. So - we can execute him to prevent a crime for which we couldn’t execute him for actually committing.

Therefore, the Church’s stance on this issue is not in any way linked to the value of CP as a primary means to achieving justice, whether it punishes the offender, or whether it deters others from committing crimes.

The Church’s stance on all punishment is that it is related primarily to the requirements of justice; the defense of society, rehabilitation, and deterrence are secondary objectives. One of the several problems with the Church’s current teaching is that she infers - but nowhere states or even addresses - that capital punishment does not follow the rules she has defined for all other forms of punishment.

There is a fundamental contradiction between what the Church says about punishment in general and what she (now) says about capital punishment in particular.

Ender

 

[Texas_Roofer]

There is plenty of evidence available if you simply look for it. Here is a summary of some papers on the subject. google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&ct=res&cd=2&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.goccp.org%2Fcapital-punishment%2Fdocuments%2Fcap-pun-deterrence-resources.doc&ei=LVnxSIyGOojkeq7c1c0H&usg=AFQjCNEFzoihg5IVyvYYGTLnfxLm9g7Fog&sig2=POFG0ZOIPJws7ZVoPBZm6g

It seem as though we have been here before first there is no proven given at the site at all, second on the couple of referenced paper which claim to show any support one clearly states it is the announcement of the death penalty not the action of the death penalty, and the other could not be found on a public search. The vast majority of the papers either say the statistical results are inconclusive or show some slight deterrence effect. Overall the statement “We are killing people with no substantial support for the reduction in crime” is affirmed by the data you cite.

This would be an example of an assertion with no evidence whatever to support it.

you mean listed to support it? Like how it is illegal to coerce confessions? Here:” Coerced-Compliant False Confessions
Coerced-compliant confessions occur when suspects confess, despite the knowledge of their innocence, due to extreme methods of police interroga tions (Gudjonsson, 1991, 1992; Gudjonsson & MacKeith, 1990; Kassin, 1997; Kassin & Wrightsman, 1985; Wrightsman & Kassin, 1993). Numerous false confessions that were elicited through the use of torture, threats, and promises were presumed to be of this type, as in the Salem witchcraft confessions in the 17th century (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1985; Wrightsman & Kassin, 1993). The best known classic example of a coerced-compliant false confession is the case of Brown v. Mississippi (1936). “Brainwashing,” a technique commonly used on POWs falls under the category of coerced-compliant false confession. Almost forty years ago, during the Korean War, reports by the North Koreans stated that a number of cap tured American military men had confessed to a number of treasonable acts and expressions of disloyalty to the U. S. (Bem, 1966; Wrightsman & Kassin, 1993). Hunter (1960) examined the brainwashing methods used by the communists during the Korean War. The prisoners would attend communist in doctrination lectures, for a minimum of four hours, at least once per day. During these lectures, the prisoners would be forced to make a confession and express the communist point of view in his own words. The rationale behind forcing the prisoners to confess was to have it become second nature for them and become a part of their mentality. As Hunter (1960) points out: Each time a U.N. soldier stood up and used the words “I confess,” his Red masters were confident that in the back of his mind a tiny trace at least of this intrinsic content of the world would filter down, even if only subconsciously. Each time he repeated it, they were certain a little more of this content was being rubbed onto his mentality. The communists actually heard him saying each time, in their double talk, “I submit,” getting himself accustomed to the thought. (p. 238) Similar confessions were made by some of the American POWs in the Vietnam War. During the first week of the Persian Gulf War in 1991, American TV viewers saw the grim and swollen faces of captured American airmen, and as reported by Fleming and Scott (1991), “each of the pilots identified himself and delivered a short speech deploring their government’s involve - ment in Operation Desert Storm” (p. 127).
truth.boisestate.edu/jcaawp/9901/9901.pdf

Execution may prevent a person from being rehabilitated but it does not prevent expiation, which is accomplished not by repenting of the sin but by accepting the punishment.

No – context, context, context, context When the famous football star was found “not guilty” of double murder, the church was not advising he accept a lack of responsibility at all. It is not the punishment of man! He needs to expiate his sins, regardless of his legal status .

The Church has not always been quite so ambivalent on the subject as she is now but I am not aware that she has explained away God’s words to Noah that “whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed.”

There is a lot of killing in the Old Testament, Jesus said love thy neighbor as thy self, so we usually do not select to kill thy self

 

[Texas_Roofer]

One would certainly think this was true, however data regarding the effectiveness of prisons has become the determining factor…

No

This sets up the bizarre situation where a person who kills someone cannot be executed for that crime but may be executed if he is judged to present a significant risk of killing someone else. That is, he can’t be executed for having killed someone in the past but he can be executed if it is reasonably believed he will kill someone in the future. So - we can execute him to prevent a crime for which we couldn’t execute him for actually committing.

close! killing criminals does not equal punishing

The Church’s stance on all punishment is that it is related primarily to the requirements of justice; the defense of society, rehabilitation, and deterrence are secondary objectives. One of the several problems with the Church’s current teaching is that she infers - but nowhere states or even addresses - that capital punishment does not follow the rules she has defined for all other forms of punishment.

there you go, punishment is punishment The death penalty is for protecting the innocent

There is a fundamental contradiction between what the Church says about punishment in general and what she (now) says about capital punishment in particular.

no contradiction at all punishment to redress the disorder, killing criminals to protect society when other options are not practical. NOTE: Killing a criminal does not require the criminal have committed murder!!!

 

[Oscarthecat]

One would certainly think this was true, however data regarding the effectiveness of prisons has become the determining factor in deciding the moral question of when capital punishment is acceptable. I’m not convinced that is a valid basis for resolving moral questions.

You’re going to have to be more specific about your criteria for determining the “effectiveness” of a prison- because some people would measure effectiveness by several, often conficting, factors. These might include the ability of a prison system to rehabilitate and reintegrate prisoners, the cost-effectiveness of a prison, the ability of a prison system to deter repeat offenders, etc.

But in regard to Catholic teaching specifiically in regard to Capital Punishment, CP is not justified so long as a prison can effectively contain prisoners and prevent them from doing more harm.

That’s it. As most modern societies have the ability to contain prisoners in a reliable manner, CCC says that the conditions for CP should be exceedingly rare.

This sets up the bizarre situation where a person who kills someone cannot be executed for that crime but may be executed if he is judged to present a significant risk of killing someone else. That is, he can’t be executed for having killed someone in the past but he can be executed if it is reasonably believed he will kill someone in the future. So - we can execute him to prevent a crime for which we couldn’t execute him for actually committing.

We can protect ourselves, as a society, from individuals who are intent on harming us.

The act of execution is not a response to past acts because in that case, the act would be oriented toward retribution or punishment.

Neither is it an anticipatory punishment for an expected harm, because in that case, as you stated, we would be punishing a person for a crime they have not committed.

In both of these cases, the primary intention expressed in the act of executing the criminal is punishment or retribution.

The Church teaches that the only moral exercise of Capital Punishment occurs when the action is fundamentally oriented toward the preservation of life- to protect individuals from a specific, deliberate, and otherwise unavoidable harm.

The Church’s stance on all punishment is that it is related primarily to the requirements of justice; the defense of society, rehabilitation, and deterrence are secondary objectives. One of the several problems with the Church’s current teaching is that she infers - but nowhere states or even addresses - that capital punishment does not follow the rules she has defined for all other forms of punishment.

There is a fundamental contradiction between what the Church says about punishment in general and what she (now) says about capital punishment in particular.

No, there is no contradiction because, as I just mentioned, the moral application of CP is not oriented toward punishing the criminal, but should be understood as a last resort to protect society from that criminal.

There are very few, if any, instances of CP which have met this criteria in modern history. Personally, I can’t think of any.

 

[Ender]

But in regard to Catholic teaching specifiically in regard to Capital Punishment, CP is not justified so long as a prison can effectively contain prisoners and prevent them from doing more harm.

That’s it. As most modern societies have the ability to contain prisoners in a reliable manner, CCC says that the conditions for CP should be exceedingly rare.

This is my point: the morality of executing someone depends on an analysis of the effectiveness of a societies penal system. That is, the morality of the act is dependent on ones personal judgment of the security of prisons. You are quite willing to declare that modern societies have such abilities. I am not, but in any case our judgment of penal effectiveness is a strange measurement of moral action.

The act of execution is not a response to past acts because in that case, the act would be oriented toward retribution or punishment.

Yes. Do you recognize that retribution is the primary objective of **ALL **punishment?

Neither is it an anticipatory punishment for an expected harm, because in that case, as you stated, we would be punishing a person for a crime they have not committed.

It is certainly anticipatory in the sense that it leads to the execution of someone before he has committed a crime. It is bizarre to claim that this doesn’t count as punishment; I’m sure the prisoner wouldn’t understand it the way you do.

No, there is no contradiction because, as I just mentioned, the moral application of CP is not oriented toward punishing the criminal, but should be understood as a last resort to protect society from that criminal.

The contradiction is that 2266 defines the primary objective of punishment as retribution while 2267 prohibits a particular form of punishment based on a secondary objective. There is nothing in 2267 that repeals what was just said in the preceeding paragraph; the definitions of 2266 are simply ignored.

Ender

 

[Oscarthecat]

This is my point: the morality of executing someone depends on an analysis of the effectiveness of a societies penal system. That is, the morality of the act is dependent on ones personal judgment of the security of prisons. You are quite willing to declare that modern societies have such abilities. I am not, but in any case our judgment of penal effectiveness is a strange measurement of moral action.

You’re dancing around with the word “effectiveness.”
CP is justified only if society cannot otherwise protect itself from an individual intent on doing proportionate harm.
If an aggressor can be caught, and once caught cannot break out of our jails, then there is not a just cause for execution.

I don’t know how that could be more clear?

Yes. Do you recognize that retribution is the primary objective of **ALL **punishment?

Not according to CCC 2266, which states:
“Punishment has the primary aim of redressing the disorder introduced by the offense.”

I think the problem might be that you are confusing “retribution” with “restitution.”

You are correct that retribution emphasizes the punishment of the criminal- such that the criminal experiences suffering or loss proportionate to the suffering or loss they inflicted.

However, restitution is oriented toward restoring the injured party to the state they enjoyed prior to being harmed.

Restitution more accurately describes what is referred to as "“Redressing the disorder introduced by the offense” in CCC 2266.

In regard to capital offenses, like murder, restitution is not possible for obvious reasons. Consequently, people often conclude that retribution must be the correct path, and thus justify making the criminal suffer in a manner proportionate to the injured party.

However, the Church does not consider retribution in lieu of restitution. Instead, the last line of CCC2266 states, “Punishment then, in addition to defending public order and protecting people’s safety, has a medicinal purpose: as far as possible, it must contribute to the correction of the guilty party.”

In this way, CCC2266 is concerned with laying out the 4 objectives in dealing with criminals, whereas 2267 is concerned with the specific conditions for using the death penalty.

The 4 objectives identified by 2266 are

1. restitution,
2. defending the public order,
3. protecting safety,
4. contributing to the correction of the guilty party is last, as conditioned by the statement “as far as possible.”

You should also notice that 2267 specifically mentions #2 and #3 as the primary objective of capital punishment, with no reference to restitution, and acknowledges that capital punishment may preclude the potential for #4.

Punishment is clearly not considered an objective in the Church’s teaching on the death penalty.

In fact, the word “punishment” does not appear in CCC2267.

It is certainly anticipatory in the sense that it leads to the execution of someone before he has committed a crime.

What I said was that it was not an anticipatory PUNISHMENT. So you are correct that it is anticipatory, but it is not a punishment. It is an anticipatory action which is determined by a just authority as the “only possible way of effectively defending human lives against the unjust aggressor.” (CCC2267)

It is bizarre to claim that this doesn’t count as punishment; I’m sure the prisoner wouldn’t understand it the way you do.

Well, for the Church’s conditions to be met, the prisoner would have to be so intent on killing people, and so adept at escaping confinement, that it would be evident to everyone present, most of all the prisoner, that their execution was an act of self defense.

I would agree that the use of capital punishment the the modern context would certainly be understood by the prisoner to be a punishment- because that’s exactly what it is. But that’s a moot point, because I’m not defending the contemporary practice of Cp, I’m defending the Church’s teaching on the prerequisite conditions for a moral application of the death penalty.

The contradiction is that 2266 defines the primary objective of punishment as retribution while 2267 prohibits a particular form of punishment based on a secondary objective. There is nothing in 2267 that repeals what was just said in the preceeding paragraph; the definitions of 2266 are simply ignored.
Ender

What you’re saying is simply incorrect as no form of the word “retribution” occurs anywhere in 2266 or 2267.

2267 doesn’t repeal anything in 2266. 2267 addresses circumstances which are not addressed in 2266.

2266 acknowledges the authority of the state to punish criminals and defines the proper objectives of such punishment, which I listed above.

2267 acknowledges that the state has the right to execute an unjust aggressor only as a last resort when it is impossible to protect society by any other means.

 

[Ender]

If an aggressor can be caught, and once caught cannot break out of our jails, then there is not a just cause for execution.

The Church has no expertise in determining the effectiveness of prisons. Whether or not a prisoner is dangerous is a prudential question the Church is unqualified to answer.

The 4 objectives identified by 2266 are1. restitution,
2. defending the public order,
3. protecting safety,
4. contributing to the correction of the guilty party is last, as conditioned by the statement “as far as possible.”

Cardinal Dulles has a different list. You’ll notice his includes retribution, not restitution.

"The purposes of criminal punishment are rather unanimously delineated in the Catholic tradition. Punishment is held to have a variety of ends that may conveniently be reduced to the following four: rehabilitation, defense against the criminal, deterrence, and retribution."

leaderu.com/ftissues/ft0104/articles/dulles.html

Punishment is clearly not considered an objective in the Church’s teaching on the death penalty.

You have this backwards: 2267 in the case of the death penalty limits the objectives of punishment to defense only. It simply ignores the other objectives, including the primary one; this is one of its major flaws.

In fact, the word “punishment” does not appear in CCC2267.

The Church has since the beginning considered executions to be punishment. There is, not coincidentally, nothing in the Catechism that references any document in Church history prior to 1995 on this subject in support of 2267. Your belief that an execution is not punishment is a bizarre interpretation that does not accord with what the Church has always taught.

*“Another kind of lawful slaying belongs to the civil authorities, to whom is entrusted power of life and death, by the legal and judicious exercise of which they **punish **the guilty and protect the innocent.” *(Catechism of the Council of Trent)

What you’re saying is simply incorrect as no form of the word “retribution” occurs anywhere in 2266 or 2267.

You misunderstand what 2266 is saying. (pace Dulles)

2267 doesn’t repeal anything in 2266. 2267 addresses circumstances which are not addressed in 2266.

2266 discusses punishment. Capital punishment is a form of … punishment … and must accord with the definitions of 2266.

Ender

 

[Texas_Roofer]

poster 1:

: Punishment is clearly not considered an objective in the Church’s teaching on the death penalty.

Poster 2:

:You have this backwards: 2267 in the case of the death penalty limits the objectives of punishment to defense only. It simply ignores the other objectives, including the primary one; this is one of its major flaws.

catechism:

; …If, however, non-lethal means are sufficient to defend and protect people’s safety from the aggressor, authority will limit itself to such means,…

Poster 1 has it correct the catechism is clear the assumption that some crimes require capital punishment is not from the Church. Jesus refuted this 2000 years ago (see John 8)

 

[Oscarthecat]

The Church has no expertise in determining the effectiveness of prisons. Whether or not a prisoner is dangerous is a prudential question the Church is unqualified to answer.

The Church does not claim to be able to determine the effectiveness of prisons. It leaves that to the particular judgment of the just governing authority.

Cardinal Dulles has a different list. You’ll notice his includes retribution, not restitution.

Intentionally or not, you’re drifting into a conversation about how the Church’s teaching remains consistent as it develops throughout history.

The overarching concern expresesd in Cardinal Dulles’ article was a response to the emergence of a theologically untenable position which specifically contradicts both scripture and tradition. Specifically, the opinion that the death penalty ought to be regarded as an immoral act always and everywhere contradicts the fact that the death penalty is upheld in both scripture and tradition as a just implement of the state.

With this, Cardinal Dulles’ task, as well as numerous theologians who have been writing on this same topic for the same reason, was to systematize the Church’s teaching on the death penalty which best explains why the death penalty has been considered a morally acceptable act in scripture and tradition, and how we ought to implement it in a morally acceptable manner today.

Such positions serve to explain and develop long standing Church teaching, and as such they are valid, academic opinions- but they are not official teachings put forth by the Magisterium.

Therefore, ** it is inappropriate to cherry pick quotes from one such article and juxtapose it against actual teaching documents produced by the Magisterium. **

In any event, I agree that Cardinal Dulles’ position is a part of the discussion, and I would challenge you to acknowledge that the discussion has developed since he wrote that in 2001, just as it has developed since the Council of Trent.

You have this backwards: 2267 in the case of the death penalty limits the objectives of punishment to defense only. It simply ignores the other objectives, including the primary one; this is one of its major flaws.

No, and I think someone already clarified this point, so I’ll leave it with what they said.

The Church has since the beginning considered executions to be punishment. There is, not coincidentally, nothing in the Catechism that references any document in Church history prior to 1995 on this subject in support of 2267. Your belief that an execution is not punishment is a bizarre interpretation that does not accord with what the Church has always taught.

You’re misrepresenting what I said by converging two separate concepts into one.

1. Execution can certainly be a form of punishment- and I even indicated my agreement that most if not all executions in recent history have been forms of punishment.
2. The just execution of a person by the state for the purpose of protecting society from them, according to the conditions I have already delineated, is not oriented toward punishing them, but rather toward protecting society from them.

2266 discusses punishment. Capital punishment is a form of … punishment … and must accord with the definitions of 2266.

Ender

You’re repeating your comments here, but not adding anything new, so I’ll just refer you to what I have already written.

 

[Ender]

The Church does not claim to be able to determine the effectiveness of prisons.

“Today, in fact, given the means at the State’s disposal to effectively repress crime by rendering inoffensive the one who has committed it …”

This is JPII and the catechism rendering judgment on the capabilities of prison systems. This judgment lies at the heart of the prohibition against capital punishment.

The overarching concern expresesd in Cardinal Dulles’ article was a response to the emergence of a theologically untenable position which specifically contradicts both scripture and tradition.

Ah … that would be the current teaching on the death penalty.

Therefore, ** it is inappropriate to cherry pick quotes from one such article and juxtapose it against actual teaching documents produced by the Magisterium. **

Cardinal Dulles’ comments are not the development of doctrine, they simply explain what it is and in no way are counter to what the Church teaches. It is not a choice between Dulles and the Magisterium but between Dulles and you.

I agree that Cardinal Dulles’ position is a part of the discussion, and I would challenge you to acknowledge that the discussion has developed since he wrote that in 2001, just as it has developed since the Council of Trent.

Dulles’ “position” is that of the Church; he gives no new position of his own. Second, the discussion has not developed since 1995 and JPII’s Evangelium Vitae.

The just execution of a person by the state for the purpose of protecting society from them, according to the conditions I have already delineated, is not oriented toward punishing them, but rather toward protecting society from them.

I am interested in your concept of justice in that you advocate executing a person in anticipation of a crime he has not yet committed. Where is the justice in that?

Ender

 

[Ender]

Poster 1 has it correct the catechism is clear the assumption that some crimes require capital punishment is not from the Church. Jesus refuted this 2000 years ago (see John 8)

The subject of whether certain crimes require the execution of the criminal to fully expiate his sin has not really been discussed. 2267 ignores this aspect of punishment so it cannot be said to have resolved it. Nor did Jesus answer this question: as Paul wrote - and as the Church has always held - execution may be a just punishment for certain crimes.

Ender

 

[Texas_Roofer]

The subject of whether certain crimes require the execution of the criminal to fully expiate his sin has not really been discussed…

I think it does, and that is the heart of this issue

… 2267 ignores this aspect of punishment so it cannot be said to have resolved it…

“authority will limit itself to such means” sounds pretty clear to me

Nor did Jesus answer this question:

Was Jesus just another law breaking criminal? He refused to stone the girl to death. So could have known what he was doing?

as Paul wrote - and as the Church has always held - execution may be a just punishment for certain crimes.

Ender

The Old Testament mandates many criminal recieve the death penalty yet we do not follow those. Under the new covenent death is not *required *as punishment

 

[Ender]

{the expiation of sin} is the heart of this issue

I agree. Unfortunately 2267 talks only about defense. This is why I said that the issue of expiation has not really been discussed.

“authority will limit itself to such means” sounds pretty clear to me

We all know what was said. The reason behind that statement has to do with defense only; there is nothing that mentions expiation.

The Old Testament mandates many criminal recieve the death penalty yet we do not follow those. Under the new covenent death is not *required *as punishment

My reference was to the writings of Paul which constitute the bulk of the New Testament. I don’t know if there is anything specific in the NT that mandates death as expiation; there is, however, a very specific reference that authorizes the state to use it as appropriate. You are also very cavalier about dismissing the OT. There are parts of it - e.g. some of the Mosaic code - that were particular to that culture and are no longer applicable but don’t think that the NT replaces the entire OT. That’s not how the Church understands things.

Ender

 

[Ender]

The just execution of a person by the state for the purpose of protecting society from them, according to the conditions I have already delineated, is not oriented toward punishing them, but rather toward protecting society from them.

First, there is no such thing as a just execution of a person if the person does not merit the punishment. We cannot execute people simply to safeguard the public if they have done nothing to deserve it. That is, security alone does not provide just cause for executing someone. If they do not deserve it as punishment it is unjust to do it so the conditions of your first sentence can never be satisfied: it is never just to execute someone solely to protect society.

Second, if protecting society is the highest objective, then what would that mean if the death penalty was actually a deterrent? I realize there is no definitive proof that it is but there is also no proof that it is not which leaves open the possibility that at some point in the future it will be discovered that, indeed, executions deter other murders. In that case society would be protected better by executing more people so that the morality of the action would be completely reversed: it would be immoral not to execute them. That this conclusion sounds bizarre is only so because the premise for determining the morality of capital punishment is based solely on protecting society and not on justice.

Ender