Abortion, infanticide, and nominalism

[Black_Rose]

Utilitarians are (usually) epistemological nominalists who deny a “human essence”; to them, there is no essence that makes being humans “special”; for nominalists, “human” is a label that denotes species affiliation. Consequently, membership in the human species itself does not afford one ethical consideration nor does membership in another species preclude such consideration.

Utilitarians, instead, consider the presence of other qualities besides species affiliation when determining the ethical significance of a biological entity. Since utility is defined as the attainment or avoidance of subjective states of mind such as happiness, contentment, or the absence of suffering, one’s ability to suffer, possess interests, and having a perception of themselves as a distinct entity with a past, present, and future (consciousness) would be the criteria for ethical consideration because these properties provide the capacity for reaching such states of mind. Biological entities whose interests would be taken into consideration in a utilitarian ethical framework are referred to as “persons”. The reason why it would be acceptable to terminate the life of a “non-person” (human or nonhuman) is that they lack the capacity to possess interests that would be violated and would therefore not merit ethical consideration.

Although aforementioned faculties are strongly associated with neurological development which in turn progress chronologically, the continuity of human development makes it difficult for one to determine the exact point of human biological development where one becomes a ”person” as besides from being born, there does not seem to be any rigid “boundary” during the process. Although these faculties are strongly associated with neurological development which in turn progress chronologically, exiting the uterus does not drastically alter the developmental status of a human being, so being born does not result in an ontological change since there is no major augmentation of any capacity that utilitarians deem relevant. Therefore one cannot derive a concrete period of time from utilitarian ethics where terminating the fetus/baby is no longer acceptable because one cannot derive a strict demarcation line from the knowledge of biological human development. One implication is that under a utilitarian system of ethics, infanticide can be permissible because being born does not warrant ethical consideration for the infant; in other words, a born infant can be deemed a non-person.

Why not (arbitrary) define “personhood” (more precisely stage of maturity where a fetus/baby merits the protection of its bodily integrity) that would be universally accepted in the legal system?

Nominalist definitions are often arbitrary in nature because nominalists use words primarily as short-hand labels intended to facilitate conveying information in the medium of language; the words themselves do not describe any essences, just empirical observations. For instance, a puppy is the label we use for a young dog; it does not assume any essence of a puppy. There is little confusion when one uses the word puppy since the above definition is universally accepted in the English language.

The word “human” in a biological context simply describe a member of reproductively-isolated biological collective (a species). The conundrum of defining a species is one of having a universally accepted rigorous definition for an intuitive concept, not of discovering the “essence" of a species.

 

[Black_Rose]

Ernst Mayr, in the 1940s, popularized the definition of different species being “groups of actually or potentially interbreeding natural populations, which are reproductively isolated from other such groups”. It is obvious that by applying Mayr’s definition that chimpanzees should be classified as a different species than humans because humans and chimpanzees are currently reproductively isolated.

The inevitable consequence of many generations of reproductive isolation, random mutations, and natural selection between two gene pools that were originally from the same parent population is speciation between the two gene pools. Usually, reproductive isolation first occurs due to the erection of natural environmental barriers or the migration of a group from the original population which separates the populations geographically, preventing them from being in the same location that the same time. Reproductive isolation would segregate the gene pools of the two populations and the different selection pressures encountered by the two gene pools would cause the two populations to adapt to different ecological niches. The importance of genetic drift in the process of speciation is currently unknown. Natural selection would then reinforce the geographic barriers because it would produce heritable changes between the populations, resulting in, for example, dissimilar mating behavior and anatomical incompatibility of their reproductive organs which would preclude members of the populations from producing viable offspring.

Evolutionarily, Homo sapiens and Pan troglodytes shared a common ancestor 5-7 million years ago, and this provides ample time for the two species to become reproductively isolated from each other. While humans can be categorized into “races” which can be identified by observing visible physiological characteristics, there is actually more genetic variation within a designated race than between them, so different “races” are not distinct species. All human beings share a matrilineal common ancestor who lived 200,000 years ago (Mitochondrial Eve), meaning that there would be too few generations for speciation to occur.

The above was intended to provide a brief post-hoc explanation for the discrete and discontinuous identities of humans and chimpanzees based on the insight provided by modern evolutionary biology and DNA sequencing that illuminates the natural history of the human lineage. In contrast, this knowledge would be inaccessible to people who lived before the publication of Charles Darwin’s seminal exposition of his theory of evolution, The Origin of Species, but it was evident that human and chimpanzees are different “species” because the substantial biological differences between them. Since humans and chimpanzees were fundamentally discrete biological entities, the Linnaean taxonomical system, which as based on categorizing different organism primarily by their structural similarities, characterized them as unique species. Since many commonly encountered species can be identified without knowing its detailed evolutionary history, the rigorous definition of “species” would have little utility outside of the pedantic environment of academia as the intuitive definition would suffice in vernacular language.

The process of speciation is indeed a continuous process, but a large temporal separation between the gene pools would result in profound phenotypic differences between their members, allowing even the most casual observer to distinguish unambiguously organisms from two gene pools are different species. In contrast, the issue of personhood, as discussed above, deals with a contemporary continuous transformation within an observable time frame as opposed to a completed historical process such as speciation.

 

[St_Francis]

Scientists are well able to differentiate between human DNA and non-human DNA. I would say that any being that is alive and has human DNA qualifies as a human being and ought to be afforded *all *the protections of legal persons. While politically there will be those who argue against acceptance of this definition, I believe that it is the only definition which makes sense.

 

[Black_Rose]

Scientists are well able to differentiate between human DNA and non-human DNA. I would say that any being that is alive and has human DNA qualifies as a human being and ought to be afforded *all *the protections of legal persons. While politically there will be those who argue against acceptance of this definition, I believe that it is the only definition which makes sense.

Why doesn’t the modern utilitarian position make sense? It seems to be logically consistent and it provides a framework for treating people fairly and mercifully.

The above emphasized the heritable genetic differences among human and chimpanzees that are the result of different selective pressures that their ancestors faced, causing them to adapt to different ecological niches and speciate, which results in profound phenotypical differences between them that are visually observable. It has little to do with the molecular composition of their genetic material such as different nucleotide sequences or chromosome structure (the second human chromosome was likely the result of a fusion of two chromosomes that were present in the common ancestor of chimpanzees and humans). Most of the genetic differences between humans and chimpanzees are non-functional since they are in the non-coding regions of the genome (junk DNA).

 

[vz71]

Why doesn’t the modern utilitarian position make sense? It seems to be logically consistent and it provides a framework for treating people fairly and mercifully.

The utilitarian view depends upon other external criteria.
So what are these?
The examples cited (happiness, contentment, or the absence of suffering, one’s ability to suffer, possess interests, and having a perception of themselves as a distinct entity with a past, present, and future (consciousness)) would appear to be very arbitrary.

When taking into account ethical considerations, we need concrete rules to go by, not arbitrary ones.

 

[Black_Rose]

The utilitarian view depends upon other external criteria.
So what are these?
The examples cited (happiness, contentment, or the absence of suffering, one’s ability to suffer, possess interests, and having a perception of themselves as a distinct entity with a past, present, and future (consciousness)) would appear to be very arbitrary.

When taking into account ethical considerations, we need concrete rules to go by, not arbitrary ones.

Why not argue that a system that bases ethical considerations on race and species affiliation is also arbitrary?

 

[vz71]

Why not argue that a system that bases ethical considerations on race and species affiliation is also arbitrary?

Species and race can be defined in solid terms.
You either are or are not a specific species.
And a lab test can prove it.

Happiness, contentment, or the absence of suffering, one’s ability to suffer, possess interests, and having a perception of themselves as a distinct entity with a past, present, and future (consciousness) all fail this.