R
Richca
Guest
Concerning whether the Will of God imposes necessity on the things willed by Him, this is what St Thomas says about necessary and contingent causes (ST, Part I, Q. 19, art. 8):I tend to agree with you, that in fact Aquinas already understood more of what Reeves is emphasizing than perhaps Reeves describes in the Zygon essay. For example, not only did Aquinas distinguish between primary and secondary causation, Aquinas also distinguished between contingent events and other events. Another example Aquinas used was of a debtor and creditor happening to encounter one another at a market, without either intending or planning to meet each other there. It’s similar to your example of the farmer discovering buried treasure in a field. I’ll quote Stephen Barr’s essay “Chance, By Design” as Barr explains what Aquinas had to say about it:
Similarly, most things happen in accordance with natural randomness and therefore with natural probabilities, such as coin tosses coming out heads 50 percent of the time …
In either case, whether or not things unfold in accordance with natural randomness and natural probabilities, it is God who in the vertical sense is causing them to happen that way. As St. Thomas put it, “The effect of divine providence is not only that things should happen somehow; but that they should happen either by necessity or by contingency. Therefore, whatsoever divine providence ordains to happen infallibly and of necessity, happens infallibly and of necessity; [whereas those things that divine providence conceives should happen from contingency], happen by contingency.” By itself, the doctrine of divine providence only tells us that everything unfolds in accordance with God’s plan. It does not tell us what that plan is, either in its general features or in its particular details. It does not tell us the mix of law and chance, or of necessity and contingency, that God chose to use in his plan."
For the entire essay, see
inters.org/files/Barr-Chance-Design.pdf
"On the contrary, All good things that exist God wills to be. If therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed, it follows that all good happens of necessity; and thus there is an end of free will, counsel, and all other such things.
I answer that, The divine will imposes necessity on some things willed but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign to intermediate causes, holding that what God produces by necessary causes is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes contingent. This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons.
First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent on account of the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause is hindered by deficiency in the second cause, as the sun’s power is hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause can hinder God’s will from producing its effect.
Secondly, because if the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be referred only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the divine intention and will; which is inadmissible. It is better therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the divine will. For when a cause is efficacious to act, the effect follows upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to its manner of being done or of being. Thus from defect of active power in the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in accidental points, that belong to its manner of being. Since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done, which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that He wills. Now God wills some things to be done necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects He has attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible and contingent causes, from which arise contingent effects. Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed by God happen contingently, but because God prepared contingent causes for them, it being His will that they should happen contingently."