Administering contraceptives

[Nelka]

In my job as a carer I have to administer many different medications every day. One medication that I haven’t supported somebody at the doctor’s to have is an injection that is used for contraceptive purposes however in this case it is primarily for mental health (which is the reason it was made and they found out it made someone unable to get pregnant).

My question with that is if I were to help that person have this medication surely it wouldn’t be sinful because it is being taken for non-contraceptive purposes but happens to cause it.

Expanding on it, if I were have to administer the contraceptive pill for example and purely for contraceptive purposes would I be committing a mortal sin? Would I have to refuse to administer it and leave it to a colleague?

Thanks.

 

[1ke]

Under the principle of double effect, you can certainly administer medication for a non-contraceptive purpose, even if it has a secondary effect of temporary or permanent sterility.

Regarding administering or prescribing contraceptives, I would direct you to documents such as the Ethical and Religous Framework for Catholic Healthcare Workers.

usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-dignity/health-care/upload/Ethical-Religious-Directives-Catholic-Health-Care-Services-fifth-edition-2009.pdf

I would also say to look at the moral concepts of cooperation with evil, such as:

archphila.org/HHS/pdf/CoopEvilChart.pdf

ncbcenter.org/index.php/download_file/force/185/159/

And review the catechism on the fonts of morality and formal, remote, and material coooeration with evil to determine your culpability in any specific concrete situation you find yourself in.

 

[Ron_Conte]

The principle of double effect never justifies formal cooperation with an intrinsically evil act. So the first step in judging the morality is to decide if it is intrinsically evil. If so, then you cannot cooperate formally.

The purpose for which an act is chosen does not determine if the act is intrinsically evil. For example, the intrinsically evil act of euthanasia is chosen for the good purpose of relieving suffering, and yet it remains gravely immoral.

You should also determine whether the medication is merely contraceptive, or whether it is also an abortifacient. And it matters if the person is sexually active also.

I don’t think it is moral for a health care provider to administer a medication, to a sexually active person, if the medication is known to cause an early abortion (abortifacient), regardless of the intention or purpose of giving the medication.

 

[paperwight]

The principle of double effect never justifies formal cooperation with an intrinsically evil act. So the first step in judging the morality is to decide if it is intrinsically evil. If so, then you cannot cooperate formally.

The purpose for which an act is chosen does not determine if the act is intrinsically evil.

Of course it does.

Sticking a needle into a helpless baby, causing it pain = evil.

Using an injection to deliver an inoculation to save a baby from disease or death = good.

 

[Hoosier_Daddy]

Of course it does.

Sticking a needle into a helpless baby, causing it pain = evil.

Using an injection to deliver an inoculation to save a baby from disease or death = good.

Intent is what matters. Poking a baby with a needle, bad.
Having no reasonable recourse other than injecting a baby with important medicine, good.

Administering a drug to treat a medical condition, good ( even if that drug is commonly used for birth control)
Administering a drug for artificial birth control, bad.

 

[Rau]

…You should also determine whether the medication is merely contraceptive, or whether it is also an abortifacient. And it matters if the person is sexually active also.

The moral object object of an act to administer medication to treat a mental illness would be the healing of an ill person, would it not? Unlike euthanasia, the good effects here are entirely independent of the ill effects of the drug. The morality of the act would thus appear to hang on the balance of consequences, and should also take into account alternative treatments (if any).

I don’t think it is moral for a health care provider to administer a medication, to a sexually active person, if the medication is known to cause an early abortion (abortifacient), regardless of the intention or purpose of giving the medication.

To my mind this is a challenging judgement to make one way or the other. The moral object of the act would seem to remain good. So we are faced with a judgement about the balance between health benefits and a tiny increase in the chance of an indirect abortion.

 

[Rau]

Of course it does.

Sticking a needle into a helpless baby, causing it pain = evil.

Using an injection to deliver an inoculation to save a baby from disease or death = good.

Strictly, Ron’s statement is correct. A good intention does not assure us of a good act. This is the meaning of “the ends do not justify the means”. But knowledge of the intention often informs our understanding of the nature of an act.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Strictly, Ron’s statement is correct. A good intention does not assure us of a good act. This is the meaning of “the ends do not justify the means”. But knowledge of the intention often informs our understanding of the nature of an act.

Exactly.
The three fonts are not totally indepedent or hermetically sealed off from each other.
Often so called “intention” is a valuable indicator of what the object font is when the objective deed is ambiguous so far as reason or the senses alone are concerned.
So “intention” can seem to change the object font from good to bad or vice versa…which isn’t really true.

Likewise with alleged “consequences” or circumstances which are not actually of the 3rd font at all but are further details re the object font which may define it more clearly and often make all the difference between something objectively disordered or not.

For example, state executions are not intrinsically evil. But if such an execution is considered when bloodless means of punishment are reasonably available (incarceration) then this subset type of SE becomes always disordered in the object font .
Rau of course disagrees with this…but he is warming to it.
He has to really, because we all know the 3rd font cannot change the moral nature of an act…only make it more or less culpable (or praiseworthy).

 

[Rau]

Likewise with alleged “consequences” or circumstances which are not actually of the 3rd font at all but are further details re the object font which may define it more clearly and often make all the difference between something objectively disordered or not.

Compendium of the Catechism expresses it like this: “An act is morally good when it assumes simultaneously the goodness of the object, of the end, and of the circumstances.” [after noting consequences are part of “circumstances”]. So the circumstances (here meaning essentially the balance of consequences - prudentially judged) have to be good too. If they are not good, we should not do the thing we intended, even if its moral object is good. It’s never licit to adopt a course of action (or “to do an act”) - no matter how decent and honourable it may be - if we judge it likely to cause more harm than good.

The Compendium also adds: “Circumstances can increase or diminish the responsibility of the one who is acting but they cannot change the moral quality of the **acts themselves. They never make good an act which is in itself evil.” ** This is not saying that circumstances don’t matter, nor is it saying that the presence of bad consequences changes the object to something evil. Circumstances increasing/decreasing the responsibility is about factors such as duress, or the relationship of perpetrator to victim, etc. And the terms “acts themselves” and “act…in itself” don’t refer to the human act in its totality (all fonts) but literally to the act contemplated. The moral quality of the “act itself” refers to its goodness of evil as determined by its moral object.

For example, state executions are not intrinsically evil. But if such an execution is considered when bloodless means of punishment are reasonably available (incarceration) then this subset type of SE becomes always disordered in the object font.

[By State Executions I assume you mean CP, for some States Execute persons not as any form of just punishment but to rid themselves of political enemies and the like.] The bolded text is not quite sufficient to compel a preference for bloodless means. What would get you there is if bloodless means are judged to have the equivalent good effect to CP (and recent Popes are of the opinion - a judgement of the prudential order - that they do). For then there is no basis to add more bad effect (death of criminal) given no further good effect for society.

I’ve answered your points but no doubt you will disagree. We’ve each had a go. I suggest not further hijacking the thread, which is about administering contraceptives…

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Compendium of the Catechism expresses it like this: "An act is morally good when it assumes simultaneously the goodness of the object, of the end, and of the circumstances." [after noting consequences are part of “circumstances”]. So the circumstances (here meaning essentially the balance of consequences - prudentially judged) have to be good too. If they are not good, we should not do the thing we intended, even if its moral object is good. It’s never licit to adopt a course of action (or “to do an act”) - no matter how decent and honourable it may be - if we judge it likely to cause more harm than good.

The Compendium also adds: “Circumstances can increase or diminish the responsibility of the one who is acting but they cannot change the moral quality of the acts themselves. They never make good an act which is in itself evil.” This is not saying that circumstances don’t matter, nor is it saying that the presence of bad consequences changes the object to something evil. Circumstances increasing/decreasing the responsibility is about factors such as duress, or the relationship of perpetrator to victim, etc. And the terms “acts themselves” and “act…in itself” don’t refer to the human act in its totality (all fonts) but literally to the act contemplated. The moral quality of the “act itself” refers to its goodness of evil as determined by its moral object.

[By State Executions I assume you mean CP, for some States Execute persons not as any form of just punishment but to rid themselves of political enemies and the like.] The bolded text is not quite sufficient to compel a preference for bloodless means. What would get you there is if bloodless means are judged to have the equivalent good effect to CP (and recent Popes are of the opinion - a judgement of the prudential order - that they do). For then there is no basis to add more bad effect (death of criminal) given no further good effect for society.

I’ve answered your points but no doubt you will disagree. We’ve each had a go. I suggest not further hijacking the thread, which is about administering contraceptives…

I don’t understand why you believe the Compendium (a strange place to look to make your point) denies what I summarised from traditional moral theologians and their boilerplate texts on the matter.

What is your difficulty with SE? It is what it means…any killing wrought by the State rather than an individual . Some may be unjust, some may be just. I am sure many of them are labelled CP. That doesn’t make such CP right. Does calling something CP when incarceration for life is possible make it truly CP? Perhaps we need to stop playing with words and start clarifying the underlying realities instead.

That object (SE, and even CP) needs to have more detail (you call circumstances) before it can be clearly identified and judged in its object.

Yes materially identifying the class of object in question in a given case is obviously prudential.
But deciding what types/classes of object are good or bad is not prudentialyl judged in the same way. That is the formulation of a moral precept, it is a determination of the Magisterium that, like contraception, requires the assent of the faithful if they have any doubt in the matter.
Of course one may dissent privately if in certain conscience…however one will still be objectively in error even if not culpable.

I put you and Ender in that boat .

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Of course it does.

Sticking a needle into a helpless baby, causing it pain = evil.

Using an injection to deliver an inoculation to save a baby from disease or death = good.

You are confusing the evil of physical disorder with the evil of moral disorder.

Death and serious pain are clearly physical disorders that should never be directly intended by
any individual agent. To do so would make them guilty of a moral disorder.

However such physical disorders may be done under defined circumstances that intend to bring about a greater physical order in an imperfect world.

We may mutilate by cutting off a leg if to leave it be will kill us. We do not call this mutilation (which is intrinsically evil) but amputation (which is good).

Likewise with lethal self defence.