P
Perplexity
Guest
I’d like to outline a reason for doubting that free-will exists:
There are different kinds of freedoms of the will. The one we’re concerned with is that which is necessary for us to be morally responsible agents. An agent is morally responsible for an action if she’d deserve praise or credit if she understood that it was morally good, or she’d deserve blame if she understood it was morally bad. She’d deserve these moral predications solely in virtue of her performing the action.
Some say this free-will is compatible with us being determined, others don’t. But, what seems fairly uncontroversial (as much as can be in this field) is that an agent must be the appropriate source of the action in order to have been free with respect to performing it. She must exhibit a certain kind of control over the action in order to be morally responsible for it. If the action is produced randomly, we’d be wont to say the agent was responsible for it. etc.
What I want to suggest is that the free-will required for moral responsibility is incompatible with us being determined, or indetermined. This is good reason to doubt we have it.
I will not be providing my reason for thinking free-will is incompatible with determinism since I know of no determinists here. Rather, I’ll focus on indeterminism and its incompatibility with free-will.
So, let’s suppose that there is some agent, S, and some action A. Suppose that S causally influences the obtaining of A; but, that this causal influence is indetermined. That is, S was not causally determined to produce A.
So, we could even say there is some time, t1, at which S exerts her causal influence, and another time, t2, at which A obtains.
In order for S’s causal influence on A to be indeterministic the sum of all of S’s causal influences on A prior to t2 must be insufficient to bring A about. If that sum suffices to bring about A, then A is determined.
Therefore, taking all of S’s causal contributions collectively, prior to t2, it’s literally up in the air whether A will obtain or not. After taking all the causal conditions antecedent to A’s occurring, S plays no further causal role in whether A occurs. So, if A does happen to occur, it’s not because of S. It’s just a matter of luck whether A happens.
It seems, therefore, quite intuitive to me to say that S doesn’t exhibit the kind of control over A needed in order for S to be morally responsible for A. That is, if A happens to occur, it’d seem quite unnatural for us to ascribe praise or blame to S for A.
But, if an undetermined S isn’t morally responsible for A, then S doesn’t have free-will with respect to A.
I feel confident then in concluding that indeterminism is incompatible with free-will.
Thoughts?
There are different kinds of freedoms of the will. The one we’re concerned with is that which is necessary for us to be morally responsible agents. An agent is morally responsible for an action if she’d deserve praise or credit if she understood that it was morally good, or she’d deserve blame if she understood it was morally bad. She’d deserve these moral predications solely in virtue of her performing the action.
Some say this free-will is compatible with us being determined, others don’t. But, what seems fairly uncontroversial (as much as can be in this field) is that an agent must be the appropriate source of the action in order to have been free with respect to performing it. She must exhibit a certain kind of control over the action in order to be morally responsible for it. If the action is produced randomly, we’d be wont to say the agent was responsible for it. etc.
What I want to suggest is that the free-will required for moral responsibility is incompatible with us being determined, or indetermined. This is good reason to doubt we have it.
I will not be providing my reason for thinking free-will is incompatible with determinism since I know of no determinists here. Rather, I’ll focus on indeterminism and its incompatibility with free-will.
So, let’s suppose that there is some agent, S, and some action A. Suppose that S causally influences the obtaining of A; but, that this causal influence is indetermined. That is, S was not causally determined to produce A.
So, we could even say there is some time, t1, at which S exerts her causal influence, and another time, t2, at which A obtains.
In order for S’s causal influence on A to be indeterministic the sum of all of S’s causal influences on A prior to t2 must be insufficient to bring A about. If that sum suffices to bring about A, then A is determined.
Therefore, taking all of S’s causal contributions collectively, prior to t2, it’s literally up in the air whether A will obtain or not. After taking all the causal conditions antecedent to A’s occurring, S plays no further causal role in whether A occurs. So, if A does happen to occur, it’s not because of S. It’s just a matter of luck whether A happens.
It seems, therefore, quite intuitive to me to say that S doesn’t exhibit the kind of control over A needed in order for S to be morally responsible for A. That is, if A happens to occur, it’d seem quite unnatural for us to ascribe praise or blame to S for A.
But, if an undetermined S isn’t morally responsible for A, then S doesn’t have free-will with respect to A.
I feel confident then in concluding that indeterminism is incompatible with free-will.
Thoughts?
