Agape and its significance

[R_Daneel]

First, I would like to make a strong suggestion. Please don’t use the word “love” when you refer to God, use the word “agape” (divine love). The English language, beautiful as it is, does not differentiate between the different types of “love”, and this leads to confusion. It is true, that one of the meanings of “love” is the “divine love”, but this usage is by far not the most prominent one. So, borrowing the Greek word of “agape” we can cut down of the possibility of misunderstandings.

Well, this was just a suggestion, the meat is about to follow. Agape means selfless, benevolent, possibly even sacrifical behavior on behalf of others. The definition also includes that this behavior is volitionally driven, usually phrased as “love is an act of will”.

Now the question is this: “why is the volitional part considered to be important?”. Let’s create a new word: “epaga”, which means selfless, benevolent behavior, which is NOT volitionally driven, say: “programmed”. For the external observer and the recipient of the action it is indistinguishable from “agape”. What does the “volitional” part add to it? In my opinion, nothing. Agape and epaga are the same in their effects. No one should care if the benefactor chose to be as he is or was programmed to be as it is. Do you agree, or not? (And if yes, then why not? )

 

[tonyrey]

Now the question is this: “why is the volitional part considered to be important?”. Let’s create a new word: “epaga”, which means selfless, benevolent behavior, which is NOT volitionally driven, say: “programmed”. For the external observer and the recipient of the action it is indistinguishable from “agape”. What does the “volitional” part add to it? In my opinion, nothing. Agape and epaga are the same in their effects. No one should care if the benefactor chose to be as he is or was programmed to be as it is. Do you agree, or not? (And if yes, then why not? )

There are clear differences between human and programmed behaviour:

1. We can choose to be reasonable or unreasonable.
2. We can choose to behave unpredictably.
3. We can understand and explain why we choose to behave as we do.
4. Unlike animals we can force ourselves to act against all our instincts.
5. Unlike machines we can reprogramme ourselves.
6. We are responsible for our thoughts and actions.
7. We can distinguish programmed behaviour from that which is not programmed.

 

[R_Daneel]

There are clear differences between human and programmed behaviour:

1. We can choose to be reasonable or unreasonable.
2. We can choose to behave unpredictably.
3. We can understand and explain why we choose to behave as we do.
4. Unlike animals we can force ourselves to act against all our instincts.
5. Unlike machines we can reprogramme ourselves.
6. We are responsible for our thoughts and actions.

So, what is the significance? That was the question. Why does it matter?

1. We can distinguish programmed behaviour from that which is not programmed.

Not necessarily. A perfect emulation (epaga) is indistinguishable from the “real McCoy” (agape). Only the internal workings differ. And even if we could tell them apart, why does it matter?

 

[tonyrey]

So, what is the significance? That was the question. Why does it matter?

It matters because we cause our behaviour and are responsible for what we choose.

 

[Thing]

First, I would like to make a strong suggestion. Please don’t use the word “love” when you refer to God, use the word “agape” (divine love). The English language, beautiful as it is, does not differentiate between the different types of “love”, and this leads to confusion. It is true, that one of the meanings of “love” is the “divine love”, but this usage is by far not the most prominent one. So, borrowing the Greek word of “agape” we can cut down of the possibility of misunderstandings.

Well, this was just a suggestion, the meat is about to follow. Agape means selfless, benevolent, possibly even sacrifical behavior on behalf of others. The definition also includes that this behavior is volitionally driven, usually phrased as “love is an act of will”.

Now the question is this: “why is the volitional part considered to be important?”. Let’s create a new word: “epaga”, which means selfless, benevolent behavior, which is NOT volitionally driven, say: “programmed”. For the external observer and the recipient of the action it is indistinguishable from “agape”. What does the “volitional” part add to it? In my opinion, nothing. Agape and epaga are the same in their effects. No one should care if the benefactor chose to be as he is or was programmed to be as it is. Do you agree, or not? (And if yes, then why not? )

If you were programmed to be selfless then you Daneel would not be selfless, you would be nothing and it would be your programmer who is selfless towards himself making you just an unconscious appendage of himself. To be selfless yourself you have to be yourself and to be yourself you have to be free which allows you to be selfless if you choose by your own volition to be so.
No greater love can any man have than to lay down his life for his friends; so says the programmer to himself while he presses the button to free the man to act ‘by his own volition’.

 

[R_Daneel]

If you were programmed to be selfless then you Daneel would not be selfless, you would be nothing and it would be your programmer who is selfless towards himself making you just an unconscious appendage of himself. To be selfless yourself you have to be yourself and to be yourself you have to be free which allows you to be selfless if you choose by your own volition to be so.
No greater love can any man have than to lay down his life for his friends; so says the programmer to himself while he presses the button to free the man to act ‘by his own volition’.

Your analysis is off the mark. The being, whose behavior toward others is programmed to be beneficial still can have the recognition of “self”. “It” may not care about maintaining that “self” - therefore it would be “selfless” in this respect.

But, be as it may, it still does not answer the question. The two beings, “A” and “B” exhibit the same behavior, “A” acts from “agape”, whild “B” acts from “epaga”. To whom does the difference matter? And why?

 

[R_Daneel]

It matters because we cause our behaviour and are responsible for what we choose.

And what is the significance of that? A good deed is a good deed, reagrdless of the motivation. If someone gives money to a beggar out of compassion, and someone else gives money just to feel good about himself, the beggar would not know the difference, and even if he would, he would not care.

 

[tonyrey]

It matters because we cause our behaviour and are responsible for what we choose.
And what is the significance of that? A good deed is a good deed, regardless of the motivation. If someone gives money to a beggar out of compassion, and someone else gives money just to feel good about himself, the beggar would not know the difference, and even if he would, he would not care.

If you were a beggar and some one gave you money as if you were a piece of dirt you would throw it back at him if you had any pride… A good deed is not a good deed, regardless of the motivation. An apparently generous deed can be a foul deed…

 

[Thing]

Your analysis is off the mark. The being, whose behavior toward others is programmed to be beneficial still can have the recognition of “self”. “It” may not care about maintaining that “self” - therefore it would be “selfless” in this respect.

But, be as it may, it still does not answer the question. The two beings, “A” and “B” exhibit the same behavior, “A” acts from “agape”, whild “B” acts from “epaga”. To whom does the difference matter? And why?

You are only viewing this from the ‘beings’ pre-programmed perspective. There are other viewpoints to consider.
It, the being, would have to be programmed not to care about self, or to have the choice of selfish or selfless rendered non-existant. For the Ideal Prototype beings in the very Beginning [before errors or viruses]; they would have a perfect sense of self and the choice of what to do for the love of the programmer. For beings malfunctioning and crashing with diverse programming viruses a workaround which forces selflessness is one solution but at the expense of the freedom of the being.

It obviously matters to the ‘programmer’ or, the Creator, of free beings.
Why precisely and exactly He wishes free beings is His own business, probably.

 

[R_Daneel]

If you were a beggar and some one gave you money as if you were a piece of dirt you would throw it back at him if you had any pride…

Well, when one has to choose between starvation and “pride” (which is sinful, ), pride goes out the window. But this is not the point. The beggar has no access to the internal workings of the giver, he only sees a donation. Why should he care about the causes?

A good deed is not a good deed, regardless of the motivation. An apparently generous deed can be a foul deed…

That would be an interesting theory to prove. You say that an “ontologically good action” is only “really good”, if it is also “morally good”. I am interested in your proof of such a concept.

 

[R_Daneel]

You are only viewing this from the ‘beings’ pre-programmed perspective. There are other viewpoints to consider.
It, the being, would have to be programmed not to care about self, or to have the choice of selfish or selfless rendered non-existant. For the Ideal Prototype beings in the very Beginning [before errors or viruses]; they would have a perfect sense of self and the choice of what to do for the love of the programmer.

Please leave “love” out of this. We are not concerned with “generic” love, we are concerned with “agape” or epaga".

It obviously matters to the ‘programmer’ or, the Creator, of free beings.
Why precisely and exactly He wishes free beings is His own business, probably.

So we are not privy to that information. Can we agree that apart from that missing information, apart from the creator’s perspective - it simply does not matter if the beings in question act out of “agape” or “epaga”? The recipient of the beneficial action cannot tell the difference, and should not care. Now, if you think that he should care, tell me why?

 

[Slowlearner]

The English language, beautiful as it is, does not differentiate between the different types of “love”, and this leads to confusion. It is true, that one of the meanings of “love” is the “divine love”, but this usage is by far not the most prominent one.

I had been taught the same thing. It is untrue. I learned this recently reading my Douay-Rheims. 1 John 4:16: “God is charity: and he that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him.” Charity has same meaning as agape.

These days the primary meaning of charity to most people is generosity to those in need. But Webster’s still lists “benevolent goodwill or love of humanity” as first definition.

First assignment before this class discusses agape: Caritas in Veritate

 

[R_Daneel]

I had been taught the same thing. It is untrue. I learned this recently reading my Douay-Rheims. 1 John 4:16: “God is charity: and he that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him.” Charity has same meaning as agape.

These days the primary meaning of charity to most people is generosity to those in need. But Webster’s still lists “benevolent goodwill or love of humanity” as first definition.

First assignment before this class discusses agape: Caritas in Veritate

I don’t see your point. According to Online Webster:

Charity

Noun

1. A foundation created to promote the public good (not for assistance to any particular individuals).
2. A kindly and lenient attitude toward people.
3. An activity or gift that benefits the public at large.
4. Pinnate-leaved European perennial having bright blue or white flowers.
5. An institution set up to provide help to the needy.

Source: WordNet 1.7.1 Copyright © 2001 by Princeton University. All rights reserved.
“Charity” is a name that signifies or is derived from: “the charity”, “a generous love”, “dear”, “beloved”.

Etymology: Charity \Char"i*ty, noun; plural Charities. [French charit['e] from Latin caritas dearness, high regard, love, from carus dear, costly, loved; akin to Sanskrit kam to wish, love, compare to Irish cara a friend, Welsh caru to love. Compare to Caress.].
Specifically concerning the Bible:
Charity (1 Cor. 13), the rendering in the Authorized Version of the word which properly denotes love, and is frequently so rendered (always so in the Revised Version). It is spoken of as the greatest of the three Christian graces (1 Cor. 12:31-13:13). Source: Easton’s 1897 Bible Dictionary.​

None of these definitions have anything to do with “emotional type of love”. They all refer to a spcific type of love, “divine love”, which is perfectly expressed by the word “agape”. Let’s not multiply the synonyms. There is no ambiguity in the definition. The question at hand: “what is the added value of the volition in this concept?”.

 

[Thing]

So we are not privy to that information. Can we agree that apart from that missing information, apart from the creator’s perspective - it simply does not matter if the beings in question act out of “agape” or “epaga”? The recipient of the beneficial action cannot tell the difference, and should not care. Now, if you think that he should care, tell me why?

No, I don’t think we can agree yet. If you leave out the programmer you leave out the programmers meaning in his program and as such you no longer know if your beings action satisfies the programmers intention in the program. Since the correct response, from the programmers perspective is, action motivated by the divine love of the programmer and the programmers divine love of the being; and the incorrect response is an action by the being not motivated by the divine love of the programmer and the programmers divine love of the being.

 

[R_Daneel]

No, I don’t think we can agree yet. If you leave out the programmer you leave out the programmers meaning in his program and as such you no longer know if your beings action satisfies the programmers intention in the program.

Actually I left out the programmer’s part intentionally, for the time being. The beings, who behave in a certain manner, do not even know if their behavior is “programmed” or “natural”. I am concerned with the programmer’s part, too, but only after the interactions of the beings is evaluated. According to you, the programmer’s intentions are hidden from us. Therefore we can only speculate about them. But the behavior of the beings is known. We can evaluate their interactions.

Since the correct response, from the programmers perspective is, action motivated by the divine love of the programmer and the programmers divine love of the being; and the incorrect response is an action by the being not motivated by the divine love of the programmer and the programmers divine love of the being.

Furthermore, the alleged “agape” on the programmers’ part is just an assumption. There is no need for the programmer to have any “feeling” toward the creation, he might be totally indifferent, or driven out of curiosity. This programmer is not related to the Christian God in any particular respect. He is merely the creator of those beings who are exactly like us, with one exception: “they have no moral chioces, but they are programmed to act in an objectively good manner”. They have ample freedom to make amoral choices.

 

[R_Daneel]

Since the correct response, from the programmers perspective is, action motivated by the divine love of the programmer and the programmers divine love of the being; and the incorrect response is an action by the being not motivated by the divine love of the programmer and the programmers divine love of the being.

Let me add something to this. There is no need for the assumption of a programmer. These beings may act instinctively, without having been programmed explicitly. I am not against bringing in a hypothetical programmer with his assumed intentions. But at this moment it is premature. We can imagne to be in this world, and have no insight into the internal “machinery” of its inhabitants. We may assume that some of them act volitionally, and some do not - but cannot decide who belongs to which category. Is there any criterion which would make the volitional acts “superior” to the “instict driven” ones? That is the question, nothing more, nothing less - for the time being. Let’s stick to it.

 

[Thing]

Actually I left out the programmer’s part intentionally, for the time being. The beings, who behave in a certain manner, do not even know if their behavior is “programmed” or “natural”. I am concerned with the programmer’s part, too, but only after the interactions of the beings is evaluated. According to you, the programmer’s intentions are hidden from us. Therefore we can only speculate about them. But the behavior of the beings is known. We can evaluate their interactions.

Furthermore, the alleged “agape” on the programmers’ part is just an assumption. There is no need for the programmer to have any “feeling” toward the creation, he might be totally indifferent, or driven out of curiosity. This programmer is not related to the Christian God in any particular respect. He is merely the creator of those beings who are exactly like us, with one exception: “they have no moral chioces, but they are programmed to act in an objectively good manner”. They have ample freedom to make amoral choices.

I said even if we don’t know the exact and precise intentions of the programmer, meaning that we know at least of the programmers divine love of his beings and their divine love of him, and any correct solution must be consistant with at least that knowledge.

In your second part you have beings who are programmed to make good choices only but apparently can also make amoral choices too. So I am confused.

 

[Thing]

Let me add something to this. There is no need for the assumption of a programmer. These beings may act instinctively, without having been programmed explicitly. I am not against bringing in a hypothetical programmer with his assumed intentions. But at this moment it is premature. We can imagne to be in this world, and have no insight into the internal “machinery” of its inhabitants. We may assume that some of them act volitionally, and some do not - but cannot decide who belongs to which category. Is there any criterion which would make the volitional acts “superior” to the “instict driven” ones? That is the question, nothing more, nothing less - for the time being. Let’s stick to it.

An instinct driven action by creatures assumes a creator of those beings and therfore the beings become a simple extension of the will of their creator, as I said berfore.
A volitional being is not a simple extension of its creator it is like a pro-creator a co-conspirator in producing good effects. Therefore the co-conspirator produces the effect of Divine Love in its fellow and between the conspirators. Is a volitional act superior to an instinctive act, then yes. But from whos point of view - from the beings and its creators point of view. A spectator will see two acts, so what? Any criterion to whom you ask? Maybe one being is more happier than the other…

 

[R_Daneel]

I said even if we don’t know the exact and precise intentions of the programmer, meaning that we know at least of the programmers divine love of his beings and their divine love of him, and any correct solution must be consistant with at least that knowledge.

I think that I used the word “programmed” in quotes when I first mentioned it. It does not have to be taken literally. But even if one assumes a “programmer”, it does not follow that the “programmer” had to act selflessly on behalf of the created ones.

You may assume that there is an “agape” on the part of the programmer, but that is just an unwarranted assumption. Likewise the created ones are not necessarily aware of having been created, so there is no necessary “agape” toward the programmer. Therefore the interpersonal relationships between the created ones can and must be examined without making any reference to the alleged “programmer”. Once that is done, we can expand the scope of scrutiny - if there is a good reason to assume a “programmer”.

In your second part you have beings who are programmed to make good choices only but apparently can also make amoral choices too. So I am confused.

Why is there a cause for confusion? Even if one assumes a programmer, it would be an “overkill” to try and pre-program all the possible scenarios. It would be much easier to create guidelines for the non-important problems and allow some amount of “freedom”.

An instinct driven action by creatures assumes a creator of those beings and therfore the beings become a simple extension of the will of their creator, as I said berfore.

No it does not assume anything of the kind. There are billions of snowflakes and not two of them are alike. That does not point to a snowflake-designer and creator. The instinctive behavior of animals is well explained by natural causes, it does not imply a creator.

Is a volitional act superior to an instinctive act, then yes.

The question is still: “WHY?”. This is what I am asking.

Any criterion to whom you ask?

Both the giver and the recipient.

Maybe one being is more happier than the other…

Your “confused” smiley is proper. “Happiness” is a state of mind. One cannot compare two “happy” persons and try to analyze, which one is “happier”.

 

[tonyrey]

If you were a beggar and some one gave you money as if you were a piece of dirt you would throw it back at him if you had any pride…

Pride is not necessarily sinful because it may be justified. You can take pride in your work and pride in not being a servile sycophant. Many people would choose to wait for the next kind person and go hungry rather than be treated like a piece of dirt.

The beggar has no access to the internal workings of the giver, he only sees a donation. Why should he care about the causes?

There are plenty of outward signs of inward vice. Are you immune to contempt and scorn shown in the expression on a person’s face?

A good deed is not a good deed, regardless of the motivation. An apparently generous deed can be a foul deed…

That would be an interesting theory to prove. You say that an “ontologically good action” is only “really good”, if it is also “morally good”. I am interested in your proof of such a concept.

You are the one who is using the term “ontologically good action”, not I. The morality of an action has three aspects: the motive, the means and the end - any of which may be good or evil. I leave you to work out the permutations… only one of which is good in every respect…