"All truth is relative" = an absolute truth: Why?

[John_Martin]

By “things” you of course mean speech acts (?). A rock is not judged to be either true or not true.

We do judge of form (or concepts) of objects, knowing “what is a rock”, “what is a tree” that would be true for any rock or any tree, so that we will know an individual rock or an individual tree when we meet them. And individually, when we perceive actual objects, we compare (very quickly) the actual object to the forms in our understanding, and we do judge the “truth” of the individual being an individual of a certain form (judgement: “it is true that this individual object is an individual rock (or tree)”, or "it is not true that this is an individual rock (or tree), but it is true that it is a piece of concrete shaped like a rock (or plastic shaped and colored like a tree).).

 

[zerubabel]

We do judge of form (or concepts) of objects, knowing “what is a rock”, “what is a tree” that would be true for any rock or any tree, so that we will know an individual rock or an individual tree when we meet them. And individually, when we perceive actual objects, we compare (very quickly) the actual object to the forms in our understanding, and we do judge the “truth” of the individual being an individual of a certain form (judgement: “it is true that this individual object is an individual rock (or tree)”, or "it is not true that this is an individual rock (or tree), but it is true that it is a piece of concrete shaped like a rock (or plastic shaped and colored like a tree).).

“Rock” is an abstract construct, a representative linguistic sign which only has meaning relative to the material world because a discreet group of people agrees that it does.

The Englishman points to the piece of concrete shaped like a rock and says: “Rock.” The Irishman points to the piece of concrete shaped like a rock and says:“Carraig.”

Both speech acts were untrue. Yet the piece of concrete shaped like a rock was never untrue. It was steadfastly a piece of concrete shaped like a rock throughout all the untruths spoken about it.

BTW I’m not fully convinced of my own theory. I’m fishing for an example of truth/untruth that is not a speech act. Anybody have one?

.

 

[Bradski]

On lying, you seem to go in two different directions. The beginning seems to be consistent with the acceptance of objective morality- “it would be wrong for me to lie right now” will be objectively true or false, depending on the situation.

I say that lying isn’t objectively wrong because it depends on the circumstances. Unlike the fact that there is a pen on my desk. The pen isn’t there* under some circumstances*. No-one has to ask ‘in what sense is it on your desk?’ It’s a fact.

If someone says that lying to gain an unfair advantage is wrong, then the qualification itself renders it to be relative. You can be as specific as you want in regard to lying, giving a very detailed scenario such that everyone would agree. It is then a truth statement, universally agreed. That does not make it a fact.

 

[Peter_Plato]

I say that lying isn’t objectively wrong because it depends on the circumstances. Unlike the fact that there is a pen on my desk. The pen isn’t there* under some circumstances*. No-one has to ask ‘in what sense is it on your desk?’ It’s a fact.

If someone says that lying to gain an unfair advantage is wrong, then the qualification itself renders it to be relative. You can be as specific as you want in regard to lying, giving a very detailed scenario such that everyone would agree. It is then a truth statement, universally agreed. That does not make it a fact.

Your presumption is that only material things can possibly be susceptible to being called “facts.”

2+2 = 4 is a fact about mathematics – in fact, it is called a math fact.

Ergo, “The deliberate distortion of truth is bad or errant," could, in fact, also BE a fact. 1+2=4 is factually untrue (errant) but not sufficiently or significantly untrue to be morally important or “wrong” in a morally relevant sense.

However, lying to convict someone of a crime could very well count as a morally significant untruth or error because it is a morally significant contravention of the FACT that deliberate distortion of the truth is bad – in this case ‘morally’ bad because morally significant.

 

[CommonWeal]

Article 1. Whether truth resides only in the intellect?

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Metaph. vi), “The true and the false reside not in things, but in the intellect.”

Article 5. Whether God is truth?

On the contrary, Our Lord says, “I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life” (John 14:6).

I answer that, As said above (Article 1), truth is found in the intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is; and in things according as they have being conformable to an intellect. This is to the greatest degree found in God. For His being is not only conformed to His intellect, but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of every other intellect, and He Himself is His own existence and act of understanding. Whence it follows not only that truth is in Him, but that He is truth itself, and the sovereign and first truth.

Summa, I, Q.16.

 

[Rhubarb]

When we’re discussing what can be true or not, I think it’s important to get our domain of discourse together. Truth, let alone “absolute” truth is a tricky thing. But a claim like “there is no absolute truth” can be easily contradicted with a simple tautology. p≡p is trivially true, so long as p is in the domain we’re discussing. So there must be SOME truths.

 

[CommonWeal]

When we’re discussing what can be true or not, I think it’s important to get our domain of discourse together. Truth, let alone “absolute” truth is a tricky thing. But a claim like “there is no absolute truth” can be easily contradicted with a simple tautology. p≡p is trivially true, so long as p is in the domain we’re discussing. So there must be SOME truths.

To speak of “truth” as though it were a kind of qualitative thing can lead to serious confusion. As rational creatures, we cannot live without truth, indeed, we cannot escape it, either intellectually or practically. Truth is an objective reality, like “being” itself, that finds its origin in God and which we participate in by our very nature.

 

[Bradski]

A fact is something that stands on it’s own without further qualification. There is a pen on my desk. As long as we agree on the meanings of the words ‘pen’ and ‘desk’ and ‘on’ etc, then no more needs to be said in way of explanation. The statement stands alone. It is a true statement only in the meaning that I am not lying when I make it. There is no ‘truthiness’ about the pen being there.

If you say that killing is wrong, then you immediately have to qualify the statement, therefore rendering it automatically as being a relative concept. Because the statement ‘killing is wrong’ is not valid in all circumstances.

Bradski: How about killing in a war?
Peter: Well, it would have to be justifiable.
Bradski: What if the enemy was no threat?
Peter: Well, he’d have to be a threat.
Bradski: What if he was unarmed?
Peter: No, he’d have to be able to defend himself.
Bradski: Chemical weapon OK?
Peter: No, that’s immoral.
Bradski: Can I just shoot him and leave him to die?
Peter: No, if you get the opportunity, it must be done to minimise suffering.
Bradski: What if she’s 16?
Peter: Ummm, no, not really.

So now you can say that killing is wrong…unless it’s in a justifiable war, and if the enemy is armed, is not female, is over 16 and is killed humanely using conventional weapons. You then declare to the world that we have an objective truth!

So now we have a gazillion of what you call objective truths, all specifically qualified to make sure there aren’t any grey areas and to which everyone can agree. Except that they are all based on relative concepts (it’s wrong if this and if that and only if the other). So it’s not objective in any sense whatsoever.

The old standby used by people like yourself is to say something along the lines of: ‘It is wrong to rape’. You might as well say that it is wrong to stick pins into someone for fun or that it is wrong to beat them with a cricket bat or it is wrong to poke therm in the right eye or throw rocks at them. Another gazillion so called objective truths, which seem to be decided on whether we agree if it’s objectionable. Or in my case, whether harm has been done. Which means that we aren’t talking about specific acts of harm, rather about whether ‘Not causing Harm’ is an objective truth.

Then we are back to qualifying it. It is wrong to kill if…yadda yadda yadda (relative). It is wrong to cause harm if…there are no overall benefits (immunisation, surgery etc) or it isn’t done in self defence or if the other person objects or would object if given the opportunity, or if it’s consensual (sport of some kind).

In the case of rape, what you saying is that it is wrong to cause harm if…yadda yadda yadda (relative). We would all agree with your statement just as we would agree with your one about killing someone (if it was in a justifiable war and this and that etc).

With the pen on the desk, there is no qualification needed. It makes no sense to say that the pen is on the desk if…

But with harm, you need the ‘if’. It is wrong to cause harm if…it constitutes non-consensual sex with another person. Relative.

 

[Peter_Plato]

A fact is something that stands on it’s own without further qualification. There is a pen on my desk. As long as we agree on the meanings of the words ‘pen’ and ‘desk’ and ‘on’ etc, then no more needs to be said in way of explanation. The statement stands alone. It is a true statement only in the meaning that I am not lying when I make it. There is no ‘truthiness’ about the pen being there.

If you say that killing is wrong, then you immediately have to qualify the statement, therefore rendering it automatically as being a relative concept. Because the statement ‘killing is wrong’ is not valid in all circumstances.

Bradski: How about killing in a war?
Peter: Well, it would have to be justifiable.
Bradski: What if the enemy was no threat?
Peter: Well, he’d have to be a threat.
Bradski: What if he was unarmed?
Peter: No, he’d have to be able to defend himself.
Bradski: Chemical weapon OK?
Peter: No, that’s immoral.
Bradski: Can I just shoot him and leave him to die?
Peter: No, if you get the opportunity, it must be done to minimise suffering.
Bradski: What if she’s 16?
Peter: Ummm, no, not really.

So now you can say that killing is wrong…unless it’s in a justifiable war, and if the enemy is armed, is not female, is over 16 and is killed humanely using conventional weapons. You then declare to the world that we have an objective truth!

So now we have a gazillion of what you call objective truths, all specifically qualified to make sure there aren’t any grey areas and to which everyone can agree. Except that they are all based on relative concepts (it’s wrong if this and if that and only if the other). So it’s not objective in any sense whatsoever.

The old standby used by people like yourself is to say something along the lines of: ‘It is wrong to rape’. You might as well say that it is wrong to stick pins into someone for fun or that it is wrong to beat them with a cricket bat or it is wrong to poke therm in the right eye or throw rocks at them. Another gazillion so called objective truths, which seem to be decided on whether we agree if it’s objectionable. Or in my case, whether harm has been done. Which means that we aren’t talking about specific acts of harm, rather about whether ‘Not causing Harm’ is an objective truth.

Then we are back to qualifying it. It is wrong to kill if…yadda yadda yadda (relative). It is wrong to cause harm if…there are no overall benefits (immunisation, surgery etc) or it isn’t done in self defence or if the other person objects or would object if given the opportunity, or if it’s consensual (sport of some kind).

In the case of rape, what you saying is that it is wrong to cause harm if…yadda yadda yadda (relative). We would all agree with your statement just as we would agree with your one about killing someone (if it was in a justifiable war and this and that etc).

With the pen on the desk, there is no qualification needed. It makes no sense to say that the pen is on the desk if…

But with harm, you need the ‘if’. It is wrong to cause harm if…it constitutes non-consensual sex with another person. Relative.

You must have had great fun stringing all those words together into their nearly comprehensible final form. :whacky:

However, you could have saved yourself a great deal of time and effort. The last three sentences would have sufficed.

The presence of an “if” doesn’t make a moral truth claim relative, it makes it contingent upon outcome and a few other variables, which complicate the determination. That is because morality depends not merely on the current state of things (as facts about the physical world do,) but on the potential for alternative and unexpected results that are not determinable beforehand. That would be because moral agency and free will are involved as determiners of outcomes.

The physical order is predictable because it is causal, ergo outcomes are expected because they are consistent

The moral order, however, is dependent upon the actions and intentions of moral agents, the specific circumstances surrounding the act and a variety of other variables that may influence the outcome. It is all those features of moral facts that make them more complex and more difficult to make determinations about their truth value, but does not make moral facts “relative.” Given same motives, same circumstances and same outcomes, the truth value assigned to the moral “fact” would be consistent.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

If someone says that lying to gain an unfair advantage is wrong, then the qualification itself renders it to be relative. You can be as specific as you want in regard to lying, giving a very detailed scenario such that everyone would agree. It is then a truth statement, universally agreed. That does not make it a fact.

In what respect would the statement “We should do good and avoid evil” be a truth, universally agreed upon, but not a fact?

 

[Bradski]

In what respect would the statement “We should do good and avoid evil” be a truth, universally agreed upon, but not a fact?

It isn’t universally agreed upon. I won’t agree to it unless you tell me what you consider to be evil. If it’s using contraception for example, then I don’t agree with your statement. You have to qualify it to explain what you personally mean by it.

Which makes it…relative.

 

[Bradski]

You must have had great fun stringing all those words together into their nearly comprehensible final form.

I can only hope that you are enjoying it as much.

However, you could have saved yourself a great deal of time and effort. The last three sentences would have sufficed.

The presence of an “if” doesn’t make a moral truth claim relative, it makes it contingent upon outcome and a few other variables, which complicate the determination.

Well, here’s a definition of contingent:

‘occurring or existing only if (certain circumstances) are the case; dependent on.’

Note the word ‘if’. Maybe you’ve explained it better than I have. Whether something is moral or not is entirely contingent on the situation. That is, X is wrong if Y. X is relative to Y. If Y is not the situation, then Not X.

I guess you can give very specific examples of a wrong doing, but as I said earlier, you are defining the situation as being relative by having to describe the particular situation. If you still say it’s absolute, then everything would be so. Well, actually, that might be true for you considering your previous arguments that taste and beauty were not relative.

In any case, if something is absolute, then how do you know? It is just obvious? It it a universal agreement? How do you determine it? It really does seem that everything is absolute to you because…

Given same motives, same circumstances and same outcomes, the truth value assigned to the moral “fact” would be consistent.

Maybe instead you could describe how you determine if something is relative.

 

[rossum]

“All truth is relative” = an absolute truth: Why?

Human language is relative, not absolute. A word only has meaning relative to the appropriate dictionary. For example, “elf” means “mythological humanoid” is English; “elf” means 11 in German.

Hence, it is better to say, “All truths expressed in any human language are relative.” Naturally, being expressed in a human language, that sentence is a relative truth, not an absolute truth.

There may possibly be absolute truths, but if there are, then those truths cannot be expressed in any relative human language. Being human, all we can do is to resign ourselves to working with relative truths.

That is not always as bad as it sounds. Providing something is true here and now, then I can work with it. It does not matter much to me if that truth fails in the Andromeda galaxy, or if it fails in 100,000 years time. I am not in the Andromeda galaxy and I will not be alive 100,000 years from now.

Similarly, it may be true that in the Andromeda galaxy it is a grave moral crime to use your 17th tentacle to waderixi your fomeliten. That does not worry me, since I don’t have enough tentacles.

$0.02

rossum

 

[rossum]

2+2 = 4 is a fact about mathematics – in fact, it is called a math fact.

However, it is not an absolute fact but a relative fact. It is relative, among other things, to the number base which is assumed to apply.

“2 + 2 = 4” is meaningless in binary because the symbols “2” and “4” have no meaning in binary.

“2 + 2 = 4” is meaningless in ternary because the symbol “4” has no meaning in ternary. The correct representation in ternary is “2 + 2 = 11”

“2 + 2 = 4” is meaningless in base four because the symbol “4” has no meaning in that base. The correct representation in base four is “2 + 2 = 10”

Only in number bases 5 or greater does the sum “2 + 2 = 4” have the usually assumed meaning.

Of course, I haven’t even started on the possible different meanings given to “+” and “=” in various situations. For instance, “2 + 2 = 22” is valid where “+” means concatenation.

The truth, or not, of “2 + 2 = 4” depends on various ancillary assumptions, which may or may not be correct.

rossum

 

[Peter_Plato]

However, it is not an absolute fact but a relative fact. It is relative, among other things, to the number base which is assumed to apply.

“2 + 2 = 4” is meaningless in binary because the symbols “2” and “4” have no meaning in binary.

“2 + 2 = 4” is meaningless in ternary because the symbol “4” has no meaning in ternary. The correct representation in ternary is “2 + 2 = 11”

“2 + 2 = 4” is meaningless in base four because the symbol “4” has no meaning in that base. The correct representation in base four is “2 + 2 = 10”

Only in number bases 5 or greater does the sum “2 + 2 = 4” have the usually assumed meaning.

Of course, I haven’t even started on the possible different meanings given to “+” and “=” in various situations. For instance, “2 + 2 = 22” is valid where “+” means concatenation.

The truth, or not, of “2 + 2 = 4” depends on various ancillary assumptions, which may or may not be correct.

rossum

Thanks for making my point clear for Bradski. Math facts are relative based upon the number base being used, just as moral facts are relative to the circumstances, motives and ends. Given the base being used, number facts are true without qualification. Likewise, given a proper accounting for motives, circumstance and end goods, moral facts are true without qualification.

Bradski, your example of the fact of the pen being on the desk is likewise “relative.” A primitive human being would comprehend neither the idea of pen or desk. Both of these would be completely foreign to them - which makes the fact of the pen and desk more like a truth since its being understood properly and completely depends on the situation and mindset of the agent attempting to grasp the proposed fact. This is no different than moral agents trying to grasp the moral truth involved in making a decision.

 

[Peter_Plato]

However, it is not an absolute fact but a relative fact.

Whether that is a distinction that makes any difference is debatable. A “relative” fact would be contingent upon other facts for its truth value.

That does not mean it couldn’t be absolutely or necessarily true if the truth it depends upon is necessarily true.

There is an argument for absolute truth in there somewhere.

 

[Bahman]

We are consciousness=absolute truth. :bounce:

 

[Lucy107]

Terms like “absolute truth,” “objective truth,” “scientific fact” and some others are often used as power words; ie. the intent that the speaker of those words has is to gain power over the person he is speaking to.
The psychological momentum of interpersonal powerplay is biggest when using those terms.

 

[rossum]

Whether that is a distinction that makes any difference is debatable. A “relative” fact would be contingent upon other facts for its truth value.

That does not mean it couldn’t be absolutely or necessarily true if the truth it depends upon is necessarily true.

There is an argument for absolute truth in there somewhere.

Any fact stated in a human language is contingent on other facts, at the very least the dictionary for that language.

Since the dictionary for a language is itself written in that same language, then the dictionary is itself contingent. There is no absolute source that we can rely on. All we have are contingent sources written in contingent languages.

There may possibly be absolute truths, however we do not have the required mechanisms to filter those absolute truths from the mass of contingent truths we see expressed in languages.

rossum

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

Ok, so one of the arguments proving absolute truth is the one I just mentioned in the title.

If I were to conclude “There is no absolute truth”, then my conclusion would be self-refuting and would be a statement of absolute truth.

I then realize this and believe absolute truth to be real.

**but what if someone were to ask “Why do you believe that “there is no absolute truth” is an absolute truth?”

What is a good answer I could give that wouldn’t result in an infinite regress, circular argument, or assumption?**

The statement “There is no absolute truth” is self-referentially inconsistent.

My reasoning is as follows.

(1) “There is no absolute truth” is a universal negative proposition.
(2) As a proposition it can be either true or false.
(3) The statement is asserted as a true proposition, i.e., a truth.
(4) As a universal it admits of no exceptions.
(5) An absolute truth is a true proposition that admits of no exceptions.

Yet when tested on itself the universal and exceptionless character of that very proposition itself is denied, and, therefore, its truth as well. In short, the proposition asserts an absolute truth that denies that one can assert an absolute truth.

It suffers from the same self-referential inconsistency as the following:
"All generalizations are useless." But it is a generalization.
"No one can know anything for certain." But you’re claiming to know this for certain.
"There is no truth." But you’re asserting this as a truth.

So “All truth is relative” is a universal affirmative asserted as being true and exceptionless.

If it means all truth is a relation between a knower and the known, it simply states a characteristic of truth. Truth is the correspondence between intellect and thing.

If it means that all convictions, beliefs, or belief systems, are equally true, then the statement itself is a member of that set and may be dismissed as no truer/better than any other.