Alternatives to nominalism and conceptualism?

[Qoeleth]

Following a recent discussion of Ockham, I would like to raise a question.

It seems obvious that names refer to mental concepts. When one thinks of the word “Dog”, one has the concept of a dog-ness. A nominalist or conceptualist position is that such a concept exists only in the mind. Proof of such a position is that there could easily be languages which have several words for ‘dog’ (e.g. a different words/concepts for small dogs and big dogs), or no word for dog (e.g. there may be one word/concept which covers both cats and dogs). Moreover, new words and concepts can easily be invented, such as Letterism, or differance.

Now, the ‘realist’ position asserts that the concepts have some kind of absolute existence, independent of thought and language.

I honestly cannot understand how such a position can be sustained. ‘Where’ do such concepts exist, if not in the mind- in some kind of Platonic ‘World of Forms’, where dog-ness and cat-ness are walking around? Moreover, are there a finite, or an infinite number of possible forms? Is there single form of dog-ness, or is there also a form of poddle-ness, bulldog-ness, etc.? And how do we reconcile such an idea of absolute existence of concepts with the fact that language can easily make new concepts and fuse or alter existing ones?

If anyone can provide a plausible alternative to nominalism and/or conceptualism, I would be most interested…

 

[andreashofer]

You have a great imagination. That is what Adam had when he named all the animals and beasts on the planet.

I believe that the likeness of dogs (species) is well defined and bundled into the term: “Dog” (kind). When we say “dog- ness” we will find like- minded people that identify it with “like- ness of a dog”, which doesn’t make it strong and absolute. A dog is a dog, without relativism. It is absolutely a dog.
In this perspective we have to stick to our ancestors “language” that taught us to call dogs nothing but dogs. And the other “languages”? Maybe a result of division: The tower of Babel.
Man wanted to lift himself up higher than God and make up his own laws and doctrines, precepts and statutes, that fit their personal agenda.

Why would I not want to be simply a child of God, humble and contrite of heart?

LUKE 10: 21-23
{10:21} In the same hour, he exulted in the Holy Spirit, and he said: “I confess to you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because you have hidden these things from the wise and the prudent, and have revealed them to little ones. It is so, Father, because this way was pleasing before you.
{10:22} All things have been delivered to me by my Father. And no one knows who the Son is, except the Father, and who the Father is, except the Son, and those to whom the Son has chosen to reveal him.”
{10:23} And turning to his disciples, he said: “Blessed are the eyes that see what you see.

Everything else is just: “Bla, bla, bla” for the sake of “Bla, bla, bla”

 

[Taestron]

As long as we say that the name of something is only a symbol of the form and not the form itself, I don’t see how the variance of languages proves the issue one way or the other. Personally, I think that forms only exist in the mind, but since God must be part of the equation, these have a greater sort of existence than in your standard nominalism.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Following a recent discussion of Ockham, I would like to raise a question.

It seems obvious that names refer to mental concepts. When one thinks of the word “Dog”, one has the concept of a dog-ness. A nominalist or conceptualist position is that such a concept exists only in the mind. Proof of such a position is that there could easily be languages which have several words for ‘dog’ (e.g. a different words/concepts for small dogs and big dogs), or no word for dog (e.g. there may be one word/concept which covers both cats and dogs). Moreover, new words and concepts can easily be invented, such as Letterism, or differance.

Now, the ‘realist’ position asserts that the concepts have some kind of absolute existence, independent of thought and language.

I honestly cannot understand how such a position can be sustained. ‘Where’ do such concepts exist, if not in the mind- in some kind of Platonic ‘World of Forms’, where dog-ness and cat-ness are walking around? Moreover, are there a finite, or an infinite number of possible forms? Is there single form of dog-ness, or is there also a form of poddle-ness, bulldog-ness, etc.? And how do we reconcile such an idea of absolute existence of concepts with the fact that language can easily make new concepts and fuse or alter existing ones?

If anyone can provide a plausible alternative to nominalism and/or conceptualism, I would be most interested…

The Moderate Realism of St. Thomas. A good place to start would be The Last Superstition by Edward Feser ( skip pg 146 - Doctors and Nurses only). If you can get a copy of The Philosophy of Human Nature by George P Klubertanz, S.J., it is excellent.
Basically your concepts are abstracted from the forms of species as they exist in nature (i.e. dogness, duckness, humanness, living, non-living, etc). The concepts you have of the abstracted forms are real, they exist in your mind as concepts or ideas but as real forms in nature. You can think about them and compare them to other forms reaching certain Truths about reality. You can discuss these concepts and conclusions or thoughts with other people. These thoughts are real and true in the sense at least that they exist in your mind, although the conclusions you reach may be false.

Take the concept of the Triangle for instance, an enclosed three sided figure. You got this concept by abstracting it from things in nature which had this quality. The concept will be used by you in geometry class or in identifying forms in reality which have the form of a triangle. Although each one of the realities in nature conforms to your concept in irregular ways. Some will be Right Triangles, some Isosceles, etc. But the basic concept will always exist in your mind.