An Argument for Newman's illative sense

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Birdmanman

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Here is my (in progress) argument in favor of Blessed Cardinal Newman’s illative sense. It basically says, until one knows an entirely self-evident argument/reason for why the illative sense is false, one must necessarily hold the illative sense to be true (or else, refrain from judging whether the illative sense is true or false). I will be grateful if anyone would provide feedback, critique, or outright shut this argument down.
  1. Something that cannot possibly be reasonably (justifiably) held as false must be held as true, and when held as true, is reasonably held as true. (Premise)
  2. The evidences and arguments provided by induction alone are each in themselves merely probable (Premise)
  3. Knowledge is justified true belief. [Throughout, ‘to believe’ is synonymous with ‘to hold’] (Premise)
  4. A proposition is only reasonably held to be true if it is justified to be held to be true. (Premise)
  5. If, in order for a proposition to be reasonably held to be true, the contrary proposition must also be held to be true, then the former proposition cannot possibly be reasonably held to be true. (Premise)
  6. Newman’s Illative Sense says we are justified in holding a proposition as true that has in its support an accumulation of evidences and arguments, even if the evidences and arguments for the proposition each in themselves are merely probable. (Definition)
  7. If it is reasonably (justifiably) held to be true that the Illative Sense is false, this proposition (‘the Illative Sense is false’) is only either (S) supported by at least one known self-evident truth, or knowledge that has been strictly deduced from self-evident truth, or (~S) is supported only by inductive evidences and arguments. (Disjunction)
  8. It is not known to be a self-evident truth, and not known to be strictly deduced from self-evident truth, that the proposition (‘The Illative Sense is false’) is true. (S) is false.
  9. (From 6 and 7) Therefore, it must be that if the proposition (‘The Illative Sense is false’) is to be held true, its justification must lie only in inductive evidences and arguments.
  10. (From 2 and 7) This means its justification is based upon evidences and arguments that are each in themselves merely probable.
  11. (From 4 and 3 and 9) The proposition (‘The Illative Sense is false’) cannot be reasonably be held to be true.
  12. (From 1 and 10) The proposition “The Illative Sense is True” must be held to be true.
 
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