An objection to the 5th way

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Matthias123

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The fifth way:
The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.
I came up with this objection myself, and with my current knowledge of physics and philosophy, I cannot refute it. I would appreciate some help/

Here is the objection:

It would seem that intelligence is not necessary for the movement of agents towards fixed or similar ends, as some events are physically impossible, such as the creation or destruction of energy, or the predictability of the location of particles at the quantum level. These physical impossibilities restrict the possible outcomes of the interactions between physical bodies. Therefore it follows that the similar or fixed ends of agents could be the result of physical necessity and not intelligence.

Here is as far as I got on a rebuttal:

If it is possible that intelligence is necessary for the movement of agents towards a fixed end, there exists a possible world where it is necessary for an intelligence to move agents towards a fixed ends. Since the truth that intelligence is necessary would be broadly logically necessary, the refutation of this truth would be self-contradictory, as what is self-contradictory in a possible world, it is contradictory in all possible worlds. Therefore if it is possibly necessary for the movement of agents towards a fixed end to be caused by intelligence.

Yes I used the S5 axiom. 🙂
 
I think what he meant by “end” is “purposeful or intentional end”. Thus your objection from physics is void.

Of course, he presumes “purpose” which makes his argument unsound. Without first providing a foundation for purpose, his 5th way is meaningless.
 
It would seem that intelligence is not necessary for the movement of agents towards fixed or similar ends, as some events are physically impossible, such as the creation or destruction of energy, or the predictability of the location of particles at the quantum level. These physical impossibilities restrict the possible outcomes of the interactions between physical bodies. Therefore it follows that the similar or fixed ends of agents could be the result of physical necessity and not intelligence.
But, isn’t placing boundaries on what’s possible in the first place requires intelligence?
 
Fifth way:
We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result.
The quoted text has no meaning. How does a piece of rock “act” to obtain the “best result”? What kind of “end” is there for a rock? The “fifth way” is just as nonsensical as the others - well, maybe even worse. 🙂
 
The quoted text has no meaning. How does a piece of rock “act” to obtain the “best result”? What kind of “end” is there for a rock? The “fifth way” is just as nonsensical as the others - well, maybe even worse. 🙂
Spock, the problem with metaphysics from the 13th century is that the terminology that is used is very different from what we use today. This is why many modern thomists are analytic thomists. It does have meaning, but you need to know the terms.

I want to see more thomsits take a stab that this
 
Here is as far as I got on a rebuttal:

If it is possible that intelligence is necessary for the movement of agents towards a fixed end,
Yes, then intelligence is necessary by S5. Your opponent would simply deny this premise though. If it is **possible **that movements of agents can occur towards a fixed end without intelligence, then it is not possible that intelligence is necessary.
 
Yes, then intelligence is necessary by S5. Your opponent would simply deny this premise though. If it is **possible **that movements of agents can occur towards a fixed end without intelligence, then it is not possible that intelligence is necessary.
The possibility of not having intelligence being necessary would imply that there is no possibility for intelligence being necessary.

As possibly not necessary P, implies not necessary P, and not necessary P would imply not possibly necessary P. Therefore it would not be possibly necessary for an intelligence moving things to fixed or similar ends.

This is more of a wedge tactic to start a rebuttal. Then all I have to do is prove that it is possible.
 
It would seem that intelligence is not necessary for the movement of agents towards fixed or similar ends, as some events are physically impossible, such as the creation or destruction of energy, or the predictability of the location of particles at the quantum level. These physical impossibilities restrict the possible outcomes of the interactions between physical bodies. Therefore it follows that the similar or fixed ends of agents could be the result of physical necessity and not intelligence.
To be honest, i think a good teleological arguement would require a whole book; so consider this as just a quick point about what i think the basis of a good teleological arguement should be.

We should not try to disprove that things move toward purposeful ends out of physical necessity. It is not that a thing can move to an end out of natural necessity that we must consider, because this is true regardless of whether or not we consider Gods existence. But it is rather, that things move toward ends that are purposeful, i.e, the eye is as such that it sees in connection to a nervous system which can give functionality to a conscious mind that can respond to its environment through various sensory perceptions and emotional feelings which are as such that they are interactive with an “objective reality”. These functions are meaningfully linked to each other to such an extent as to inspire the idea that there is an ultimate purpose behind them; and so it is at least reasonable to believe it, even if there is no absolute proof of it. That we feel fear in the presence of an objective danger, is not something that can be reduced to clock work mechanisms, but rather it is understandable in terms of purpose,**** that fear exists for the purpose of warning us of an objective danger, when we consider that nature is blind****. Even more so when we consider that all of this requires objectively meaningful information in order to work, since physical events are blind. We must also understand that it is true of physical events that there are principles of functionality in nature that are not caused but reside in nature itself waiting to be actualised. This “truth” that we find in nature, is transcendent of physical causes and is yet at the same time reliant on physical events inorder to achieve actuality. When we consider such qualities in respect of truth, we must understand such a truth as being transcendent of physical causes since physics cannot create “necessary” truth. It can only create contingent truths in so far “actuality” is concerned. But that it creates a brain, and that the principle of the brain is reliant on other functions in order to work, one can only say that this is necessarily true of the physical order so long as physical reality exists, and yet it is not “caused” by the physical order; but is instead a product of a necessary truth, given the proposition that out of nothing comes nothing.

If one can show that the first cause is not one and the same nature as the dynamic reality that we called the physical order, then we can prove that things move toward principled ends not just out of the necessity of nature, but because the first cause has has intelligently created the fundamental principles and qualities which we find in nature, with out which, there would be no reason for there to be such a thing as a “nervous system” or “consciousness”. One is obviously going to reply that i haven’t shown this, but just asserted it. But consider this: If physical reality is caused, then we are necessarily left with something that is not physical, and if physical principles are only meaningful in regards to the existence of physical events, then where does all this meaningful information come from that a being should feel emotional or have an opinion about something? We certainly cannot say these qualities “exist” because of the interactions of physical events, since out of nothing comes nothing, and in order for nature to function in a manner that we see in biological organisms, we have to say that this information exists within the physical order of things. Necessity alone therefore doesn’t work, because the principles exists alongside or in physical events, not before; and if one is so in love with naturalism as to say that the principles existed before, then in what sense can one say “before” if physical reality is not eternal and is not the fundamental basis of existence? Are these principles perhaps eternal abstract realities, perhaps the ideas of an eternal being?

This is not the Aquinas’s teleological arguement, or even an arguement as such, but rather an attempt to put things in a perspective where i think a genuine teleological argument is possible. I think the fact that Aquinas leaves the teleological arguement for last is telling of the fact that we first have to consider beings as beings, before we can move on to whether they are caused by an intelligent being. The fact that Aquinas says at the end of each arguement that this is what we understand as God, is not really reflective of what he believes to be proven by the arguement, but rather that a “necessary being”, as such, is what Christians mean by God.

I think Aquinas was fully aware that the first 4 ways were building up to number five and are not to be considered apart from each other.

I can’t really give you the kind of arguement that i want to give you at this point in time, and i think that a proper arguement cannot be given in the short manner that Aquinas has given them since there are so much more to consider; and to be quite honest, Aquinas as i understand him, had a metaphysical system that cannot be understood merely by looking at the five ways. But hopefully this will point you in the right direction of what is needed in order to make a better arguement.
 
I thought that i would just post this again just in case you missed it.

That we feel fear in the presence of an objective danger is not something that can be reduced to clock work mechanisms, but rather it is understandable in terms of purpose since fear often if not always corresponds to an objective danger or the belief that one is going to be harmed; and this is also present in most animals with a lesser to no understanding of death or harm. Thus one can reasonably believe, given the experience of fear, that fear exists for the purpose of warning us of an objective danger. Thus one can also believe that physical reality was created for a purpose
 
The possibility of not having intelligence being necessary would imply that there is no possibility for intelligence being necessary.

As possibly not necessary P, implies not necessary P, and not necessary P would imply not possibly necessary P. Therefore it would not be possibly necessary for an intelligence moving things to fixed or similar ends.
That is correct.
This is more of a wedge tactic to start a rebuttal. Then all I have to do is prove that it is possible.
If you succeed without conflating epistemic with logical or ontological possibility, I’d be very interested.
 
That is correct.

If you succeed without conflating epistemic with logical or ontological possibility, I’d be very interested.
Well, I will see what I can do. Because in conjunction with the cosmological argument, I could require one to accept the cosmological argument, untill physics has broken such an argument with certainty.
 
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