ā¦Are we equating ārational soulā with ārational mindā? (All humans may have ārational soulsā but their minds, well, thatās another matter, as you say

) I donāt think we have to go so far as to say that a creature must have a rational mind to have a spiritual or immaterial soul. I donāt think itās really necessary. I donāt think itās even necessary to insist that animals have consciousness to have an immaterial soul. That animals have souls is a given. Now, the Church makes no distinction between animals: āOh, well, primates seem rational, so they have souls, but insects donāt seem rational, so they have no souls.ā Let me repeat that. The Church makes no distinction between which animals have souls and which do not (assuming some do not). The reason why God purportedly chose to make human souls eternal and animal souls transitory eludes me. I cannot find such reasoning anywhere in Catholic documentation so far. Logically, it makes no sense. Wouldnāt it have been āeasierā (taken less of His energy) to create only one kind of soul and place it in all creatures? Even if one rejects this rationale, how can one argue that God cannot create as many different kinds of immortal souls as there are different creatures? (To do so would be heresy, implying that God is not omnipotent) Personally, I cannot see how saying that an animal has an immortal soul would deny or contradict anything in Catholic belief. And itās not like the Church would have to edit thousands of official texts if she changed her belief. She would, however, have to modify some of her attitudes about animal cruelty and welfare.
Some great responses here thanks.
Also, the more considered responses below suggest my intuition may be correct that the Church doesnāt actually have much to say either way on this topic. Of course Aquinas (whom I majored in for my philosophy degree long ago) would disagree because his philosophic system rests on the premise that the eternity of a soul depends on what powers that soul possesses. (If it possesses intellectual powers in addition to nutritive and sensory then it is by definition imperishable). However, as many have rightly stated, the Church has christened the Thomistic Corpus but not necessarily canonised it

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I really was surprised that some think the raising of this question ludicrous. If we will one day live in a new heaven and a new earth that does appear to admit the possibility of trees, gardens and rivers and fish inhabiting that world.
Whether my very same pet goldfish has to be there I do not know. If I would be a little unhappy without it then I suppose it will have to be there otherwise I wouldnāt be in heaven! But I was really talking about the personal imperishability of animals much closer to us.
Which raises the question of what truly is the basis for the imperishability of the human person.
āSoulā talk is one well worn way (Greek philosophy) of āexplainingā this doctrine of our faith. No doubt there could be other ways of expressing this teaching. Buddhism speaks of an ongoing flow of karmic causality which westerners still havenāt got their heads around because we still think Greek philosophy even if we donāt know it. There is continuity of "identity beyond death in that Buddhist thinking but it is not the same sort of āidentityā that the West is familiar with. That, it seems to me, is why Buddhists deny the existernce of āsoulā. Not because there isnāt continuity of identity beyond death but because there is no continuity of Western personality (āmeā). I think Scholastics could agree. The āconsciousnessā of a disembodied soul is not what most of us might imagine it to be. We could have very different āpersonalitiesā as well. Anways I am going of topic here.
**Are we equating ārational soulā with ārational mindā? **This is prob a language thing more than a philosophic issue. For Scholastics I believe there is no distinction. All mindās are rational by definition and are possessed by a species that has a rational soul . There is a bit of a difficulty though between brain (the organ) and mind (the spiritual faculty of the human soul). If oneās biology (brain) is impaired (even if through lack of education) then the rational mind cannot operate well.
There is also the difficulty of assuming, by induction, that ALL humans must have rational souls because the majority of them evidence rational behaviour.
"I donāt think we have to go so far as to say that a creature must have a rational mind to have a spiritual or immaterial soul. "
This is pretty much the hypothesis I was putting out here. Scholastics always identify imperishability of a soul if that soul has the powers of intellect (mind) and will.
I think there could be other views (eg simply the will of God that only the human race has been given this gift - even if dolphins might be rational animals too). If God can single out the Jews to be His People why cannot he single out humans for special treatment?
I have always found the use of the phrase āimmaterial soulā problematic.
It suggests there can be a āmaterial soulā. I donāt believe either Aristotle or Aquinas ever used such expressions either. I believe āmaterial soulā is a contradiction in terms.
All souls by definition are spiritual (ie composed of no matter). The distinction between animal and human souls is perhaps more to do with the spiritual power of self-subsistance. Animal souls, allegedly, cannot self-subsist because they do not have this additional level of vitality. Human souls, allegedly do, as is evidenced by free-will and intellection.
I agree with others that the perishability of animals (if true) still does not mean we can treat them as we wish. God called us to stewardship.