Animals: Is it of Faith that they are perishable?

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Again, both Christ and the Holy Church have left animal afterlife an open question. So we have to content ourselves with that.

I do believe though, that for at least some species, it would be a shame if God chose to waste so much affection :)šŸ™‚

ICXC NIKA
 
ā€¦Are we equating ā€œrational soulā€ with ā€œrational mindā€? (All humans may have ā€œrational soulsā€ but their minds, well, thatā€™s another matter, as you say šŸ˜ƒ ) I donā€™t think we have to go so far as to say that a creature must have a rational mind to have a spiritual or immaterial soul. I donā€™t think itā€™s really necessary. I donā€™t think itā€™s even necessary to insist that animals have consciousness to have an immaterial soul. That animals have souls is a given. Now, the Church makes no distinction between animals: ā€œOh, well, primates seem rational, so they have souls, but insects donā€™t seem rational, so they have no souls.ā€ Let me repeat that. The Church makes no distinction between which animals have souls and which do not (assuming some do not). The reason why God purportedly chose to make human souls eternal and animal souls transitory eludes me. I cannot find such reasoning anywhere in Catholic documentation so far. Logically, it makes no sense. Wouldnā€™t it have been ā€œeasierā€ (taken less of His energy) to create only one kind of soul and place it in all creatures? Even if one rejects this rationale, how can one argue that God cannot create as many different kinds of immortal souls as there are different creatures? (To do so would be heresy, implying that God is not omnipotent) Personally, I cannot see how saying that an animal has an immortal soul would deny or contradict anything in Catholic belief. And itā€™s not like the Church would have to edit thousands of official texts if she changed her belief. She would, however, have to modify some of her attitudes about animal cruelty and welfare.
Some great responses here thanks.

Also, the more considered responses below suggest my intuition may be correct that the Church doesnā€™t actually have much to say either way on this topic. Of course Aquinas (whom I majored in for my philosophy degree long ago) would disagree because his philosophic system rests on the premise that the eternity of a soul depends on what powers that soul possesses. (If it possesses intellectual powers in addition to nutritive and sensory then it is by definition imperishable). However, as many have rightly stated, the Church has christened the Thomistic Corpus but not necessarily canonised it :D.

I really was surprised that some think the raising of this question ludicrous. If we will one day live in a new heaven and a new earth that does appear to admit the possibility of trees, gardens and rivers and fish inhabiting that world.

Whether my very same pet goldfish has to be there I do not know. If I would be a little unhappy without it then I suppose it will have to be there otherwise I wouldnā€™t be in heaven! But I was really talking about the personal imperishability of animals much closer to us.

Which raises the question of what truly is the basis for the imperishability of the human person.

ā€œSoulā€ talk is one well worn way (Greek philosophy) of ā€œexplainingā€ this doctrine of our faith. No doubt there could be other ways of expressing this teaching. Buddhism speaks of an ongoing flow of karmic causality which westerners still havenā€™t got their heads around because we still think Greek philosophy even if we donā€™t know it. There is continuity of "identity beyond death in that Buddhist thinking but it is not the same sort of ā€œidentityā€ that the West is familiar with. That, it seems to me, is why Buddhists deny the existernce of ā€œsoulā€. Not because there isnā€™t continuity of identity beyond death but because there is no continuity of Western personality (ā€œmeā€). I think Scholastics could agree. The ā€œconsciousnessā€ of a disembodied soul is not what most of us might imagine it to be. We could have very different ā€œpersonalitiesā€ as well. Anways I am going of topic here.

**Are we equating ā€œrational soulā€ with ā€œrational mindā€? **This is prob a language thing more than a philosophic issue. For Scholastics I believe there is no distinction. All mindā€™s are rational by definition and are possessed by a species that has a rational soul . There is a bit of a difficulty though between brain (the organ) and mind (the spiritual faculty of the human soul). If oneā€™s biology (brain) is impaired (even if through lack of education) then the rational mind cannot operate well.

There is also the difficulty of assuming, by induction, that ALL humans must have rational souls because the majority of them evidence rational behaviour.

"I donā€™t think we have to go so far as to say that a creature must have a rational mind to have a spiritual or immaterial soul. "
This is pretty much the hypothesis I was putting out here. Scholastics always identify imperishability of a soul if that soul has the powers of intellect (mind) and will.
I think there could be other views (eg simply the will of God that only the human race has been given this gift - even if dolphins might be rational animals too). If God can single out the Jews to be His People why cannot he single out humans for special treatment?

I have always found the use of the phrase ā€œimmaterial soulā€ problematic.
It suggests there can be a ā€œmaterial soulā€. I donā€™t believe either Aristotle or Aquinas ever used such expressions either. I believe ā€œmaterial soulā€ is a contradiction in terms.
All souls by definition are spiritual (ie composed of no matter). The distinction between animal and human souls is perhaps more to do with the spiritual power of self-subsistance. Animal souls, allegedly, cannot self-subsist because they do not have this additional level of vitality. Human souls, allegedly do, as is evidenced by free-will and intellection.

I agree with others that the perishability of animals (if true) still does not mean we can treat them as we wish. God called us to stewardship.
 
Iā€™ve pondered these questions as well. Clearly, our relationship to animals is closer then previously thought due to the discovery of evolution. I donā€™t have any strong position on this but I will lay out my current thoughts.

(a) I havenā€™t found anything either. However, despite accepting evolution, the church still recognizes that humans are unique in being made in the image of God, meaning that we have an intellect and a will capable of coming to know and love God. Humans can choose to glorify God by cooperating with his grace but animals glorify him by their mere existence. Nevertheless, I think it would be amiss to say that animals have a complete lack of intellect and will.

(b) Iā€™m not so sure, though Iā€™m no expert on Aristotle. In De Anima he writes that if there is a function of the soul that is not an actuality of the body, it can survive without it.

(c) Not that I am aware of.

(d) I donā€™t know of any scholastic philosopher who held that animals have immortal souls so it would be a difficult case to make. The point I think they would make is that humans have a rational nature even if they are not developed enough to express it, or perhaps canā€™t express it due to some impairment.
Thanks.
Re
(b) I think you may find this is a Christian interpretation of a ambiguous text which disapassionate philosophers regard as a bridge too far.
(d) You are right. The point I am really making is whether Scholastic philosophy could, without logical contradiction, make room for this view if neo-scholastics today decided to take this angle.

The modern more empirical approach would have difficulty with the statement. Yes Ochamā€™s razor would suggest that ā€œdeficitā€ principles should be invoked to explain why a minority of a given species do not exhibit the ā€œnatureā€ that all members of the species are meant to exhibit. (The principle of Exemplar induction to define a species). However there are other (less likely and more complicated) ways of explaining the same empirical observations that could be the case too which could arrive at different understanding of ā€œhuman nature.ā€
 
Iā€™m not sure that rational mind and rational soul are separable except by language.

In French, there is no word for mind, and the word Ć¢me, (soul) or esprit, (spirit) are used in place of mind.

In English, we distinguish soul from mind, because soul is equated with life (the whole body) while mind resides in the human head. But even then, especially with roots from other languages, we conflate them. For example, psychology literally means ā€œsoul studyā€ but is used to mean mind study.

Of course, the use of a rational mind depends on a live and functional head; as anybody who has suffered cerebral anoxia or a knock on the head has experienced.

But given a working head, rational human soul and rational human mind are inseparable.

ICXC NIKA.
 
Thanks.
Re
(b) I think you may find this is a Christian interpretation of a ambiguous text which disapassionate philosophers regard as a bridge too far.
(d) You are right. The point I am really making is whether Scholastic philosophy could, without logical contradiction, make room for this view if neo-scholastics today decided to take this angle.

The modern more empirical approach would have difficulty with the statement. Yes Ochamā€™s razor would suggest that ā€œdeficitā€ principles should be invoked to explain why a minority of a given species do not exhibit the ā€œnatureā€ that all members of the species are meant to exhibit. (The principle of Exemplar induction to define a species). However there are other (less likely and more complicated) ways of explaining the same empirical observations that could be the case too which could arrive at different understanding of ā€œhuman nature.ā€
(b) Perhaps, but he does seem to leave open the possibility. I donā€™t have De Anima in front of me right now, but I believe he briefly brings this up around 413a.
(d) I donā€™t see why not. Hopefully if the topic is given more consideration the tradition will evolve. Not much has been said about it by neo-scholastics as far as I know.

I donā€™t know about Aristotle, but I think Aquinas believed as you say, that souls are essentially immaterial. A lot of philosophers had this idea of ā€œspiritual matterā€ because matter is the principle of potency and form is the principle of actuality. Since only God is pure act, the angels must be beings composed of some sort of matter. Aquinas agreed that only God is pure act but nevertheless held that angles are pure form containing a mixture of potency by participating in existence, which is the actuality of essence. He basically added existence to the metaphysical discussion.
 
I donā€™t know about Aristotle, but I think Aquinas believed as you say, that souls are essentially immaterial. A lot of philosophers had this idea of ā€œspiritual matterā€ because matter is the principle of potency and form is the principle of actuality. Since only God is pure act, the angels must be beings composed of some sort of matter. Aquinas agreed that only God is pure act but nevertheless held that angles are pure form containing a mixture of potency by participating in existence, which is the actuality of essence. He basically added existence to the metaphysical discussion.
Thanks for the insights here.
I agree that ā€œspiritual matterā€ could be a valid way of dealing with the potency that must be in angelic forms. However, for this approach to be completely consisent, this suggests that most of the Thomistic terms we are familiar with (eg matter/form, essence/existence, sustance/accidents, soul/body etc) may have to be subtley reedefined essentially making for a different philsophical system from Thomism. This essentially is what Bonaventure does I believe.

If there can be spiritual matter perhaps there could be a ā€œmaterial formā€ (which I suppose is what is meant by ā€œmaterial soulā€)? Its not Aquinas but its a valid enough system I suppose if all the other linked terms are correctly defined.
 
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