There is no doubt that PJPII position on the death penalty qualifies as a prudential judgement. However, it was also unreasoned and was improperly used to affect the Catechism.
This requires a response. The more I see of the postings that follow that to which I now respond, the clearer is this need.
His Holiness’s rejection of un-necessary executions was a matter of Faith and Morals.
What may be prudential was his judgement of what is necessary.
He was not rolling out the Old Testament, to call for ‘an eye for an eye’, indeed he seemingly rejected any theological requirement for capital punishment.
He was basing necessity purely upon the requirement of defence of the population.
PJPII argued that the death penalty was not needed for a defense of society. However, he never looked at the risk to innocents without the death penalty. Innocents are more at risk when we allow murderers to live. Therefore, the defense of society should call for more executions.
This indeed was a prudential judgement, which seemingly is in error.
Some so-called civilised nations still prefer to live in the judicial dark-ages.
Thus his Holiness incorrectly judged certain countries to be civilised.
That was his prudential error.
PJPII’s position spares guilty murderers at the cost of sacrificing more innocents, a position totally at odds with fundamental Catholic principles.
NOTE: Because innocents are at risk of executions, some wrongly presume that innocents are better protectedimplementing a life without parole sentence, instead.
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Whatmany forget to do is weigh the risk to innocents within a life sentence. When doing that, we find that innocents are more at risk with a life sentence.
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First, we all know that living murderers, in prison, after escape or after our failures to incarcerate them, are much more likely to harm and murder, again, than are executed murderers.*
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Secondly, no knowledgeable party questions that the death penalty has the most extensive due process protections in US criminal law.
Therefore, it is logically conclusive, thatactual innocents are more likely to be sentenced tolife imprisonmentand more likely to die in prison serving under that sentence, that it is that an actual innocent will be executed.
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Thirdly, 15 recent studies, inclusive of their defenses, find for death penalty deterrence. Somebelieve that all studies with contrary findings negate those 10 studies. They don’t.*Studies which don’t find for deterrence don’t say no one is deterred, but that they cannot measure those deterred, if they are.
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Ask yourself: “What prospect of a negative outcome doesn’t deter some?” There isn’t one, although committed anti death penalty folk may say the death penalty is the only one. However, the premier anti death penalty scholar accepts it as a given that the death penalty is a deterrent, but does not believe it to be a greater deterrent than a life sentence. I find the evidence compelling that death is feared more than life - even in prison.
In choosing to end the death penalty, or in choosing not implement it,some havechosen to put more innocents at risk.
I do not pretend that the answer is simple.
I accept that it may be necessary to permantly disable certain individuals from ever re-entering free society, and that under these circumstances, euthanasia makes sense. A rabid dog is not shot out of hatred, or because it has bitten, and so condemned a human to a vile death, but it is euthanased,
1/ because it is lethally dangerous, and,
2/ because if allowed to live out its diseased natural life it will suffer unbearably.
Likewise, any ‘rabid’ human should be either euthanased, or given the opportunity to sacrifice his/her life in a useful manner.
The euthanasia should not be carried out with the pomp of a vengeful execution, but in quiet calm mutual consent, using the method found in Holland and Switzerland, a drink containing a powerful anesthetic cocktail.
Strapping the victim to a crucifix, and inserting needles and drips insults both medicine and the Cross.