P
polytropos
Guest
(1) Something exists (in the actual world a). (premise)
(2) Possibly, no contingent being should exist (in a possible world w). (premise)
(3) For any contingent but actual state of affairs, possibly there exists some other state of affairs which would have caused or prevented it. (principle of hetero-explicability)
(4) Possibly, there is an explanation of the nonexistent contingent beings in w (which are actual in a). (from (2), (3))
(5) The explanation in (4) is not contingent. (from (2), (4))
(6) Possibly, there exists a necessary being. (from (5))
(7) There exists a necessary being. (from (6), axiom S5)
Here is a shot at a modal argument.
Its main presupposition is (3), the principle of hetero-explicability, which is a very weak version of the principle of sufficient reason which holds that if a state of affairs is contingent, then it is possible that it has an explanation. (So its falsity would require not just that some contingent state of affairs does not have an explanation, but that it could not have an explanation in principle–which is a tall order, in my opinion.) The explanation is a state of affairs that accounts for the existence or non-existence of a contingent state of affairs, but the explanation needs to be existent (actual). I cannot, for instance, account for the non-existence of unicorns by appeal to an explanation that sorcerers did not create any unicorns, since sorcerers do not exist either (though they may be contingent) and would therefore require an explanation. I can say, however, that there is some possible world in which the non-existence of unicorns is explained by the fact that bears killed all of the unicorn’s evolutionary ancestors.
The argument also makes use of S5.
I have not really thought about what I would/could do to show that the necessary being is God. I’m not really worried about that, at the moment.
(2) Possibly, no contingent being should exist (in a possible world w). (premise)
(3) For any contingent but actual state of affairs, possibly there exists some other state of affairs which would have caused or prevented it. (principle of hetero-explicability)
(4) Possibly, there is an explanation of the nonexistent contingent beings in w (which are actual in a). (from (2), (3))
(5) The explanation in (4) is not contingent. (from (2), (4))
(6) Possibly, there exists a necessary being. (from (5))
(7) There exists a necessary being. (from (6), axiom S5)
Here is a shot at a modal argument.
Its main presupposition is (3), the principle of hetero-explicability, which is a very weak version of the principle of sufficient reason which holds that if a state of affairs is contingent, then it is possible that it has an explanation. (So its falsity would require not just that some contingent state of affairs does not have an explanation, but that it could not have an explanation in principle–which is a tall order, in my opinion.) The explanation is a state of affairs that accounts for the existence or non-existence of a contingent state of affairs, but the explanation needs to be existent (actual). I cannot, for instance, account for the non-existence of unicorns by appeal to an explanation that sorcerers did not create any unicorns, since sorcerers do not exist either (though they may be contingent) and would therefore require an explanation. I can say, however, that there is some possible world in which the non-existence of unicorns is explained by the fact that bears killed all of the unicorn’s evolutionary ancestors.
The argument also makes use of S5.
I have not really thought about what I would/could do to show that the necessary being is God. I’m not really worried about that, at the moment.