Another modal cosmological argument

[punkforchrist]

R Daneel:

We are going in circles. It is not the point that we, in this actual world can make correct propositions about a hypothetical world. Certainly we can. But in that hypothetical world there are NO propositions. And that is what we did agree upon at the beginning. Are you repudiating that agreement?

I’m agreeing with you for the sake of argument. I also believe that abstract objects exist as necessary concepts of the mind of God.

More importantly, though, a proposition can have meaning even assuming it doesn’t exist in some possible world.

If those non-physical entities are concepts then they do not exist if there are no beings who are able to conceptualize. if those non-physical entities are no concepts, then what are they?

See above.

Of course I don’t. It would be meaningless to assume the final outcome of the whole argument and also use it as a premise.

I’m not saying we should assume that. What I’m saying is that we need to consider the merits of the argument instead of just postulating possible worlds in which a necessary entity does not exist. As I pointed out before, I can just as easily postulate a possible world in which a necessary entity does exist. So, if one postulation doesn’t entail actual possibility, then neither does the other.

They are not contingent. They simply exist as a brute fact.

Brute facts are logically contingent. The meaning of a “brute fact” is this: a logically contingent fact that is unexplained.

Unfortunately what you say is even formally (mathematically) incorrect. And it also presumes the acceptance of “abstract objects”, and we both agreed that this is a nonsensical proposition.

Their non-existence doesn’t mean they are without meaning.

To say that the postulated W1 = {Q1} also contains a “set” is not acceptable. A set is a logical construct, not an ontological entity.

Certainly, and that’s why I listed it as an abstract object and noted that the argument will only persuade someone who believes abstract objects have an ontological status.

But let’s examine what happens if we accept this idea.

Take the orininal W1 = {Q1}. You say that W1 is not “really” W1, rather it is W1’ = {Q1, {Q1}}. But these two worlds are not identical W1 <> W1’ (W1 prime). And further W1’’ = {Q1, {Q1}, {Q1, {Q1}}… etc. Now it is either true that W1 is a possible world, and W1’ and W1’’ are also possible worlds, not identical to W1, or none of them are possible worlds - and as such there are no possible worlds at all, including our current actual world. And that is absurd.

I’m not sure how you get to the conclusion that there are therefore no possible worlds. One can consistently reject W1 and W1’ as possible worlds, but maintain that there are other possible worlds that contain more than one or a few contingent entities.

 

[R_Daneel]

I’m agreeing with you for the sake of argument. I also believe that abstract objects exist as necessary concepts of the mind of God.

Oh brother. The whole MOA is just an attempt to prove that these is “a” god or “necessarily existent being”. Now you say that you believe that “abstract objects” exist (whatever that means) in the mind of God. If nothing else, that is premature, since you cannot use abstract objects to substantiate God’s existence, by stipulating that abstract objects exist in God’s mind.

But I reject the concept of abstract objects, and at the beginning you agreed with me.

More importantly, though, a proposition can have meaning even assuming it doesn’t exist in some possible world.

Not in that world. First of all no proposition has an “objective” meaning. Second, a proposition only exists in a communication channel, with a sender and a receiver. The meaning of the propostion is whatever the receiver understands - regardless of the intentions of the sender. In normal circumstances the two meanings are the same, and if not, we have a misunderstaning (happens an awful lot around here!). Imagine, that an alien race contacts us, and they use their own language. Their message is a radio transmission, and it is (in their language!): “we came in peace to bring friendship and prosperity to you”. It just so happens that in our language the same words also happen to have a meaning, and it is: “we came to obliterate you and conquer your planet”. So, what is the “meaning” of the message? What they intend to say, or what we understand?

See above.

So what are those non-physical entities which are not concepts? An example, please.

I’m not saying we should assume that. What I’m saying is that we need to consider the merits of the argument instead of just postulating possible worlds in which a necessary entity does not exist. As I pointed out before, I can just as easily postulate a possible world in which a necessary entity does exist. So, if one postulation doesn’t entail actual possibility, then neither does the other.

It will not help you. Even if there is a possible world, in which a “locally” necessary entity would exist, that would not be a “globally” necessary entity.

Brute facts are logically contingent. The meaning of a “brute fact” is this: a logically contingent fact that is unexplained.

Logically contingent on what?

Their non-existence doesn’t mean they are without meaning.

Refer to the paragraph above. There is no “objective” meaning, only an understanding of the receiver in the communication channel. And if there is no sender, and no receiver, and therefore there is no communication channel, then there is no meaning.

Certainly, and that’s why I listed it as an abstract object and noted that the argument will only persuade someone who believes abstract objects have an ontological status.

Which does not include me, and I was under the impression that it does not include you either. So why did you bring it up?

I’m not sure how you get to the conclusion that there are therefore no possible worlds. One can consistently reject W1 and W1’ as possible worlds, but maintain that there are other possible worlds that contain more than one or a few contingent entities.

I am dealing with very generic concepts here. True, I did not spell out the argument in full details.

Here comes. I defined the world W1 = {Q1}. You said that this is not really a proper description of W1, since it also contains infinitely many sets, so W1 = {Q1, {Q1}, {Q1, {Q1}}… } ad infinitum. Let’s do the same process for W2 = {Q2}. By your process this is also an incorrect description of W2, it really should be W2 = {Q2, {Q2}, {Q2, {Q2}}… } also ad infinitum. However, W1 and W2 - as defined by you - still do not have a common element (their intersection is the null-world), and as such there there is no necessary entity - even according to your proposed definition. Just to reiterate, I do not accept the existence of “sets” as ontological entites.

 

[punkforchrist]

R Daneel:

Oh brother. The whole MOA is just an attempt to prove that these is “a” god or “necessarily existent being”. Now you say that you believe that “abstract objects” exist (whatever that means) in the mind of God. If nothing else, that is premature, since you cannot use abstract objects to substantiate God’s existence, by stipulating that abstract objects exist in God’s mind.

But I reject the concept of abstract objects, and at the beginning you agreed with me.

That’s not an ontological argument, but a conceptualist argument. I pointed out that I’m not going to assume that abstract objects exist. I only agreed with you for the sake of argument, so we don’t get bogged down in a distinct proof.

Not in that world. First of all no proposition has an “objective” meaning.

Words don’t, but propositions are the states of affairs that sentences (words) correspond to.

Second, a proposition only exists in a communication channel, with a sender and a receiver. The meaning of the propostion is whatever the receiver understands - regardless of the intentions of the sender.

Sure.

In normal circumstances the two meanings are the same, and if not, we have a misunderstaning (happens an awful lot around here!). Imagine, that an alien race contacts us, and they use their own language. Their message is a radio transmission, and it is (in their language!): “we came in peace to bring friendship and prosperity to you”. It just so happens that in our language the same words also happen to have a meaning, and it is: “we came to obliterate you and conquer your planet”. So, what is the “meaning” of the message? What they intend to say, or what we understand?

It’s what they intended to say, but this confuses the subjectivity of language with the objectivity of meaning.

So what are those non-physical entities which are not concepts? An example, please.

God is one, but if one adopts a materialistic worldview, then there are no non-physical entities in such a perspective. There would be no God, no angels, no souls.

It will not help you. Even if there is a possible world, in which a “locally” necessary entity would exist, that would not be a “globally” necessary entity.

Well, if S5 is rejected, then that would be one consistent conclusion.

Logically contingent on what?

Something is logically contingent so long as it exists in at least one, but not all possible worlds. If there is a possible world with only one logically contingent entity, then it wouldn’t be logically contingent “on” anything.

Refer to the paragraph above. There is no “objective” meaning, only an understanding of the receiver in the communication channel. And if there is no sender, and no receiver, and therefore there is no communication channel, then there is no meaning.

If it is true that the aliens meant something, and it was a false interpretation that the humans gave to it, then that would presuppose objective meaning. The only thing that is subjective in this case is the language used to represent meaning.

Which does not include me, and I was under the impression that it does not include you either. So why did you bring it up?

Mainly for the sake of interest. If anyone reading this is a Platonist, for example, then they may be persuaded that their view of abstract objects is more consistent with the MCA.

I am dealing with very generic concepts here. True, I did not spell out the argument in full details.

Here comes. I defined the world W1 = {Q1}. You said that this is not really a proper description of W1, since it also contains infinitely many sets, so W1 = {Q1, {Q1}, {Q1, {Q1}}… } ad infinitum. Let’s do the same process for W2 = {Q2}. By your process this is also an incorrect description of W2, it really should be W2 = {Q2, {Q2}, {Q2, {Q2}}… } also ad infinitum. However, W1 and W2 - as defined by you - still do not have a common element (their intersection is the null-world), and as such there there is no necessary entity - even according to your proposed definition. Just to reiterate, I do not accept the existence of “sets” as ontological entites.

We don’t need to assume that the sets are ontological entities. I just want to know why you think that if w1 and w2 - as you defined them - are not possible worlds, then there are no possible worlds. That doesn’t seem to follow. There could simply be possible worlds which do include a necessary entity.

 

[R_Daneel]

Ok, let’s clarify a few things. The MCA is completely dependent on S5. If we take out S5, the whole MCA collapses. That is why I concentrate on it. I know that many philosophers accept S5 (not all, by any means), but I suspect that those philosophers are not mathematicians, and not familiar with set theory. (Poor suckers. )

I think you use “proposition” and “state of affairs” interchangeably. It is confusing for me and I think it is misleading. A “state of affairs” exists whether there is anyone there to conceptualize it. A “proposition” is the mental abstraction of this state of affairs and it does not exist if there is no one to make that abstraction. So I agree that there are states of affairs in any possible world (if there are entities in those worlds), but there are no propositions unless there are thinking beings there. Can we agree on that?

You mention God as an example of a non-physical and not conceptual entity. But this presupposes the existence of God, and the whole point of the MCA is to prove that “some” God exists, therefore it is not a valid example. The MCA (or any other proof of God) is supposed to start from a wholly materialistic worldview, and use some kind of logical inference which shows that this worldview is logically deficient. From a purely logical standpoint it would be an error to “squeeze” in God into one of the premises.

Therefore we must start with a completely materialistic picture. There are no “abstract objects”, there are no “non-physical” entities, except concepts - which are the mental abstractions made by a “thinking being”, unless, of course you can bring up examples which are not contingent upon God.

There could simply be possible worlds which do include a necessary entity.

If that is true, then S5 is null and void, isn’t it?

I just want to know why you think that if w1 and w2 - as you defined them - are not possible worlds, then there are no possible worlds. That doesn’t seem to follow.

Well, first of all, the definition of a “possible world” is a state of affairs which is different from our existing world, in some respect, and which does not contain a logical contradiction. We agreed that the collection of all possible worlds contains all the possible, non-contradictory states of affairs, and therefore we can disregard dynamics, we can disregard time and change. Each state of affairs is static. If a “world” contains a logical absurdity (contradiction) then the world is not “possible”, if a world does not contain a logical absurdity (contradiction) then the world is possible.

Now to say that W1 and W2 are not possible worlds all you have to point out a logical contradiction in them. Since both of them contain only one elementary particle and nothing else, there can be no logical contradiction. Therefore they are possible worlds. And that refutes S5.

Now to your direct question. Any possible world is a collection of physical entities (STEM). Don’t forget that we are still dealing with a materialistic worldview. We know that physical entities are not “impossible”, since our world is composed of them. These entities form causal chains. Let’s consider a very simple world W, which contains one causal chain. Let W = {A, B, C} and within that world there is one causal chain: A → B → C. (Say, grandparent → parent → child). Suppose that this is a possible world. If we take out “C”, we get another world, W’ = {A, B} and the causal chain will be A → B. No problem here. The “end” of a causal chain can be removed and the result is still a possible world. Since W was a possible world, W’ is also a possible world.

Now, let’s remove “B”. The world W’’ = {A, C} but the previous causal chain is “broken”. “C” is “hanging” in the air. Is now W’’ a possible world? If the existence of “B” would be logically necessary for the existence of “C”, then this is not a possible world. If the causal chain could be A → C, that is the existence of “B” was not necessary and so W’’ is a possible world. We can conclude that we cannot always remove the “middle” of a causal chain, and “hope” that the “smaller” world is still “possible”. The same would apply to the attempt to remove “A”, the beginning of the causal chain. But we can always remove the “end” of any causal chain. By this process we can start with our existing world (which is possible), and keep on removing causal chains from it. Eventually we arrive at a few, very simple worlds, which only contain one elementary particle. Since elementary particles cannot form the “middle” of a causal chain, these simple worlds are all possible.

We can do the opposite process. Let’s start with the simplest worlds, and suppose that they are possible. We can always add new entities to these worlds. These new entities either form a new causal chain, or we append them to the end of a causal chain. By this process we get new possible worlds, and eventually we reach our world.

Finally, let’s suppose that the simple worlds are not possible. Then you cannot add new entities to them, since one cannot resolve a logical contradiction by adding new elements to the world, and so our world would not be possible, since it is composed of elementary particles.

I guess, this is the whole shebang. What is your opinion?

 

[punkforchrist]

R Daneel, my apologies for taking so long to get back to you.
R Daneel:

Ok, let’s clarify a few things. The MCA is completely dependent on S5. If we take out S5, the whole MCA collapses.

Yes indeed, which is why I briefly defended S5 in my opening post.

That is why I concentrate on it. I know that many philosophers accept S5 (not all, by any means), but I suspect that those philosophers are not mathematicians, and not familiar with set theory. (Poor suckers. )

Conversely, I’m sure many mathematicians and set theorists aren’t familiar with modal logic. I can’t say I’m familiar with any set theorists who claim that there is a possible world with or without a necessary entity.

I think you use “proposition” and “state of affairs” interchangeably. It is confusing for me and I think it is misleading.

I defined “state of affairs” as the instantiation or non-instantiation of a concrete object or set of objects. “Propositions” are broader.

A “state of affairs” exists whether there is anyone there to conceptualize it. A “proposition” is the mental abstraction of this state of affairs and it does not exist if there is no one to make that abstraction. So I agree that there are states of affairs in any possible world (if there are entities in those worlds), but there are no propositions unless there are thinking beings there. Can we agree on that?

Sure, but just take that with a grain of salt.

You mention God as an example of a non-physical and not conceptual entity. But this presupposes the existence of God, and the whole point of the MCA is to prove that “some” God exists, therefore it is not a valid example.

The point of the MCA is to show that such an entity exists, so we cannot dismiss it on the grounds that it points to an immaterial concrete entity.

The MCA (or any other proof of God) is supposed to start from a wholly materialistic worldview, and use some kind of logical inference which shows that this worldview is logically deficient. From a purely logical standpoint it would be an error to “squeeze” in God into one of the premises.

If anything, we should try to start from a neutral perspective, rather than presupposing some form of materialism. However, I don’t think even neutrality is possible. We all have our prior commitments.

Therefore we must start with a completely materialistic picture. There are no “abstract objects”, there are no “non-physical” entities, except concepts - which are the mental abstractions made by a “thinking being”, unless, of course you can bring up examples which are not contingent upon God.

Doesn’t this just presuppose that the MCA is wrong? Since you ask for additional examples, though, I would also say the mind is immaterial.

If that is true, then S5 is null and void, isn’t it?

Why?

Well, first of all, the definition of a “possible world” is a state of affairs which is different from our existing world, in some respect, and which does not contain a logical contradiction. We agreed that the collection of all possible worlds contains all the possible, non-contradictory states of affairs, and therefore we can disregard dynamics, we can disregard time and change. Each state of affairs is static. If a “world” contains a logical absurdity (contradiction) then the world is not “possible”, if a world does not contain a logical absurdity (contradiction) then the world is possible.

I agree with that, but establishing what is or is not logically contradictory isn’t as easy as merely conceptualizing something. Can’t I very easily conceptualize a possible world in which a necessary entity exists?

 

[punkforchrist]

R Daneel:

Now to say that W1 and W2 are not possible worlds all you have to point out a logical contradiction in them. Since both of them contain only one elementary particle and nothing else, there can be no logical contradiction. Therefore they are possible worlds. And that refutes S5.

It begs the question against both S5 and the W-PSR.

Now to your direct question. Any possible world is a collection of physical entities (STEM). Don’t forget that we are still dealing with a materialistic worldview.

I just don’t see any reason to limit ourselves to this.

We know that physical entities are not “impossible”, since our world is composed of them. These entities form causal chains. Let’s consider a very simple world W, which contains one causal chain. Let W = {A, B, C} and within that world there is one causal chain: A → B → C. (Say, grandparent → parent → child). Suppose that this is a possible world. If we take out “C”, we get another world, W’ = {A, B} and the causal chain will be A → B. No problem here. The “end” of a causal chain can be removed and the result is still a possible world. Since W was a possible world, W’ is also a possible world.

The difficulty with this is that A is itself not only unexplained, but not even possibly explained. I suspect we ought to focus more on S5, though.

Now, let’s remove “B”. The world W’’ = {A, C} but the previous causal chain is “broken”. “C” is “hanging” in the air. Is now W’’ a possible world? If the existence of “B” would be logically necessary for the existence of “C”, then this is not a possible world. If the causal chain could be A → C, that is the existence of “B” was not necessary and so W’’ is a possible world. We can conclude that we cannot always remove the “middle” of a causal chain, and “hope” that the “smaller” world is still “possible”. The same would apply to the attempt to remove “A”, the beginning of the causal chain. But we can always remove the “end” of any causal chain. By this process we can start with our existing world (which is possible), and keep on removing causal chains from it. Eventually we arrive at a few, very simple worlds, which only contain one elementary particle. Since elementary particles cannot form the “middle” of a causal chain, these simple worlds are all possible.

I don’t have any problem with the postulation that some end of a causal chain can be removed in a possible world. However, the fact that you state B is necessary for C itself presupposes some form of explicability, does it not? Now, why should A be exempt from explication?

We can do the opposite process. Let’s start with the simplest worlds, and suppose that they are possible. We can always add new entities to these worlds. These new entities either form a new causal chain, or we append them to the end of a causal chain. By this process we get new possible worlds, and eventually we reach our world.

Sure. I mean, our own world has an expanding universe.

Finally, let’s suppose that the simple worlds are not possible. Then you cannot add new entities to them, since one cannot resolve a logical contradiction by adding new elements to the world, and so our world would not be possible, since it is composed of elementary particles.

You’re starting from the presupposition that our own world does not contain a necessary entity. That’s the only way the reductio ad absurdum argument you list above can work. For instance, if we say that W* is a possible world that is just like ours and without a necessary entity, and W* was originally simple but became increasingly more complex, one could just as well deny that our world is identical to W*. So, there’s really no problem in denying the premise of the reductio above.

I guess, this is the whole shebang. What is your opinion?

Well, I think we have some fundamental disagreements about the nature of possibility itself. Our different views are also the result of disagreements concerning the applicability of modal logic, especially S5.

 

[R_Daneel]

R Daneel, my apologies for taking so long to get back to you.

That is quite all right. This is just a conversation, and not an exercise in speed-posting.

I think we are in dire need of laying down a groundwork, some basic stuff we both can agree upon. When you said that we should try to approach the problem from a neutral perspective, you were very right. When I said that we should start from a materialistic point of view, I was imprecise. I did not mean to discard the possible outcome of some non-physical, yet active entity out of hand. I only meant that we must start from what we know. That is:

We both know that physical entites exist. We both agree that physical entites have attributes, and they have relationships. We agree that the relationships are not physical entities themselves. For example, I mean here: “distance” between physical entites, and stuff like that. (Distance can mean spatial and temporal difference.) We can also agree that “activites” of physical entites exist, and these activities are also non-physical entites themselves. Example: “walking” is a non-physical entity, it is however the physical activity of muscles of the legs. We can agree that the “mind” is not a physical entity per se. To our best knowledge, it is the activity of the brain. (I know you might not agree with this, but all the evidence points in that direction.)

Now comes the harder part. We may have a difference talking about “states of affairs” and “propositions”. You said that “propositions” are a broader category. Please explain. Without an agreement about such a basic concept we cannot go any further. For the rest of this post, I will use the term “proposition” as a statement about something.

We must take care not to confuse the “entities” themselves (entity can be anything here) with our mental concepts about these entities. As long as our mental concepts are correct about those entities, we have a correspondence between the two.

Now even more problematic stuff. When I talk about a proposition (a statement) it can have several “outcomes”. The statement can be true, false, self-contadictory, or undecidable. A true statement describes the state of affairs correctly, a false one does not. A self contradictory statement can be like: “this statement is false” - which has no truth-value associated with it. An undecidable statement has no “true” or “false” value associated with it. The undecidable statements can be “future conditionals”, like the famous sea-battle problem, or something like “it will rain tomorrow”. When tomorrow will come, the statement will resolve to have been either true or false. Up until then it makes no sense to try and assign a truth-value to it.

The problem of the “axiom” of S5. It says “if it is possible that something possibly necessarily exist, then it necessarily exists”. This is defining something into existence, which is sheer nonsense. The statement uses the words “possibly” and “possible” in an ambigious way. The distinction of modal logic of “impossible”, “possible” and “necessary” denotes 3 categories, which do not overlap. There is no entity which (A) “may” or “may not” exist and which also (B) “must exist”. So the S5 proposition (“possibly necessarily”) is a linguistic handwaving, a nonsense, a self-contradiction. If there is a necessarily existing entity, it exists in all possible worlds. Therefore “possible world” must be defined. To find out if a there is a “necessary existence”, all possible worlds must be examined - and we need a method to separate the possible and impossible worlds. There must be a way to look at a possible world Wx, and find out if that world is possible or not. There is no “tricky” shortcut like S5.

I ask you to reply at your convenience, and I also ask you to elaborate on possible disagreements. Don’t just say that you disagree, but also, why you disagree, and present your view, as well. You don’t have to reply sentence by sentence. Just present your view.

 

[punkforchrist]

It might help if we just take one issue at a time.

Without necessarily commenting on the ontological status of propositions, would you agree (at least tentatively) that a state of affairs is the instantiation or non-instantiation of a concrete entity (or entities)? If so, would you agree that S really is a possible state of affairs?

 

[R_Daneel]

It might help if we just take one issue at a time.

Yes, certainly.

Without necessarily commenting on the ontological status of propositions, would you agree (at least tentatively) that a state of affairs is the instantiation or non-instantiation of a concrete entity (or entities)?

Only half of it. I agree that “a state of affairs is the existence of some concrete entity or entities”. I don’t like the word “instantiation” for its overtone, which implies “someone” who instantiates it. I don’t find the second part meaningful: “a state of affairs is the nonexistence of some concrete entity or entities”. How can one speak of the “nonexistance” of a concrete entity?

If so, would you agree that S really is a possible state of affairs?

Do you refer to the second premise of your OP?

1. There is a possible state of affairs S in which nothing contingent exists. (Premise)

I can answer only tentatively until we can agree what is a possible state of affairs, and how do we decide if a state of affairs is possible or not? But, yes, the mini-worlds I mentioned I consider possible, and they have only one concrete entity (the quark), which are not contingent on anything.

 

[stenlis]

I have been working on this for some time, so I thought I would test it out. Feedback, as always, is welcome.

Standard versions of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) usually state something like this: every existing things has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature, or in an external cause.

The strongest version (S-PSR) states: every state of affairs has an explanation . . .

I think the PSR is true, but suppose we weaken it:

W-PSR: Every state of affairs is at least partially explicable

where “explicable” means “possibly explained.” More precisely, then, the W-PSR states: Every state of affairs is possibly at least partially explained. I prefer the former way of saying it because the latter is a mouth-full.

The question is: can we demonstrate the existence of a necessary entity with the W-PSR? I think we can:

1. Every existing entity is either contingent or necessary. (Definition)

contingent = possibly can-be, possibly can not-be
necessary = cannot not-be (e.g. must-be)

In short, a contingent entity is something that can exist but can also fail to exist. A necessary entity is something that, if it exists at all, cannot fail to exist. It’s also important to note that we’re not presupposing the existence of anything contingent or necessary in (1). Instead, we are stating our available options. The only other option is that an entity be impossible, in which case it cannot exist, anyway.

1. There is a possible state of affairs S in which nothing contingent exists. (Premise)

If one part of a house can fail to exist, then it is reasonable to conclude that the house as a whole can fail to exist. This is an instance, I think, in which the whole really is like its parts. In any case, there doesn’t appear to be any logical contradiction in the idea of a collective failure to exist of anything contingent.

1. Every state of affairs is at least partially explicable. (Premise, W-PSR)

Imagine that a brick pops into existence without any explanation whatsoever. I don’t think this is possible, but let’s assume for the sake of argument that it is. Even granting this as a possibility, it is also possible for the brick to be explained in some possible set of circumstances, e.g. the brick’s popping into existence is explicable, even if not actually explained.

1. A state of affairs is explicable only if something exists. (Premise)

If nothing exists, then nothing would be able to explain the state of affairs.

1. Hence, a necessary entity possibly exists. (From 1 - 4)

If nothing contingent exists in S, then the only thing capable of explaining (even if only partially) S is a necessary entity. Given that S is possible, it follows that a necessary entity is possible.

1. Therefore, a necessary entity exists. (Conclusion, from 5 and S5)

Whatever is possibly necessary is necessary, via the S5 axiom of modal logic.

Any thoughts?

You have a very simple problem - assuming you want to argue for god. There is an entity that complies with your definition of a ‘necessary’ entity and it is not god. It’s called ‘energy’ and to the best knowledge of everybody in this world, energy cannot be created nor destroyed or brought in or out of existence if you prefer. So your whole argument can be viewed as an argument for the existence of the first law of thermodynamics.

You see, this is the general problem of any attempt at a cosmological argument. At first people were stating the first premise as “Everything that exists must have a cause”. The problem was that granting that premise they would have to claim that if god exists, it must have had a cause. So later people refined that argument saying “Everything that begins to exist must have a cause” or, as you did, “Everything that can be destroyed can be created and it must have a cause”. The problem there though is energy - we’ve never seen an instance of energy beginning to exist.

 

[R_Daneel]

You have a very simple problem - assuming you want to argue for god. There is an entity that complies with your definition of a ‘necessary’ entity and it is not god. It’s called ‘energy’ and to the best knowledge of everybody in this world, energy cannot be created nor destroyed or brought in or out of existence if you prefer. So your whole argument can be viewed as an argument for the existence of the first law of thermodynamics.

You see, this is the general problem of any attempt at a cosmological argument. At first people were stating the first premise as “Everything that exists must have a cause”. The problem was that granting that premise they would have to claim that if god exists, it must have had a cause. So later people refined that argument saying “Everything that begins to exist must have a cause” or, as you did, “Everything that can be destroyed can be created and it must have a cause”. The problem there though is energy - we’ve never seen an instance of energy beginning to exist.

That is true. Of course “energy” is only one aspect of STEM (space - time - energy - matter). None of them can exist apart from the others, that is why we don’t use the matter vs. energy distinction, and we don’t speak of absolute space and absolute time either. They are all interconnected, and they “simply” exist.

 

[stenlis]

That is true. Of course “energy” is only one aspect of STEM (space - time - energy - matter). None of them can exist apart from the others, that is why we don’t use the matter vs. energy distinction, and we don’t speak of absolute space and absolute time either. They are all interconnected, and they “simply” exist.

That’s not really relevant in this case. Yeah, when I say energy I mean matter as well.

However space and time does not factor in here, because there is no observed law of conservation of space and time.

 

[punkforchrist]

R Daneel:

Only half of it. I agree that “a state of affairs is the existence of some concrete entity or entities”. I don’t like the word “instantiation” for its overtone, which implies “someone” who instantiates it. I don’t find the second part meaningful: “a state of affairs is the nonexistence of some concrete entity or entities”. How can one speak of the “nonexistance” of a concrete entity?

When I say “instantiation,” I don’t mean to beg the question by postulating that it is instantiated or caused by someone or something. I just mean very generally that if X is instantiated, then X is concretely real.

To answer your question, though, we may speak of the non-existence of a concrete entity by giving examples. My computer exists, but there is a possible state of affairs in which it does not exist. So, we have a concrete entity (my computer) being non-instantiated in a state of affairs.

Do you refer to the second premise of your OP?

Yes, I should have made that clearer than I did.

I can answer only tentatively until we can agree what is a possible state of affairs, and how do we decide if a state of affairs is possible or not? But, yes, the mini-worlds I mentioned I consider possible, and they have only one concrete entity (the quark), which are not contingent on anything.

We can agree that something is possible if there are no contradictions inherent in it or in its relation to the rest of reality. Now, when you say a quark is not contingent upon anything, you’re making use of one definition of “contingent.” When I say “contingent” in this context, I don’t mean that a thing is caused or dependent for its existence on something else. I only mean that a thing exists in at least one, but not all possible worlds. So, the quarks you mention are contingent in this latter sense (logically contingent) even assuming they are not caused or dependent.

Does this final point especially make sense?

 

[punkforchrist]

stenlis:

You have a very simple problem - assuming you want to argue for god. There is an entity that complies with your definition of a ‘necessary’ entity and it is not god. It’s called ‘energy’ and to the best knowledge of everybody in this world, energy cannot be created nor destroyed or brought in or out of existence if you prefer. So your whole argument can be viewed as an argument for the existence of the first law of thermodynamics.

The matter and energy of this world may be thought of as temporally necessary, but few of us believe that the same matter and energy exist in all possible worlds. The argument I’m defending concludes with the latter type of necessity.

You see, this is the general problem of any attempt at a cosmological argument. At first people were stating the first premise as “Everything that exists must have a cause”. The problem was that granting that premise they would have to claim that if god exists, it must have had a cause. So later people refined that argument saying “Everything that begins to exist must have a cause” or, as you did, “Everything that can be destroyed can be created and it must have a cause”. The problem there though is energy - we’ve never seen an instance of energy beginning to exist.

The original defenders of the cosmological argument didn’t say that everything has a cause, or even that whatever begins to exist has a cause. Plato and Aristotle believed that the universe is eternal, and Aristotle especially argued that the motion of the universe must have a First Mover that sustains the universe’s motion. (The First Mover is causally prior, but not temporally prior, to the universe according to Aristotle.) This is a bit off-topic, but I wanted to clarify some things.

Energy doesn’t need to have a beginning in order for this argument to work, since this is a modal argument.

 

[R_Daneel]

When I say “instantiation,” I don’t mean to beg the question by postulating that it is instantiated or caused by someone or something. I just mean very generally that if X is instantiated, then X is concretely real.

Very well. We are in synch now.

To answer your question, though, we may speak of the non-existence of a concrete entity by giving examples. My computer exists, but there is a possible state of affairs in which it does not exist. So, we have a concrete entity (my computer) being non-instantiated in a state of affairs.

I see another possible different use of words. The computer, which exists, is a concrete computer. It has actual attributes (size of memory, a specific hard drive, a certain monitor, etc…) it occupies a certain position on your desktop, it was manufactured by a specific company, it has a serial number, etc… In other words, it can be told apart from a very similar, but not identical computer.

The computer which does not exist in some “other” state of affairs, is not a “concrete” computer, it is an abstract, imagined, but not real computer. It has no actual attributes, only conceptual, imagined ones. It has no specific CPU, motherboard, sound card, etc… In a very good sense one cannot really speak of a nonexistent computer, since a nonexistent computer is not different from a nonexistent apple. Nonexistence has no “identity”, has no attributes.

Of course I am not sure, why should we bring “nonexistent” or “not-instantiated” entities into the picture. They seem to be unnecessary (in yet another meaning of “necessary”.)

Yes, I should have made that clearer than I did.

Cool hand, Luke.

We can agree that something is possible if there are no contradictions inherent in it or in its relation to the rest of reality.

Excellent. Now we can almost speak of “possible states of affairs”, provided that we can resolve the issue of “nonexistent entities”. Let me suggest this: In a concrete possible word (state of affairs) you own a set of “things”, and one among them is the computer (state of affairs “A”). It is a possible world. In another possible state of affairs you own the same set of “things”, except you do not own a computer (state of affairs “B”). This is another state of affairs. Both are possible states of affairs - different from each other, and we do not have to speak of “nonexistent” entities, only about actual, “concrete” ones.

Now, when you say a quark is not contingent upon anything, you’re making use of one definition of “contingent.”

Yes, I did.

When I say “contingent” in this context, I don’t mean that a thing is caused or dependent for its existence on something else. I only mean that a thing exists in at least one, but not all possible worlds. So, the quarks you mention are contingent in this latter sense (logically contingent) even assuming they are not caused or dependent.

Does this final point especially make sense?

Yes it does, and in this sense I agree. I am only concerned a little, since we must be careful and should not forget that the “contingency” we speak of is not equivalent to “dependence”. It is too bad that words have so many meanings, and some choice of words is rather unfortunate. But this is just another “state of affairs” we have to deal with.

 

[stenlis]

Energy doesn’t need to have a beginning in order for this argument to work, since this is a modal argument.

Modality is not the problem. Let me put it as simply as I can:

In your argument you come to the following conclusion:

1. Therefore, a necessary entity exists.

Building upon the following definition of a ‘necessary entity’:

1. Every existing entity is either contingent or necessary. (Definition)

contingent = possibly can-be, possibly can not-be
necessary = cannot not-be (e.g. must-be)

I pointed out that indeed a necessary entity exists and we call it ‘energy’. Either you need to prove that:

a) energy is not necessary - that it possibly can not-be

or you need to

b) specify more qualifiers for the ‘necessary entity’ you are looking for in your conclusion

The matter and energy of this world may be thought of as temporally necessary, but few of us believe that the same matter and energy exist in all possible worlds. The argument I’m defending concludes with the latter type of necessity.

OK, you try to argue for a). Not convincingly enough though. What are “all possible worlds” and how would you go on demonstrating that they are “possible”? Just saying that “few of us believe that…” is not enough. How would you convince the rest of us about your ‘possible worlds’?

 

[punkforchrist]

R Daneel:

. . . The computer which does not exist in some “other” state of affairs, is not a “concrete” computer, it is an abstract, imagined, but not real computer. It has no actual attributes, only conceptual, imagined ones. It has no specific CPU, motherboard, sound card, etc… In a very good sense one cannot really speak of a nonexistent computer, since a nonexistent computer is not different from a nonexistent apple. Nonexistence has no “identity”, has no attributes.

Of course I am not sure, why should we bring “nonexistent” or “not-instantiated” entities into the picture. They seem to be unnecessary (in yet another meaning of “necessary”.)

Well, even if we say that non-existent “things” don’t have attributes, it is entirely possible that my computer could cease to exist. After all, there was a time in the past in which it did not exist.

Excellent. Now we can almost speak of “possible states of affairs”, provided that we can resolve the issue of “nonexistent entities”. Let me suggest this: In a concrete possible word (state of affairs) you own a set of “things”, and one among them is the computer (state of affairs “A”). It is a possible world. In another possible state of affairs you own the same set of “things”, except you do not own a computer (state of affairs “B”). This is another state of affairs. Both are possible states of affairs - different from each other, and we do not have to speak of “nonexistent” entities, only about actual, “concrete” ones.

Sure, there is a possible world in which I own one less concrete object.

Yes it does, and in this sense I agree. I am only concerned a little, since we must be careful and should not forget that the “contingency” we speak of is not equivalent to “dependence”. It is too bad that words have so many meanings, and some choice of words is rather unfortunate. But this is just another “state of affairs” we have to deal with.

Yes, indeed.

Hopefully my point about non-instantiation is a little clearer now. A logically contingent concrete object that exists could also not-be.

 

[punkforchrist]

stenlis:

OK, you try to argue for a). Not convincingly enough though. What are “all possible worlds” and how would you go on demonstrating that they are “possible”? Just saying that “few of us believe that…” is not enough. How would you convince the rest of us about your ‘possible worlds’?

That would require us to get into a discussion about what constitutes a possible world, and whether there really are possible worlds. To put it briefly, a possible world is a compossible set of states of affairs. If there is no contradiction inherent in a concept and no contradiction between the concept and its relationship to other states of affairs, then said concept is possible. I can’t think of any contradiction in the idea of matter and energy not existing, or with a different set of matter and energy existing.

 

[R_Daneel]

Well, even if we say that non-existent “things” don’t have attributes, it is entirely possible that my computer could cease to exist. After all, there was a time in the past in which it did not exist.

Undoubtedly. And that would be a different state of affairs.

Hopefully my point about non-instantiation is a little clearer now. A logically contingent concrete object that exists could also not-be.

I don’t argue with that. There are two different states of affairs, each containing a different set of “existing” entities. I still don’t understand what is the point of bringing in the “uninstantiated == nonexistent” entities. We can describe a state of affairs by enumerating all the existing entities in it. I see no reason to bring in anything that does not exist, even if it “may” exist. What would be the point?

 

[stenlis]

I can’t think of any contradiction in the idea of matter and energy not existing, or with a different set of matter and energy existing.

The problem is not that there would be a contradiction. The problem is that you would be talking in a theoretical realm. Theoretically we can posit:

1)There are possible worlds in which matter and energy behaves differently.

However, if we do that, then when our conclusion requires 1), our conclusion is also in the theoretical realm. In your case, you would conclude a theoretical god.

If you want to argue for a god in the real world, you have to work with what you’ve got in our reality. And in our reality we do not know of any way how energy could not-be and we do not have any indication of an existence of other ‘possible worlds’.

To put it as simple as I can:

Are your ‘possible worlds’ really possible or are they theoretically possible? That would make a difference in you concluding a real god or a theoretical god.

If they are really possible, how would you demonstrate that?