Another reason why philosophers are useless

[Innoruk]

Agreed. It’s also interesting how, in a traditional Catholic interpretation of hell, once you go there you are never heard from again. You can no longer harm anyone. Playtime is over, so to speak.

So why is not “playtime” over for Satan? There seems to be an “open door” policy in hell for Satan; unlike a human being who has been damned to hell eternally, Satan still interacts with the world of mortals, still able to wreak havoc. He abides in hell and he abides on earth. Why is this?

And is Satan suffering in hell? Upon reflection, as frequently as I hear of the suffering of the damned in hell, I rarely hear about the suffering of Satan. Unlike the suffering of a damned human being – whose suffering is purported to be unbearable – Satan seems to be holding up pretty well, under the circumstances, endowed with superhuman intelligence and an ability to think clearly enough to continue to have negative influence on the world of mortals (when an individual’s pain is unbearable, it is all but impossible to “think clearly” and to plot and scheme).

A few years ago, a high-ranking Vatican official declared that “Satan has infiltrated the Vatican.” A damned human being cannot infiltrate the Vatican, as a damned human being is confined to hell. Why should not Satan be confined to hell, no less than the damned? Is it merely because God respects Satan’s “free will”? Yet how many damned human beings would love the opportunity to continue to interact with the world of mortals – continuing to wreak havoc and influence destruction. But no – they are kept in hell, where they can no longer do harm. So why isn’t Satan? And, in earthly terms, why are human beings permitted to harm others during life, yet suddenly are not permitted to harm others, in death?

It would be completely logical for the damned to become Satan’s demons, his henchmen, able to roam the earth as freely as Satan himself.

So yes – in a gentler, more transparently just world, Satan would be confined to hell (free will notwithstanding, given that the damned have free will and they are confined to hell) and it would not be possible for one human being to violate the free will of another human being. Indeed, one’s freedom would be inviolable.

The funny thing is that the believers will contend that the angels (Lucifer, the Lightbringer - what an ironic name that is!) only had one instance of “free will”, and having made their selection to be either for God or against him, they have no more freedom. The “good” ones cannot rebel, while the “bad” ones cannot repent and change their mind. Also the “damned” humans in hell are unable to repent, there is no more freedom - it is gone at the very moment of death, when - finally! - one could make an informed decision.

And the irrationalities never stop. Why would a presumably smart God create those angels, who will rebel against him, who will try to thwart his plans? Even if at the end those rebels will be destroyed (will they be??) they could tempt and convince a sizable amount of humans, thus depriving God of having “all” humans to be with him… which is allegedly his desire.

It is hilariously funny to see the plethora of contradictions propagated by the believers, who also deny those contradictions. (I especially like when the contradictions are “redefined” to be mysteries.)

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Innoruk

Again, if God’s “goodness” is compatible with allowing / committing / perpetrating all the natural / moral horrors then God’s “goodness” is a meaningless term. The other contradiction is that the theist stipulates the existence of an “absolute morality” while he also advocates the “relative morality” - by asserting that action “X” is always, under any and all circumstances is immoral… unless it is God who does it. And then cheerfully denies this contradiction.

Many complain that God could prevent all the evils in the world if He wished. From this fact they deduce that God is either imperfect or does not exist. Absent from this reasoning is the fact that we must all die. The unbeliever surely sees this as the consummate evil. Shall we find God culpable for death too? But beyond death we say there are two realities to encounter: one is a deserved reality better than the one we have lived on earth; the other is a deserved reality worse than the one we have lived here. God’s justice attends to this. But also his mercy, if we repent; and especially if we repent of thinking we know better than God how the world should go.

 

[Portofino]

I am constantly amazed that the theists argue for the existence of genocides, tortures, wars, rapes and other atrocities. They decry the possible worlds without such atrocities as a “utopia”.

Ironically, they grant that a possible world without such atrocities can and does exist – in heaven. They say that such atrocities must exist on earth, because humans have free will (yes, a tsunami; an earthquake; cancer exists, because humans have free will ).

But even heaven is a paradox, vis-a-vis free will – why does not suffering not exist in heaven, if humans have free will? It would seem that one’s free will is now “restored” to God’s will. Once in heaven, always in heaven – it cannot be lost. Yet Satan was a fallen angel, who “lost” heaven – because of free will! Yet humans, who have free will, presumably would never lose heaven, once there.

Would seem that free will operates differently, in the afterlife

remember a hypothetical poll from a long time ago when one of the options was to implement a system which could detect vicious thoughts and prevent them from being acting upon them. The theists were against such a solution… in the name of “freedom”.

In the world as it exists, I would be against such measures because it would make for an even more violent world, even more dystopian (history has demonstrated this, I think, including the history of Christendom, frankly). Reminds me of a Clockwork Orange or of Spielberg’s Minority Report

Throughout the history of Christendom, there has been a rather curious disparity between a metaphysical affirmation of free will – usually to justify the ways of God to man, and explain the problem of evil – versus a political suspicion of free will. Many Christians today disclaim liberalism and believe that is an example of freedom run amok, with legalized abortion and birth control, pornography, divorce laws, etc. “Look at the results!” they say – “society should not encourage the freedom to engage in such activities.” They seem to believe, ironically, that our society has made an idol of freedom and, as I’ve mentioned, Benedict himself had admonished that “freedom must be tempered with truth” (“you shall know the truth, and the truth shall set you free” could be interpreted as being anti-liberal in its implications, saying that truth takes priority, and that – if you have truth – then you are automatically free, so focus on truth and not freedom).

It’s as if there are two strands within this Christian/Catholic thinking – one that insists on absolute freedom, in one sense; and another that clenches its teeth whenever it hears the words “freedom” invoked by secularists, who – in the name of freedom – would make yet another form of immorality legally permissible. It was hard, very hard, for the Church to come to terms with the fact that there is and ought to be a “freedom” to be non-Catholic; for why encourage immorality? Why protect immorality? Why knowingly jeopardize salvation?

Getting back to your last example above, though, I can well imagine a universe where hell would be – metaphorically speaking – a lot less hot; a world where the rules of the game would be a lot less cruel, a lot less painful. Apologetics aside, Christians and non-Christians alike feel all of the cruelties of this world – the prayers, the supplications, the efforts at mutual comfort, are all acknowledgements that there is something “not right” with this world; and that yes, this is not heaven. I’ve heard three things from Christians, over the years – 1. sinful humans are responsible for all of it, even things --like natural disasters or incurable diseases-- that are seemingly beyond our control; 2. the devil is doing much of it; 3. God’s will is responsible for it, but “his ways are bigger than our ability to comprehend,” thus we cannot criticize or second guess anything that He wills to transpire (which is, indeed, a blank check for God).

In this last scenario, things are indeed open-ended. You can tell someone, “a tsunami hit the coast of ____ ; what would be the results in a world where God loves us and has ordered everything for the best?” And the believer would not dare to presume what would happen, in a world where God loves us and has ordered everything for the best – for example, he could not say, “the tsunami caused no casualities, or minimal casualties, and most everyone was miraculously saved.” Instead, the believer would ask, “well, tell me what did happen.” So you tell them – it could have been pretty “bad” – and they say, “that one; that’s what happens in a world where God loves us and orders everything for the best, even if our puny human minds don’t understand his ways.” Thus, what would happen in a world where God loves us can never be predicted in advance, can only be assessed retroactively, by saying, “whatever happened must have been be for the best, because God willed it that way” (for the sake of argument, I’m focusing here on natural disasters or other “acts of God”, as they are called). Thus, if everyone was miraculously saved – God loves us and cares for us, praise God! If everyone perished – well, it doesn’t mean that God doesn’t love us and care for us, even if the response on the part of believers will be a lot…quieter. They will not praise God – will not even thank God – for all of those who perished in a natural disaster, but they will praise God for those who didn’t.

But yes, if this were the only world there is, I’m not sure the Christian would be as as peace with the existence of wars, genocides, abortions, natural disasters, diseases (and, frankly, they are not at peace, all of the time, for instance as regards issues like abortion. All of their anger is displaced towards human beings, however; never towards God, no matter what transpires).

 

[polytropos]

But the very line “free will is what is ultimately important” is an assumption. That free will not only trumps, but ought to trump the prevention of unjust harm to one’s neighbor is what Catholics are assuming, in order to justify God’s ways.

Our own laws proceed on the contrary principle; there, it is morality that trumps freedom. Murder, stealing, and rape are not rendered legal, in the name of respect for free will.

But you have ignored the distinction made between prevention by omnipotent and non-omnipotent beings. Laws ought to prevent the actions of murder, stealing, and rape, but it is logically impossible for an omnipotent being to prevent actions without preventing will (because such actions become logically impossible if they are prevented in principle, which would mean that the intellect cannot grasp them, which would mean that it is impossible to will them).

Catholics are not saying that we should legally permit evil in order to preserve free will, because our prevention of evil instantially does not inhibit free will. Logically, however, God’s prevention of evil would.

What is the problem with this? It is placing a very high premium on this notion of freedom; this is ironic to me, because Pope Benedict himself declared that western liberalism overvalues freedom, to begin with. I believe he said that “freedom must be tempered with truth.” There, he was speaking about legal restrictions to freedom.

I’d be careful not to conflate multiple (conflicting) conceptions of freedom. Insofar that western liberalism argues for the “right” to entertain any desires (including sinful desires), it is overvaluing “freedom.” People are physically able to sin and can freely choose to, but they are not entitled to the legal protection of sinful action. Legal restrictions to freedom don’t restrict the will, however, in the way that prevention of actions by an omnipotent being would.

Again, the fundamental difference of opinion is in the assumption that it is terribly important to be capable of willing evil. Why?

Well, “it is right and just” to extend worship to God. (Contemplating God is also the highest intellectual activity for man.) To not do these things is in some sense evil. It does not sever us from God in the way that mortal sins do, but the point is that being unable to will evil basically entails living a flawless life without a choice to do otherwise, in which case no one has freely chosen to follow God because there was no possibility of choosing otherwise.

One could say that God could allow the evil of rejecting Him but not of, say, murder, but in this case you’re dictating that God ought to draw an arbitrary line of what evils he allows, which is incoherent.

The whole problem, obviously, is that God is not subject to the same morality as human beings. It would monstrous for a human being to say that he values freedom over morality and that, therefore, nothing is illegal, nothing is prohibited, and that one should never intervene. This would be a laissez faire attitude, which a Catholic would consider immoral. Yet when God permits “laissez faire”, in the name of freedom, then, suddenly, “freedom is of the utmost importance.”

God does not have the same moral obligations as humans do. He created the world and did not have to. As I’ve said, He has no “final causes,” while humans do. The intellectual apprehension of those final causes and the direction of the will towards them is what morality is (in the Catholic conception). This is not to say that God is saying we should allow people to do anything they would like; that simply doesn’t follow for reasons previously stated. God does not prevent evil because it would make freely choosing to follow Him impossible. That does not mean that “nothing is illegal, nothing is prohibited, and that one should never intervene.” It doesn’t mean that we have a right to ignore final causes which God doesn’t have.

 

[polytropos]

It seems a lot of these arguments involve throwing the “burden of proof” back and forth, like a hot potato. I think Innoruk’s position is that all Catholic doctrines need to be proven; you cannot use an unproven doctrine, an article of faith (“free will is the most important thing”) to prove another doctrine or article of faith (“an omnipotent and omni-benevolent God made the universe just as it should be, and it ought not to be otherwise”).

This itself begs the question; if you get to define your own terms, then of course you can create a logically consistent, self-contained system in which all dilemmas are solved. But the question is, has the Catholic himself proven it, or has he himself “begged the question” by authoritatively proclaiming it as axiomatic?

One issue is that in the argument from evil the atheist is taking on the burden of proof to show that there is a contradiction between evil and Catholicism. And they are not obviously contradictory, so the atheist must demonstrate that God cannot have morally sufficient reasons for permitting evil. Given that the atheist is not omniscient, that is a truly massive burden of proof, but it is not my fault that the atheist takes on a burden of proof which he could never prove.

The other issue is that the argument from evil is an indirect proof, ie. you assume p and show that p leads to a contradiction; therefore, not p. In other words, a genuine argument from evil would go something like this: “Even if Catholics were right about what evil and goodness and omnipotence and omniscience are, there is a contradiction between evil and Catholicism. The contradiction is obtained by these logical steps: [insert logic, hopefully].”

But Innoruk never actually does this. He never actually claims (or at least, has never even attempted to demonstrate) that there is a contradiction between Catholicism as a whole and evil. He begins by saying that he doesn’t agree with Catholicism’s definitions. So what he is doing (insofar that his argument is an “argument from evil”) is assuming not p; therefore, not p. That isn’t to say that his arguments against other Catholic doctrines cannot be valid (though I don’t think they are), but what he’s peddling is not an “argument from evil.”

So his argumentative strategy is basically to claim he is making an argument from evil. But then he never actually does so, and just argues that he finds other Catholic doctrines “incoherent.” So then he demands that Catholics recount other doctrines (the analogy of goodness in God and goodness in humans, evil as privation of good, etc.) that Catholic thinkers have spent hundreds of pages defending. If he wants to debate those doctrines, then he should clearly do so, but he shouldn’t “sell” them as what they are not (the problem of evil).

To say that the argument from evil is contingent upon those doctrines being wrong is basically to concede that the problem of evil is not problematic for Catholicism, but rather that Catholicism’s definition of evil or good is actually problematic. But that is a separate argument.

I’d, of course, argue that Catholicism’s definition of evil and good are not problematic, but the difficulty in discussing them is that they are based on much more basic principles and metaphysics. There is no good reason why the Catholic should have to recount the entirety of Catholic philosophy in order to defend against the problem of evil, which is a charge of inconsistency of the whole religion. This is why Innoruk’s “argument from evil” is intellectually dishonest; he does not even try to show that Catholicism and evil are actually contradictory. I am willing to defend against other Catholic doctrines if he is willing to state the argument clearly and fairly, but he should do so in an isolated manner.

So am I begging the question? Absolutely not; I’m not doing anything. The argument from evil is the atheist’s argument, and since it is an indirect proof, the atheist is actually the one who is supposed to beg the question in favor of Catholicism and show that it leads to a contradiction. If you beg the question against Catholicism, it is fairly obvious (and unremarkable) that you will obtain your desired contradiction.

One of those Catholic axioms, as you seem to admit, is that “free will is of the utmost importance.” Yet I’ve encountered Catholics themselves who admit that this is a moral paradox, as this thinking has no place in a human conception of morality. Morality trumps freedom, every time – which, again, is why we have laws, and why we incarcerate violent criminals. Yet God is conceived of as not accountable to the human moral imperative to intervene to prevent evil – a truth, or a rationalization?

Yes, humans have a moral obligation to let morality trump freedom, but this is because our prevention of evil does not eliminate free will.

I don’t see any way of affirming that the world as it is, ought to be the world as it is, without begging the question.

That’s not what I’m saying. Above I have clarified why free will is necessary to freely love God (a premise most atheists concede in the argument from evil).

 

[Portofino]

The funny thing is that the believers will contend that the angels (Lucifer, the Lightbringer - what an ironic name that is!) only had one instance of “free will”, and having made their selection to be either for God or against him, they have no more freedom. The “good” ones cannot rebel, while the “bad” ones cannot repent and change their mind. Also the “damned” humans in hell are unable to repent, there is no more freedom - it is gone at the very moment of death, when - finally! - one could make an informed decision.

Yes, that freedom is of the utmost importance here – but not in the afterlife – is assumed to be the case. Thus, freedom’s importance is relative to this world, not to the hereafter, even though Satan’s fall from heaven was due to the exercise of freedom…in the hereafter.
This suggests to me that angels have free will in the afterlife, but not human beings.

This notion of “choosing for all eternity” – in advance – doesn’t make sense to me, either. If there is no ability to change one’s mind, then one is no longer free.

would a presumably smart God create those angels, who will rebel against him, who will try to thwart his plans? Even if at the end those rebels will be destroyed (will they be??) they could tempt and convince a sizable amount of humans, thus depriving God of having “all” humans to be with him… which is allegedly his desire.

Why God allows the devil to “play” outside of the confines of hell would indeed be a great mystery. It’s one thing that humans are able to hurt each other, in the name of free will, but throwing the devil into the mix just complicates, even confuses, matters.

As mentioned, eternally damned human beings are confined to hell; yet the devil is not (obviously, the devil, or a demon, cannot possess someone, or infiltrate an institution, if he is confined to hell).

is hilariously funny to see the plethora of contradictions propagated by the believers, who also deny those contradictions. (I especially like when the contradictions are “redefined” to be mysteries.)

For me it’s not funny, but I respect and appreciate when Christians and Catholics acknowledge that some things are indeed difficult – perhaps impossible – to comprehend.

The book of Job is still a living text; the problems it grapples with are problems that Christians continue to grapple with, I think. The problem of evil is not just an “atheist” problem; it is a believer’s problem, as well.

When Christians or Catholics are in discussion with each other, the “problem of evil” is still a topic of discussion; this dilemma, this utter unfathomability of the ways of God, perdures.

Noah’s Flood – yet another dilemma that occurred to me, at least per the “God respects free will” arguments that are being espoused. If God respects human beings’ free will, then why intervene to destroy most of humanity by flood? Why intervene to destroy Sodom and Gomorrah?

It’s this very intervention that – fairly, I think – has people asking why God did not intervene during the Shoah, as he did in the parting of the Red Sea. The Old Testament sets up the expectation of intervention, in the many places where God steps in to say, “enough is enough, people!” The Ten Plagues is another example of this.

Yet, nowadays, Catholics do not seem to say that people perishing is an example of God punishing humanity (only Fundamentalist Protestants still say this). Yet Noah’s Flood, destroying most of humanity in this world, on account of its wickedness – a problem, assuming one holds the story of the Flood to be the inerrant Word of God.

 

[polytropos]

From what I understand of his argument, I think he’s simply pointing out the paradox of having two moralities, two forms of goodness – one for God, and one for man. As you yourself grant, what would be immoral for man – non-intervention to prevent evil that one is capable of preventing – is presumably not immoral for God.

Well, we have our morality (which is directed by God through our creation), and God strictly speaking does not have moral obligations (to say that He does would be contradictory, and would be the source of the “Euthyphro problem”). But I’m not just claiming that God must have a different attitude toward the prevention of evil in order to justify the existence of evil. I have given a reason that you did not specifically respond to, namely that an omnipotent being cannot, logically, both prevent evil and preserve will (and therefore cannot prevent evil and preserve the ability of other intelligent agents to freely choose to love Him).

It only confuses matters, of course, when Jesus on earth was very hands on – healing the sick, raising the dead; and, of course, Christians still believe that God miraculously heals the sick. It is a sign of his love for us, they contend.

Yet the opposite – not healing the sick, not miraculously intervening is conceived of as not impugning the goodness of God one iota. It is a strange double-standard, seen from the outside. I appreciate that, in the end, it is the “Daddy knows best” argument, and that is a blank check, a way of saying, “God obviously knows better than us” and, in the words of Alexander Pope, “whatever is, is *right.”.

Well, Jesus was also fully man. His actions to prevent evil did not logically necessitate the prevention of will.

It’s not exactly a blank check to say that God knows better than us, since other arguments (like the one I’ve given) show that it would be logically problematic for God to prevent evil and preserve free will. Aquinas’s Fifth Way demonstrates that God is Supreme Intelligence. It doesn’t really matter whether or not the atheist likes the response that God is omniscient so we don’t know what His reasons are, because there is nothing logically problematic with such a defense, and the atheist is the one making the positive argument that Catholicism is incoherent. Again, it’s not my fault that the atheist has voluntarily taken on more burden of proof than he can handle.

 

[Peter_Plato]

I think your argument would be a lot simpler if God never intervened, yet Catholics obviously believe that “sometimes he does, sometimes he doesn’t.” And even Christians wonder, or don’t understand, why he doesn’t intervene a little more than he does, or, perhaps, a lot more – for example, when there is a natural disaster, that has nothing to do with human beings being capable of willing evil. If anything, “natural evil” just confuses matters – non-human caused suffering and death is all around us, which blurs the sense that evil exists precisely so that the human will can be free.

Fr. Barron’s commentary on the movie World War Z, I think, helps put this issue into proper perspective.

I suggest you interrupt your reading of this post and watch the commentary before reading on.

wordonfire.org/WOF-TV/Commentaries-New/World-War-Z-A-commentary-by-Fr-Barron.aspx

If we consider evil in the sense of a contagion or disease that propagates through contact rather than simply as behaviour that is imitated we might shed some light on the problem.

In this light, consider the idea of God intervening to stop evil. In what way will that intervention be helpful if the reality is that evil is a “force” that causes the disintegration of the human subject/identity/person/will? Any intervention - in your sense of the term - by God would simply involve managing the fallout, but would not address the problem itself because the problem is not the resultant behaviour, but rather the disintegration of the volitional moral agent.

If, as Fr. Barron proposes, evil is a kind of zombification of the human person, where the person/will is shattered and lost, it would not seem to make much of a difference whether this simulacrum of the former person engages in devouring human flesh or abides by a more traditional diet of the four food groups. The damage has been done, the evil accomplished, the “person” is no more even though it walks and talks like a human, it has become a subhuman zombie.

Let us propose, as a banned poster, Trurl, (who bears an uncanny resemblance to Innoruk in perspective and writing style) did in this past thread,

forums.catholic-questions.org/showthread.php?p=9776869#post9776869

that a viable option to remedy evil is simply to turn every human being into a robot-like entity that, quite simply, always does good actions and never evil. Trurl would accept, according to his proposed solution, that a race of human zombies would be preferable to humans with free will as long as evil acts did not result. He actually argued that turning human agents into robots programmed to “do good” would be his preferred option.

It would seem to me that taking this view is problematic because it assumes that, in the movie World War Z, the real evil was in the fact that the zombies engaged in devouring humans and not in the “zombification” of those affected. This is problematic for two reasons.

1. Zombies that eat humans would seem to be no different than, say, tigers or dingoes that do if it is merely their choice of staple food that makes them evil, since, as zombies, they would seem no longer capable of moral agency.
2. Given Trurl’s view, a feasible and complete remedy for this evil would be to “train” the zombies to a more appropriate lifestyle of burgers and fries, sports on the weekend and a productive career in some trade that could be done by rote.

I suggest that the crux of the problem of evil, which the movie helps to demonstrate, is that evil is not in the “fallout” so much as in the ruination of the human person so affected - in the loss of the subjective “self” wherein free agency is embedded. Zombies are zombies because they are not volitional moral human agents, but rather mere shadows of what it means to be human. It would be just as evil (morally speaking) to have flesh eating zombies as it would be to have zombies, who were formerly human, but must now relentlessly and witlessly carry out the biddings of a master, no matter how good.

If the movie were about injecting otherwise normal human beings with a drug that turned each of them into slaves that carried out the beck and call of the inventor of the drug we would be equally morally appalled, although Trurl would, apparently, find that an appealing scenario.

It seems to me that any option taken by God that does not involve cooperative free choice on the part of each human agent, is tantamount to creating human zombies and misses the point and importance of what it means to be a moral agent.

I believe the principle in question is to never use an evil means to bring about a good end. That principle would seem to apply here. God would be using an evil means (creating human zombies) if he were to compel the will of every human to carry out only good deeds as ends.

 

[Portofino]

It’s not exactly a blank check to say that God knows better than us, since other arguments (like the one I’ve given) show that it would be logically problematic for God to prevent evil and preserve free will.

This argument is becoming very abstract to me, which may be why I am finding your arguments hard to follow.

Do you believe that God intervenes to prevent evil, sometimes? What you’re writing seems to square much more easily with a world in which God never intervenes, always respecting free will.

To make the discussion more concrete:

–Do you believe that God flooded the earth, destroying most human life – and most animal life – save for Noah and a few other individuals?

–Do you believe that God destroyed Sodom and Gomorrah, on account of their sinfulness?

–Do you believe that God is ultimately responsible for all manner of natural disasters, and that these are the result of God’s will?

–Do you believe in miraculous healings?

If so, then you are granting that God can intervene, without violating free will (or, perhaps, that free will can and ought to be violated, if God wills it to be). Presumably, you are leaving it up to God as to the conditions under which violating free will is permissible; thus, if God decided that it is not important for the will to be free, you presumably would have no problem with that. Freedom is only important because God has determined it to be so.

Fifth Way demonstrates that God is Supreme Intelligence. It doesn’t really matter whether or not the atheist likes the response that God is omniscient so we don’t know what His reasons are, because there is nothing logically problematic with such a defense, and the atheist is the one making the positive argument that Catholicism is incoherent. Again, it’s not my fault that the atheist has voluntarily taken on more burden of proof than he can handle.

The argument that God knows better cannot be disproven, in principle; yet it pretty much ends the discussion, since – even if the world were a lot worse than it is (let’s say a natural disaster destroyed 99% of humanity) – there still would be no way to disprove that it wasn’t for the best, or that God wasn’t all-good and all-merciful. God is not being judged by the same standards as human beings; what would be immoral for a human being, is not immoral for God.

There’s no way to prove this – nor disprove this. It’s simply a theoretical possibility. So, there is no need for evidence that God loves us and cares about our well-being, since it’s already considered to be proven that whatever God does “to us” could, in principle, be a result of his love and concern for us. Nothing that could possibly happen could ever be adduced as counterevidence – not even if the Black Plague, or Noah’s Flood, had wiped out all of humanity. If God had done it, there would be good and justifiable reasons for doing so.

The argument is clever because it is immune from criticism – in the final analysis, it is neither verifiable empirically, nor falsifiable, empirically. You would never know for sure

 

[Portofino]

Fr. Barron’s commentary on the movie World War Z, I think, helps put this issue into proper perspective.

Thanks for the video, Peter Plato. I did view it and definitely appreciate Father Barron’s “thoughtful” take on things.

It seems that your argument has more of a bearing on the need for the existence of moral evil, though (murders, rapes, thefts), as opposed to the existence of natural evil (hurricanes, earthquakes, tornados, tsunamis, freak accidents, incurable diseases).

seems to me that any option taken by God that does not involve cooperative free choice on the part of each human agent, is tantamount to creating human zombies and misses the point and importance of what it means to be a moral agent.

Yet this would not be without exceptions, it would seem – the story of the Flood, for example, or the smiting of Sodom and Gomorrah.

It seems that both arguments are promulgated, at once – first, God does not interfere with free will; second, when God does intervene, and makes things happen to us, He is wholly justified in doing so.

In other words, we are as free as God wants us to be – when we are free, it is God’s will; when we are not free (e.g., the lives of the first-born Egyptians were cut short, such that it was no longer possible for them to live and to make choices) it is God’s will, as well.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Portofino

**The argument that God knows better cannot be disproven, in principle; yet it pretty much ends the discussion, since – even if the world were a lot worse than it is (let’s say a natural disaster destroyed 99% of humanity) – there still would be no way to disprove that it wasn’t for the best, or that God wasn’t all-good and all-merciful. God is not being judged by the same standards as human beings; what would be immoral for a human being, is not immoral for God. **

Well let’s take that hypothesis 1% further. Let’s say that God wipes out the whole planet of humans. He does, you know. We all have to die. Is it immoral for God to take all of our lives sooner or later? I think not. What is God’s to give is God’s to take away. God is not immoral. God gives us life, then he sacrifices himself on a cross to save us from ourselves. Then He offers us greater and eternal life. How does that make God immoral?

The argument is clever because it is immune from criticism – in the final analysis, it is neither verifiable empirically, nor falsifiable, empirically. You would never know for sure.

You wouldn’t know for sure because you don’t believe in anything supernatural. Once you open your heart and overcome all skepticism, you might come to believe. “You would never know for sure” unless you try.

 

[Portofino]

Well let’s take that hypothesis 1% further. Let’s say that God wipes out the whole planet of humans. He does, you know. We all have to die. Is it immoral for God to take all of our lives sooner or later? I think not. What is God’s to give is God’s to take away. God is not immoral. God gives us life, then he sacrifices himself on a cross to save us from ourselves. Then He offers us greater and eternal life. How does that make God immoral?

No, I respect that, Charlemagne – and I appreciate your stating it so boldly and openly, so that both sides (the believers and the non-believers) understand each other.

The thing is that, given your argument, one could not predict in advance what an outcome reflective of God’s love for us would be. There is no predictive power there, at least in terms of the details. If an asteroid were headed for a populated area, we could not even predict, “in a world where God loves us, although some in that city might die, others in that city – fervent Christians who prayed – likely would be spared, miraculously.” If there were such thing as a 100% casualty rate, we still couldn’t say that God doesn’t love us and is not concerned for our well-being and flourishing. Nothing could possibly occur on this earth, no matter how unpleasant by human standards, that could disprove that a personal God loves us and is actively concerned for us, given that God always knows better. For example, if folks prayed that God avert the asteroid, and the asteroid nonetheless wiped an entire region’s population off the map, God “must have had” good reasons for doing so.

By the same token, of course, good things – miraculous healings, miraculous survivals (like that girl who was the lone survivor of a plane crash some years ago) – is not in itself evidence that God does love us; not, at least, if the non-miraculous (or perhaps miraculous?) non-survival does not prove that God doesn’t love us.

Yet, in human beings as they actually are constituted, there seems to be a double-standard – the good stuff is taken evidence that God cares for us, that He listens to our prayers, while the “the bad stuff” is not taken as evidence that He doesn’t.

So be it – I can accept this, that the proposition, theoretically at least, is irrefutable, that it is a non-falsifiable theoretical possibility.

Then again, there is no way to disprove that God doesn’t love us, either. Both are beyond empirical verification or falsifiability, just like the existence of limbo (if limbo, by definition, is not discernible by the senses, it is subject neither to being empirically verified, nor empirically falsified).

 

[Innoruk]

In the world as it exists, I would be against such measures because it would make for an even more violent world, even more dystopian (history has demonstrated this, I think, including the history of Christendom, frankly). Reminds me of a Clockwork Orange or of Spielberg’s Minority Report

Oh, but there are much better methods. I wonder if you happen to be familiar with the universe of Larry Niven? He created many interesting races, two of which are pertinent to this discussion. One is the “Pierson Puppeteers”, a herbivore race, for whom the ultimate virtue is cowardice. The other one is the Kzinti, a warrior race of feline origin, for whom the ultimate virtue is ferocity. Obviously, if a clash between such two races happen, the Puppeteers are at a tremendous disadvantage… except the Puppeteers invented the ultimate defensive “weapon”, a gadget which invokes incredible bliss an happiness in the would-be attacker. No one who is basking in incredible joy and happiness would dream about attacking anyone. What kind of problem can be brought up against such a “humane” solution? No oppression, merely a feeling of joy.

Another hypothetical solution is described in Stanislaw Lem’s book: “Return from the Stars”. The heroes return from a long interstellar trip and find a mild society, where all the violence is removed from humans, by injecting them with certain chemicals. The people can imagine all the atrocities, they simply do not wish to perform them. Where is the problem with such a solution?

Of course, this whole argument stemming from the “respect of free will” is nonsense. The overwhelming majority of humans is basically “decent”. They would never dream of raping a girl, or smashing the head of a toddler against a stone. Possibly they could be “forced” into a violent action, if provoked beyond endurance. But left alone, no such action would even occur to them. So the simplest solution would come from creating all humans with a decent disposition like this. Obviously it would not be beyond God’s power to create decent human beings, and not create sociopaths or psychopaths. There would be no need to interfere against a violent action, since people would not even contemplate such actions. Mind you, these people would not be “saints”, they would simply be decent, good-willing, everyday human beings. The result, no moral atrocities.

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Portofino

Then again, there is no way to disprove that God doesn’t love us, either. Both are beyond empirical verification or falsifiability, just like the existence of limbo (if limbo, by definition, is not discernible by the senses, it is subject neither to being empirically verified, nor empirically falsified).

You are subjecting the testing of God’s will to the same criteria for the testing of natural laws?

So are you an advocate of scientism? That there can be no truth outside of science?

 

[Innoruk]

The other issue is that the argument from evil is an indirect proof, ie. you assume p and show that p leads to a contradiction; therefore, not p. In other words, a genuine argument from evil would go something like this: “Even if Catholics were right about what evil and goodness and omnipotence and omniscience are, there is a contradiction between evil and Catholicism. The contradiction is obtained by these logical steps: [insert logic, hopefully].”

This is impossible, since the catholic definition of “goodness” is nonsensical. It is impossible to argue against a “married bachelor”.

So his argumentative strategy is basically to claim he is making an argument from evil. But then he never actually does so, and just argues that he finds other Catholic doctrines “incoherent.” So then he demands that Catholics recount other doctrines (the analogy of goodness in God and goodness in humans, evil as privation of good, etc.) that Catholic thinkers have spent hundreds of pages defending. If he wants to debate those doctrines, then he should clearly do so, but he shouldn’t “sell” them as what they are not (the problem of evil).

Those defenses are worthless. The old statue of the goddess of “Justitia” (the goddess of justice) is depicted with a blindfold, indicating that the person of the perpetrator is irrelevant, it is the deed itself that matters. It does not matter if an atrocity is committed by a human or by God, it is an atrocity, nevertheless. However the theists assert that there is a different method for human, and a different scale for God - which is a blatant invocation of the “might makes right” principle. I don’t need to argue against such a principle, since it is universally rejected as unacceptable. The offered defense is simply a special pleading.

Actually I already argued against the “evil is the privation of good”, but you might have overlooked it.

 

[Portofino]

Portofino

Then again, there is no way to disprove that God doesn’t love us, either. Both are beyond empirical verification or falsifiability, just like the existence of limbo (if limbo, by definition, is not discernible by the senses, it is subject neither to being empirically verified, nor empirically falsified).

You are subjecting the testing of God’s will to the same criteria for the testing of natural laws?

So are you an advocate of scientism? That there can be no truth outside of science?

As far as myself as a human being, in terms of my ability to know – yes, though I would call it naturalism. I am not directly acquainted with the supernatural realm. To tell you the truth, I really can’t prove that the divine forces posited by the Native Americans do not exist, either.

If there were an invisible man that is neither detectable to touch, nor to sight, nor to smell, then I couldn’t disprove his existence, either. Such an invisible man would remain an irrefutable theoretical possibility.

But hey, William Blake himself wrote, “How do you know but every bird that cuts the airy way, is an immense world of delight, closed by your senses five?”

 

[Charlemagne_II]

Innoruk
**
It does not matter if an atrocity is committed by a human or by God, it is an atrocity, nevertheless. However the theists assert that there is a different method for human, and a different scale for God - which is a blatant invocation of the “might makes right” principle. I don’t need to argue against such a principle, since it is universally rejected as unacceptable. The offered defense is simply a special pleading. **

Some people like to judge God by a human yardstick. It makes them feel oh so powerful and superior to God. But their yardstick is not long enough for the job.

 

[Innoruk]

As far as myself as a human being, in terms of my ability to know – yes, though I would call it naturalism. I am not directly acquainted with the supernatural realm. To tell you the truth, I really can’t prove that the divine forces posited by the Native Americans do not exist, either.

If there were an invisible man that is neither detectable to touch, nor to sight, nor to smell, then I couldn’t disprove his existence, either. Such an invisible man would remain an irrefutable theoretical possibility.

But hey, William Blake himself wrote, “How do you know but every bird that cuts the airy way, is an immense world of delight, closed by your senses five?”

Let’s not forget that the concept of “proof” is only applicable in axiomatic, formal systems. In other circumstances one can only speak of evidence. And the saying that “absence of evidence is a very strong evidence of absence” is the concept to go by! If there is no evidence of “divine forces” or “divine intervention” then the only rational behavior is to discard the hypothesis.

 

[Innoruk]

Some people like to judge God by a human yardstick. It makes them feel oh so powerful and superior to God. But their yardstick is not long enough for the job.

Present your “God” so I can compare him to the yardstick. I am here to accept any challenge from your imaginary deity… where is he? If he does not show up, he loses by default. … oops… he lost.

 

[Portofino]

Present your “God” so I can compare him to the yardstick. I am here to accept any challenge from your imaginary deity… where is he? If he does not show up, he loses by default. … oops… he lost.

I suppose it depends on whether one accepts the proofs evinced for the existence of God; I’m not convinced, though I don’t exclude the possibly that perhaps I don’t understand them aright.

The incarnation of Jesus is also supposed to be a big one, though this happened 2,000 years ago – you or I were not eyewitnesses – and was written about in a book, and testified to by human followers. It is hearsay – reliable hearsay, per the Christian, but hearsay nonetheless.

I suppose we won’t have a “smoking gun” to satisfy reasonable skepticism until the Second Coming of Christ, if it occurs. The disciples of Christ have been waiting for this Second Coming for 2,000 years thus far, and may be waiting for 10,000 more. Our lifespan, unfortunately, may not be long enough for us to test this prediction that he’s going to come back

Another means of knowing – when we die, and if there’s an afterlife, we’ll know whether we were right or wrong. Again, we will have to wait beyond such time as we are capable of participating in Catholic Answers Forum – as long as we live, we may never know.

Yet another source of evidence put forth are the effects of the First Coming of Jesus, though – I must say – those effects are not all that visible to me. Humanity is still sinful, by Christian standards; suffering and death, and earning one’s bread through the sweat of one’s brow (Adam’s curse) was not redeemed through the crucifixion of Christ. The soul was given the possibility of redemption – after death.

From what I understand, Jews were not impressed by the effects of the First Coming; for them, there is only one coming of the Messiah, and it seemed suspect to them to be told, “everything you claim should have happened with the coming of the Messiah is going to happen during the Second Coming” – deferred indefinitely into the future.

Christians also hold forth the survival of the Church, or its “positive influence” on humanity as proof that it has the truth, though that’s debatable, of course. Its survival could be due to very human reasons, and to say that it’s had primarily a positive effect on humanity is an ultimately subjective viewpoint (especially since any of the negatives, such as a Borgia as pope, or the historical persecution of non-Catholics, are said not to matter). We’re told that the important thing is that the Church gives us everything necessary for salvation – yet we won’t know if that is true statement, until we’ve died.

Finally, there are the miracles, which are supposed to prove God’s existence and his intervention in the world. Of course, there is irreducibly subjective element in judging what is a miracle, what is not a miracle. You’re either convinced that something was a miracle, or you’re not; or, even if you say it is possible something was a miracle, you also would have to be open to the fact that “other explanations are possible, as well.” The same would go for Marian visitations; statues that bleed, or shed tears; diseases that are inexplicably cured (as if our inability to explain a cure through current medical knowledge, were sufficient proof that the cure was supernatural!) I’ve never been first-hand witness to any of these events, but if I were, I might believe… And even if I were, and might believe, that still does not exclude the possibility that I was mistaken.