Simple observations about reality are not “philosophical statements”.
True this. However, as Aquinas points out:
We do not know a great many of the properties of sensible things, and in most cases we are not able to discover fully the natures of those properties that we apprehend by the sense. Much more is it the case, therefore, that the human reason is not equal to the task of investigating all the intelligible characteristics of that most excellent substance. (SCG Ch 1, 5)
So making simple “observations” about the properties of sensible things is the prerogative of science. Now assuming the universe is not merely sensible, but downright intelligible, then we must also assume that it has intelligible characteristics, the study of which is the endeavor of philosophy, not science.
Obviously, if human beings are confounded even by the sensible properties of nature and have devoted entire branches of science to their study, then it stands to reason that we are barely scratching the surface regarding the intelligible characteristics of the universe and reality in general. That does not argue for the uselessness of philosophy, unless you want to argue that making intelligent observations about the universe is a “useless” pursuit, but rather that we have spent entirely too much time and effort on gathering sensible data (the concern of the scientific method), but entirely too little on what that data could possibly entail (the concern of philosophy, in general.)
Furthermore, since the prerogative of science is sensible data and you want to argue for the uselessness of the intelligible characteristics of the universe, then you seem to be making a case that what is “useful” is only useful as it pertains to furthering the sensory aspects of human beings. Your case depends upon the assumption that the end of cosmic evolution is merely the development of human senses and appetites and not intelligence, at all. I.e., useful is defined as that which furthers the sensory or appetitive faculties of human beings and not the intellective faculties. Seeking to know is only useful as it pertains to fulfilling the appetitive or sensory nature of human beings and not an end in itself.
Ultimately the universe is, then, according to your philosophy, only there for the purpose of its utility towards satisfying the desires and appetites of human beings. How else would you define “useful” without reference to knowledge as an end in itself?
If knowledge is, indeed, an end in itself, then its utility
cannot depend on its being “useful” towards some other end. Philosophy, then, as knowledge of reality, it would seem, need not be useful towards some other end precisely because it is an end in itself.
Given Aquinas’ distinction between the vegetative (plant), sensitive (animal) and rational (human) souls, you seem to be arguing that humans are not rational or intelligent beings at all, but merely possess sensitive souls, seeing as you are arguing for the priority of the senses and the uselessness of intelligence except as it is utile towards fulfilling animal rather than rational ends.