Another reason why philosophers are useless

[Innoruk]

In those cases the goal is impossible–just as impossible as leaping a tall building in a single bound or running as fast as a speeding bullet. True we are not free to do any of those things. But usually people don’t speak about freedom in relation to the impossible, which we know (given we have no power to do) we are not free to do. In the face of the impossible we go to other goals and means.

These examples were brought up just to illustrate that we are not “free” to do anything and everything that we wish to do.

Let me give another example. Due to my upbringing I find it “impossible” to stay seated on a bus when an older person is standing. Not physically impossible, of course. I can imagine to stay seated, I could perform the act of staying seated, but psychologically I am “compelled” to get up and offer my seat. Now here is an interesting question: “do I act freely in such a case”? My answer is: “yes”. There is no external force which would prevent me from making either choices, I am in control, so the locus of decision is in me. I could stay seated, if I wanted to… but I do not wish to exercise that option, because I would find it “unpalatable”.

Yes, freedom can apply to things like tie color or eating your vegetables before you mashed potatoes. But it also applies to greater struggles like remaining faithful in marriage in the face of temptation; conduct in war; choosing moral business practices even though they are not as “profitable” as less moral ones; confronting a friend with a drinking problem that is destroying his life and family rather than taking the easy way out and letting it slide.

Of course. You are absolutely correct. These are much more important choices. But this is not the topic at hand. We seem to agree that if one wishes to achieve some goal, but is unable to do it, then in that respect he does not enjoy “free will”. Using the red/blue tie example, if he only has a blue tie, and not wearing a tie is not an option (due to some social pressure) then the person has no freedom, since he does not have at least two alternatives to choose from.

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

These examples were brought up just to illustrate that we are not “free” to do anything and everything that we wish to do.

Let me give another example. Due to my upbringing I find it “impossible” to stay seated on a bus when an older person is standing. Not physically impossible, of course. I can imagine to stay seated, I could perform the act of staying seated, but psychologically I am “compelled” to get up and offer my seat. Now here is an interesting question: “do I act freely in such a case”? My answer is: “yes”. There is no external force which would prevent me from making either choices, I am in control, so the locus of decision is in me. I could stay seated, if I wanted to… but I do not wish to exercise that option, because I would find it “unpalatable”.

Of course. You are absolutely correct. These are much more important choices. But this is not the topic at hand. We seem to agree that if one wishes to achieve some goal, but is unable to do it, then in that respect he does not enjoy “free will”. Using the red/blue tie example, if he only has a blue tie, and not wearing a tie is not an option (due to some social pressure) then the person has no freedom, since he does not have at least two alternatives to choose from.

Yes, we may be in agreement. It’s probably down to semantics now.

So if when you say “in that respect he does not enjoy ‘free will’" you mean what you said before that “we are not ‘free’ to do anything and everything that we wish to do” i.e., the impossible, then I agree. We are not free to do the impossible. However ‘free will,” in RC usage anyway, refers to a faculty which, even when faced with the impossible, remains. And I think you already agree with that.

In RC usage if I were to consider whether I could “stand next to a mountain and chop it down with the edge of my hand,” the issue of freedom wouldn’t even come up: it’s just plain impossible to do that. Same in a situation where escape from death is impossible. But in most cases people do not know that, so they keep freely trying to escape. If they somehow did know, then they would freely resign themselves to that end. I’ve often thought about those poor passengers on that doomed Concorde flight. Not much one could do there.

 

[jonathan_hili]

This is what I call the lack of epistemology. Epistemology is the “tool” to separate the true propositions from the false ones. If the “tool” is objective, then it can be “wielded” by anyone, and the result will be same, no matter what the person a-priori believes.

If the “tool” is contingent upon the person’s a-priori beliefs, then it is already “tainted” and as such it is useless.

A real world example: quite a while ago I asked why God never talks to me. I was told that IF I perform a certain task (for example praying the rosary) then God WILL talk to me. I tried, and of course nothing happened. So the alleged epistemological “tool” (praying the rosary) proved to be useless. The answer was:

1. you did not persist long enough (how long is long enough?) or
2. you did not pray “honestly” enough, or
3. I closed my ears, or
4. God is not a vending machine… or many other cop-outs.

In my eyes these white-washing attempts are the indications of intellectual dishonesty, when the “player” refuses to fold his card, but insists of changing the rules to escape that his hand contains a losing combination.

I agree, such whitewashing does seem dishonest or naive at least. However, different epistemological perspectives are not the same as this. If the contention is that God will talk to you every time you pray (and I’ve never heard anyone suggest this), then if you pray and He doesn’t, it is obviously false. If the result is contingent on certain factors, such as, length and persistence of prayer, there must be a legitimate way to authenticate this. Different epistemologies are certainly not like this. They explain rather than predict, and can be falsified.

I would also suggest that human epistemology cannot be separated from the consciousness of the human subject, and therefore neither from one’s beliefs.

I guess my question to you is this: what epistemology would you find reliable and why?

 

[Innoruk]

Yes, we may be in agreement. It’s probably down to semantics now.

Indeed. And I am glad about this. It happens too rarely.

 

[Innoruk]

I agree, such whitewashing does seem dishonest or naive at least. However, different epistemological perspectives are not the same as this. If the contention is that God will talk to you every time you pray (and I’ve never heard anyone suggest this), then if you pray and He doesn’t, it is obviously false. If the result is contingent on certain factors, such as, length and persistence of prayer, there must be a legitimate way to authenticate this. Different epistemologies are certainly not like this. They explain rather than predict, and can be falsified.

I see a problem with your last sentence. How can something be falsified without a prediction?

I guess my question to you is this: what epistemology would you find reliable and why?

I am not sure I understand. Do you mean an epistemology to employ concerning the claims of objective reality? Please, clarify. Observe that I left the phrase “objective reality” extremely vague. The expression obviously includes the objective physical reality, but I did not suggest that it should be “closed” to other aspects of reality (if such aspects exist).

 

[jonathan_hili]

I see a problem with your last sentence. How can something be falsified without a prediction?

I suppose I should have said that, unlike scientific experiments and the example you used, epistemological theories are not essentially predictive but explanatory. Consequently, a theory can only really be considered worthwhile depending on its explanatory power and scope rather than producing results.

I am not sure I understand. Do you mean an epistemology to employ concerning the claims of objective reality? Please, clarify. Observe that I left the phrase “objective reality” extremely vague. The expression obviously includes the objective physical reality, but I did not suggest that it should be “closed” to other aspects of reality (if such aspects exist).

I mean, how do you explain or understand how human beings comprehend reality?

 

[Innoruk]

I suppose I should have said that, unlike scientific experiments and the example you used, epistemological theories are not essentially predictive but explanatory. Consequently, a theory can only really be considered worthwhile depending on its explanatory power and scope rather than producing results.

Epistemology is a method or a procedure to separate true propositions from false ones. The method varies according to the disciplines. But the basic process is uniform within the investigation of the objective reality, and in the axiomatic systems.

I mean, how do you explain or understand how human beings comprehend reality?

They look at reality, they think about it, they set up hypotheses, they experiment, they compare the prediction of the hypotheses with the reality. This is a never-ending spiral, and we gain more and more understanding of reality.

 

[jonathan_hili]

Epistemology is a method or a procedure to separate true propositions from false ones. The method varies according to the disciplines. But the basic process is uniform within the investigation of the objective reality, and in the axiomatic systems.

Epistemology, as far as I’ve always understood it, theorises how a person perceives and understands reality, and isn’t really a “method” (i.e. procedure) as such, though it can incorporate them.

They look at reality, they think about it, they set up hypotheses, they experiment, they compare the prediction of the hypotheses with the reality. This is a never-ending spiral, and we gain more and more understanding of reality.

Sure, but what’s the epistemological basis of this? I mean, if you were an idealist, you’d certainly have a different understand of “reality” than if you were a realist or materialist.

 

[Peter_Plato]

This is what I call the lack of epistemology. Epistemology is the “tool” to separate the true propositions from the false ones. If the “tool” is objective, then it can be “wielded” by anyone, and the result will be same, no matter what the person a-priori believes.

If the “tool” is contingent upon the person’s a-priori beliefs, then it is already “tainted” and as such it is useless.

A real world example: quite a while ago I asked why God never talks to me. I was told that IF I perform a certain task (for example praying the rosary) then God WILL talk to me. I tried, and of course nothing happened. So the alleged epistemological “tool” (praying the rosary) proved to be useless. The answer was:

1. you did not persist long enough (how long is long enough?) or
2. you did not pray “honestly” enough, or
3. I closed my ears, or
4. God is not a vending machine… or many other cop-outs.

In my eyes these white-washing attempts are the indications of intellectual dishonesty, when the “player” refuses to fold his card, but insists of changing the rules to escape that his hand contains a losing combination.

It seems to me that this explication involves a category mistake. If God is anything he is not “a proposition.” Your model might find some utility for assessing the proposition “God exists,” as a proposition and its function as a proposition, but it is not clear whether it serves to distinguish between possible “epistemological tools” or assess their adequacy to the task.

Let’s take four propositions:

Rocks exists
Oak trees exist.
Snow leopards exist.
God exists.

Obviously, these propositions refer to four inherently different objects. To claim that the epistemological tool ought not depend upon a priori beliefs is a questionable one. In order to decide upon appropriate epistemological tools to determine the adequacy of the tool for determining the truth of each of the four propositions, a priori beliefs about the kind of object that each proposition refers to is a very important factor in determining whether the tool is adequate as a means of verifying the object of the proposition.

The method that one chooses for determining whether rocks exist will not be the same method for determining whether snow leopards do.

Your specified epistemological tool for determining whether God exists (praying the rosary) would also be useless for determining whether rocks, oak trees or snow leopards exist because none of these manifestly answer prayer either, but that does not entail they do not exist. The lack of efficacy of the tool says more about the adequacy of the tool than about the truth of the proposition.

The “answering prayer” tool would serve to dispel the notion that a divine genie that answers all prayers exists, but does not demonstrate anything about whether God, properly understood, does.

A researcher intent upon uncovering the truth of the proposition, “Snow leopards exist.” would not find an adequate answer to that question by noisily wandering through Central Asia yelling, “Are there any snow leopards here? Answer if there are!” That would seem to be a ridiculous “epistemological tool” to rest a belief about the existence of snow leopards upon. It is not clear why anyone would then submit such a tool as the means to determine the existence of God a Being who is manifestly more intelligent and infinitely more stealth capable than snow leopards.

It seems to me that even proposing prayer as an epistemological tool and then concluding anything about its efficacy is engaging a set of a priori presumptions despite your denial.

Determining the means of assessing the proposition, for example, about the existence of snow leopards, does involve a priori considerations about the kind of beings snow leopards are and that proving the truth of the proposition does involve tailoring the tool to one’s a priori beliefs about the kind of thing being proposed.

 

[Innoruk]

The method that one chooses for determining whether rocks exist will not be the same method for determining whether snow leopards do.

On the very contrary, the method is exactly the same. It is exactly the same for every physically existing ontological object. It is called observation, either directly through our senses, or the extension of these senses.

Your specified epistemological tool for determining whether God exists (praying the rosary) …

The praying was not intended to see if God exists or not, it was only intended to examine, if God will be talking to me or not. And the experiment showed that contrary to the “promise” that he would, he did not. Naturally, the lack of communication says nothing about God’s existence.

We all know that the objective external, physical reality exists. The word “exists” is well defined. It designates a spatially and temporally limited phenomenon. We all know how we ascertain that this reality exists: “by using our senses”. The question is: “is the external reality limited to the physical objects, or not”. The other question is: “what does the word ‘exists’ mean in the proposition: God exists?”.

The believers of some kind of “supernatural” or maybe “paranormal” existence assert that the external reality is not limited to the physical ontological objects. That is a positive claim, so the proponents are under the obligation to provide the epistemological method which enable the skeptics to verify the claims of the believers - without a-priori accepting the veracity of the claims. Uri Geller and the other proponents of the paranormal all assert that the existence of skeptics “disrupt” the paranormal flow, so if they are present in the audience the effects will not materialize. They never perform when trained stage magicians are there to observe, since the magicians are able to see through the flim-flamm.

Now, here comes the fun part. Can the alleged non-physical “objects” affect our physical existence? Also, can we, physical beings affect the non-physical objects? If the answer to these questions is negative, then the two realms (physical and non-physical) cannot affect each other, and as such the question of the “existence of the non-physical realm is moot, irrelevant”. On the other hand, if there is an interaction between the two realms, then the “interface problem arises”. At least part of the interaction happens in the physical realm, so our method of “observation” is a valid epistemological tool. But the proponents of the “supernatural” wish to have their cake and eat it too. They say that God can affect us, and we can affect God (via prayer, even though God cannot be influenced - don’t you just love the contradiction?) but this “interaction” has a magical, undetectable interface. Since the skeptics adamantly refuse to believe in “magic” it is pretty much useless to talk to believers - except for entertainment value. It is amusing to see the believers contradicting their previous assertions, their attempts to move the goalposts, the re-classification of contradictions to “mysteries”.

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

This is what I call the lack of epistemology. Epistemology is the “tool” to separate the true propositions from the false ones. If the “tool” is objective, then it can be “wielded” by anyone, and the result will be same, no matter what the person a-priori believes.

If the “tool” is contingent upon the person’s a-priori beliefs, then it is already “tainted” and as such it is useless.

A real world example: quite a while ago I asked why God never talks to me. I was told that IF I perform a certain task (for example praying the rosary) then God WILL talk to me. I tried, and of course nothing happened. So the alleged epistemological “tool” (praying the rosary) proved to be useless. The answer was:

1. you did not persist long enough (how long is long enough?) or
2. you did not pray “honestly” enough, or
3. I closed my ears, or
4. God is not a vending machine… or many other cop-outs.

In my eyes these white-washing attempts are the indications of intellectual dishonesty, when the “player” refuses to fold his card, but insists of changing the rules to escape that his hand contains a losing combination.

Hi Innoruk. Let me see if I can make some contribution here. I am just putting some general observations on the table. Not sure where you fit into some of this–no accusations intended.

(1) Knowing comes before epistemology.
First we human beings know (apprehend reality as it is), then we pre-reflectively know we know (are aware of the fact we know); only lastly have human beings formally reflected in philosophy on the act of knowing and the conditions for truth, i.e., derive an epistemology.
Aristotle didn’t receive logic as a revelation or invent it before people ever knew they reasoned correctly. He explicitly formalized what he and other people already were doing and informally knew.

(2) A method used with its attendant epistemology will differ in some respects depending on the subject matter. Aristotle noted that the method of investigation should correspond with its subject matter.
Even in the natural sciences the method and epistemology of a field ecologist will differ in many respects from that of an astrophysicist studying subatomic particles.

(3) There has been a method of verification and epistemology used in theism (which I will limit myself to) for thousands of years. It’s just not the natural scientific method (SM) or a physicalist philosophy/epistemology. Historically, re the SM:
–It was developed as an empirical, mechanistic, and quantitative investigation of physical reality.
–It was recognized as a distinct method for a distinct subject matter giving a distinct kind of knowledge (from the philosophy of nature) roughly by the end of the 18th c.
–Those who gave it explicit formulation directly affirmed its goal to seek only empirically verifiable and where possible quantifiable explanations for physical phenomena.
–Methodologically God, as an explanatory principle or object of study, was expressly and by design excluded from consideration without prejudice to the question of His existence.

All this is rightly so for the type of questions the natural sciences puts to physical reality which is what the method was rightly developed to investigate.

(4) The physical givenness, physical observability, physical testability of physical things don’t apply to God who by definition is immaterial and personal. A physicalist philosophy, epistemology, and method will not discover God.
To insist on the type of methods and mind set of testing and investigation applicable to physical objects regarding God is to rule out God even if he did exist. It would be like a person who said I’ll believe in atoms only when I can see them with my own eyes, because I believe only what I can see with my own eyes. The object of the test, God, is excluded by the design of the test. No scientific research operating in such a way would be accepted.

(5) God in theism is personal. The domain of religious experience is not primarily one of a physical or metaphysical explanation of objects, but rather one of an encounter and relationship between subjects (persons, divine and human).
Consequently, approaching religious experience and traditions (in view of some adjudication) a priori, detached, and extrinsic like naturalists speaking in hushed voices observing the mating habits of adult lions from the safety of a Jeep is not methodologically consistent with the subject matter. An approach like that would be unreasonable.

 

[Innoruk]

All this is rightly so for the type of questions the natural sciences puts to physical reality which is what the method was rightly developed to investigate.

To save bandwidth, let me simply agree with you, without quoting everything you said.

(4) The physical givenness, physical observability, physical testability of physical things don’t apply to God who by definition is immaterial and personal.

But you do not say that God never interferes with the physical reality. You also do not say that we are unable to “affect” God - it is widely assumed that God sometimes answers prayers in a positive fashion. (Of course this is in dire contradiction with the idea that God is “immutable”, but we can let that pass for the moment.)

As such we are left with the interface problem (as I stated to Peter Plato in the post directly above yours). And since there is an alleged two-way interaction between God and this, physical reality, therefore it rational to “demand” the physical evidence for the interaction. The so called SM (scientific method) is applicable to the physical realm, and thus it is applicable to God’s activities concerning our existence.

(5) God in theism is personal. The domain of religious experience is not primarily one of a physical or metaphysical explanation of objects, but rather one of an encounter and relationship between subjects (persons, divine and human).
Consequently, approaching religious experience and traditions (in view of some adjudication) a priori, detached, and extrinsic like naturalists speaking in hushed voices observing the mating habits of adult lions from the safety of a Jeep is not methodologically consistent with the subject matter. An approach like that would be unreasonable.

Sorry, my friend, this looks like an attempt of special pleading.

If we are able to ask “favors” from God - supplicative prayer - and if it is assumed that God sometimes answers these prayers in a positive fashion, then both the supplication and the fulfillment of these requests both fully reside in the physical realm, and as such the “experiment” is subject to the scientific method. And this is where all the properly controlled, double blind experiments failed. Since there are no positive results, the usual “cop-out” is that God is aware that we wish to test him, and then God deliberately “cheats” and makes sure that the result of experiment is never positive. You see, nothing I as an atheist can say about God is as degrading and as disrespectful toward God as the usual cop-out, which describes God as a petty cheater.

 

[Peter_Plato]

Sorry, my friend, this looks like an attempt of special pleading.

If we are able to ask “favors” from God - supplicative prayer - and if it is assumed that God sometimes answers these prayers in a positive fashion, then both the supplication and the fulfillment of these requests both fully reside in the physical realm, and as such the “experiment” is subject to the scientific method. And this is where all the properly controlled, double blind experiments failed. Since there are no positive results, the usual “cop-out” is that God is aware that we wish to test him, and then God deliberately “cheats” and makes sure that the result of experiment is never positive. You see, nothing I as an atheist can say about God is as degrading and as disrespectful toward God as the usual cop-out, which describes God as a petty cheater.

The charge of special pleading is quite incorrect because it assumes that God is incapable of distinguishing between a prayer request and alternative options which could, in the long run, be more conducive to overall good. In a sense it “sets up” the conditions under which God must respond by aligning them to a limited conception of how God should respond. In other words, it assumes the supplicant knows best regarding how God ought to respond.

By analogy using the requests contained in supplicative prayer as the determiners for an “appropriate” response by God is akin to determining the existence of “medical competency” skills in a physician by how diagnoses made by that physician correspond to the expectations of each patient. That would be an error.

If I go to a physician with the belief that I am having a stroke, but the physician assures me that my symptoms are the result of a migraine headache and that is, ultimately, the correct diagnosis, then basing competency experiments upon whether or not a physician’s responses closely matched my expectation as a patient clearly shows the “experiment” to be ill-conceived. It assumes the patient knows best and judges the competency of the physician by the (in)competency of the patient. Yet that is precisely what supplicant prayer experiments do. They gauge God’s competency and, by implication, his existence, upon how closely his responses match supplicant expectations. This kind of experiment is simply ill-conceived.

To question whether the existence of God is properly determined by answers to supplicant prayer requests is not an example of special pleading, but rather a strong case for doubting the adequacy of supplicant prayer as a means of determining the existence of God.

If responses by God to supplicative prayer are to be used as evidence, then perhaps experiments of this kind should not attempt to match how closely “God responses” correlate to prayer requests, but rather should correlate the intensity, fervour and sincerity of individuals who engage in prayer to more general benefits such as happiness, peace of mind, and a range of other such determinable benefits, building into experiment the possibility that the response by God not merely matches the request but could, in fact, exceed it.

We would not determine the competency of a physician by whether the physician matches the prescriptive expectations of the patient because we do not assume the patient is in the best position to know what they, in fact, need. The physician might know better than the patient. Yet, supplicative prayer experiments do make the assumption that God does not.

 

[Innoruk]

The charge of special pleading is quite incorrect because it assumes that God is incapable of distinguishing between a prayer request and alternative options which could, in the long run, be more conducive to overall good. In a sense it “sets up” the conditions under which God must respond by aligning them to a limited conception of how God should respond.

The usual assumption of the believers is that God sometimes answers the supplicative prayers in a positive fashion. Since both the prayer and the “answer” happen in the physical reality, the experiment to test for God’s positive answer is subject to the scientific method. None of the properly executed, double blind experiments show that God “will answer” the supplicative prayers in a positive fashion. What you do is exactly the same as the other attempts to explain away the negative results.

This particular test is only one of all the possible ones. The point is that God IS subject to the scientific testing method, and every actual experiment fails to substantiate God’s existence. And the usual cop-out is that God is a cheater, who will deliberately “foul up” the outcome of the test.

 

[tonyrey]

Socrates pointed that anyone who thinks we should retreat from philosophy must also think soldiers should retreat when it seems likely they will be killed in battle. In other words, only cowards are afraid of the truth…

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Of course “philosophy” as an entire field of endeavor does not propose ”a” particular epistemology, but that is because philosophy as a formal approach does not side with any particular epistemological proposal but, as a formal endeavor, seeks the ultimate ground for considering any of them to be true. Philosophy is more basic even than epistemology which is why epistemology is within the wider field of philosophy and not the other way around.

Thomas Aquinas had a very definite theory of knowledge, much of it based on Aristotle. But unlike you I never bothered much with it because it is simply the natural way people think. Certainly not something to hang your entire life on. The most uneducated people I ever met had perfectly functioning intellects and could detect the most clever falsehoods, they just couldn’t put names to them.

And of course they didn’t have to study some grand course in Epistomology to tell them that God existed. Divine Revelation as interpreted and handed on by the Magisterium of the Catholic Church was sufficient for them. But this is not enough for modern man because the truth is, he doesn’t want God to exist. So he invents all kinds of clever, rationalizations, to make him feel good and superior to all those idiot believers. Such people will never believe anything, unless God hits them over the head with a hammer, they are lost - or will be.

Linus2nd

 

[Fr_of_Jazz]

To save bandwidth, let me simply agree with you, without quoting everything you said.

Glad to hear it!

But you do not say that God never interferes with the physical reality. You also do not say that we are unable to “affect” God - it is widely assumed that God sometimes answers prayers in a positive fashion. (Of course this is in dire contradiction with the idea that God is “immutable”, but we can let that pass for the moment.)

As such we are left with the interface problem (as I stated to Peter Plato in the post directly above yours). And since there is an alleged two-way interaction between God and this, physical reality, therefore it rational to “demand” the physical evidence for the interaction. The so called SM (scientific method) is applicable to the physical realm, and thus it is applicable to God’s activities concerning our existence.

IMO for the interface rebuttal to work several issues and/or problems must be discussed/resolved.

(6) Definitions are important.
If you’re doing scientific research for God as viewed by monotheists, then it is for a personal, free, infinitely intelligent and powerful God. For one to approach Him like an impersonal natural phenomena or force in order to look for a “God law” or “God effect” that can be quantified, predicted, and controlled is utterly inconsistent with the definition of God, the object under investigation.

(7) Theists think historically (given that we are part of a long historical tradition) and the facts I gave above in (3) about the SM are established.
So given (3) and (6), prima facie it seems highly unlikely that the SM will produce any scientific results isolating the action or reality of God. So before this proposal can be given serious consideration it is incumbent on the physicalist to show concretely and specifically what kind of scientific test he or she would perform and what kind of scientific results they might expect that would be significant for our question so as to lead them to make this unlikely proposal.

(a) It’s true that statistical methods of investigating say, prayer, seem like a promising avenue of research. A review of the literature shows results are mixed. The big problem is no one can agree on an experimental design and method for the research. Physicalist opponents cite design flaws—many times for sound reasons; and theistic proponents often can’t agree on methods either. Given these design disputes, I don’t see how a statistical blip would be seen as methodologically valid or suggestive of divine action to physicalists and even many theists.

(b) Further, how would even a documented miracle (in RC terminology) really count as any evidence of God to a physicalist? Say a person goes to Lourdes, France with late stage degenerative bone cancer. X-rays prove it. That individual comes out of the water and it is gone. X-rays prove this too. The facts are then documented by the International Medical Association of Lourdes run only by doctors, who critically evaluate purported cures and document inexplicable ones. There are actually many documented cures at Lourdes. All the SM can say is that it is inexplicable at present.

So again I stress: it is incumbent on the physicalist to show concretely and specifically what kind of scientific test he or she would perform and what kind of scientific results they might expect that would be significant for our question.

(8) It ignores the possibility that God’s interaction with physical reality may be apprehensible only by a cognitive act (by the intellect), and not by direct empirical observation.
What do I mean? Look at it this way. David Hume was right: raw sense (name removed by moderator)ut considered in itself does nothing more than make impressions on individual sense organs which are retained in memory. So for causality, such data gives us no more than the brute impression series that one event often follows another. It is the intellect that grasps the operation and nature of causality. Or, regarding the existence of something, the reception of raw sense impressions on sense organs of itself does not contain the judgment that a particular thing exists: it is an act of the intellect which judges that a thing or property exists. Ditto for truths like the Principle of Sufficient Reason which are grasped by the intellect.

Until (6)-(8) are dealt with adequately the objection stands that adopting usual physicalist methods to test for God a priori rules out an affirmative result even if He did exist. Such a procedure would never be used in any credible research.

Sorry, my friend, this looks like an attempt of special pleading.
. . .

I don’t see how it could be special pleading. I was reminding you in (5) above of the definition of the object of investigation (God) as understood by the theistic tradition for millennia, and stressing that one needs to adapt their method of investigation accordingly. That is a central methodological consideration in any credible research. Aristotle stressed this as I said.

These considerations would only be special pleading to one who has already adopted physicalism as a philosophy. Yet that directly or indirectly is exactly what is at issue given that you are urging a physicalist methodology, investigative mind-set, and conclusions re the question of God to theists.

Yet the theistic tradition pre-exists the physicalist school of thought. The very motto in your posts is in part a reaction to theism. You would need to show why a theist must abandon the conviction from time immemorial that there are immaterial features to reality outside the mind and traditional methods of verification in favor exclusive reliance on a method designed ex professo to study only physical objects and to do that w/o due regard for the personal and immaterial nature of God.

 

[Peter_Plato]

The usual assumption of the believers is that God sometimes answers the supplicative prayers in a positive fashion. Since both the prayer and the “answer” happen in the physical reality, the experiment to test for God’s positive answer is subject to the scientific method. None of the properly executed, double blind experiments show that God “will answer” the supplicative prayers in a positive fashion. What you do is exactly the same as the other attempts to explain away the negative results.

This particular test is only one of all the possible ones. The point is that God IS subject to the scientific testing method, and every actual experiment fails to substantiate God’s existence. And the usual cop-out is that God is a cheater, who will deliberately “foul up” the outcome of the test.

I don’t see how this answers my point at all.

The supplicant’s request is the criterion upon which the experiment is based. If that particular outcome does not obtain, the result is negative. However, much more positive results beyond the scope or time frame of the experiment do not enter into consideration or simply count as negative.

My argument still stands because even using patient expectations is not an adequate means to gauge the competency of a physician, yet the concept of “benefit” as it pertains to God has a much wider scope than mere physical health, so supplicant expectations are even less reliable for assessing God’s competency in acting for human good. Something like “eternal” well-being would be a more adequate criterion, but that cannot be valid within the scope of scientific experiments which can only be concerned with evidence from the natural world.

Special pleading would only apply if the claim of a believer were that God is only concerned with the temporal good of believers, which is assumed in these type of prayer experiments, but that is certainly not an legitimate theological position.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I don’t see how this answers my point at all.

The supplicant’s request is the criterion upon which the experiment is based. If that particular outcome does not obtain, the result is negative. However, much more positive results beyond the scope or time frame of the experiment do not enter into consideration or simply count as negative.

My argument still stands because even using patient expectations is not an adequate means to gauge the competency of a physician, yet the concept of “benefit” as it pertains to God has a much wider scope than mere physical health, so supplicant expectations are even less reliable for assessing God’s competency in acting for human good. Something like “eternal” well-being would be a more adequate criterion, but that cannot be valid within the scope of scientific experiments which can only be concerned with evidence from the natural world.

Special pleading would only apply if the claim of a believer were that God is only concerned with the temporal good of believers, which is assumed in these type of prayer experiments, but that is certainly not an legitimate theological position.

Peter, the following post was directed to another poster, not you. Disregard.
" Originally Posted by Peter Plato
Of course “philosophy” as an entire field of endeavor does not propose ”a” particular epistemology, but that is because philosophy as a formal approach does not side with any particular epistemological proposal but, as a formal endeavor, seeks the ultimate ground for considering any of them to be true. Philosophy is more basic even than epistemology which is why epistemology is within the wider field of philosophy and not the other way around.

Thomas Aquinas had a very definite theory of knowledge, much of it based on Aristotle. But unlike you I never bothered much with it because it is simply the natural way people think. Certainly not something to hang your entire life on. The most uneducated people I ever met had perfectly functioning intellects and could detect the most clever falsehoods, they just couldn’t put names to them.

And of course they didn’t have to study some grand course in Epistomology to tell them that God existed. Divine Revelation as interpreted and handed on by the Magisterium of the Catholic Church was sufficient for them. But this is not enough for modern man because the truth is, he doesn’t want God to exist. So he invents all kinds of clever, rationalizations, to make him feel good and superior to all those idiot believers. Such people will never believe anything, unless God hits them over the head with a hammer, they are lost - or will be. "

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Innocente? Have you been reincarnated or merely playing a joke?

Your wrong, it is Tyrion playing mind games again.

Linus2nd