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Peter_Plato
Guest
I had my suspicions and looked through past threads on free will to find more specific correlations but didn’t have enough time to corroborate my suspicions.
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polytropos
Guest
He uses Tyrion’s arguments, but just like he is not inocente, he is not Tyrion. He uses the same terms, more or less, in talking about epistemology. Tyrion recently was arguing about the efficacy of prayer. Elsewhere, Innoruk was attempting to make the claim that the ineffability of God’s nature entails that we don’t know what God’s qualities mean, which is another of Tyrion’s common arguments (although the objection makes little sense in the context of Thomism).
The problem with the mind is that historically, since modern science began its development, the mind has been where we’ve dumped all “subjective phenomena.” It requires a lot of argument (much of which, I think, fails) to claim that it is even in principle possible that intentionality and consciousness are reducible to a material explanation. There is no established materialistic philosophy of mind. There are so many, in fact, that you’d have to specify which you subscribe to if you are going to at all. Until you do that, the claim that existence is well defined in terms of physical objects simply does not hold.
You’ve claimed that propositions are mind dependent*, but I would disagree. The proposition George Washington crossed the Delaware would remain true even if everyone died tomorrow and there were no mind for the proposition to inhere in. Appealing to its linguistic or symbolic basis will not do either, since the proposition is the same if it is stated in, say, French or if it is rephrased. This is because the truth of a proposition has to do with relationships among its referents, not the way it is stated. Another, slightly more extreme illustrative case: All humans die. The earth has no rational creatures on it. Eventually other rational creatures come about, though, and manage to learn about human history, including the proposition George Washington crossed the Delaware. The proposition was true even while there was no one around to think of it; it did not cease to be true for a period and then become true again once someone was around to think about it.
*This compounds the problem of the lack of a viable materialistic philosophy of mind. Even if propositions are mind dependent, you would be saying that a proposition inheres in a strictly material object, which would undermine the possibility of a proposition carrying any meaning, since that meaning would have to succumb to a strictly material explanation as well.
A similar case ensues with abstract objects like numbers. 2 + 2 = 4 whether anyone thinks so. It was true before Arabic numerals were developed. It was true before humans ever existed. It would remain true if everyone died tomorrow. That is not to say that arithmetic, as an operation in an axiomatic system would still exist if the axioms were never established, but it does mean that the relationships denoted by the operation and the numbers represented by the symbols are real whether or not the system is defined.
The main issue I see is that existence is not currently limited spatially and temporally. Science only investigates spatial and temporal material objects; it does not follow that the only things that exist are spatial and temporal. The main three things that cause issue for this claim are the mind, propositions, and abstract objects like numbers.
The problem with the mind is that historically, since modern science began its development, the mind has been where we’ve dumped all “subjective phenomena.” It requires a lot of argument (much of which, I think, fails) to claim that it is even in principle possible that intentionality and consciousness are reducible to a material explanation. There is no established materialistic philosophy of mind. There are so many, in fact, that you’d have to specify which you subscribe to if you are going to at all. Until you do that, the claim that existence is well defined in terms of physical objects simply does not hold.
You’ve claimed that propositions are mind dependent*, but I would disagree. The proposition George Washington crossed the Delaware would remain true even if everyone died tomorrow and there were no mind for the proposition to inhere in. Appealing to its linguistic or symbolic basis will not do either, since the proposition is the same if it is stated in, say, French or if it is rephrased. This is because the truth of a proposition has to do with relationships among its referents, not the way it is stated. Another, slightly more extreme illustrative case: All humans die. The earth has no rational creatures on it. Eventually other rational creatures come about, though, and manage to learn about human history, including the proposition George Washington crossed the Delaware. The proposition was true even while there was no one around to think of it; it did not cease to be true for a period and then become true again once someone was around to think about it.
*This compounds the problem of the lack of a viable materialistic philosophy of mind. Even if propositions are mind dependent, you would be saying that a proposition inheres in a strictly material object, which would undermine the possibility of a proposition carrying any meaning, since that meaning would have to succumb to a strictly material explanation as well.
A similar case ensues with abstract objects like numbers. 2 + 2 = 4 whether anyone thinks so. It was true before Arabic numerals were developed. It was true before humans ever existed. It would remain true if everyone died tomorrow. That is not to say that arithmetic, as an operation in an axiomatic system would still exist if the axioms were never established, but it does mean that the relationships denoted by the operation and the numbers represented by the symbols are real whether or not the system is defined.
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Peter_Plato
Guest
I think to claim anything like a proposition being “true” in any sense must entail that its veracity is objective and not subjective. If the value of a proposition being true depends upon its relationship to a subjective thinker, then the proposition can only be true conditionally, which is not what is commonly understood to be the meaning of “true” as a verifiable quality.
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polytropos
Guest
There is more I’d like to add, regarding epistemology.
1). Change occurs in the world.
2). All change is a transformation from potency to act caused by something else in act.
(I have not presented the argument in full, but as you know, it is readily available, and my suggestion if you’d like to be acquainted with it is Aquinas by Feser.)
The conclusion is that there must be a being who is Pure Act. Being Pure Act entails being immaterial, because all material things are necessarily some combination of act and potency. But Pure Act must also be able to Act. These conclusions are all derived from premises that, given sensory experience, are undeniable.
So the issue is not that the Thomist has not properly defined what exists means. The Thomist knows that the external physical reality exists, but he also knows that the change he sees necessarily entails the existence of a being which is Pure Act. Such a being must 1). have causal efficacy, 2). exist, and 3). be immaterial (among so many other things - but thousands of pages have been written on that subject).
These are all conclusions, not assumptions. The Thomist is not starting by saying, “Immaterial things can exist.” The Thomist concludes that there must be an existent being which is Pure Act, and since it’s Pure Act, it must be immaterial. It is actually the materialist who starts by saying, “I will not allow anything that is not material to exist.” Such a premise actually leads to a contradiction, since Pure Act must exist and must not be material.
But that’s okay, because the materialist was not warranted in claiming such a premise in the first place, given that such a claim could never actually be proven. As such, since the premise 1). was not necessarily true and 2). leads to a contradiction in an argument that is valid without it, we can toss it out. To say that the argument doesn’t work because of the premise is question begging.
Thomistic epistemology, as well, begins with the senses. The argument from motion (change) concludes that God exists from two premises:
1). Change occurs in the world.
2). All change is a transformation from potency to act caused by something else in act.
(I have not presented the argument in full, but as you know, it is readily available, and my suggestion if you’d like to be acquainted with it is Aquinas by Feser.)
The conclusion is that there must be a being who is Pure Act. Being Pure Act entails being immaterial, because all material things are necessarily some combination of act and potency. But Pure Act must also be able to Act. These conclusions are all derived from premises that, given sensory experience, are undeniable.
So the issue is not that the Thomist has not properly defined what exists means. The Thomist knows that the external physical reality exists, but he also knows that the change he sees necessarily entails the existence of a being which is Pure Act. Such a being must 1). have causal efficacy, 2). exist, and 3). be immaterial (among so many other things - but thousands of pages have been written on that subject).
These are all conclusions, not assumptions. The Thomist is not starting by saying, “Immaterial things can exist.” The Thomist concludes that there must be an existent being which is Pure Act, and since it’s Pure Act, it must be immaterial. It is actually the materialist who starts by saying, “I will not allow anything that is not material to exist.” Such a premise actually leads to a contradiction, since Pure Act must exist and must not be material.
But that’s okay, because the materialist was not warranted in claiming such a premise in the first place, given that such a claim could never actually be proven. As such, since the premise 1). was not necessarily true and 2). leads to a contradiction in an argument that is valid without it, we can toss it out. To say that the argument doesn’t work because of the premise is question begging.
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polytropos
Guest
To be clear about the purpose of the above post, it is not to present the argument from motion, it is to dispute the two false claims that 1). Catholics lack an epistemology (their epistemology, like that of modern science, consists of observing the world around them and drawing conclusions using reason) and 2). Catholics must posit the existence of something immaterial (they are actually proving it). So the point here is not whether or not the argument from motion is right but whether it can be rationally held that Catholics lack an epistemology or have no basis for believing that God is immaterial. (The answer is no, it cannot be rationally held that Catholics lack an epistemology or have no basis for believing that God is immaterial.) These are, I think, relevant topics for this discussion. If you’d like to dispute the argument from motion (or any other Thomistic proof of God’s existence) in particular, you should make another thread in which you clearly reproduce the argument (quoting might help) and demonstrate where it goes wrong. I am sure you will find several willing defenders (including me). But this thread is unfocused enough.
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jonathan_hili
Guest
Umm Innoruk, I’d still like to know what your epistemology is. How to you justify, epistemologically, your interpretation of reality?
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Innoruk
Guest
That is fine. However, I wish to point out that - in principle - God is subject to the scientific verification, since at least part of his activity happens in the physical reality. To say that there is an aspect of physical reality, which is NOT subject to the scientific method - would lead to all sorts of real troubles.
Let me translate this into my language: “God is unreliable”. Even though God promised that he will interfere in a positive fashion if we ask something in the name of Jesus.
That is acceptable. The skeptics rely on the teaching of the church - namely that God grants SOME of the supplications. Not all of them, for sure, but at least some of them.
Not really. There are no properly executed, double blind experiments which would show even a very mild correlation.
The method is very properly established. We literally “bet” our life on this methods. It is used by all the pharmaceutical companies when they wish to test a new drug. The method is:
- establish a test group.
- establish a control group.
- make sure that no one in this groups is aware whether they are in the test group or in the control group.
- make sure that none of the people who interact with the groups have this information either.
- run the experiment for a predetermined time.
- perform a chi-square test at the 95% confidence level and see if there is a significant difference between the test group and the control group.
That is precisely an incorrectly performed experiment. The proper method is enumerated above.
Moreover, I happened to see (here on this board and the links provided) just how flimsy was the “evidence” to establish the “miracles” performed by JPII and Mother Theresa. If anyone would suggest to a group of skeptics that those “miracles” are sufficient to declare a person to be a saint… they would roll on the floor laughing. One or two people claimed that they prayed to JPII and/or Mother Theresa, and their malady went away?
Let’s select another claim. Many people argue that they had a premonition type of paranormal experience. They had a premonition about something, and it happened. It would be easy to get - say - 10 thousand people, where every one would attest to such a very strange incident.
On the surface it looks rather convincing. In reality it bogus. There are exactly 4 possible outcomes.
- A person has a premonition about something strange and it happens. They will remember this fact.
- A person has a premonition about something strange and nothing happens. They will NOT remember this fact.
- A person has NO premonition about something strange and it happens. They will NOT remember this fact.
- A person has NO premonition about something strange and nothing happens. They will NOT remember this fact.
This is simple.
See above.
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Innoruk
Guest
Not relevant. Even if we would be unable to decipher how exactly God interferes, a statistically significant correlation would be a very strong indication that “there is something very strange going on”. If some “saint-to-be” would predict that his lay-on-hands method would cure cancer patients, and he performed a 1000 successful performances, the skeptics’ jaw would hit the floor. After all, one cannot argue with facts.
That would only be the second step, AFTER some strong, irrefutable correlation would be shown.
The theists assert that God actually interferes with this world. The skeptic simply takes the theist’s assertion at face value, and asks (according to the old commercial): “Where is the beef?”.
Sorry, the theists try to have their cake and eat it, too. As soon as they attest that God interferes with the physical reality, the interface problem will bite their “behind”.
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Innoruk
Guest
Don’t you guys have anything better to do with your time?
By the way, I became curious and checked the forum rules. I found out that it would be permissible to have multiple avatars, as long as they do not engage in a “fight” to stir up the “mud”. Of course if this is what makes you happy, by all means keep speculating about my “alleged multiple personality disorder” .
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Innoruk
Guest
Pertaining to the physical reality I use the so-called scientific - inductive - method. Pertaining to the axiomatic aspect of reality, I use the deductive method. As for the “non-physical reality”, I keep ASKING about their objective, repeatable epistemological method, but I don’t get a reply.
I use the simplest possible method: “The poof of the pudding is that it is edible”.
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polytropos
Guest
You surely could not have missed post #144. You know, the one that begins with “There is more I’d like to add, regarding epistemology.”
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Peter_Plato
Guest
Leaving aside the question of what kind of “poof” we would expect from the pudding, why should the truth of any proposition be dependent upon its palatability to human beings?
This method would seem to be more about whether God is amenable or responsive to human expectations, the same method used by science to determine whether any contrived hypothesis about an external object is true. Does the external world and all aspects of it respond the way it is expected to according to the current limited conception of it? In other words, treating God as an object that responds appropriately to human intervention. If he reacts when poked or prodded then he exists, if not then he doesn’t. This leaves out the question of whether the methodology is at all appropriate to the “object” and whether subjects ought to be treated like objects.
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Innoruk
Guest
Yes, I missed it. Thank you for pointing it out. I will go back and give my opinion… probably sometime tomorrow.
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Linusthe2nd
Guest
Man’s Freedom ( CCC, #s 1730-1738
Article 3
MAN’S FREEDOM
1730 God created man a rational being, conferring on him the dignity of a person who can initiate and control his own actions. "God willed that man should be ‘left in the hand of his own counsel,’ so that he might of his own accord seek his Creator and freely attain his full and blessed perfection by cleaving to him."26
Man is rational and therefore like God; he is created with free will and is master over his acts.27
I. Freedom and Responsibility
1731 Freedom is the power, rooted in reason and will, to act or not to act, to do this or that, and so to perform deliberate actions on one’s own responsibility. By free will one shapes one’s own life. Human freedom is a force for growth and maturity in truth and goodness; it attains its perfection when directed toward God, our beatitude.
1732 As long as freedom has not bound itself definitively to its ultimate good which is God, there is the possibility of choosing between good and evil, and thus of growing in perfection or of failing and sinning. This freedom characterizes properly human acts. It is the basis of praise or blame, merit or reproach.
1733 The more one does what is good, the freer one becomes. There is no true freedom except in the service of what is good and just. the choice to disobey and do evil is an abuse of freedom and leads to "the slavery of sin."28
1734 Freedom makes man responsible for his acts to the extent that they are voluntary. Progress in virtue, knowledge of the good, and ascesis enhance the mastery of the will over its acts.
1735 Imputability and responsibility for an action can be diminished or even nullified by ignorance, inadvertence, duress, fear, habit, inordinate attachments, and other psychological or social factors.
1736 Every act directly willed is imputable to its author:
Thus the Lord asked Eve after the sin in the garden: "What is this that you have done?"29 He asked Cain the same question.30 The prophet Nathan questioned David in the same way after he committed adultery with the wife of Uriah and had him murdered.31
An action can be indirectly voluntary when it results from negligence regarding something one should have known or done: for example, an accident arising from ignorance of traffic laws.
1737 An effect can be tolerated without being willed by its agent; for instance, a mother’s exhaustion from tending her sick child. A bad effect is not imputable if it was not willed either as an end or as a means of an action, e.g., a death a person incurs in aiding someone in danger. For a bad effect to be imputable it must be foreseeable and the agent must have the possibility of avoiding it, as in the case of manslaughter caused by a drunken driver.
1738 Freedom is exercised in relationships between human beings. Every human person, created in the image of God, has the natural right to be recognized as a free and responsible being. All owe to each other this duty of respect. the right to the exercise of freedom, especially in moral and religious matters, is an inalienable requirement of the dignity of the human person. This right must be recognized and protected by civil authority within the limits of the common good and public order.32
On the contrary, It is written (Sirach 15:14): “God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel”; and the gloss adds: “That is of his free-will.”
I answer that, Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain. In order to make this evident, we must observe that some things act without judgment; as a stone moves downwards; and in like manner all things which lack knowledge. And some act from judgment, but not a free judgment; as brute animals. For the sheep, seeing the wolf, judges it a thing to be shunned, from a natural and not a free judgment, because it judges, not from reason, but from natural instinct. And the same thing is to be said of any judgment of brute animals. But man acts from judgment, because by his apprehensive power he judges that something should be avoided or sought. But because this judgment, in the case of some particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but from some act of comparison in the reason, therefore he acts from free judgment and retains the power of being inclined to various things. For reason in contingent matters may follow opposite courses, as we see in dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical arguments. Now particular operations are contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason may follow opposite courses, and is not determinate to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary that man have a free-will.
Linus2nd
Article 3
MAN’S FREEDOM
1730 God created man a rational being, conferring on him the dignity of a person who can initiate and control his own actions. "God willed that man should be ‘left in the hand of his own counsel,’ so that he might of his own accord seek his Creator and freely attain his full and blessed perfection by cleaving to him."26
Man is rational and therefore like God; he is created with free will and is master over his acts.27
I. Freedom and Responsibility
1731 Freedom is the power, rooted in reason and will, to act or not to act, to do this or that, and so to perform deliberate actions on one’s own responsibility. By free will one shapes one’s own life. Human freedom is a force for growth and maturity in truth and goodness; it attains its perfection when directed toward God, our beatitude.
1732 As long as freedom has not bound itself definitively to its ultimate good which is God, there is the possibility of choosing between good and evil, and thus of growing in perfection or of failing and sinning. This freedom characterizes properly human acts. It is the basis of praise or blame, merit or reproach.
1733 The more one does what is good, the freer one becomes. There is no true freedom except in the service of what is good and just. the choice to disobey and do evil is an abuse of freedom and leads to "the slavery of sin."28
1734 Freedom makes man responsible for his acts to the extent that they are voluntary. Progress in virtue, knowledge of the good, and ascesis enhance the mastery of the will over its acts.
1735 Imputability and responsibility for an action can be diminished or even nullified by ignorance, inadvertence, duress, fear, habit, inordinate attachments, and other psychological or social factors.
1736 Every act directly willed is imputable to its author:
Thus the Lord asked Eve after the sin in the garden: "What is this that you have done?"29 He asked Cain the same question.30 The prophet Nathan questioned David in the same way after he committed adultery with the wife of Uriah and had him murdered.31
An action can be indirectly voluntary when it results from negligence regarding something one should have known or done: for example, an accident arising from ignorance of traffic laws.
1737 An effect can be tolerated without being willed by its agent; for instance, a mother’s exhaustion from tending her sick child. A bad effect is not imputable if it was not willed either as an end or as a means of an action, e.g., a death a person incurs in aiding someone in danger. For a bad effect to be imputable it must be foreseeable and the agent must have the possibility of avoiding it, as in the case of manslaughter caused by a drunken driver.
1738 Freedom is exercised in relationships between human beings. Every human person, created in the image of God, has the natural right to be recognized as a free and responsible being. All owe to each other this duty of respect. the right to the exercise of freedom, especially in moral and religious matters, is an inalienable requirement of the dignity of the human person. This right must be recognized and protected by civil authority within the limits of the common good and public order.32
Code:
Thomas Aquinas on Free Will, S.T., Part 1, Ques 83, Art. 1I answer that, Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain. In order to make this evident, we must observe that some things act without judgment; as a stone moves downwards; and in like manner all things which lack knowledge. And some act from judgment, but not a free judgment; as brute animals. For the sheep, seeing the wolf, judges it a thing to be shunned, from a natural and not a free judgment, because it judges, not from reason, but from natural instinct. And the same thing is to be said of any judgment of brute animals. But man acts from judgment, because by his apprehensive power he judges that something should be avoided or sought. But because this judgment, in the case of some particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but from some act of comparison in the reason, therefore he acts from free judgment and retains the power of being inclined to various things. For reason in contingent matters may follow opposite courses, as we see in dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical arguments. Now particular operations are contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason may follow opposite courses, and is not determinate to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary that man have a free-will.
Linus2nd
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Fr_of_Jazz
Guest
My argument has been:
(a) Physicalists claim that theists are in error concerning the existence of God, or at least that to be reasonable theists should suspend belief until physicalists’ evidentiary demands are met.
(b) These evidentiary demands involve testing for the existence and action of God by the methods of the natural sciences.
(c) I object that given the development and purpose of the SM and the nature of God and His action this is rigging the test so that even if God existed and acted He would not be detectable. This is not more reasonable.
(d) Your rebuttal is as stated directly above.
(e) My response has been that it is not at all clear that God or His action is subject to scientific verification for the reasons I gave: (3) and (6)-(8). And until these issues are resolved your rebuttal does not stand and it is not more reasonable to adopt it.
So let’s see where we’ve gone with this.
Although I am arguing for theism in general, let’s take Christian convictions in a broad way since they have a lot in common. The Judeo-Christian God as immaterial, free, and wise promised to answer prayers (in physical reality among other things) on His terms in His time in the context of a personal relationship with Him. This is what is under investigation.
Given that this cannot be isolated, tested, predicted, and controlled like the forces of nature (or magic), God, I grant, looks “unreliable” to a physicalist. Then again this physicalist paradigm for God does not match the definition of God the question of which the physicalist is seeking to adjudicate in the first place. How is it reasonable to say you are testing for something but actually switch out the real object for something else? The results would be invalid.
The teaching is as above: God as immaterial, free, and wise promised to answer prayers on His terms…
Actually yes, there have been some discussed in this quick survey.
Results are mixed as I said. And debates continue. . . over design details, not the general design of a scientific experiment.
Theists do not object to the general design of a proper scientific experiment. If they do, they are wrong. The objection is that until physicalists show how this method (the SM) will detect the existence and action of God as defined and not as an physical object or law or force of nature, you have not tested in a way commensurate with the subject under investigation. And until this is done the physicalist rebuttal has no leg to stand on.
IMO you really haven’t addressed the point. I made no claim that it is an experiment. It is a phenomenon. And my point was that the SM per se can only say it is inexplicable at present. So even though there are many documented miraculous cures in a circumstance commonly held to bring them about, the SM can only say they cannot be explained. Thus even phenomena as striking as this don’t provide the SM per se with evidence of the action of God.
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Fr_of_Jazz
Guest
Clearly a massive statistical correlation would raise anyone’s eye brows. No argument there. However to stipulate this as a test for God as defined does not square with the subject under investigation. Again the physicalist mind-set and paradigm for God does not match the God the physicalist claims to be testing for. This is not even good scientific practice.
I’ve mentioned the problems with the search according to the SM for statistical correlations. My point was that in general search for evidence of God and His action cannot rely solely on strict empirical observation: there are truths grasped only be the intellect. But I agree, when one focuses their attention only on statistical correlations, in that case such analysis would come after.
Theists assert that the Judeo-Christian God acts in people’s lives in the manner He has taught. This is what needs to be tested for by a method suitable to the subject matter. Otherwise you have not proven anything. And that’s my beef.
Thanks for watching our back[side].Sorry, the theists try to have their cake and eat it, too. As soon as they attest that God interferes with the physical reality, the interface problem will bite their “behind”.
We theists only want our physicalist friends to be fair and methodologically sound. As soon as you say you are investigating the Judeo-Christian God in view of some judgment (or to enlighten us) you need to do so as we hold Him to be. Otherwise whatever else your findings may be, they will surely be invalid.I would instead think outside the box and propose a different method of testing. I would argue that an intrinsic method of testing as a participant observer would be a truly adequate way based upon the nature of the subject which leaves each individual free to test and make up their own mind.
I’ve worked out a rationale for this and given that you think things through calmly and in a friendly manner, I’d be interested in your observations. It seems relevant to this thread.
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tonyrey
Guest
Those who stake everything on empirical knowledge are obviously unaware that the truth is not detectable by the senses because it is the intangible correspondence between thought and reality. So they either have to deny truth exists - which destroys the criterion of all their conclusions - or admit knowledge is not restricted to science - which raises the question of what non-scientific knowledge consists of…
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Linusthe2nd
Guest
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Innoruk
Guest
A good grin is necessary before we go any further, even though I mean the following very seriously. Another translation is due here: “If some believer utters a prayer to a recently deceased person (JPII or Mather Theresa) - which seems to be answered, then it qualifies as a “miracle”, and thus evidence for God. However if a skeptic points out zillions of prayers; none of which was fulfilled, that does not qualify as evidence against God.”Or to be put more bluntly, in the “game” between the believer and the skeptic, if the result is “heads”, the believer wins, but if it is “tails”, the skeptic loses. Sorry, this game is rigged. Of course the price the believer pays for this “victory” is very steep: the offered definition of God includes the unmentioned trait, namely that God is a shameless cheater, impostor. I am sure the believers will deny this simple observation, but that is not surprising.
Yes, this is a very serious post, despite the smiley’s.
And, as we all know, the devil is in the details. The article you linked is jus a summary, without any details.
An “experiment” does not have to be declared to be a “formal experiment” to qualify as such. What you brought up is simply a bunch of anecdotal stories, without any control built into them. It is precisely as convincing as the testimony of those baffled people who had a dream about some strange incident and then that incident happened. Even if you would produce a million of such anecdotes, that would be totally meaningless.
Just like in the previous paragraph, the SM does not even wish to explain this “phenomenon” because there is nothing to explain. Anecdotal stories are dime a dozen. If you really wish to challenge present something to examine, perform the experiment as indicated in the previous post, with control groups, etc…
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Innoruk
Guest
The fallacy what Aquinas commits here is called the “black swan” fallacy. It is (again) an unsubstantiated generalization from the peculiar to the whole. Not to mention that the understanding of Aquinas pertaining to the nature of “motion” or “change” is hopelessly incorrect. Motion, change are inherent properties of the space-time-matter-energy - none of which can be either created nor destroyed. There is no need to assume anything “external”. Obviously, Aquinas should not be blamed for his ignorance - he could not have known any better. His followers, however…!
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